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Introduction 
The Nature and Origin of Self-Consciousness: 
Why Freud, Augustine, and Aquinas? 
 
The “problem” of self-consciousness begins with the riddle that those things that are most 
familiar to us are often the most difficult to explain. There is likely nothing with which 
we are as intimately familiar than we are with ourselves. Accordingly, it should come as 
no surprise that it has proven exceptionally difficult to explain how each of us first comes 
to be consciously aware of ourselves as ourselves in distinction from any of the different 
things that we inevitably perceive as other than ourselves. What enables anyone to per-
ceive that “I” am not “that”? Despite the seeming self-evidence of this distinction be-
tween an egological “self” and an objectified “object” that is at the heart of self-
consciousness, our ability to perceive this distinction lies at the root of many of our most 
cherished activities as human beings. By enabling an awareness of our embodied and fi-
nite individuality, self-consciousness unlocks our ability to understand, love, and choose 
objects precisely as objects whose otherness we desire. In short, being self-consciously 
familiar with ourselves forms the basis on which we can genuinely, and even intimately, 
become familiar with other things as well. 
 But what exactly is self-consciousness and how does it arise in the first place? The 
difficulties of answering these questions are initially evident when beginning from the 
givenness of one’s own self-consciousness and trying to move even one step beyond that 
givenness: “I am indeed aware of myself. How did I first become so?” A hard, amnesia-
like barrier to this self-reflection emerges almost immediately: “I don’t know. I wasn’t 
aware of myself at the time.” As we will detail shortly, the logical riddles that arise in 
even knowing where to start in trying to move past this barrier are notorious, despite the 
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frequency with which the topic has been taken up in Western philosophy and theology. 
As Dieter Henrich has written, “If any basic concept has played the leading role in the 
history of Western philosophy, it is that of self-consciousness.”1 Similarly, theologians 
from across the Christian tradition, ranging from Augustine to Schleiermacher, have 
pointed to this primal awareness of ourselves as one of the most pivotal aspects of human 
experience to consider in order to situate a theological anthropology within a broader 
construal of the Creator-creation relation.   
Put simply, the goal of this dissertation is to propose a novel way of reconceptual-
izing the nature and origins of self-consciousness via an unexpected hybrid of philosoph-
ical and theological sources: the philosophically marginalized metapsychology of Sig-
mund Freud and the theological anthropologies of Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. As 
will become clear in this Introduction, this project has its origins in a pair of conjectures 
that initially emerged out my reading of the Freudian and the Augustinian/Thomist intel-
lectual traditions. These conjectures suggested that these traditions could be resourced 
productively in order to address several of the most enduring riddles having to do with 
self-consciousness. In the chapters that follow, I have combined and deepened these con-
jectures in order to formulate a constructive proposal regarding the nature, origins, and 
theological significance of self-consciousness.  
On a first impression, these intellectual traditions and figures—Freud, Augustine, 
and Aquinas—are admittedly unexpected choices to focus upon in a study devoted to the 
theme of self-consciousness. It would be much more expected to draw upon the strains of 
                                                
1 Dieter Henrich, “Selbstbewußtsein: Kritische Einleitung in eine Theorie,” in Hermeneutik und Dialektik: 
Hans-Georg Gadamer zum 70. Geburtstag, Aufsätze I, ed. Rüdiger Bubner, Konrad Cramer, and Reiner 
Wiehl (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1970), 257 (ET: “Self-Consciousness, A Critical Introduc-
tion to a Theory,” Man and World 4, no. 1 (1971): 3). 
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thought that have primarily shaped the modern discourse on self-consciousness such as 
those found in German Idealism (e.g. Kant and Hegel), Romanticism (e.g. Fichte, Hölder-
lin, Novalis, and Schleiermacher), or their more recent successors (e.g. Dieter Heinrich, 
Manfred Frank, Ned Block, or Sydney Shoemaker) and/or critics (e.g. William James, 
Heidegger, Sartre, or Wittgenstein). Accordingly, it is the burden of this Introduction to 
offer a prima facie case for why the conjunction of Freud, Augustine, and Aquinas might 
yield promising conceptual solutions that are not immediately obvious from within these 
expected frameworks for considering self-consciousness. 
 My route for presenting this case will unfold in five sections that follow. First, I 
offer a few important definitions that will specify more exactly what I mean by the “prob-
lem” of explaining the nature and origins of self-consciousness. Second, based upon ex-
amples taken from the genealogy above, I will outline four of the most common ap-
proaches to theorizing self-consciousness: the presuppositional, exceptional, unconscious, 
and theological approaches. Third, with this genealogical backdrop in mind, I will de-
scribe how this specific proposal came into focus in the form before you now. A crucial 
part of this section will include making explicit several open and contested questions that 
arise from the common approaches to self-consciousness. These questions will then func-
tion as a frame for outlining the joint promise of combining the original insights of 
Freud’s metapsychology with the Augustinian/Thomist theological synthesis for address-
ing them satisfactorily from within a rigorously systematic metaphysical and theological 
anthropology. Fourth, I will furnish a general statement of methodology and a corre-
sponding chapter outline through which I intend to tie together Freud, Augustine, and 
Aquinas in order to develop my constructive proposal. Lastly, I will close with a couple 
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of more minor methodological and terminological notes that will be important to state 
clearly before proceeding.   
I. Definitions and the Riddle of Self-Consciousness as a Primal Self-Relation 
 
Despite some intrinsic weaknesses to the genealogy above that together open the door for 
our alternative inquiry, the cumulative interactions between various figures within it have 
gradually produced some sound definitions and distinctions that it will serve us well to 
make explicit at the outset.  
The most wide-ranging definition serves as a basis upon which to explain how 
self-consciousness is a variety, as the name suggests, of the more generic experience of 
consciousness. According to the terminology I will employ throughout this study, the 
most basic kind of consciousness is something that we will call phenomenal conscious-
ness.2 It involves at least three baseline processes: (1) sensory experiences that make us 
aware of external objects (via seeing, hearing, smelling, touching or being touched by, 
and tasting); (2) the internal recurrence of these sensory experiences through memory and 
the imagination, and (3) immanent sensations corresponding to desirous urges (e.g. hun-
ger and thirst), the pleasure of their satisfaction, and the pain of their deprivation. Most of 
the time, phenomenal consciousness coincides with waking consciousness (i.e. the state 
of not being asleep). However, in a point that will prove important when we turn to 
Freud, dream consciousness counts as a subspecies of phenomenal consciousness as well. 
In this state of phenomenal consciousness, the imagination immanently renders streams 
of images despite the slumbering of waking consciousness.3  
                                                
2 This term comes form Ned Block. Cf. Ned Block, “On a Confusion about a Function of Consciousness,” 
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (1995): 227-87. 
3 On the need to attend to dream consciousness in this regard, cf. Henrich, “Selbstbewußtsein,” 260, 71-77 
(“Self-Consciousness,” 5-6, 16-21). 
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 The most important difference between phenomenal consciousness and self-
consciousness is that it is possible to theorize the former without the contemporaneous 
effects of the latter. On its own, phenomenal consciousness simply produces a bare 
flux—a Kantian “manifold”—of sensations in which neither the synthetic unities of 
“self” or “object” are necessarily perceived. At a minimum, what self-consciousness adds 
to this flux is an awareness that there is an intensive unity or whole—a “self”—that en-
dures across the occurrence of these otherwise disparate sensations. As I use the term, an 
intensive unity is distinguished from what we will call an extroverted unity because it is 
constitutive of an individual organism alone.4 Extroverted unities, on the other hand, in-
volve a union between an individual and another external object. 
Accordingly, self-consciousness can be defined as a differentiated awareness of 
ourselves as an intensive, bodily, and diachronic unity that endures alongside the imme-
diate flux of phenomenal consciousness. This self-conscious unity manifests itself in a 
kind of quality5 that is added to certain first-order processes such that these processes 
themselves are differentiated from the one who does them or experiences them. As Fichte 
writes:  
I cannot take a step, move hand or foot, without an […] intuition of my self-
consciousness in these acts; only so do I know that I do it, only so do I distinguish 
my action, and myself therein, from the object of action before me. Whoever as-
cribes an activity to himself, appeals to this intuition.6 
 
                                                
4 My adoption and employment of the term “intensive” can ultimately be traced to how it is used in 
Elizabeth Brient, The Immanence of the Infinite: Hans Blumenberg and the Threshold to Modernity 
(Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2002). See pp. 450-52 below for more on how 
Brient employs the term and on the potential convergence between this project and her line of inquiry.  
5 My description of this as a “quality” comes from Freud and Bernard Lonergan. Cf. Freud, The Ego and 
the Id, SA 3:2/SE 19:13 and Bernard J. F. Lonergan, Insight: A Study of Human Understanding, ed. 
Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran, vol. 3, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1992), 3:344-46. 
6 Johann Gottlieb Fichte, “Zweite Einleitung in die Wissenschaftslehre,” in Fichtes Sammtliche Werke, ed. 
I.H. Fichte (Berlin: W. deGruyter, 1970), I:463 (ET: SK, 38). Emphasis in original. 
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Schleiermacher speaks of this same qualitative addition to other processes in terms of 
how self-consciousness “appears as an accompaniment of the state itself [als den Zustand 
selbst begleitend].”7 This qualitative accompaniment does not accrue to all aspects of 
human life (e.g. growing hair or digesting food), which remain at every point “uncon-
scious” to both phenomenal and self-consciousness. Nonetheless, the multitudinous in-
stances in which this accompaniment does occur represent some of our most reliable 
glimpses into the nature of self-consciousness. 
In addition to this accompaniment, perhaps the most important effect of self-
consciousness is that its grounds the subject-object distinction. By intensively founding 
the “subject” side of that relation, self-consciousness opens up a differentiated “distance” 
through which other phenomena—i.e. those that are ipso facto “not-self”—can be “ac-
cessed”8 as differentiated objects. This differentiated “access” stands at the center of our 
ability to “subject” these objects to any number of mental (e.g. understanding, willing, 
comparing, resisting or pursuing desires) or extra-mental activities (e.g. grasping, using, 
eating). Through the emergence of self-consciousness, what was once only a bare flux of 
sensitive data becomes the accessible field through which the individual can purposefully 
synthesize and enact the higher-level dramas of human subjectivity.  
 The crux of the compound riddle that self-consciousness presents arrives in trying 
to specify the exact relation between phenomenal consciousness and self-consciousness. 
There are two closely intertwined aspects of this riddle. First, there is a question of defini-
tion: what exactly are the terms of the relation—the relata—that self-consciousness ena-
bles? One of these relata is clear: the relevant data of phenomenal consciousness. But is 
                                                
7 Schleiermacher, CG, 13.1: §3.2, p. 23 (CF, 6).  
8 This is Ned Block’s apt term. Cf. Block, “On a Confusion about a Function of Consciousness,” 229-36. 
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self-consciousness itself the other relata?9 If so, then this seems to suggest that self-
consciousness is a unified “entity” or “process” unto itself before it “adds” the accompa-
nying quality of experience to another process. If one endorses this option, then one must 
give some account regarding what constitutes self-consciousness “on its own.” Various 
answers, as we will see in a moment, have been offered in response to this question. For 
example, self-consciousness could be a kind of primal self-knowledge, self-feeling, or 
self-acquaintance. Another possibility is to deny that self-consciousness is one of the re-
lata at all. Rather, it could be theorized as something that is “produced” through the com-
bination of two other relata. As will become clear, it will be a version of this second pos-
sibility that I will ultimately set forth and defend. One of the key elements of this pro-
posal will depend on an extension of the jointly Aristotelian and Thomist insistence that 
“primal” self-knowledge is impossible. By extending the metaphysical principles under-
lying this insistence, I will argue that self-consciousness is an effect produced through a 
                                                
9 Some (e.g. Brentano, Schmalenbach, and Sartre) have tried to explain this problem away by arguing that 
self-consciousness emerges simply as the incidental combination of various stimuli (e.g. seeing, hearing, 
thinking) at a giving moment. This argument fails on two accounts. First, as Chalmers has persuasively 
shown recently (and in a manner that repeats conceptual territory already covered by thinkers such as Fich-
te and Schleiermacher), the stimuli and the experience of the stimuli simply cannot be reduced to one an-
other. Second, as Manfred Frank and Dieter Henrich argue at length, this theorization fails to explain the 
diachronic unity of the self that persists through different combination of stimuli at different times. Cf. 
David J. Chalmers, “Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 2, no. 
3 (1995): 200-04; Henrich, “Selbstbewußtsein,” 261-63 (“Self-Consciousness,” 6-9); “Über die Einheit der 
Subjektivität,” Philosophische Rundschau 3 (1955): 28-69 (ET: “On the Unity of Subjectivity,” in The Uni-
ty of Reason: Essays on Kant’s Philosophy, ed. Richard L. Welkley (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1994), 17-54); Identität und Objektivität: Eine Untersuchung über Kants transzendentale Deduktion 
(Heidelberg: Carl Winter Universitätsverlag, 1976) (ET: The Unity of Reason, 123-208); Manfred Frank, 
“Fragmente zu einer Geschichte der Selbstbewußtseins-Theorien von Kant bis Sartre,” in 
Selbstbewußtseins-Theorien von Fichte bis Sartre (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1991), 413-599 (Partial ET: 
“Fragments of a History of the Theory of Self-Consciousness from Kant to Kierkegaard,” Critical Horizons 
5, no. 1 (2004): 53-136); and “Subjektivität und Individualität: Überblick über eine Problemlage,” in 
Selbstbewusstsein und Selbsterkenntnis: Essays zur analytischen Philosophie der Subjektivität (Stuttgart: P. 
Reclam, 1991), 9-49 (ET: “Subjectivity and Individuality: Survey of a Problem,” in Figuring the Self: 
Subject, Absolute, and Others in Classical German Philosophy, ed. David E. Klemm and Günter Zöller 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), 3-30). 
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relation between phenomenal consciousness and an immanent capacity—primary identi-
fication—that Freud seminally discovers and describes.  
 The second aspect of the riddle of self-consciousness can be expressed as a ques-
tion of origin or causation. Most of the time we answer questions of origin by reducing 
phenomena to objects to be investigated in order to determine the functional effects of 
their causes. This method ties together the search for all scientific knowledge. For exam-
ple, to borrow an example from David Chalmers, the inquiry into the origin of observable 
traits passed from generation to generation gradually focused on the function of genes. 
How do genes pass these traits on to the next generation of offspring? Well, it turns out 
that “DNA performs this function.”10 However, there are two reasons that this approach 
will not work for explaining the origins of self-consciousness. First, self-consciousness is 
not a generic object open to examination in the way that genes are. I cannot examine your 
self-consciousness and you cannot examine mine. This non-observable and non-
transferable quality of self-consciousness has led to the so-called “zombie hypothesis”—
the idea that everyone else could theoretically be a zombie devoid of self-consciousness 
and simply “programed” to interact with me in recognizable ways—that has proven ex-
ceptionally difficult to logically disprove because the self-consciousness of others (if they 
have any!) cannot in fact be scientifically “inspected.”11  
Second, even though we can reflectively examine our own self-consciousness as a 
kind of immanent “object,” we cannot explain its origins through such inspection for the 
simple reason that we must presuppose its existence in order to engage in the act of re-
flection. Failing to see this has led to the repeated fallacy of what Dieter Henrich has 
                                                
10 Chalmers, “Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness,” 203. 
11 Cf. Block, “On a Confusion about a Function of Consciousness,” 229-36. 
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helpfully coined as the “reflection-theory” of self-consciousness. As he writes in a semi-
nal essay: 
[R]eflection can only mean that an item of knowledge which is already at hand is 
properly apprehended and thereby made explicit! However, the reflection-theory 
of the self wants to explain the origin, not the clarity, of self-consciousness. Be-
cause this is what it claims to do, it is circular.12 
 
Despite this intrinsic circularity, the temptation to try to ground self-consciousness 
through reflection is so strong that, as Henrich further remarks, the preponderance of the 
reflection theory is likely not an historical accident rooted in the particular methodologies 
of figures like Descartes or Kant. Underlining this point even at this juncture will prove 
essential because we will appeal to the pull of the reflection theory across intellectual eras 
as a chief way of tying together Augustine, Aquinas, and Freud. Instead of being an his-
torical accident, the attraction of the reflection theory, as Henrich declares,  “probably has 
its grounds in the structure of consciousness itself.”13 What Henrich means by this is that 
the phenomenon of self-consciousness is so closely related to the kind of intellectual 
knowledge that necessarily entails the subject/object relation, that attempts to explain the 
origins of self-consciousness almost inevitably slip into modes of query and discourse 
that presuppose the self-knowing, objectifying subject as part of its own logic. Guarding 
against this slippage will be of chief importance in all that follows in this project. For 
self-reflection can only confirm the existence and character of self-consciousness; it can-
not on its own explain the conditions of its existence in the first place. Instead, as the 
Romantic philosopher Novalis once wrote: “What reflection finds, seems to be there al-
                                                
12 Dieter Henrich, “Fichtes ursprüngliche Einsicht,” in Subjektivität und Metaphysik, ed. Dieter Henrich 
(Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1966), 193-94 (ET: “Fichte’s Original Insight,” trans. David R. Lachter-
man, in Contemporary German Philosophy, ed. Darrel E. Christensen (University Park, PA: The Pennsyl-
vania State University Press, 1982), 15). 
13 “Selbstbewußtsein,” 274 (“Self-Consciousness,” 19). 
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ready.”14 If it were not, there would neither be anything to find nor a subject capable of 
reflectively inquiring. 
II. From Kant to Schleiermacher: Four Approaches 
 
As we turn to consider four common approaches to theorizing self-consciousness, much 
of the varying conceptual terrain between these approaches come into view on the basis 
of differing answers to the questions of definition and origin just outlined. I am summa-
rizing these four as the presuppositional, exceptional, unconscious, and theological ap-
proaches to self-consciousness. By identifying only these four, I am acknowledging the 
futility of attempting to give anything approaching a thorough overview of all the rele-
vant historical figures to the theme at hand. However, the primary figures I have chosen 
to illustrate these approaches—Kant, Fichte, Hölderlin/Novalis, and Schleiermacher—all 
have a recognizably prominent place in terms of their influence upon the contemporary 
philosophical discourse on self-consciousness.15  
In addition to their overall importance, these figures also have a relatively close 
historical connection to one another, as they are all clustered around the heights of Ger-
                                                
14 Novalis, Fichte-Studien, ed. Richard Samuel, Novalis: Schriften (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1960), 
II:112, no. 14. (FS, 12). 
15 The key roles that they play in Henrich’s and Frank’s indispensable genealogical work on the topic are 
enough to substantiate this point. On Kant: cf. Dieter Henrich, Between Kant and Hegel: Lectures on 
German Idealism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), 15-63; “Über die Einheit der 
Subjektivität,” 28-69; Identität und Objektivität: Eine Untersuchung über Kants transzendentale Deduk-
tion; Frank, “Fragmente,” 415-49 (“Fragments,” 54-78); and Auswege aus dem Deutschen Idealismus 
(Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2007), 160-93. On Fichte: cf. Henrich, “Fichtes ursprüngliche Einsicht,” 188-232; 
Between Kant and Hegel, 157-277; Frank, “Fragmente,” 449-55 (“Fragments,” 78-84); Unendliche 
Annäherung: Die Anfänge der philosophischen Frühromantik (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1997), 152-98, 690-
753 (Partial ET: The Philosophical Foundations of Early German Romanticism, trans. Elizabeth Millan-
Zaibert (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004), 23-76); Präreflexives Selbstbewusstsein: Vier 
Vorlesungen (Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam, 2015), 7-52. On Hölderlin and Novalis: cf. Dieter Henrich, Der 
Gang des Andenkens: Beobachtungen und Gedanken zu Hölderlins Gedicht (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1986) 
(ET: The Course of Remembrance and Other Essays on Hölderlin, ed. Eckart Förster (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1997)); Between Kant and Hegel, 279-97; Manfred Frank, Selbstgefühl: Eine Historisch-
systematische Erkundung (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2002), 8-51, 234-59;  “Fragmente,” 456-76 (“Fragments,” 
84-100); and Unendliche Annäherung, 648-60, 715-882 (ET: The Philosophical Foundations of Early 
German Romanticism, 39-190). On Schleiermacher: cf. “Fragmente,” 482-92 (“Fragments,” 110-116); 
Selbstgefühl, 190-98; and Auswege aus dem Deutschen Idealismus, 236-70. 
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man Idealism and early Romanticism (~1775-1850) that were at least partially spawned 
by Kant and the profusion of critics and/or supporters that rose up in his wake. Further-
more, the last four figures have a particularly close historical association, with Hölderlin 
and Novalis attending Fichte’s lectures in Jena and Novalis and Schleiermacher enjoying 
some degree of mutual influence.16 These direct connections between them will enable us 
to narrate these approaches less as atomistic alternatives and more as options that have an 
organic and even narrative relation to one another. 
 Finally, it might well be asked: why these figures and not more contemporary 
thinkers? I have chosen to focus on the sequence between Kant and Schleiermacher in 
large part because in the twentieth-century the discourse on self-consciousness has tended 
to fragment under the weight of philosophers who tried to dismiss the nub of the riddle 
described above by attempting to negate self-consciousness as a meaningful concept for 
describing an immanent state of awareness. For example, there were attempts to reduce 
self-consciousness to an occurrent relation between external events (e.g. James and Rus-
sell),17 the given, external conditions of Dasein or the supposed concreteness of “Ex-
istenz” (e.g. Heidegger),18 or the differential play of signifiers (e.g. Lacan and Derrida).19 
Given the fact that Henrich and Frank have produced exhaustive responses for why these 
                                                
16 Cf. Unendliche Annäherung, 715-68, 88-920 (ET: The Philosophical Foundations of Early German Ro-
manticism, 39-126, 151-190). 
17 E.g. Williams James, “Does ‘Consciousness’ Exist?,” The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and 
Scientific Methods 1 (1904): 477-91 and Bertrand Russell, The Analysis of Mind (London: G. Allen & 
Unwin, 1921). 
18 Cf. Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, Gesamtausgabe (Frankfurt: 
Vittorio Klostermann, 1977), 2:§1-38 (ET: Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Albany: State Univer-
sity of New York Press, 2010) and Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie (1927), ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm 
von Herrmann, Gesamtausgabe (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1975), 24:§15 (ET: The Basic Problems 
of Phenomenology, trans. Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982).  
19 E.g. Jacques Lacan, Le Séminaire, Livre II: Le moi dans la théorie de Freud et dans la technique de la 
psychanalyse, 1954-1955 (Paris: Seuil, 1978) (ET: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book II: The Ego in 
Freud’s Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis, 1954-1955, trans. Sylvana Tomaselli (New York: 
Norton, 1991)) and Jacques Derrida, La dissémination (Paris: Seuil, 1972) (ET: Dissemination, trans. Bar-
bara Johnson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983). 
  
  12 
reductive gestures only bracket the real question of self-consciousness—viz. the intensive 
and differentiated awareness that grounds our “experience” of events, Dasein, or the play 
of signs in the first place—instead of genuinely addressing the matter directly,20 my strat-
egy here is to simply heed their direction that the most enduringly relevant expressions of 
the hard knot that is self-consciousness were formulated a while back in Königsberg, Je-
na, and Berlin. 
a. The Presuppositional Approach: Kant  
The hallmark of the presuppositional approach is the supposedly necessary affirmation of 
self-consciousness as the unexplainable prerequisite for a subject’s intellectual 
knowledge. In this regard, this approach’s basic shape was established by Descartes’ 
search for an irrefutable foundation for the knowing subject. As he famously wrote in his 
Principles of Philosophy (1644):  
[W]e can easily indeed suppose that there is no God, no sky, no material bodies; 
and even that we ourselves have no hands, or feet, in short, no body; yet we do 
not on that account suppose that we, who are thinking such things, are nothing: 
for it is contradictory for us to believe that that which thinks, at the very time 
when it is thinking, does not exist. And, accordingly, this knowledge [haec cogni-
tio], I think, therefore I am [ego cogito, ergo sum], is the first and most certain to 
be acquired by and present itself to anyone who is philosophizing in correct or-
der.21 
 
If everything else can be doubted, the only foundation that suggests itself is our 
knowledge of ourselves as subjects who carry out certain activities. Accordingly, so the 
                                                
20 The definitive source of responses that touch upon all of these figures, and which Frank articulates by 
extending several of Henrich’s central insights is, Manfred Frank, Was ist Neostrukturalismus? (Frankfurt: 
Suhrkamp, 1983) (ET: What is Neostructuralism?, trans. Sabine Wilke and Richard Gray (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1989). Of more focused importance is Henrich’s response to Heidegger’s 
reading of Kant in, Henrich, “Über die Einheit der Subjektivität,” 28-69 and Frank’s response to Lacan in, 
Manfred Frank, “Das ‘wahre Subjekt’ und sein Doppel. Jaques Lacans Hermeneutik,” Sondernummer des 
Wunderblock. Zeitschrift für Psychoanalyse (1978): 12-37 (ET: “The ‘True Subject’ and its Double: 
Jacques Lacan’s Hermeneutics,” in The Subject and the Text. Essays on Literary Theory and Philosophy, 
ed. Andrew Bowie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 97-122). 
21 René Descartes, Principia philosophiae I, §7. (ET: Principles of Philosophy, trans. Valentine Rodger 
Miller and Reese P. Miller (Boston: Reidel, 1983)). 
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logic goes, I must presuppose myself as the one doing the very thing I am doing—in this 
case thinking. The resonance of Descartes’ approach with the notion of the reflection the-
ory is a rather obvious judgment to make and indeed Henrich and Frank have made it re-
peatedly.22 The reflective “gaze” that Descartes describes above purportedly secures the 
very thing that is likewise necessary for the reflective act itself: the self-aware and know-
ing ‘I’. As Frank concludes, Descartes “was so preoccupied with the foundational func-
tion which he attributed to the ‘I’ in his philosophy that he never really paid attention to 
the structure of this principle itself.”23 
 For his part, Kant’s version of this presuppositionalist approach is a good bit more 
nuanced and cognizant of its own limits. Part of its nuance is due to his attentiveness to 
the British empiricists—especially Locke and Hume—and the particular shape of their 
arguments regarding the cognitive limits of sensory (or sensitive) experience. Kant ac-
cepted their general observations that sensitive experience, or intuition (Anschauung) as 
Kant calls it, cannot furnish the principles needed for intellectual, synthetic cognition of 
phenomenal objects encountered within that experience. However, he criticized Locke 
and Hume for not considering the possibility that there is an a priori ground for synthetic 
judgments of sensory data within self-consciousness itself that can be deductively af-
firmed on the basis of all true propositions.24 On the basis of arguing for the deductive 
rationality of this affirmation, Kant equates self-consciousness with what he calls, in a 
phrase taken from Leibniz, the transcendental “synthetic unity of apperception,” which is 
                                                
22 E.g. Henrich, “Fichtes ursprüngliche Einsicht,” 188-232 (“Fichte’s Original Insight,” 15-53) and Frank, 
“Subjektivität und Individualität,” 9-49 (“Subjectivity and Individuality,” 3-30). 
23 “Fragmente,” 415 (“Fragments,” 55). 
24 Kant, KrV, A94-95/B127-129. 
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the “supreme principle of all use of the understanding.”25 This synthetic unity of apper-
ception then combines with the equally a priori categories (e.g. unity, possibility, reality, 
existence, necessity) in order to produce epistemic judgment.26  
 Despite this additional layer of analysis in Kant, his view that this unity of apper-
ception exists a priori as the condition for all understanding entails that we must simply 
“presuppose”27 self-consciousness. It (and the categories) can be indirectly deduced—a 
posteriori—through the experience of epistemic judgment, but in itself it simply must be 
presupposed. As he writes in the Critique of Pure Reason (1781/1787), “Self-
consciousness in general is the […] condition of all unity, and yet is itself unconditioned 
[…] I cannot cognize as an object itself that which I must presuppose in order to cognize 
an object at all.”28 In passages such as this one, Kant shows a general awareness of the 
lacuna inherent to the reflection theory. Nonetheless, in his own theories he could only 
reinforce the presuppositionary logic intrinsic to Descartes’ emphasis on self-reflection. 
Indeed, as Frank concludes, Kant was so convinced of the self-evidence of this inner limit 
to synthetic knowledge that it was a “surprise” to him that examining the exact constitu-
tion and origin of the self-conscious ‘I’ “was to become a chief preoccupation of his pu-
pils and successors.”29 
b. The Exceptional Approach: Fichte 
Following Kant’s influential wake, the first thinker who made explicit the explanatory 
lacuna in Kant’s theory of self-consciousness was Johann Gottlieb Fichte. Fichte’s semi-
nal contributions can be described by summarizing two related insights that first thema-
                                                
25 Ibid., B136-139. 
26 Cf. Ibid., A70/B95-A93/B109. 
27 Ibid., A366 and A402. 
28 Ibid., A401-402. 
29 Frank, “Fragmente,” 415-16 (“Fragments,” 55).  
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tized what I described above as the questions of definition and origin regarding self-
consciousness. First, whereas Kant was content to presuppose self-consciousness as the 
always already synthesized ground of the subject-object relation and therefore of cogni-
tive understanding as well, Fichte endlessly interrogated this presupposition as something 
that must be adequately explained if a theory of self-consciousness is to be logically satis-
fying at all.  
The initial step of this critical interrogation begins, however, with a deepening of 
what can easily be recognized as a variation of one of Kant’s chief insights: that in order 
to ground the subject-object division, self-consciousness must itself be theorized as an 
unqualified and spontaneous unity that eludes reduction to the division that it illuminates. 
As he states in Versuch einer neuen Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre (1797/1798) in 
what he calls an “incontrovertible” (unwidersprechlich) proposition regarding self-
consciousness: 
Every object comes to consciousness only under the condition that I am also con-
scious of myself as a conscious subject […] There is a consciousness in which the 
subjective and the objective cannot be separated, but rather are absolutely one and 
the same [absolut Eins und ebendasselbe]. Thus it is this kind of consciousness 
that would be needed to explain consciousness at all.30 
 
In his most well-known treatise, The Science of Knowledge, Fichte repeats this principle 
of differentiation through which self-consciousness grounds consciousness of objects 
(viz. object consciousness) in a formulation was not only seminal itself, but which will 
prove be decisive for our own proposal as well: he attributes self-consciousness as arising 
from a primal, unconditioned, but nonetheless contingent and embodied, act through 
which the self posits (setzt) itself and thereby the not-self as well. As he writes, “The self 
                                                
30 Johann Gottlieb Fichte, “Versuch einer neuen Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre,” in Fichtes 
Sammtliche Werke, ed. I.H. Fichte (Berlin: W. deGruyter, 1971), I:526-27.  
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and the not-self are both products of original acts of the self [Das Ich sowohl, als das 
Nicht-Ich sind beides Producte ursprünglicher Handlungen des Ich], and consciousness 
itself is similarly a product of the self’s first original act, its own positing of itself.”31 In 
short, the intensive unity of the self-conscious subject emerges, or “posits” itself, in the 
same “original act,” that posits the finite “not-self” as an “object” that can thereby be 
known “qua object.” On its own however, the act that posits self-consciousness eludes 
this division; it consists in an qualified, pre-reflective, “immediate unity of being.”32 
Most crucially to note here is how Fichte’s classification of self-consciousness as 
arising from a kind of contingent “act,” a concept Fichte may have modeled after Aristo-
tle’s ancient notion of “act” (energeia) to which we will return,33 decisively separates his 
theorization from any philosopher that preceded him. As the eminent Allen Wood writes,  
[It was] Fichte, of all modern philosophers, who first offered a conception of the 
mind or subject that is decisively different from Descartes. Fichte was the first to 
understand the subject as necessarily embodied and also necessarily intersubjec-
tive—standing in an interdependent communicative relation to other subjects. 
Fichte’s conception of subjectivity is, in these ways, fundamentally anti-
Cartesian, anti-Lockean, even anti-Humean. Fichte would not permit the inference 
from cogito to sum res cogitans, and even denies the latter proposition in the 
sense that Descartes meant it. The Fichtean I is not a thing at all, it is only an 
act—the act, Fichte thinks, which lies at the ground of all consciousness whatev-
er, and necessarily precedes any “giving” of ideas, perceptions, representations, 
things, or objects, or any facts about these, however immediate and self-evident 
they are supposed to be.34 
 
Despite the additional requisite concepts that we will end up gathering from Augustine, 
Aquinas, and Freud, this basic Fichtean insight regarding self-consciousness as arising 
from a kind of embodied act will remain with us for the length of our study.  
                                                
31 Fichte, GWL, I:107 (SK, 107). 
32 Fichte, “Erste Einleitung,” I:435 (SK, 17).  
33 Cf. Heath and Lachs, “Preface,” in SK, xv.  
34 Allen W. Wood, Fichte’s Ethical Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 49. Emphases in 
original. 
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Second, as one might expect given his critical stance vis-à-vis Kant, Fichte was 
not content with simply stating the necessity of this pre-reflective act that grounds self-
consciousness. Indeed, the terms of his critique virtually required him to continuously 
inquire into the origin of this primal unity, viz. the nature of the “original acts” through 
which the self “posits” the self/not-self division, and how it is related to its embodied and 
intersubjective situatedness. The most promising and enduring of his ideas on this front is 
that the unitary nature of self-consciousness arises on the basis of the division and deriva-
tive determination of a primal “drive” (Trieb) through which the original activity of the 
“self” is carried out. Through the notion of a drive, which he—along with other contem-
poraries such Hegel and Schelling—likely took from the Lutheran mystic Jakob Böhme 
(1575-1624),35 Fichte attempts to name the spontaneous (i.e. unconditioned, uncaused, 
and thus undivided) activity that grounds self-consciousness. Throughout The Science of 
Knowledge Fichte characterizes this drive-based activity as a kind of “striving” (Streben) 
or “longing” (Sehnen) to “be infinite” (unendlich).36 In itself, as Fichte declares: 
[This drive] is an activity that has no object at all,  but is nonetheless irresistibly 
driven out towards one [getrieben auf eins ausgeht], and is merely felt [gefühlt]. 
But such a determination in the self is called a longing; a drive towards something 
totally unknown, which reveals itself only through a need, a discomfort, a void, 
which seeks satisfaction, but does not indicate from whence [nicht andeutet, 
woher].37 
 
According to Fichte, self-consciousness emerges on the basis of this insatiable and uni-
tary drive to be infinite and, in particular, its modulation in connection with one’s sensi-
tive or empirical perceptions. 
                                                
35 Cf. Paola Mayer, Jena Romanticism and Its Appropriation of Jakob Böhme: Theosophy, Hagiography, 
Literature (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1999); Ariel Hessayon and S. L. T. Apetrei, An 
Introduction to Jacob Boehme: Four Centuries of Thought and Reception (New York: Routledge, 2014), 
162-79, 224-43; and S. J. McGrath, The Dark Ground of Spirit: Schelling and the Unconscious (New York: 
Routledge, 2012), 1-43. 
36 Fichte, GWL, I:270 (SK, 238).  
37 Ibid., I:302-303 (SK, 265). Emphases in original. 
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Fichte describes this modulation in terms of an original unity between what we 
later experience as a split between ideal and real activity. In its primal unity, as Fichte 
writes, “the original striving of the self [ursprüngliche Streben des Ich] is founded, as a 
drive, solely in the self as such [im Ich selbst] as both ideal und real at once.”38 It is real 
because this drive thrusts the “self” out into reality such that the self is opened up to the 
external influence received through one’s “empirical existence” (emprischen Dasein).39 It 
is ideal because this “proce[ssion] outward” is determinative solely of the self, not of the 
external “force” (Kraft) that is empirically encountered—through what we would call 
phenomenal consciousness—and thus must be said to be “existing independently” (un-
abhängig vorhandene).40  
 According to Fichte, self-consciousness emerges as that primal drive splits under 
the external force of empirical existence that inevitably stands as a “check” (Anstoss) and 
“limitation” (Begrenzung) to the self’s intrinsic drive to be infinite. The conflictual result 
is that there is still a thrust outward—real activity—that seeks to expand the self unre-
strictedly vis-à-vis this external force, but that this momentum is blunted as a portion of 
the drive is diverted back—ideal activity—to the self’s own bounded finitude. In Fichte’s 
own words, “Through limitation […] this original force is as it were divided [getheilt]: 
and the remainder which reverts back to the self is the ideal force.”41 Out of this tension 
between real activity, the external force of empirical existence, and the resulting diver-
sion of ideal activity back onto the self, there arises in the self a pre-egological “feeling” 
                                                
38 Ibid., I:294 (SK, 258-259). Emphasis in original.  
39 Ibid., I:279 (SK, 246). 
40 Ibid.  
41 Ibid., I:294 (SK, 259). 
  
  19 
(Gefühl) of itself as a finite self with “its own power within itself” in distinction from the 
external force whose independent existence splits the primal drive outward.42  
This derivative “feeling,” which emerges through the division of the primally uni-
tary drive, thus points to the coterminous positing of the boundary between self and the 
not-self that is constitutive for self-consciousness.43 As Fichte concludes in a summary 
passage worth quoting at length:  
[T]he ultimate ground of all reality for the self is an original interaction between 
the self and some other thing outside it, of which nothing more can be said, save 
that it must be utterly opposed to the self. In the course of this interaction, nothing 
is brought into the self, nothing alien is imported; everything that develops there-
in, even out to infinity, develops solely from itself, in accordance with its own 
laws; the self is merely set in motion by this opponent [das Ich wird durch jenes 
Entgegengesetzte bloss in Bewegung gesetzt], in order that it may act; without 
such an external prime mover [erstes bewegendes ausser ihm] it would never have 
acted, and since its existence consists solely in acting, it would never have existed 
either. But this mover has no other attribute than that of being a mover, an oppos-
ing force [eine entgegengesetzte Kraft], and is in fact only felt to be such [wird 
gefühle als solche].44 
 
In addition to pointing out that this is the second instance (in addition to the notion of 
“act”) in which a well-known Aristotelian concept (i.e. the prime mover) that significant-
ly influences Aquinas as well makes an appearance in an important passage in The Sci-
ence of Knowledge, the most crucial aspect of this summary to note is the way that it es-
tablishes Fichte’s subtle logic for preserving that complete spontaneous ideality of the 
self’s emergence into reflective consciousness. In one sense, as Fichte immediately ob-
serves in the next sentence, self-consciousness is entirely “dependent” (abhängig) upon 
the opposing force of the empirical for its development. For without the external force of 
this “opponent,” the self “would have never acted” in the first place. However, in another, 
                                                
42 Ibid., I:299 (SK, 263). 
43 Cf. Ibid., I:313 (SK, 274). 
44 Ibid., I:279 (SK, 246). 
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even more important sense for Fichte, this external force of the empirical does not deter-
mine the self in any specific sense (viz. “nothing more can be said” about this force) and 
therefore the spontaneous, primal unity of the self’s development can still be affirmed: 
“in the determinations [Bestimmungen] of [the self’s] existence it is absolutely independ-
ent [schlechthin unabhängig].”45  
 What makes Fichte’s theory characteristically “exceptional” is the way that he 
connects the primal drive to be a self to the actual occurrence of intellectual knowledge. 
According to Fichte, even though the subjective and the objective “cannot be separated” 
and thus are “absolutely one” in the self’s primal drive to be itself, that identity is genu-
inely a unification of the “subjective” and the “objective” such that those words still 
name something conceptually meaningful in the nature of that union. By insisting on this 
point, Fichte claims a primal element of self-knowledge within self-consciousness that 
arises through an exception to the epistemic law whereby knowledge bridges a prior divi-
sion between subject and object. Incidentally, we will see Augustine make a very similar 
plea for the exceptional status of self-knowledge. The terms of Fichte’s plea includes the 
affirmation that even though, and only in this case, knowledge arises prior to any division 
between subject and object, this “immediate self-knowledge”46 is still knowledge because 
it is an identity between the subjective and objective. In this way, Fichte explicitly af-
firms that which Kant denied: a specifically intellectual form of what Kant assigns only 
to the senses, namely a direct intuition. As Fichte declares openly, the “act whereby the 
self arises […] I refer to as [an] intellectual intuition [intellectuelle Anschauung]”47 that 
                                                
45 Ibid. 
46 This is Henrich’s summarizing phrase for this element in Fichte’s theory of self-consciousness. Cf. 
Henrich, “Fichtes ursprüngliche Einsicht,” 212-13 (“Fichte’s Original Insight,” 36-37). 
47 Fichte, “Zweite Einleitung,” I:463 (SK, 38). Emphasis in original. 
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thereby grounds all other acts of intellectual knowledge. Thus Fichte ends up blending his 
theorization of pre-reflective “feeling” and intellectual “intuition” such that the immedia-
cy of self-consciousness entails a primal “unification, a synthetic connection, between 
feeling and intuition [eine Vereinigung, ein syntehtischer Zusammenhang des Gefühls 
und der Anschauung].”48 For Fichte, self-consciousness is ultimately grounded in a pri-
mal simultaneity of a pre-egological feeling and an exceptional self-knowledge that 
thereby grounds all other knowledge that depends upon an awareness of the sub-
ject/object distinction.  
c. The Unconscious Approach: Hölderlin and Novalis 
Despite Fichte’s rhetorical adamancy regarding this primal identity between the subjec-
tive and objective, and therefore of feeling and self-knowledge, two of his students in Je-
na, Friedrich Hölderlin and the pseudonymously named Novalis,49 were not, as Frank re-
marks, “gullible” enough to be convinced by Fichte’s special pleading regarding the 
character of human knowledge.50 In their view, either knowledge requires a preexistent 
division or it does not. In order to register this criticism, they rightly pointed out that as 
soon as one reimports the conceptual outline of the subject/object distinction in order to 
furnish a primal ground for an intellectual self-knowledge inherent to self-consciousness, 
then, no matter how much one insists on their “identity,” one has recreated the very apor-
ia that Fichte set out to remedy: the inconsistencies characteristic of the reflection theory. 
Hölderlin makes this criticism explicit in a fragment entitled, “Urteil und Sein,” in which 
he argues that self-consciousness must emerge from a prior, non-intellectually self-aware 
state which, drawing upon terminology that he and Novalis derived from Spinoza, he 
                                                
48 Fichte, GWL, I:319 (SK, 279). 
49 His given name was Georg Philipp Friedrich Freiherr von Hardenberg. 
50 Frank, “Fragmente,” 450 (“Fragments,” 80). 
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calls “absolute being.” Unlike Fichte’s theorization of a primal identity between the sub-
jective and objective, the preceding intensive state of “absolute being” completely eludes 
the subject/object division itself, despite the fact that it remains the necessary ontological 
ground for that division: 
If I say: ‘I am I,’ the Subject (‘I’) and the Object (‘I’) are not so united such that 
no division (Trennung) between them can be made without a misunderstanding 
[lit: a misreading, verlezen] of the being [das Wesen] that should be divided in 
this way. On the contrary, the ‘I’ is only possible through this division within the 
‘I’. Can I even say ‘I’ without self-consciousness? How then is self-consciousness 
possible? Through the I opposing myself from myself, distinguishing myself from 
myself, and yet recognizing the identity of the opposed self in spite of the distinc-
tion. But to what extent the same? I can, I must inquire this way; for in another re-
spect [the ‘I’] opposes itself. Therefore, identity is not a unity of object and sub-
ject that would merely take place [schlechtin stattfände], therefore identity is not 
equivalent to absolute being [die Identität nicht = dem absoluten Sein].51 
 
The most important facet of this passage to underline is Hölderlin’s insistence that the 
synthetic function of the self-consciousness “I” always presupposes a division in some 
kind of primal unity that forms the vital basis for self-consciousness. Like Hölderlin, No-
valis names this primal unity as “being” or “mere-being.” In itself, mere being has no op-
position or division; in order to enter the determined sphere of self- and other-
awareness—Novalis calls this sphere that of “reference” (Beziehen)—a differentiation 
must be posited within ourselves and thus “outside” ourselves as well. The actual occur-
rence of that division does not, however, abolish the originary intensive unity of being; it 
simply renders it inaccessible to the inquiring “I” that is formed on the basis of the divi-
sion and on which its enduring possibility continues to rest. As Novalis concludes in his 
study on Fichte, “In order to determine the I we must refer it to something. Reference oc-
                                                
51 Friedrich Hölderlin, “Urteil und Sein,” in Hölderlin: Sämtliche Werke, ed. Friedrich Beissner (Stuttgart: 
W. Kohlhammer, 1962), IV:227. 
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curs through differentiation – Both [occur] through the thesis of an absolute sphere of ex-
istence. This is mere-being [dis ist das Nur Sein].”52  
The terms of the subsequent division then form the immanent relata that self-
consciousness synthesizes as a higher unity (i.e. genuine synthesis) that is nonetheless a 
unity-in-distinction (i.e. “an identity in spite of the separation”). Despite furnishing the 
ground for this division and subsequent synthesis, the primal unity of “absolute being” is 
itself—according to Hölderlin and Novalis—cognitively inaccessible to anything (i.e. 
self-consciousness, intellectual intuition, reflection, or self-knowledge) that presupposes 
separated relata. As Henrich summarizes, Hölderlin and Novalis force “one [to] con-
ceive, prior to the distinction between subject and object that constitutes all conscious-
ness, a whole that always remains unknowable”53 precisely because it does not conform to 
the conditions required for self-consciousness and/or intellectual self-knowledge. As No-
valis writes, the “unknown is the prototype of the I.”54 Like Fichte, Novalis affirms that 
the only trace of this unknown ground that enters into self-consciousness is that of a pre-
reflective “feeling” of the self’s fundamental “dependence” on something else. Unlike 
Fichte, however, Novalis is insistent that this feeling is completely devoid of intellectual 
intuition: “Feeling proceeds from the undetermined, which it is without knowing it.”55  
If one searches in Hölderlin and Novalis for further thematizations of this un-
knowable ground of self-consciousness in addition to that of “absolute being,” one will 
find references to “absolute spirit,”56 the “One,”57 and a mutual embrace of Fichte’s own 
                                                
52 Novalis, Fichte-Studien, II:106, no. 3 (FS, 6). 
53 Dieter Henrich, “Hölderlin über Urteil und Sein. Eine Studie zur Entstehungsgeschichte des Idealismus,” 
in Konstellationen: Probleme und Debatten am Ursprung der idealistischen Philosophie (1789-1795) 
(Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1991), 74 (ET: The Course of Remembrance, 86). Emphasis added. 
54 Novalis, Fichte-Studien, II:145, no. 83 (FS, 43).  
55 Ibid., II:126, no. 32. (FS, 25). 
56 Ibid., II:273, no. 568. (FS, 170-71). 
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theorization of a primal conflict between, as the metrical version of Hölderlin’s Hyperion 
reads, a “drive to stride forth toward the infinite [Trieb unendlich fortzuschreiten]” and a 
“drive to be limited [beschränkt].”58 Nonetheless, the accent on the unknowability of our 
pre-reflective unity runs deep in both figures. Accordingly, they tend to insist that the on-
ly way that this pre-reflective unity from which our “feeling” of self-consciousness 
emerges can be truly depicted is through the poetic excess of meaning—in comparison to 
the limits of theoretical speculation—made possible through aesthetic representation.59 
Hence Novalis’s famous declaration: “The limits of feeling are the limits of philosophy. 
Feeling cannot feel itself.”60 
d. The Theological Approach: Schleiermacher 
There were admittedly several important figures in this milieu other than Schleiermacher 
(e.g. Hegel and Schelling) who associated the unfolding of self-consciousness, and espe-
cially its apparent affinity with a drive to infinity and a germinal self-knowledge, with the 
question of God. However, among these thinkers Schleiermacher stands out as one of the 
only figures who incorporates the burgeoning discourse on self-consciousness into a clas-
sically Christian account of the God-world relation, viz. one that unambiguously affirms a 
qualitative divide between the Creator and creation, including the affirmation of creatio 
ex nihilo.61 In contrast, for Hegel the unfolding of self-consciousness inevitably entails a 
dialectical sublation of the illusion of God’s otherness so that a recognition of the singu-
                                                                                                                                            
57 Ibid., II:296, no. 662. (FS, 194). 
58 Friedrich Hölderlin, “Die metrische Fassung des Hyperion,” in Hölderlin: Sämtliche Werke, ed. Friedrich 
Beissner (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1957), III:195, lines 46-51. 
59 C.f., for example, “Über die Verfahrungsweise des poetischen Geistes,” IV:253-54 (ET: “On the Opera-
tions of the Poetic Spirit,” in Friedrich Hölderlin: Essays and Letters on Theory, trans. and ed. Thomas 
Pfau (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988), 72-73) and Frank, “Fragmente,” 465-67 (“Frag-
ments,” 92-93). 
60 Novalis, Fichte-Studien, II:114, no. 15 (FS, 13). 
61 Cf. Schleiermacher, CG, 13.1:§40-41, pp. 230-240 (CF, 149-156). 
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larity between “God” and the community’s self-consciousness is the fulfillment of the so-
called “absolute idea.”62 Or similarly for Schelling: God is attributed something like an 
unconscious drive for self-realization that results in the act of creation.63 On these fronts, 
Schleiermacher is clear and resolute: “Creation […] must, indeed, be traced entirely to 
the divine activity, but not in such a way that this activity is thought of as resembling 
human [or] temporal activity.”64 
 Schleiermacher’s groundbreaking integration of classical Christian doctrine with 
the themes of self-consciousness regnant in his intellectual setting reflects a number of 
insights that can be traced back through Fichte, Hölderlin, and Novalis. For example, 
Schleiermacher endorses Fichte’s seminal distinction between object-consciousness and 
the immediate unity of self-consciousness that necessarily precedes object-consciousness 
as a “feeling” that, as we referenced above, “accompanies” states that can be associated 
with object-oriented consciousness.65 Similarly, he echoes Novalis and Hölderlin in dis-
tinguishing the immanent givenness of “feeling” (Gefühl) from the object-oriented do-
mains of intellectual “knowing” (Wissen) and, in addition, practical “doing” (Thun).66 In 
order to express this point, Schleiermacher formulates what can be interpreted as a varia-
tion on Fichte’s account of the immanently and externally-oriented drives. Schleierma-
                                                
62 Cf. G.W.F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion, III: Die vollendete Religion, ed. 
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Meiner Verlag, 1984), 233-70 (ET: Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, Volume III: The Consummate 
Religion, ed. Peter C. Hodgson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007), 310-347). 
63 Cf. F.W.J. Schelling, Die Weltalter. Fragmente. In den Urfassungen von 1811 und 1813, ed. Manfred 
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cher argues that all of human life occurs as a vacillation between two elemental modes: 
the mode of receptivity in which we are influenced and causally conditioned by other ob-
jects and the mode of freedom in which we reciprocally exercise influence and causal 
conditioning upon other objects.67 Or as he expresses the same point through alternative 
terminology: “Life, then is to be conceived as an alternation between an abiding-in-self 
(Insichbleiben) and a passing-beyond-self (Aussichheraustreten) on the part of the sub-
ject.”68 Doing is clearly an activity of freedom that passes-beyond-self. However, his de-
scription of the relation between feeling and knowing from within this framework nicely 
encapsulates Hölderlin and Novalis’s objection to Fichte’s insistence on a primal identity 
between feeling and (self-)knowing. As Schleiermacher summarizes the relation: 
But while Knowing, in the sense of possessing knowledge, is an abiding-in-self 
on the part of the subject, nevertheless as the act of knowing, it only becomes real 
by a passing-beyond-self of the subject, and in this sense it is a Doing. As regards 
Feeling, on the other hand, […] it is not effected by the subject, but simply takes 
place in the subject, and thus, since it belongs altogether to the realm of receptiv-
ity, it is entirely an abiding-in-self; and in this sense it stands alone in antithesis to 
the other two—Knowing and Doing.69 
 
By precisely delineating this distinction, Schleiermacher further solidifies a conceptual 
trajectory in which the chief clue that points to the unitary, pre-reflective ground of self-
consciousness—namely, Gefühl—is clearly differentiated from the subject/object relation 
inherent to acts of knowledge per se. 
 Undoubtedly, however, Schleiermacher’s most decisive and enduring insight con-
sists in his argument that the dependent feeling that pervades self-consciousness—or as 
he calls it the “feeling of absolute dependence” (das Gefühl schlechthinniger Abahäng-
igkeit)—finds its ultimate causative source not in the limiting force of an empirical 
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“check” (Fichte) or the unknowable simplicity of one’s absolute being (Hölder-
lin/Novalis), but rather in our radical dependence upon the all-pervading causality of God 
as the Creator of the world. In other words, our self-conscious feeling of ourselves as fi-
nitely “absolutely dependent” ultimately points to our intrinsic “relation to God”70 as part 
of the divine creation. God is the felt “whence of our receptive and active existence 
[Woher unseres empfänglichen und selbsttätigen Dasein]”71 whose creative causality 
cannot be reduced to any single cause in creation. Rather, God is the “whence” for all of 
creation and thus in relation to this Creator all things are primally receptive as “implied 
by [our] self-consciousness.”72 Our feeling of absolute dependence is the causative trace 
of God’s pure and eternal freedom and activity within which there is no trace of recipro-
cal conditioning. It must be emphasized that at this point Schleiermacher in no way lapses 
into a merging of feeling into knowing. He is adamant that the feeling of dependence is in 
no way “conditioned by a previous knowledge of God.”73 Instead, short of the revelatory 
appearance of God within the confines of creation itself (i.e. in Jesus Christ),74 God re-
mains very much like something Hölderlin and Novalis described with slightly different 
rhetorical connotations: the unknown origin of being from which my feeling of myself 
mysteriously emanates, but upon which—precisely because feeling is not a knowing—I 
cannot epistemically reflect.  
III. The Origins of this Project: Two Conjectures and Finding a Midwife 
 
Broadly speaking, the proposal that follows can be understood as a blending of the un-
conscious and theological approaches to self-consciousness that also incorporates Fich-
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71 Ibid. 
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te’s key insight that self-consciousness arises from a kind of embodied “act.” For his part, 
Freud’s metapsychology reflects the joint Romantic commitment to the developmental 
centrality of an unconscious, pre-reflective wholeness and the existence of a drive whose 
fulfillment or frustration is primally decisive to the emergence of self-consciousness. In 
Freud, as we will see, these go by the name of “the id” (viz. the pre-reflective wholeness) 
and the “libido” (viz. the drive). Similarly, despite writing several centuries earlier, Au-
gustine and Aquinas stand in the same mainstream Christian theological tradition as does 
Schleiermacher in affirming that human nature—and the passive and active activities that 
are thereby concretely made possible—reflect the all-pervasive causality of the divine 
Creator.  
 However, the detailed shape of the constructive trajectory that follows has been 
determined by much more than these initial resonances with the genealogically connected 
approaches just outlined. Instead, as I signaled at the outset, my constructive trajectory 
emerged out of two initial conjectures regarding how specific aspects of Freud’s meta-
psychology and a fortuitous sequence between Augustine and Aquinas can together be 
leveraged in order to clarify unaddressed and/or contested issues that endure within the 
initial promise of the unconscious and theological approaches to self-consciousness.   
 The first conjecture began with Freud and had interrelated positive and negative 
aspects. Positively, it seemed possible to me that Freud makes a decisive clinical and the-
oretical discovery regarding the origin of egoic self-consciousness. As I will describe it in 
detail in Chapter 4, this discovery arrives in his original theorization of a mechanism—
what he calls primary identification—that accounts for how our egos self-consciously 
emerge from the id’s infantile state characterized by the flux of phenomenal conscious-
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ness and the immediacy of an extroverted, libidinal drive. According to Freud, primary 
identification names a capacity to bond with certain sense-perceptions that engender ei-
ther intense pleasure or pain (e.g. a mother’s breast or traumatic events) in such a way 
that they are perceived by the individual in terms of a pre-reflective wholeness that eludes 
the subject/object division. Instead, those sensations are immediately perceived in terms 
of the “subject.” For example, for the infant the presence of the breast is immediately and 
unconsciously coterminous with the infant as a extension of “itself.” Even though the in-
fant does not in any way think of itself as an “I,” Freud evocatively suggests that our only 
way of illustrating this fusion of primary identification is through the phrase, “I am the 
breast.”75 In other words, the breast is perceived as a “part” of the infant such that its 
presence pleasurably completes an intensive, pre-reflective wholeness. Only later, after 
the dawn of self-consciousness and thus an awareness of its own embodied boundaries, 
does the infant differentiate itself and thus interact with the breast in ways that can be il-
lustrated by the phrases, “‘I have it,’ that is, ‘I am not it.’76  
As we will see, the decisive factor that triggers this subsequent awareness of the 
object qua object is that the initial pleasure of those sensations (e.g. those associated with 
the breast) inevitably gives way to the helpless and recurring pain of its unexpected ab-
sence. Given the nature of primary identification, this absence is inevitably perceived not 
as the painful lack of the breast qua object, but rather as a distressing deprivation or 
“hole” in the infant’s own pre-reflective wholeness. According to Freud’s train of 
thought, the cumulative crisis of this pain forces a coping process that culminates in a co-
alesced identification with our own finite bounds—over against that which Fichte would 
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have called the sensible “not-self”—that marks the beginning of self-consciousness. In 
this way, Freud furnishes a framework in which we can theorize that the dawning of self-
consciousness coincides with the disengagement of primary identification from the pres-
ence/absence of vacillating sense-perceptions in order to identify with the enduring pres-
ence of our own sensing and enfleshed bodies. The result of this identification is the in-
tensive and pre-reflective wholeness that we later nominally signify as “me” or 
“my/self.” 
 Even upon an initial canvassing of Freud’s account of primary identification, 
some similarities to Fichte and the Romantics should already be evident. Like the 
Fichtean drive “to be infinite,” the Freudian drive to identify is determinative only of the 
“self” and in no way yields intelligent knowledge of any sensed object qua object. All 
that is sensitively perceived is the painful “limitation” and “check” of its vacillating pres-
ence and absence. Likewise, the pre-reflective wholeness of an identificatory fusion 
broadly fits the Romantic demand for a non-cognitive wholeness prior to an awareness of 
the subject/object division.  
If these similarities were to tempt us to minimize the originality of Freud’s contri-
butions, there is nonetheless another layer of promise in addition to the mere presentation 
of the mechanism of identification. By setting primary identification within a broader 
metapsychological context, Freud situates it alongside other phenomena that either seem 
to be other instances of identification (e.g. archaic fusions with parents, trauma, halluci-
nations, and hypnosis) or closely adjacent phenomena (e.g. sexual desire, transference, 
and the self-criticism of conscience). Furthermore, Freud also gives sustained attention to 
a phenomenon that rarely captures systemic consideration in either Idealism or Romanti-
  
  31 
cism: the pathological disruption and/or complete breakdown of the synthesized ‘I’ under 
pressure from various stimuli. The net result of this broader Freudian context is that it 
seems increasingly possible for self-consciousness to be described more accurately in re-
lation to other sets of anthropological data. In other words, in Freud’s metapsychology 
self-consciousness loses some of its seductive status as something truly exceptional and 
completely sui generis; rather, one gains the sense that it might indeed be a species of 
effect, though a central one to be sure, of a certain capacity for identification for which 
other instances can be plausibly described.  
 To this prima facie promise of Freud’s metapsychology we must nonetheless im-
mediately add two potentially insuperable weaknesses. First, as I will show in Chapter 4, 
in his metapsychology Freud actually falls prey to a psychoanalytic version of the reflec-
tion theory. The result is that he vacillates between two separate and ultimately irrecon-
cilable theories regarding the origins of egoic self-consciousness. In addition to the one 
that relies upon identification (viz. the “identification theory”) he also includes another 
theory (viz. the “sexual theory”) that insists on the etiological centrality of sexual desire 
for every facet of psychic development. In the places in Freud’s metapsychology in 
which the sexual theory has a dominating influence, the result is a marginalization of the 
idiosyncratic fusions of primary identification. Instead, when working with the sexual 
theory Freud assumes an always already egoic subject such that the intrinsic self-
differentiation of sexual attraction becomes attributable to the infant (i.e. I am not that 
object/I do not have that object/I want that object). In this vacillation, Freud recreates a 
version of the reflection theory’s quintessential circularity: the temptation to reinsert the 
self-conscious subject—in this case the sexually self-aware subject—into the very expla-
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nation for how this subject supposedly emerges in the first place. In light of this internal 
inconsistency, if we are to capitalize on the promise of primary identification for a theory 
of self-consciousness, then we will need to find a framework that enables us to differenti-
ate it clearly from sexual desire in a manner that Freud consistently fails to do. 
Second, the negative inverse of Freud’s theoretical uniqueness is that his meta-
psychology lacks the conceptual resources to make the leap from its distinctive psycho-
analytic preoccupations to the conceptual precision necessary for philosophical and/or 
theological explanation. Even though he was clearly influenced by Romantic philosophy 
and poetry, most obviously Goethe and Schiller77 as well as secondary sources such as 
Eduard von Hartmann’s Philosophie des Unbewussten (1869)78 and the Nietzchean-
inspired Georg Groddeck,79 by the time derivative themes show up in his metapsychology 
they are mostly shorn of their philosophical connotations and/or refashioned in terms of 
the peculiar thematic concerns of psychoanalysis. Freud often redoubles this problem by 
exhibiting an explicit hostility toward being interpreted as a philosopher—he always 
identifies as a doctor dedicated to the ideals of scientific and clinical observation—to the 
point that he even openly decries any demand that he produce a metapsychology that is 
thoroughly theoretically or conceptually consistent.80 When one combines all of these fac-
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tors, the task of trying to make a link between Freud’s metapsychology and any construc-
tive explanation becomes a notoriously fraught affair on which to set out.81 
 Unbeknownst to me when this initial evaluation of Freud’s metapsychology first 
occurred to me, Manfred Frank had come to a similar compound conclusion regarding 
Freud about a decade earlier. In his essay, “Subjectivity and Individuality: Survey of a 
Problem,” Frank echoes the positive aspect of my conjecture by remarking that Freud’s 
theorization of a self-awareness that only emerges out of a prior “unconscious history” 
rightly displaces the self-conscious “I” as someone (or something) who is in fact “not the 
master in its own house.”82 Instead, our sense of being a unified “I” depends, much to our 
chagrin, on immanent, lower-level processes that constantly elude our attempts to bring 
them into our own reflective gaze. As such we remain paradoxically, as the Romantics 
pointed out, unconscious of the very ground of our self-consciousness. Similarly, Frank 
also immediately adds the negative aspect as well. As he writes, “If indeed [our] knowing 
self-relation were only a tiny light spot on the dark map of the unconscious or if it were a 
place of delusion, the structure of this light spot or of this delusion would have to be de-
scribed intelligibly.”83 Unfortunately, as Frank incisively concludes, “Freud’s theory—
like that of [fellow psychoanalytic theorist Jacque] Lacan—is not advanced far enough to 
provide this description with its own means.”84 
 If, however, one remains convinced of the promise of Freud’s metapsychology  
for describing the origins of egoic self-consciousness, then the dilemma that opens up in 
light of the two weakness described above is analogous to what Socrates famously de-
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scribes in Plato’s Theaetetus as the need to find an “intellectual midwife” in order to fer-
ret out and retranslate Freud’s insights into a form that is conceptually portable and there-
fore more philosophically/theologically usable.85 If we were to take Frank’s cue on where 
to look for finding an intellectual midwife for Freud, we would inevitably be led back 
into the heart of the above genealogy, drawing upon Kant, Fichte, the Romantics and 
their direct contemporary successors in theorizing self-consciousness. My reason for opt-
ing for an alternative strategy to this expected route stems from the fact that the weakest 
and most contested aspects of that genealogy coincide with the very conceptual sites at 
which a good translator for Freud’s metapsychology would need to provide the greatest 
degree of clarity.    
 Three such conceptual sites of weakness stand out most prominently. First, mak-
ing sense of Freud’s account of the ego’s formation requires a maximal degree of preci-
sion regarding the interrelation between different human capacities (e.g. sense-
perception, desire, knowledge, and identification). Unfortunately, much of the internal 
confusion and disagreement between the four approaches described above stems from a 
complete lack of clarity about how to describe this type of immanent relation between 
capacities. To be sure, the particular capacities that we end up associating with self-
consciousness are the ones that loom largest here, but disagreement and confusion re-
garding a whole constellation of other capacities, nearly every one of which is potentially 
relevant to Freud, consistently hampers and mars attempts to gain clarity about this pri-
mary relation. The most obvious and enduring example of this lack of clarity can be 
traced to the way that, Kant (via Descartes, Locke, and Hume) bequeaths to those after 
him what is in my judgment a deeply confused assumption of a division between sensi-
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tive data and the synthetic acts of understanding such that an a priori epistemic quality 
must be attributed to self-consciousness. 
Second, translating identification’s developmental role in the origins of egoic self-
consciousness demands a careful delineation of several different types of intensive and 
extroverted unity that define human existence from its most primal inception and then at 
every point of its life thereafter. The importance of this delineation is underlined because 
Freud’s interrelated notions of the id as the originary unity of the psyche and the pre-
reflective fusions of primary identification inevitably raise the knotty question of how to 
relate different kinds of unity that intensively occur within a human being (e.g. self-
consciousness) or are mediated to it as the extroverted interiorization of something exter-
nal to it (e.g. the senses). If one turns to the four approaches above on this question, one 
is immediately faced with the lack of consensus illustrated by Kant’s a priori “synthetic 
unity of apperception” and its a posteriori synthesizing of cognitive unities, Fichte’s 
“immediate” identity of the subjective/objective and the subsequent unity forged through 
the self’s originary acts through which it posits itself, and Hölderlin and Novalis’s primal 
unity of “absolute being” and the dependent, derivative unity-in-distinction that is self-
consciousness.  
Third, if we are to re-render Freud’s proposed link between libidinal desire and 
self-consciousness then we will need a consistent account for how to relate the supposed 
infinity of the self’s striving to the teleological status of the objects qua objects that the 
self-conscious subject can thereby perceive, know, reflect upon, or and/or produce. This 
compound relation elicits some of the most divergent answers among the approaches de-
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scribed above. For Fichte,86 the infinitely desirous “whence” of self-consciousness end-
lessly propels the subject toward an infinity for which no object could possibly satisfy. 
For Hölderlin and Novalis, the self is forced to direct its desire to the production of poetic 
means in order to express the absolute unity of its dependency. Lastly, for Schleierma-
cher the dependent “whence” of self-consciousness ultimately points to the Creator 
whose infinity grounds and causes the totality of all finite things.  
If only one of these weaknesses were to be found in the above genealogy, it would 
likely not derail an attempt to resource such figures for translating and appropriating 
Freud’s insights. When taken all together, however, one begins to wonder whether head-
ing back into Freud’s own direct and indirect Idealist and Romantic sources might be a 
strategy better suited for explaining more exhaustively how Freud arrived at his brilliant, 
albeit conceptually challenged, metapsychology than it would be for finding conceptual 
resources that are, in the end, precise enough for actually explaining the anthropological 
phenomena under investigation.    
At this point, the relevance of my second conjecture finally comes into view. This 
conjecture grew out of my reading of Bernard Lonergan’s landmark transposition of the 
Thomist metaphysical framework in order to recover its relevance as a resource for cri-
tiquing the Kantian assumption that there must be an a priori structuring of sense-
perception in order to synthetically “produce” knowledge. As an extension of Lonergan’s 
trajectory, I suspected that, if it is appropriately resourced, Aquinas’s metaphysics and 
theological anthropology could similarly open up novel ways for describing the nature 
and origin of self-consciousness that are not initially obvious when working solely within 
the expected genealogy. On the surface, I was attracted to the fact that Aquinas’s theolog-
                                                
86 And we could analogously add Hegel, Schelling, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche. 
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ical anthropology has several areas of strength that overlap with the three problematic 
clusters outlined above. For example, as I will show in detail in Chapters 2 and 3, Aqui-
nas furnishes (1) precise descriptions of how distinct human capacities dynamically relate 
to each other by expanding upon the ancient idea of distinct “parts” or “layers” of the 
soul (e.g. the vegetative, sensitive, and intelligent), (2) a complete typology of different 
kinds of intensive and extroverted unities supported by a metaphysical account of being, 
activity, and the soul that ties them all together coherently and teleologically, and (3) an 
exhaustive account of the systematic way that different types of knowledge can be corre-
lated with corresponding types of desire, with the highest kind of knowledge (i.e. intelli-
gible knowledge) being correlated with a natural desire for a parallel kind of infinity (i.e. 
the infinite good).  
Even more intriguing is the combined Augustinian and Aristotelian backdrop 
against which Aquinas formulates these crucial elements of his theological anthropology. 
We will start with the Augustinian background. For our purposes, as I mentioned above, 
there is a fortuitous sequence between Augustine and Aquinas that can be promisingly 
resourced for clarifying a number of the pitfalls characteristic of the reflection theory. In 
his seminal treatise on the Trinity, De Trinitate, Augustine touches upon a number of 
themes familiar from the genealogy outlined above: the notion of a primal, epistemic self-
awareness and its relationship to the extroverted unities of sense, knowledge, and desire. 
For our purposes, however, what is most important about De Trinitate is the vacillation 
that one witnesses in Augustine between two conflicting affirmations. First, the entire 
framework that he establishes for the interrelated character of creation and the nature of 
human desire promisingly suggests three distinct intensive unities that tie together human  
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existence from its beginning to its intended conclusion in in union with God: a primal 
unity given in the soul, an epistemic unity that occurs in self-knowledge, and a teleologi-
cal unity that occurs as a result of being unified with God. Secondly, however, at many of 
the most important junctures of De Trinitate Augustine ends up conflating these three 
intensive unities into a single type of intensive unity: a reflective self-knowledge always 
already natively given in the soul. As we will see, there are a number of reasons that Au-
gustine feels pulled toward the second affirmation. However, the most decisive factor 
comes down to how he understands the Creator-creature relation and therefore the nature 
of imago Dei in human beings. If, as Augustine believes, God is an eternally simple in-
tensive unity of reflective self-knowledge, so the reasoning goes, then there must be an 
epistemic parallel in human beings by which they always already know themselves.  
However, by insisting on construing the imago Dei in this manner, as I will show 
in Chapter 1, Augustine gets caught in a dilemma that is again characteristic of the temp-
tation inherent to the reflection theory. The result of this confusion results in the now fa-
miliar circular trap. On the one hand, he attributes a primal intensive unity to a human 
being based upon a natively given self-knowledge in the soul. On the other hand, he sim-
ultaneously describes self-knowledge as something contingently forged through particu-
lar acts of self-reflection. The result is that Augustine, just like we saw in the genealogy 
above, conflates and confuses a number of different types of intensive unity—including a 
primal self-awareness—that need to not only be properly distinguished, but also placed in 
some sort of explanatory order in relation to one another.   
The latter part of the sequence is found in turning, as we will do in Chapters 2 and 
3 to Aquinas’s theological anthropology in the Summa Theologiae in which one finds an 
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elegant and precise solution to Augustine’s dilemma in a manner the ends up capitalizing 
on the three types of intensive unity—primal, epistemic, and teleological—that Augustine 
glimpses and yet is unable to coherently explain on his own terms. Aquinas formulates 
this solution by transposing several of Augustine’s overall insights regarding the nature 
of desire, knowledge, and the imago Dei into an Aristotelian metaphysical framework. In 
particular, as we will see, Aquinas appropriates Aristotle’s theory of the soul and the in-
tellect, both of which serve to deny that any primal (or a priori) self-knowledge is possi-
ble at all for a human being. Instead, according to this theorization, self-knowledge is on-
ly derivatively possible on the basis of the extroverted unities of sense-perception and the 
intelligent knowledge of external objects. The result of this transposition is a theological 
anthropology precise enough not only to solve Augustine’s dilemma, but also to fully 
furnish a promisingly ordered account of the different types of intensive/extroverted uni-
ties that occur in conjunction with the variety of capacities (e.g. the senses, knowledge, 
and desire) within a human individual.  
IV. Chapter Outline: Leveraging Aquinas’s Solution to Translate Freud  
 
Based upon these two conjectures, what I propose to do in this study is to leverage Aqui-
nas’s solution to Augustine’s dilemma in order to solve Freud’s analogously circular 
problem and thereby formulate a reconceptualized blending of the unconscious and theo-
logical approaches to egoic self-consciousness. In order to accomplish this, the initial 
wager of this project is that drawing upon the metaphysics of Aquinas’s theological an-
thropology will furnish us with the conceptual precision necessary in order to address 
both of the weaknesses that I cited above that hinder the relevance Freud’s theorization of 
primary identification vis-à-vis the riddle of self-consciousness from coming into full 
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view. On a broad scale, the precision of Aquinas’s theological anthropology will allow us 
to translate Freud’s metapsychology into a form in which the crucial distinctions between 
different human capacities, the variety of intensive/extroverted unities characteristic of 
existence, and the ground and telos of infinite desire can be drawn with promising clarity. 
Following this translation, we will then be able to (1) separate out the idiosyncratic func-
tion of identification in order to distinguish it adequately from sexual desire and (2) illu-
minate its significance as a member of the active relation (viz. a relata) out of which ego-
ic self-consciousness emerges. The result will be a constructive proposal regarding the 
nature, origin, and—in something of a Thomistic tribute to Schleiermacher’s seminal in-
sights—the theological significance of self-consciousness.  
As a way of executing this basic plan, the route toward formulating this proposal 
will take us through five chapters. The first three chapters will re-narrate Aquinas’s ap-
proach to solving Augustine’s dilemma in a manner that simultaneously successfully 
transposes his original insights regarding desire and (self-)knowledge into an Aristotelian 
metaphysical framework. In Chapter 1, I will engage in a close reading of the second half 
of De Trinitate in order to outline the shape of Augustine’s circular dilemma. Along the 
way, we will also touch upon his seminal insights into the nature of desire, knowledge, 
and the central analogy that he draws between the Creator’s simplicity and the intensive 
unity of human beings. As we will see, this analogy gives creation, and human nature in 
particular, an exitus-reditus structure, which means, to borrow and extend some terminol-
ogy from above, that God is the whence and whither of creation and every creature there-
in. Despite the specific critique that we will formulate based upon Augustine’s dilemma, 
what we will also find is that in our constructive trajectory we will end up endorsing 
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many of his overarching theological insights regarding desire and the Creator-creation 
relation in the revised form that they are found in Aquinas. Accordingly, giving balanced 
attention to these seminal insights in De Trinitate, and not just the aspects of it with 
which we level a critique, will prove important for us in understanding Aquinas’s anthro-
pology and then extending them later in conversation with Freud as well. 
Following this reading of De Trinitate, in Chapters 2 and 3 I will present Aqui-
nas’s multi-level solution to Augustine’s dilemma that simultaneously maintains—and 
even explanatorily expands upon—several of his most important insights regarding the 
nature of desire, knowledge, the intensive unity of an individual, and their created rela-
tion to God. Most crucially, I will detail the way in which Aquinas draws upon Aristo-
tle’s metaphysical framework, especially his theory of the soul, the hierarchical (or verti-
cal) relation of the soul’s sensitive and intelligent layers, and the corresponding ontologi-
cal and epistemological significance of intelligible and sensible forms, in order to trans-
pose Augustine’s insights into a theological anthropology that denies that the human soul 
has any primal knowledge at all, much less something as specific as self-knowledge. In-
stead, the intellect is characterized by a native extroversion that can only pivot “inward” 
in reflection after coming to know external objects qua objects. Based upon this transpo-
sition, Aquinas is able to successfully resituate the three forms of intensive unity in hu-
man beings that Augustine had suggested within a much more metaphysically precise 
theological anthropology. According to the terms of Aquinas’s solution, these forms of 
intensive unity are re-rendered as an absolutely primal unity attributable to the soul, an 
epistemic unity characteristic of reflective self-knowledge, and a unity of desire that 
comes when all of our desires are aligned, penultimately by reason and ultimately in un-
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ion with God. There is, however, one weakness, which I will point out right at the end of 
Chapter 2, that is created by the elegance of Aquinas’s solution. By resituating self-
knowledge as the basis of the intellect’s native extroversion, Aquinas unintentionally va-
cates Augustine’s (and, as history turned out, Kant’s, Fichte’s, Hölderlin’s and Novalis’s) 
concern to articulate a kind of immanent awareness that intensively grounds the “subject-
side” of the subject-object divide that is then bridged by the extroverted unities of intelli-
gent knowledge. His reasons for doing so are clear and justified, in my judgment, as the 
Aristotelian/Thomist account of cognition is simply too convincing in terms of its grasp 
of the order of human knowledge. However, the vacated place that it leaves behind does 
point to how I will end up situating egoic self-consciousness as a fourth type of intensive 
unity in conversation with Freudian primary identification in Chapters 4 and 5.   
 Before moving on to discuss the shape of the chapters on Freud, however, it 
should be noted that Chapters 2 and 3 are divided in a manner that reflects a central struc-
tural feature of Aquinas’s theological anthropology. According to Aquinas the two high-
est layers of the soul—the sensitive and the intelligent—are each made up by paired 
powers of knowledge (i.e. the “apprehensive powers” of the senses and the intellect) and 
desire (i.e. the “appetitive powers” of the sensitive and intellective appetites). Inasmuch 
as these powers are paired in the same layers of the soul, they respond to different aspects 
of reality: broadly speaking, the senses and the sensitive appetite respond to the sensible 
qualities of reality, while the intellect and the intellective appetite (or, the will) respond to 
the intelligible qualities of reality. However, inasmuch as these powers are analogous 
powers of knowledge (i.e. the senses and the intellect) or desire (i.e. the sensitive and in-
tellective appetites), they can be described according to the same metaphysical principles 
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that jointly govern them as apprehensive or appetitive capacities. Based upon this classi-
fication, my chosen route of presentation will be to consider first the apprehensive pow-
ers and especially Aquinas’s reconceived understanding of self-knowledge vis-à-vis Au-
gustine’s (Chapter 2) and then the parallel operations of the appetitive powers (Chapter 
3).  
Based upon this presentation of Aquinas’s solution to Augustine’s dilemma and 
the metaphysically precise theological anthropology that it engenders, in Chapter 4 I will 
turn to the analogous dilemma that Freud produces for himself in working out the ego’s 
developmental relation to primary identification. The first half of the chapter will be de-
voted to outlining the irreconcilable circularity that arises in Freud’s vacillation between 
the identification theory and the sexual theory for how egoic self-consciousness emerges 
out of the pre-egological immediacy characteristic of the “id.” Following this descriptive 
and diagnostic task, in the second half of the chapter I will attempt to reapply the shape of 
Aquinas’s solution to Augustine in the specifically psychoanalytic context. The dual pur-
pose of this reapplication will be (1) to solve Freud’s circular dilemma by untangling the 
developmental effects of identification from those tied to sexual desire and (2) to simul-
taneously translate the promise of primary identification into a new philosophically port-
able form—i.e. one that broadly conforms to the Aquinas’s metaphysical synthesis of Ar-
istotle and Augustine—from which we can analyze its significance for the debates re-
garding the origins of self-consciousness and also re-render it in terms of its theological 
significance. As will become clear at that point, the proposal that I will set forth through 
this act of translation is that in primary identification Freud stumbles upon a human ca-
pacity that can be plausibly theorized as a distinct “layer” of the soul—complete with an 
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apprehensive and appetitive power—that stands vertically between the sensitive and in-
tellectual layer of the soul. Given that this is the juncture at which all of the intellectual 
streams upon which we are drawing flow together for the first time, the latter half of 
Chapter 4 represents the conceptual linchpin upon which my entire constructive trajecto-
ry rests and can be subsequently extended.  
Finally, in Chapter 5 I will bring all of these threads of argumentation together. 
By drawing upon the Augustinian/Thomist theological anthropology developed in Chap-
ters 1-3 and expanded in conversation with Freud in Chapter 4, I will defend the proposal 
that egoic self-consciousness emerges as the product/term of an act of primary identifica-
tion with one’s own enfleshed and sensing body. In itself, this act is unconscious such 
that the pre-reflective wholeness that it produces between the power of identification and 
“my” body cannot itself be “known” or “inspected.” Our only two clues to its preceding 
and ongoing occurrence are to be found in (1) the feeling of whence that constitutes self-
consciousness and the corresponding qualitative accompaniment that accrues to the first-
order processes of phenomenal consciousness; and (2) the pathological effects—i.e. the 
collapse of the synthesized “I” as Freud observes so acutely—that can be observed when 
our power of identification produces a pre-reflective fusion with an object other than our 
body. 
Near the end of this chapter, as briefly suggested above, I will furnish a final ex-
tension of this proposal by situating the fused unities of identification, including that one 
which produces self-consciousness, in relation to the three others forms of intensive unity 
that Aquinas enumerates (e.g. the soul, self-knowledge, and the intelligent alignment of 
desires). The resulting argument will be that egoic self-consciousness “rests” on two pre-
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ceding types of pre-reflective intensive unity (i.e. the soul and that of primary identifica-
tion). Furthermore, in its successful formation and operation, egoic self-consciousness 
derivative unlocks, as we discussed above, all of our intelligent capacities (e.g. the intel-
lect and the will) precisely because its coalesced intensive unity founds the subject side of 
the subject-object divide. As such, self-consciousness is a necessary key for forging both 
of the other two types of intensive unity: reflective self-knowledge and the alignment of 
our desires in relation to both reason (penultimately) and God (ultimately). In this precise 
connection, the relation between egoic self-consciousness and our longing for the infinite 
will finally come into light. By unlocking our intelligent capacities, the dawning of self-
consciousness really does thrust us toward that “object”—unknown as of yet—from 
whom our longing for infinity originates and in whom alone it can find utter satisfaction: 
the God who, as Aquinas affirms following Augustine, is genuinely an infinite unity of 
truth and goodness. 
V. Some Methodological and Terminological Notes 
 
Before launching into this itinerary there are three additional methodological notes and 
one terminological note to make clear before proceeding. The first two methodological 
notes stem from my intent, illustrated by my broad alignment with Schleiermacher’s the-
ological approach to self-consciousness, my main sources in Augustine/Aquinas, and my 
goal to situate self-consciousness within the overall Creator/creation relation, that what 
follows be a work in constructive Christian theology. This is further reflected in my con-
viction, which I will expand upon in the overall Conclusion at the end of this study, that 
the theological anthropology set out here has a number of contributions to make in broad-
er theological, and even pastoral contexts (e.g. a theology of desire that grounds deriva-
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tive theologies of marriage, sexuality and soteriology) beyond the scope of this particu-
larly project. In fact, one of the immediate impetuses of this project was an increasing 
frustration with cumulative points of incoherence surrounding topics such as de-
sire/marriage/sexuality in contemporary theological discussions stemming from the con-
fusions that inevitably follow from trying to make constructive theological, pastoral, and 
moral judgments without possessing a maximally coherent theological anthropology on 
which to base such reasoning and reflection. From my perspective, reconstructing such a 
theological anthropology from within the confusing and fractured terrain of contemporary 
theology simply takes time, a patient stepping-back from the trendiest theological figures, 
and usually a kind of piecing together of resources from unconventional sources from the 
past. Obviously, those that I have found most helpful in this overall reconstruction are 
pre-modern theologians like Augustine/Aquinas and philosophically-maligned voices like 
Freud. 
 However, this mix of philosophical and theological resources, and here is the first 
of the notes on methodology, suggests that I should offer some description for how I un-
derstand the relationship between philosophy and theology. My approach to the discipli-
nary distinction between philosophy and theology is unapologetically defined from the 
“theological” direction of that distinction. In its specifics, my intent is to calmly practice 
a version of how Augustine and Aquinas seemed to approach this relation. Given how 
remote this approach seems from the modern university these days, I might simply add 
that they thought this understanding of philosophy and theology was imminently defensi-
ble and thus relatively uncontroversial.   
  
  47 
The easiest way to grasp this approach is to begin with the affirmation that the 
truth of creation (or being, the world, or reality) is unitary and vertical. Because of its 
unitary nature, all attempts to explain phenomena encountered in creation according to 
their causes are organically related to one another and arise from a common (and God-
given) desire for truth. Because of its vertical nature, human knowledge is ordered in 
“successive, distinct autonomous sciences” that can be noncompetitively unified and or-
dered by placing them in relations of “successively high[er] viewpoints”87 each of which 
includes the true explanations of the lower science even as it expands upon them in a 
more complex sphere of phenomenal “data.” For example: physics (subatomic and classi-
cal) gives way to the higher viewpoint of chemistry (inorganic and organic), chemistry 
gives way to the higher viewpoint biology, and biology gives way to the higher viewpoint 
of psychology.88 According to this vertical integration, I ascribe to the classical view that 
philosophy, especially that of the metaphysical variety, and theology stand at the “top” of 
this integration such that they aim at the widest possible integration of all human 
knowledge in explanations that have a maximum degree of application across the diversi-
ty of phenomena.  
Still, from the theological point of view, theology is indeed a “higher” science 
than philosophy for the simple reason that it takes into account certain “data” (i.e. divine 
revelation) that philosophy does not, even as it incorporates all genuine truths that philos-
ophy uncovers.89 This means, of course, that—when viewed from the theological perspec-
tive—philosophy and theology vertically merge together with all the other sciences into a 
trajectory in which the seamless, unitary character of truth converges upon its source in 
                                                
87 Lonergan, Insight, 3:464-65. 
88 Ibid., 3:280-81. 
89 Cf. ST I.1.1 and I.1.5. 
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God. In contrast, from the philosophical perspective certain claims of theology that draw 
upon the data of revelation remain the opposite of seamless and unitary: inexplicably un-
intelligible and/or ideologically scandalous.   
 In terms of what this means for this study, there are large portions of each of the 
chapters that follow that would be indistinguishable from a strictly philosophical reading 
of Augustine, Aquinas, or Freud. This will likely include certain parts of these chapters 
that endorse general affirmations about the existence of God, since I subscribe to Aqui-
nas’s argument that human reason unaided by grace can rationally affirm the existence of 
God as the first efficient cause of nature.90 Nonetheless, in every chapter—except perhaps 
Chapter 4—there will aspects of the exposition and/or proposal that forge ahead into the 
portions of Augustine and Aquinas that are more strictly theological, especially in their 
respective descriptions of the trinitarian imago Dei as perceptible in the acts of intelli-
gence, the nature of creatio ex nihilo, and eschatological telos of human de-
sire/knowledge in union with God. In every instance in which this crossover occurs, I will 
simply press ahead with these theological themes. This is first and foremost because Au-
gustine and Aquinas do so and thus an accurate reading of them demands that we do as 
well. However, as a Christian theologian, I also simply take it to be true that a fully intel-
ligible explanation of the world and of human nature, of the kind that Frank so exactingly 
demands of Freud in the passage above, finds its fullest expression when an eminently 
intelligent God is included in the explanation as the beginning of all things, as that which 
sustains every moment of creation’s existence, and, perhaps most importantly, as the in-
finite end that all human beings were created to desire as their own highest and final end. 
                                                
90 Cf. Ibid., I.2.1. 
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 Second, many theological readers will inevitably notice how rarely I deal with 
matters of grace, faith, sin, soteriology, and christology, in my reading and constructive 
extension of Augustine and Aquinas. This decision is intentional, even though I am aware 
that in some readers’ eyes this will likely disqualify my methodology as legitimately 
“theological.” Obviously, a full rebuttal to such an objection cannot be made in such a 
brief context. What I can say, however, is that I take it for granted that a Christ-centered 
grace, faith, and salvation are required to reach the eschatological telos of desire and 
knowledge that Augustine and Aquinas affirm is coincident with knowing the Creator 
“face-to-face” (1 Cor. 13.12). I make this central affirmation not only on the basis of the-
ology’s proper revelatory sources, but also on the empirical grounds of how tragically 
scarred by sin our world is because of our distorted “knowledge” and disordered desires. 
Moreover, I fully expect that this theological anthropology can and will be extended to 
include more explicit discussions of grace, faith, soteriology, and christology.  
Nonetheless, what I reject is the stipulation that every attempt to make sense, even 
theological sense, of human beings must begin with a prolegomena in which all of those 
revelatory doctrines are made the explicit conceptual basis for one’s theological anthro-
pology. In one sense, this rejection simply follows from affirming that all rational inquiry 
(which includes all forms of theology) is dialectical and thus mutually influencing in 
terms of conceptual development. However, in a more personal sense this rejection is al-
so due to my experience in witnessing fights over revelation, soteriology, and the doc-
trine of God that end up inhibiting theologians that start there from ever actually getting 
around to the difficult task of formulating an equally robust theological anthropology. 
The pastoral and ecclesial implications of this bad habit, which has been particularly 
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damaging in Protestant theological circles, is immense and enduring. Hence: the rhetori-
cal and methodological movement of this theological project moves in the opposite direc-
tion.  
In addition to these two interrelated notes, a third emerges because a constructive 
project that engages with as many figures and themes as this one does must address the 
criteria according to which its claims should be measured. Even though my goal in each 
chapter has been (obviously) to provide an accurate and detailed reading of Augustine, 
Aquinas, and Freud, it should also be clear that the accuracy of those readings cannot be 
substituted for the successful persuasiveness of my overall constructive thesis regarding 
the nature and origin of self-consciousness.91 In terms of identifying a relevant standard 
for that thesis, I ultimately can only appeal to the reader to draw upon the data of their 
own consciousness and accompanying self-consciousness in order to test the degree to 
which the proposal set forth in these pages chimes with their self-conscious, synthetic 
experiences of sensing, desiring, and knowing—in addition to the fragility and potential 
collapse of this synthesized “I” under the pressures of what Freud describes as its threats 
such as melancholia and trauma. In appealing to this self-referential standard, however, I 
am tying myself to another common thread that holds together Aristotle, Augustine, 
Aquinas, and Freud. For these figures are some of the only intellectual voices that are still 
heeded (to one degree or another) that defend the idea that within the flux of one’s own 
phenomenal consciousness there are repeating patterns of effects—beyond the external 
senses themselves—that can be plausibly described and causally categorized according to 
                                                
91 This also means that in each chapter I have limited my engagement with secondary sources to a degree 
that is minimally necessary to justify my readings. As much as I can, I have steered clear of engaging in 
secondary debates among Augustinian, Thomistic, and Freudian scholars that stretch beyond the scope of 
my immediate purpose in reading and resourcing them. 
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names such as the “intellect” and the “will” (Aristotle/Augustine/Aquinas) and/or the 
“unconscious,” the “id,” the “ego,” and the “super-ego” (Freud). To the significant degree 
that my constructive proposal relies upon this common intellectual insistence between 
these figures, then I am simply content to cast my lot in with theirs and rely upon the 
evaluations, objections, and proposed clarifications that emerge from the reader’s own 
investigation of the data of consciousness to which they uniquely have access (i.e. their 
own). 
 Lastly, I close with one brief but exceedingly important terminological note. As I 
noted above, one of the chief challenges before us will be to try to find concepts with 
which to describe pre-reflective states prior to and/or unconsciously “beneath” our self-
conscious awareness of ourselves. One way that I will attempt to successfully steer clear 
of the circular pitfall that we have repeatedly witnessed above of reinserting the latter into 
the explanation of the former is to limit my use of words like “self,” “self-conscious,” or 
“subject” to instances when I clearly mean it to refer to fully self-conscious states and/or 
human capacities that require the prerequisite of self-consciousness and thus an aware-
ness subject/object distinction (e.g. acts that yield intelligent knowledge). In all other in-
stances, I will employ generic words like “individual,” which is to be taken simply as de-
noting the organic/physical unity of a living being (viz. what Aristotle and Aquinas call 
an “indivisible”), or “perceiver,” which is to be taken as the nominal form of a human 
individual (usually an infant) whose existence is dominated by a pre-reflective flux of 
phenomenal consciousness devoid of any accompanying quality of self-consciousness.  
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Chapter 1 
Desire, Knowledge and the Varieties of Intensive Unity:  
Augustine’s Dilemma in De Trinitate 
 
As I outlined in my Introduction, by engaging in a close reading of the second half of 
Augustine’s De Trinitate in this chapter, I will seek to accomplish a twofold purpose in 
relation to my overall constructive trajectory. First, I will describe in detail Augustine’s 
seminal insights regarding the dynamic connection between desire, knowledge and the 
varieties of intensive unity in human beings as understood within his broader construal of 
the Creator-creation relation and the imago Dei. Second, within the context of these in-
sights I will show how Augustine gets caught between affirming three different types of 
intensive unity—primal, epistemic, and teleological—and conflating these unities into a 
single type found in an always already realized reflective self-knowledge. The result is a 
circular dilemma that represents an Augustinian version of the reflection theory. Based 
upon accomplishing these two purposes, we will then turn to Aquinas’s solution to this 
dilemma (Chapters 2 and 3) and its promise for translating Freud (Chapter 4) and recon-
ceptualizing self-consciousness as a fourth type of intensive unity (Chapter 5).  
 An initial analogy might help us find a rhetorical route into De Trinitate: if Kant 
strikes upon the theme of self-consciousness in the search for what grounds the synthetic 
unities of intelligence in the first place, then it might be said that Augustine stumbles up-
on a very similar theme because of the question of God’s eternal identity as the most ab-
solute intensive unity of all. Indeed, De Trinitate is first and foremost a defense of the 
coherence of the Christian claim that the eternal God is both an absolutely simple unity 
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(i.e. there is one divine essence) and a “trinity” of three “persons:” Father, Son, and Holy 
Spirit. As Augustine states his purpose at the opening of the treatise:   
We shall undertake to the best of our ability to give [reasons] to account for the 
one and only and true God being a trinity, and for the rightness of saying, believ-
ing, [and] understanding that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are of one 
and the same substance or essence.1 
 
He unfolds this defense through two strategies that define the treatise’s two halves. In the 
first half (Books I-VII), he sets forth an exposition of the doctrine of the Trinity in con-
versation with biblical and patristic authorities. In the second half (Books VIII-XV), he 
employs the preceding exposition in an extended search for identifying an analogy of the 
divine trinitarian unity in the intelligence of the human mind.  
The framing logic for his search stems from his particular version—which he 
largely shares with Aquinas—of the biblical and Christian confession that humans are 
uniquely created in the image of God (i.e. the imago Dei). Augustine’s version of the 
imago Dei grows out of a theological appropriation of the Neoplatonic and specifically 
Plotinian exitus-reditus scheme, in which God is the unitary, infinite, immaterial, and in-
telligent principle of things both as their creative origin (i.e. exitus) and the final end to 
which each creature is designed to “return” (i.e. reditus). We will touch upon some fur-
ther details of this scheme, and particularly how Augustine integrates it with the doctrine 
of the Trinity, in a moment. However, at a minimum, what this scheme entails for Augus-
tine is that God creates (i.e. exitus) through dispersing certain repeating, or intelligible, 
patterns (i.e. “forms” or “ideas”) into the materiality of creation. These forms either de-
                                                
1 Augustine, trin. I.4. Henceforth all citations to trin. in this chapter will be included parenthetically with 
book and paragraph numbers. 
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fine the truth of a particular thing’s “whatness” (e.g. a mineral, animal, or human being, 
cf. VIII.3, X.13) or some aspect of what Augustine calls a thing’s “excellence” or “great-
ness” (e.g. its degree of goodness or justice, cf. V.11, VIII.5).   
Generally speaking, Augustine refers to the defining forms as a substance (sub-
stantia) or an essence (essentia), although for living things he also speaks of them as their 
respective “soul” (anima or animus).2 Each of these substances gives a thing a degree of 
deficient similarity (i.e. participation) to the Creator and thus is in a certain sense an onto-
logical trace of the divine. In God, these forms are immaterially united in an intelligent 
mode of life eminently unique to God as the simple unity of all truth—the eternal and 
unified “pattern” of all other formal patterns. As Augustine writes in a seminal passage 
that Aquinas often cites as well: 
For ideas are the principal forms or the fixed and unchangeable reasons of things 
that have themselves not been formed and consequently are eternal, always con-
stituted in the same way and contained in the divine intelligence. And although 
these neither come into existence or perish, nonetheless everything that can come 
into existence and perish and everything that does come into existence and perish 
is said to be formed in accordance with them.3 
 
In particular, in creation these forms are dispersed into a materially-mediated metaphysi-
cal hierarchy of beings that differentiates between those things that merely participate in 
existence (e.g. a gold nugget or a carcass), those things that participate in existence and 
                                                
2 Briefly described, Augustine uses three terms that overlap between a thing’s metaphysical principle (i.e. 
its soul) and its corresponding degree of life (e.g. existence, living, and/or intelligence). Anima refers to the 
animating principle of life (i.e. soul) “in” any living being, including all animals. Animus is closely related 
to anima, but tends to refer to the rational soul and capacities for discursive reasoning and ordering of tem-
poral matters (i.e. the “lower reason”). Mens, by contrast, refers to the fully intelligent capacities (i.e. the 
“higher reason”) for making judgments of truth and, ultimately, is “capable [capax]” (XIV.11) of contem-
plating divine wisdom and participating in its eminent intelligence.  Cf. Gerard O’Daly, Augustine’s 
Philosophy of Mind (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 7-8 and Edmund Hill, The Trinity: 
Introduction, Translation and Notes (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 1991), 258-65.  
3 Augustine, div. qu. 46. 
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life (e.g. animals or “beasts”), and those things that participate in existence, life, and in-
telligence (e.g. human beings) (VIII.3, X.13).4 In this regard, a living thing’s soul gives 
that being an absolutely primal intensive unity that bears a deficient similarity to God: as 
God is one substance, so a living thing’s soul makes it a single instance of one type of 
thing. 
The decisive difference that intelligence makes in this hierarchy consists in the 
greater degree of reditus back to God that it makes possible for human beings. For intel-
ligence gives humans a mind (mens) that is capable of epistemically grasping (i.e. under-
standing or knowing) the truth of intelligible forms in creation. In fact, in one of his most 
influential insights, Augustine asserts that human beings are created with an intense de-
sire to know the truths found in understanding. When such understanding occurs, there 
exists a formal mode of extroverted union between the knower and known: that which is 
ontologically “in” the known object is simultaneously epistemically “in” the mind of the 
knower who grasps its truth (IX.6, XV.22). In its own way, this epistemic union repre-
sents another kind of deficient God-likeness, since such knowledge of truth is a dim and 
incomplete participation in that which is God’s fully and eminently. The ultimate culmi-
nation of this reditus back to God will occur in knowing, not any of the participated 
truths in creation, but rather in fully knowing God “face to face”5 and thus in being intel-
ligently united with “truth itself” (VIII.3 and 13). For by knowing God, as Augustine of-
ten appropriates 1 Jn. 3.2 (cf. XII.22, XIV.25, and XV.21), “[W]e shall be like him be-
                                                
4 Augustine also enumerates these three levels of being in lib. arb. 2.3.7. 
5 This is Augustine’s beloved appropriation of Paul’s language from 1 Cor. 13.12. Cf. VIII.3, IX.1, XII.22, 
XIV.5, and XV.3-6. 
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cause we shall see him as he is.” While all created beings bear the generality of a simili-
tude to their Creator, only in intelligence—so Augustine argues—does such a similitude 
rise to the specified level of an image of the eminently intelligent God. Only on this level 
of creation, is there “no other nature,” save our own disastrous introduction of the barrier 
of sin, that is metaphysically “interposed between [God] and [the mind]” (XI.8; cf. 
XIV.11 and 15).6 Given this metaphysical hierarchy in creation ordered toward intelli-
gence, Augustine reasons that if an analogy of the God who is a trinitarian unity is to be 
found anywhere in creation, it will be found in the inner workings of human intelligence. 
If this exitus-reditus shape of creation frames Augustine’s search for the imago 
Dei, his dilemma, as we will see, is found in trying to tie together human existence as 
something that is always already made in the image of God and yet also genuinely teleo-
logically structured to become more like God in and through our contingent reditus back 
to the Creator. As referenced above, the answer that the rhetoric of his own overarching 
theological framework suggests is that there is a threefold variety of intensive unity (pri-
mal, epistemic, and teleological) in human existence that are each deficiently similar to 
God’s singular unity in differing ways. In the end, however, he is unable to capitalize on 
the promise of this nascent insight. Instead, he functionally conflates these three into the 
single form of a primal reflective self-knowledge always already given in the soul. In this 
regard, the result of Augustine’s dilemma is strikingly similar to Kant’s presuppositional 
approach and Fichte’s exceptional approach to self-consciousness in that it circles back 
                                                
6 Rowan Williams expresses this point well: “It is possible for human minds to be free for God, because 
there is nothing in the order of creation that intrudes between the mind and God’s self-communication.” Cf. 
Rowan Williams, “Sapientia and the Trinity: Reflections on the De Trinitate,” in Collectanea 
Augustiniana: Mélanges T.J. Van Bavel, ed. B. Bruning, J. van Houtem, and M. Lamberigts (Leuven: 
Peeters, 1990), 320.  
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into grounding intelligence in the presupposition/exception of a primal self-knowledge. 
As we will show below, the two chief culprits for this conflation are (1) Augustine’s epis-
temology, which forces him to affirm that all intelligent knowledge occurs through re-
flection, and (2) his insistence that the fulfillment of the imago Dei must not depend in 
any way on objects outside of an individual—viz. it must be “non-adventitious” just like 
God’s own eternal self-knowledge. Tellingly, as we will see in Chapters 2 and 3, Aquinas 
denies both of these assumptions in order to undo Augustine’s conflation and fully capi-
talize on the unfulfilled promise of his nascent insight regarding a variety of intensive 
unities.   
The road for deepening and demonstrating these initial judgments vis-à-vis Au-
gustine’s De Trinitate will run through two primary sections below. First, I will expand 
our initial description above regarding Augustine’s understanding of the metaphysical 
structure of creation’s exitus from the trinitarian God and the analogous constitution of 
human nature that naturally includes a desire for knowledge. Second, I will detail the as-
cent of reditus that Augustine plots for this desire as it passes through unities with sensi-
ble things, knowable things in general, and finally the mind’s reflective epistemic unity 
with itself as the highest penultimate fulfillment of the trinitarian imago Dei. At the end 
of this path of ascent in the culmination of self-knowledge we will find the crux of Au-
gustine’s circular dilemma. However, as we will see, the terms that define this dilemma 
are foreshadowed and determined by the entire trajectory that he sets for himself in de-
scribing the ascent of desire through which we were created, so Augustine argues, to in-
creasingly resemble the trinitarian simplicity of our Creator. 
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I. The Eternal Simplicity of the Triune God and the Exitus of Temporal Desire 
 
By the time that Augustine arrives in Book VIII, he has already established the basic 
terms through which he describes the simplicity of the triune God’s singular substance 
that stands as the eminent analogue of creation. His usual way of expressing this unity is 
to insist that most formal appellations of God (e.g. wise, true, good, just, loving) are to be 
attributed, strictly speaking, to God essentially, viz. “the Father is good, the Son is good, 
the Holy Spirit is good” (VIII.1). Moreover, in God there is no real distinction between 
these forms such that any plurality could be imagined in God’s being. Augustine expli-
cates this point in VIII.2 in terms of the convertibility of God’s “being” (esse), God’s 
“being” true (verum), and God’s “being” great (magnum):  
Where things are intelligible and unchangeable [viz. in God] one is not truer than 
another [viz. among the divine persons], because each is equally unchangeably 
eternal; and what makes a thing great in this sphere is simply the fact that it truly 
is [vere est] […] [I]n the essence or being of truth to be true is the same as to be, 
and to be is the same as to be great; so to be great is the same as to be true. 
 
Nor—pace Plato7—do any of these forms have any existence apart from God, and their 
derivative participations among created beings, that could be imagined as the basis for 
God’s “participation” in them. As Augustine writes in V.11, again with the example of 
greatness:  
True greatness is that by which not only is a great house great or any great moun-
tain great, but by which anything at all is great that is called great, so that great-
ness is one thing and things that are called great by it another. This greatness of 
course is primally great [primitus magna] and much more excellently so [mul-
toque excellentius] than the things that are great by partaking of it. God however 
is not great with a greatness which he is not himself, as though God were to par-
ticipate in it to be great. Otherwise this greatness would be greater than God, but 
                                                
7 Cf. Plato’s formally perfect “place above the heavens [hyperuranion topon]” (Phaedrus, 247c). 
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there is nothing greater than God. So he is great with a greatness by which he is 
himself this same greatness.  
 
In the rest of Book VIII, Augustine extends this basic insight in several directions, with a 
particular emphasis on truth, goodness, justice, and love: God is “truth itself” (VIII.3 and 
13), the “good of every good” (VIII.4), the measure of all justice (VIII.9), and, of course, 
“God is love” (VIII.11-12). The only major exception to this descriptive unity in the Trin-
ity pertains to language that expresses the distinctiveness of the intra-trinitarian relation-
ships themselves: i.e. “the trinity is not Father, the trinity is not Son, nor is the trinity Gift 
[or Spirit]” (VIII.1). Of course, because these names denote the terms of specific, intra-
divine relationships (viz. the Son is the Son of the Father and only because of this neces-
sary relationship can the Father be described as “Father”),8 these appellations are still in-
trinsically bound up with the divine unity even in their linguistic exclusivity. 
The primary way that Augustine compliments this unyielding defense of divine 
simplicity with an explicitly trinitarian doctrine of God arrives in his distinctive appropri-
ation of the broadly Hellenic, but for Augustine particularly Plotinian, emphasis on the 
metaphysical superiority—even “divinity”—of a separate (i.e. non-bodily) intelligent 
mind that knows itself such that it is constituted as a simple unity of thinking/being9 and 
knower/known. A simple reflective unity such as this would be metaphysically superior 
precisely because all that it “is”—i.e. its knowledge—is not dependent on any other be-
                                                
8 Similarly, the Spirit is the Spirit/Gift of the Father and the Son. 
9 Plotinus seems to directly appropriate the idea of theorizing a unity between thinking and being from its 
original articulation in Parmenides. Cf. Giannis Stamatellos, Plotinus and the Presocratics: A 
Philosophical Study of Presocratic Influences in Plotinus’ Enneads (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 2007), 59-79. 
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ing: it always already knows everything it knows simply by intensively knowing itself. 
As Plotinus writes in his Enneads, in a mind such as this: 
All together are one, Intellect, intellection, the intelligible [nous, noēsis, to 
noēton]. If therefore Intellect’s intellection is the intelligible, and the intelligible is 
itself, it will itself think itself: for it will think with the intellection which it is it-
self and will think the intelligible, which it is itself.10  
 
By appropriating this philosophical idea of the essentially self-knowing unity into his 
doctrine of God, and expanding Plotinus’s dyadic Intellect into the expected threeness of 
the Trinity, Augustine argues that the same understanding of God as described above as 
the eminent unity of all formal truth can be rhetorically formulated in terms of a trinitari-
an perfection of self-knowledge and self-love.  
In this formulation, the Father is the eternal “source” of all truth and the Son is the 
fullness of God’s knowledge of that truth (i.e. God’s “self-knowledge). In order to ex-
press this eternal relationship between the Father and the Son, Augustine incorporates the 
verbal (e.g. word, uttering) and natal (e.g. conceive, beget, born, offspring) metaphors 
found in Scripture and endorsed by the Nicene Creed. As he declares in XV.23: 
So the Word of God, the only-begotten Son of the Father, like the Father and 
equal to him in all things, God from God, light from light, wisdom from wisdom, 
being from being, is exactly and absolutely what the Father is, and yet is not the 
Father because this one is Son, that one Father. And thus he knows everything 
that the Father knows, but his knowing comes to him from the Father just his be-
ing does. For here knowing and being are one and the same. And thus just as the 
Father’s being is not from the Son, so neither is his knowing. Hence it is as 
though himself that the Father begot the Word equal to himself in all things. 
 
In short, the Father eternally begets the perfection of divine self-knowledge—the eminent 
form of truth—in the Son/Word, which thereby represents the immanent and eminent 
                                                
10 Plotinus, The Enneads, V.3.5.44-50. 
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ground through which the derivative truth of creation was originally spoken forth (cf. Jn. 
1.3, I.9-12, IV.3, and XV.20). Or, as Augustine writes in XV.23:  
[The] Father knows all things in himself, knows them in the Son; but in himself as 
knowing himself, in the Son as knowing his Word which is about all these things 
that are in himself. Likewise the Son too knows all things in himself, that is to say 
as things that are born from the things that the Father knows in himself, and he 
knows them in the Father as the things from which are born all the things that he 
as Son knows in himself. 
 
Similarly, Augustine adopts the close biblical affinity between the Spirit and God’s voli-
tional love in order to theorize the Spirit as the eternal bond of love between the Father 
and the Son: the “charity common to them both” (XV.10, cf. VI.7 and XV.29). Based up-
on this trinitarian elaboration of the divine essence, Augustine argues that God—
precisely as the triune perfection of self-knowledge and self-love—is the amorous unity 
of truth. 
 On the basis of this trinitarian conceptualization of divine simplicity, Augustine 
draws two closely related conclusions regarding the metaphysical relation of creation to 
the Creator that combine to establish the terms on which his “search” for the trinitarian 
imago Dei is based. First, as a deficient metaphysical reflection of God, creation is con-
stituted as a province of dispersed, derivative, and changeable reflections of the unified 
and eternally unchangeable fullness of truth in God. In this very specific manner, creation 
occurs as an exitus from God. Accordingly, creation’s truth is dispersed in a materially-
mediated hierarchy of formally defined beings that differentiates between those things 
that merely exist, those things that exist and live, and those things that exist, live, and are 
intelligent. In God, all of those appellations are unified and singular; in creation, they 
constitute the very ground of nature’s diversity. As derivative, creation’s truth has a qual-
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ified integrity unto itself—viz. gold can be known as gold (VIII.3), houses and food as 
good (VIII.4), a man as just (VIII.9), and a mind as a mind (X.5)—despite the fact that 
the exhaustive truth of all things is only apprehended by “gaz[ing] upon the truth itself 
which they were created by” (VIII.2). Later, Augustine thematizes this distinction as the 
difference between knowledge (scientia or notitia), which pertains to created things, and 
wisdom (sapientia), which pertains to divine “things” (XIII.24). As changeable, crea-
tion’s truth is subject to a divide, totally foreign to God, between the truth of a thing’s 
substance and a thing’s vacillating and idiosyncratic forms of excellence. In VIII.3, Au-
gustine states this contrast by extending the example of truth and greatness into the creat-
ed realm of bodies and souls: 
But with bodies it can happen, for instance, that this gold is as equally true as that, 
and yet this is greater than that, because here greatness is not the same as truth 
and it is one thing for it be gold, another to be great. So too with the nature of the 
human soul it is not called a true spirit by the same kind of token as it is called a 
great spirit. A man who is not great-spirited [magnanimus] still has a true spirit. In 
both cases the reason is the essence or being of body and of spirit is not the being 
or essence of truth; but the trinity is, which is the one, only great God, true, truth-
ful, truth [verus, verax, veritas].11 
 
In this suggestive passage, Augustine seems to be working with a kind of distinction that 
Aquinas formalizes through his correlation of essence with a thing’s formal truth—its 
whatness—and existence with a thing’s relative forms of goodness. The former category 
is a binary state of given truthfulness and intelligibility (e.g. gold is either gold or not 
gold); the latter category admits to ongoing, open-ended vacillation (e.g. a thing’s good-
ness can “diminish or increase,” VIII.5). Both types of forms are, however, creatively 
rooted in the simplicity of God’s intelligent self-knowledge and, precisely as such, are 
                                                
11 Emphasis added. 
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capable of being understood by the human intellect and its corresponding “judgments of 
truth” (VIII.4; IX.10 and 11). 
The second corollary stemming from God’s triune simplicity establishes the met-
aphysical ground of desire as that which propels human beings in their intended reditus 
back to the Creator. According to Augustine, the open-ended character of creatures’ ex-
cellence engenders in them a natural desire, an appetitus, for the telos of their own per-
fect happiness. Whereas God definitively does not “look for” (X.10) that which God al-
ready perfectly and simply is—i.e. the most desirable “object” of all—human beings are 
created with a pulsing “desire to find [appetitus inveniendi]” (IX.18) something that will 
finally make them happy. “All [people],” as Augustine writes, “want to be happy, and 
they yearn [appetant] for this one thing with the most ardent love they are capable of, and 
yearn for other things simply for the sake of this one thing” (XIII.18). Ultimately, of 
course, according to Augustine the “one thing” that genuinely brings happiness is the es-
chatological fullness of being epistemically and amorously united with God “face to 
face.” As he declares succinctly, “[I]f you cling to [God] in love, you will straightaway 
enter into bliss” (VIII.5). Or as he later defines love in VIII.10: “True love then is that we 
should live justly be cleaving to the truth.”  
However, as Augustine describes in vivid detail throughout his oeuvre, the path of 
ascent from the inborn desire for happiness to its possible eschatological culmination “in 
God [in deo]” (IX.13) is a fraught one, to say the least. Some of this difficulty is simply 
tied to creation’s constitutive (i.e. structural) metaphysical distance in comparison with 
God, while another dimension of challenge is due to the added complexity of our sinful 
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embrace of objects that we mistakenly thought would make us happy. For the moment, 
let us stay with the structural conditions that contribute to the drama of our desire finding 
its way “home” in union with God.12 The most important structural hurdle to this culmi-
nation can be described succinctly: whereas in God there is no temporal division between 
that which God perfectly knows and loves (i.e. God eternally knows and loves Godself), 
in human beings there is an open-ended differentiation between the power that chiefly 
directs our desire for happiness (i.e. the will), various powers that procure different types 
of desirable “objects” in search of that happiness (i.e. the senses and the mind/intellect), 
and the power that loves or delights in those objects that have thereby been secured (i.e. 
the will). Similarly, the participated character of creation entails that there is a structural 
tension intrinsic to the placement of our desire for happiness in the middle of a world 
populated by other, much more proximate, potential objects of our desire in comparison 
to God. On the one hand, our desire for these objects is always due, to one degree or an-
other, to the fact that every created thing reflects a certain similitude of the ultimate de-
sirability and goodness of God. On the other hand, the challenge is always to guard 
against the “mistake” (X.11) of confusing of these derivatively desirable objects as some-
thing that could really and finally satisfy our desire for happiness.  
These structural aspects of creation form the metaphysical background for two of 
the more experiential elements that define Augustine’s account of desire’s reditus and/or 
ascent back to God. First, they establish creation as a region characterized by a certain 
benign multiplicity in comparison with God’s simplicity. This multiplicity is experienced 
                                                
12 Cf. Augustine, doct. chr. I.xi.  
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both immanently, in the open-ended plurality of our powers, and externally, in the diver-
sity of goods that somehow resemble the desirability and goodness of God. Aquinas 
would later pick up on this Augustinian principle governing the Creator-creation relation 
and reformulate it as an oft-repeated metaphysical axiom: “Whatever is divided and mul-
tiplied in creatures exists in God simply and unitedly.”13  
Second, Augustine often counsels his readers that the ascent of desire can only be 
successfully negotiated when we engage with the diversity of created goods with a degree 
of restraint that signals our lived awareness that ultimately our desire for happiness can 
be satisfied in God alone. Augustine first articulated his most famous collection of meta-
phors for this dynamic in de doctrina christiana. There he speaks of a “trek” or “voyage” 
back to our “homeland” with God in which some things are to be “used” (uti)14 and others 
to be “enjoyed” (frui): 
There are some things which are to be enjoyed (fruendum), some which are to be 
used (utendum), and some whose function is both to enjoy and use. Those which 
are to be enjoyed make us happy; those which are to be used assist us and give us 
a boost so to speak, as we press on towards our happiness, so that we may reach 
and hold fast to the things which make us happy.15 
                                                
13 Aquinas, ST I.14.1.ad2. Cf., as well, ST I.13.4.ad3. 
14 Some commentators have used the unfortunate semantic overlap between uti and our modern sense of 
“being used” in order to lodge criticisms that Augustine is hereby affirming some kind of depersonalized 
“instrumentalization” of human relationships. In my judgment, nothing could be further from an accurate 
reading of Augustine on this point. Rowan Williams is one of the few readers who has stayed with the lan-
guage long enough to accurately highlight that Augustine is actually advocating a kind restraint for desire 
that is readily amendable to warning against the violence that can often ensue when we expose other people 
to the full force of our desire and/or wounded/angry desire. As Williams writes, “The language of uti is 
designed to warn against an attitude towards any finite person or object that terminates their meaning in 
their capacity to satisfy my desire, that treats them as the end of desire, conceiving my meaning in terms of 
them and theirs in terms of me. ‘If you settle down in that delight and remain in it, making it the end and 
sum of your joy, then you can be said to be enjoying it in a true and strict sense’ (I.xxxiii); and no such 
cessation of desire is legitimate in relation to finite objects of love. It is painfully absurd, as well as destruc-
tive of self and others, to conclude our exploration when we are in reality still in via, still being formed and 
transformed by what we receive (I.xxxiii).” Cf. Rowan Williams, “Language, Reality and Desire in 
Augustine’s De Doctrina,” Journal of Literature & Theology 3, no. 2 (1989): 140. 
15 Augustine, doct. chr. I.iii. 
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As he suggests in this passage, there are indeed created goods that can be “enjoyed” in a 
certain qualified sense as penultimate goods. However, Augustine tends to reserve the 
technical sense of something to be “enjoyed” as that which we finally identify as the 
source of our ultimate happiness. “If you settle down,” as he writes in doct. chr. I.iii, “in 
that delight and remain in it, making it the end and sum of your joy, then you can be said 
to be enjoying it in a true and strict sense.”16 Or as he repeats the point in De Trinitate, 
“We enjoy [fruimur] things […] when the will reposes in them because it is delighted by 
them for their own sakes; we use [utimur] things when we refer them to something else 
we would like to enjoy” (X.13). Every created object is intended by God as a sign-post, a 
“refreshment, or even a night’s lodging for a traveler” (XI.10),” after which we were cre-
ated to “press on” (IX.1; Phil. 3.13) in our journey back to God. If we successfully situate 
these other goods as simply one juncture along this journey, some of which are more de-
cisive than others, but all of which are still merely penultimate ends, then we successfully 
“refer them” to our ultimate end and thus “use” them in the precise manner that Augus-
tine advocates as central to the ascent of our desire.  
II. Ascending to the Trinitarian Imago Dei and the Crux of Augustine’s Dilemma 
 
The influence of this overarching Augustinian theme of the reditus ascent of desire 
shapes the entire organization of the second half of De Trinitate. In Books VII-X, Augus-
tine makes an initial foray into identifying the trinitarian imago Dei, at the end of 
which—in the conclusion of Book X—he seems to settle on memory/intelligence/will 
                                                
16 Ibid., I.xxxiii. This is Rowan William’s translation. Cf. Williams, “Language, Reality and Desire in 
Augustine’s De Doctrina,” 140. 
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(X.17-18) as the most promising triad in the mind in comparison to several others that he 
variously considers, such as lover/loved/love (VIII.14 and IX.2) and the mind/its 
knowledge of itself/its love for itself (IX.8). However, at the beginning of Book XI Au-
gustine takes a rhetorical step backward in order to consider several “lesser” trinitarian 
analogies that can be deciphered in the so-called “outer man,” which is typified by the 
material operation of the senses instead of the “inner man” that is typified by the immate-
riality of intelligence (XI.1). These lesser analogies then preoccupy him for the length of 
Book XI. In Books XII-XIII, he then analyzes how desire gets sinfully “stuck” in the sen-
sible and how Christ remedies this condition by reenabling an ascent from the sensible, to 
a knowledge of creation’s penultimate intelligibility, and finally, by grace, to the eschato-
logical fullness of divine wisdom (XIII.24). Following this detour, Augustine then returns 
in earnest to the left behind trinitarian analogies of the “inner man” in Books XIV-XV.  
 The primary reason that Augustine steps back to consider the lesser trinitarian 
analogies of the outer man is that he wants to allow the reader’s mind more “practice” 
(IX.17) and “exercise” (XV.10) by analyzing the operations of the senses before attempt-
ing the much more difficult task of analyzing the inner workings of the mind itself. Even 
though he remains convinced that the fullness of the imago Dei can only be found in the 
higher operations of the mind, there is something about visible and external things—and 
they way our senses forge extroverted unions with them—that are “more familiar to deal 
with” in comparison with “intelligible things” (XI.1). Accordingly, because everything 
“bear[s] a likeness [similitudinem] to God after its own kind and fashion” (XI.8), Augus-
tine suspects that the senses might provide an aptly paced primer for the reader to begin 
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grasping the contours of how he is applying the subtleties of trinitarian doctrine to an ex-
planation of anthropological phenomena.  
 Augustine intends the pedagogy of this strategy to be applicable well beyond the 
straightforward goal of grasping his argument in De Trinitate. In this sense, his “search” 
for a trinitarian analogy should never be confused with some bald apologetic campaign 
for displaying the “logic” of the Trinity. Instead, he intends the cumulative ascent from 
the “lesser” analogies of the senses to the “higher” analogies of the mind to mimic the 
ascent of desire itself. As such, Augustine hopes that the cumulative rhetorical path of his 
treatise will stand as a practicing ground and roadmap for the reader’s own steady rise 
from the mere desire of the sensible to the more admirable desire of the intelligible that 
runs through the truth of knowing created things and, by grace, eschatologically passes 
into wisdom.17 By rhetorically walking the reader through this direction of desire’s as-
cent, Augustine hopes that the path of his search for the imago Dei will double as a spir-
itual path—a via—through which this same image is gradually renewed in us as we learn 
to “[transfer our] love from temporal things to eternal, from visible to intelligible, [and] 
from carnal to spiritual things” (XIV.23).   
 For our purposes, this roadmap is fortuitous because it furnishes a detailed ac-
count of the progressive line of reasoning that Augustine follows in relating the senses’ 
extroverted unities and the mind’s intelligent unions between knower-known before zero-
ing in—problematically as it turns out—on the unique status of self-knowledge as the 
intensive unity that most closely resembles God’s own eternal unity. Tracking this line of 
                                                
17 Cf. Ellen T. Charry, By the Renewing of Your Minds: The Pastoral Function of Christian Doctrine (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1999), esp. 120-54. 
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reasoning consistently can easily produce consternation among first-time readers of De 
Trinitate. Part of the reason for this frustration can be attributed, as Rowan Williams 
rightly observes,  to “[Augustine’s] diffuse exposition and reluctance to settle on a single 
technical vocabulary.”18 On a deeper level, however, Augustine is constantly drawing up-
on his version of the Creator-creation analogy that we outlined above—especially the 
centrality of God’s supreme simple unity—in order to interpret the various extroverted 
and intensive unities found in anthropological phenomena in a manner that seemed self-
evident to him, but which has grown out of favor in both philosophical and theological 
circles to an extent that Augustine’s application of it can induce conceptual dizziness 
among modern readers.  
 Accordingly, it will help us to state at the outset some of the logic behind how 
Augustine applies this analogy in the ascent from the sensible to the intelligible that he 
describes in Books XI-XV. Most crucially, Augustine interprets the adequacy of each 
kind of trinitarian similitude according to four vectors (or gradients) that he understands 
as governing desire’s movement upward through different unities into an increasing re-
semblance to the Trinity’s own simplicity. When combined, these vectors portray an as-
cent of desire that gradually migrates (1) from the materially sensible to the immaterially 
intelligible, (2) from the temporally changeable to the eternally unchangeable, (3) from 
the adventitiously external to the non-adventitiously interior; and (4) from the multiple to 
the supremely singular. Even upon an initial glance, one can see how each of these vec-
tors reflects different aspects of God’s triune simplicity. However, things are not as al-
                                                
18 Williams, “Sapientia and the Trinity,” 318. 
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ways straightforward when Augustine reads them into the complexity and multiplicity of 
anthropological phenomena.  
 By drawing upon these initial observations, my goal from here is to explain how 
the terms through which Augustine explicates the ascent of desire through an increasing 
resemblance to the Trinity’s simplicity sets the stage for his dilemma regarding self-
knowledge that ends up causing him to conflate the primal, epistemic, and teleological 
instances of intensive unity suggested by his exitus-reditus scheme. I will do so in three 
subsections that follow. First, I will consider the lesser trinitarian analogies drawn from 
the senses and the corresponding perils that Augustine perceives when we turn our desire 
for happiness “onto” the temporality of sensible things. Second, I will turn to the more 
exact analogies to be found the mind’s grasping of knowledge as an extension of desire’s 
“long[ing] open-mouthed to know a thing” (IX.18). Lastly, I will consider the crux of 
Augustine’s dilemma when he focuses on endorsing the reflective act that yields self-
knowledge as the clearest instance of the imago Dei short of our actual eschatological 
union with God face-to-face.  
a. Practicing with the Perils of Sensible Unities 
As I have just signaled, what we find in examining Augustine’s consideration of the “les-
sons” (documenta) that can be gathered from the trinitarian analogies in the “outer man” 
(XI.1) is that he threads into this discussion a concomitant expansion of his oft-repeated 
warning regarding the ease with which our desire becomes “stuck” (X.11) in loving the 
material delights of sensible things. Taking note of this accompanying commentary will 
be important for us because, as we will see, Augustine’s resulting leeriness regarding 
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sensible things significantly shapes the way that he ends up elucidating the nature of both 
knowledge and self-knowledge. 
 Upon analyzing how the senses’ work, Augustine proposes two trinitarian ana-
logues that are perceptible in how they enable an individual to become united to the sen-
sible object at hand. Each of these triads is taken from the faculty of external sight and its 
internal analogue, the “mental vision” of the imagination (XI.1). This choice is largely 
due to Augustine’s endorsement of the ancient Hellenic judgment that sight is the “most 
excellent of the body’s senses” (XI.1) because it is seemingly the most immaterial. He 
does, however, indicate that comparable phenomena could be found in the other senses 
since “[w]hat one tells us will go for the others” (XI.1.).  
 The first triad comes from the common experience of simply seeing an external 
object.  Within this act, he identifies a triad made up by (1) the external bodily thing, (2) 
the internalized image (phantasia) of that thing such that it can thereby be “seen,” and (3) 
the will’s “intention joining the two together” (XI.2). The first two elements are relatively 
straightforward in their relation. The internalized image is a dematerialized impression 
(impressa)19 of the bodily thing such that it is virtually rendered in the individual through 
                                                
19 Augustine likely imports this Stoic term through Cicero. In his Academica, Cicero cites both the Greek, 
phantasia (as Augustine employs here in trin.), and his own Latin translation, visum, while discussing Ze-
no’s thought that founded Stoicism, even while he consistently translates the Greek term (tuposis) appro-
priated from the actual wax impression of a signet ring into the Latin verb imprimo and its conjugated par-
ticiple impressa. Cf. Academica, I.6.18-19, I.11.40-42. Sarah Catherine Byers confirms this line of thought 
by arguing persuasively in detail that Augustine’s employment of “impression” language seems to reflect 
the Stoic version of a “cataleptic impression” (Gk. katalēptikē phantasia). Cf. Sarah Catherine Byers, 
Perception, Sensibility, and Moral Motivation in Augustine: A Stoic-Platonic Synthesis (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013), 23-54. To fill out the terminology, the adjective katalēptikē comes 
from the verb katalambanein, to grasp or get a grip on, meaning that it is through the sensitive impression 
that the mind “gets a grip on reality.” Cf. R.J. Hankinson, “Stoic Epistemology,” in The Cambridge 
Companion to the Stoics, ed. Brad Inwood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 60, n.1.  
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the power of sight. Like many of his Platonic and Stoic influences, Augustine cites the 
example of a signet ring as a metaphor for this process. As a signet ring impresses the 
wax into its own shape, so does whatever is sensed impress its form onto the senses’ in-
herent formability and then subsequently appear to the sensing individual in the form of 
phantasia (IX.10, XI.3).20 The resulting union between the enduringly material object and 
its immaterial image “in” the seer attracts Augustine as an analogy to the Father and Son 
in the Trinity precisely because the seen object and internalized image appear so united to 
the point that we usually forget that this redoubling of objects occurs at all.21 Short of a 
rational analysis of what occurs in the act of sight (XI.5), “we cannot tell the form of the 
body we see apart from the form which it produces in the sense of the seer—not at least 
                                                                                                                                            
Despite the unquestionably remarkable contribution that Byers makes in Perception, Sensibility, and 
Moral Motivation in Augustine, it remains a conundrum for why she entirely leaves out any consideration 
of impressa and imprimo in her rather detailed account of Augustine’s incorporation of the Stoic notion of 
impression into his anthropology and psychology (e.g. pp. 23-54). Instead, she repeatedly only refers to 
passages in Augustine’s corpus in which he translates impression as phantasia, which reflects the wider 
practice in Stoic secondary literary (e.g. Ibid., 6o, n.1.), or Cicero’s translation of visum, which is interest-
ingly a term that does not appear at all in trin. in contexts even remotely related to Stoic impressions. Un-
doubtedly, this lacuna is at least partially due to the fact that trin. is of little direct relevance to her thesis, 
which is much more heavily focused on conf., civ., and his sermons. My primary purpose in making this 
observation is not to push too hard on what would likely end up being a (very) minor question mark over 
her genealogy of the Stoic influence on Augustine’s psychology. Rather, it is to underline the fact that the 
phantasia/visum and the tuposis/impressa terms do in fact name logically distinct elements in Augustine’s 
psychology that should not be too quickly elided together in light of the fact that, as I will argue when I 
turn to consider Augustine’s epistemology in the next subsection, he extends the notion of impressa past 
the point in which there is any corresponding phantasia (or phantasmate) doing the impressing. Instead, the 
soul itself if impressed by God the “form(s) of truth” (IX.11) or a “notion of goodness” (VIII.4) from which 
we are able to express judgments of truth (cf. IX.18). 
20 Cf. Victor Caston, “Augustine and the Greeks on Intention,” in Ancient and Medieval Theories of 
intentionality, ed. Dominik Perler, Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters (Leiden: Brill, 
2001), 35-37. 
21 James F. Ross represents one of the few contemporary philosophers who rightly defends the philosophi-
cal and scientific coherence of insisting that the intellect in fact needs dematerialized virtualizations in or-
der to attain to understanding. Cf.  James F. Ross, “Immaterial Aspects of Thought,” The Journal of 
Philosophy 89, no. 3 (1992): 136-50 and “Adapting Aquinas: Analogy and Forms,” Proceedings of the 
American Catholic Philosophical Association 78 (2005): 41-58. 
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by the same sense, because the two coincide so exactly that there is no overlap to tell 
them apart by” (XI.3).  
 To these two central elements of thing and image, Augustine describes the will’s 
intention (intentio) as that which makes the sensitive union possible in the first place. If 
in God intelligently knowing and volitionally loving are eternally one in the divine es-
sence, then Augustine conceptualizes the will’s act of intention in human beings as a pre-
liminary “coupling [copulandam]” (XI.7 and 12) between the desiring individual and a 
specific object to be subsequently sensed, known, and/or loved. In this way, intention is 
the will’s desiderative act of directing various powers (e.g. the senses and the intellect) to 
pay attention to a certain object (cf. X.10). As Augustine writes in XI.7 in regard to the 
senses, “[W]hen the will stretches out [intenditur] to [sensible] things in desire [cum ap-
petendo] […] the vivid images [of sight] are impressed on the attention.” Consequently, it 
can be affirmed that this intention of the will not only joins the sensible thing and its im-
age together in the first place, but that they remain together only for as long as the will 
continues “holding the gaze” of the eyes in that direction (XI.3).  
 The second trinitarian similitude takes another step inside the seeing individual 
beyond the initial visual image and into the way that traces of those images are stored up 
in our memory (cf. X.11). Following this storage, the will can draw upon those mnemic 
traces in order to “fabricate images [ficto phantasmate] with which to think about those 
things” again (IX.10). In order to describe this process, Augustine inverts the notion of an 
image’s “impression” on the senses and the memory. Accordingly, the act of recall does 
not produce the original image, but rather expresses a new image that is “off-printed [ex-
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primitur] from the one held in the memory” (XI.6). This off-printed image then serves as 
the intended object toward which the will can reflectively “form the attention in the act of 
recall” (XI.6). Hence we have the three terms of Augustine’s second triad: (1) the memo-
rial trace of a sensible body, (2) its derivative, “off-printed” image to inner sight, and (3) 
the will that directs the “attention here and there and back again to be formed, and once 
formed keeps it joined [conjungit] to the image in the memory” (XI.7). “Just as it is the 
will,” as Augustine writes in XI.15 to fill out volitional analogy between the two simili-
tudes, “which fastens [adjungit] sense to body, so it is the will which fastens memory to 
sense and thinking attention [cogitantis aciem] to memory.” 
 As measured by the four vectors outlined above, the overall deficiencies of these 
two similitudes in comparison to the ideal of God’s simplicity are fairly easy to enumer-
ate. Given that both triads are thoroughly bound up with the vacillating temporality of 
sensible things, neither of them makes any progress toward the eternally unchangeable. 
Likewise, the dematerialization that takes place in the formation of sensible images de-
notes a small progression toward the immaterial, but obviously neither analogy involves 
the immateriality of the intelligible forms that the intellect alone can grasp. However, 
when measured according to the other vectors (multiplicity/simplicity and exter-
nal/interior), the verdict is of a more mixed variety. If one compares the two analogies, 
there is a noticeable progression from the extroverted multiplicity of beings involved in 
external sight to the relative intensive unity involved in the act of recollection. Whereas 
in external sight there are two different beings involved (i.e. seer and seen), in recollec-
tion all the powers belong to one being (i.e. its memory, an immanently off-printed im-
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age, and its will). In addition, as we already noted, there is an act of immanent reduplica-
tion involved here that is distantly reminiscent of the eternal begottenness between Father 
and Son (cf. XI.9). Similarly, an evaluation according to the standard of externali-
ty/interiority points in the same direction: in comparison with the kind of sight that sees 
an external object, the triad of memory, recollective “sight,” and internal intention occurs 
completely “inside and there is nothing in it apart from the nature of the soul itself [ipsius 
animi naturam]” (XI.12). There are, of course, still deficiencies with these two levels of 
progression (e.g. the memory still originated from the outside and the off-printed image is 
still of another being, cf. XI.16), but these similarities of singularity and interiority are 
enough that, as Augustine declares, they “suggest points which may help us to see truer 
and more inward things with a surer and more practiced eye” (XI.11). 
 When one turns to consider the degree of desire’s ascent that can be traced from 
these two different kinds of acts related to the senses, it is immediately evident that Au-
gustine is moving along the same vectors toward singularity and interiority in order to 
articulate what he considers to be the perils of lingering too long with sensible things. We 
should make clear that in setting forth this warning Augustine is under no illusion that the 
human life in fact requires some attention to the “the utilization of changeable and bodily 
things” (XII.12, cf. XII.17). In fact, he even advocates the necessity of the mind “deputiz-
ing” its rational capacities for the sake of “governing [gubernandis]” (XII.2) these arenas 
of life. The point is of some importance to Augustine because it underlines the mind’s 
essential unity despite its varying preoccupations (cf. XII.4): the intelligence that we use 
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to negotiate our daily lives is the exact same faculty “capable of recognizing God [potest 
esse agnitio dei]” (XII.12) and thus fully reflecting the image of God. 
Nevertheless, as Augustine sees it, the risk of this deputization is that an individu-
al’s intelligent powers will “forget” (cf. X.7) the telos of its desire in knowledge/wisdom 
and thus fail to return from the sensible realm in order to consider that which is “non-
bodily and everlasting” (XII.3).22 Instead, sin arises when our desires become habitually 
attached to sensible things (and their delights) such that we “[twist] our appetite for hap-
piness onto them” (XII.21) and even mistakenly think that the mind is itself a material 
thing with a correspondingly material and external telos (cf. X.7-16). In this way, disor-
dered desire becomes “stuck” in the sensibly exterior and, as Augustine memorably 
writes of himself in the Confessions, “lost in multiplicity.”23 The inverse of this sin points 
to the teleological intensive unity, which we will elaborate upon in a minute, that would 
accrue to us if we would desire to enjoy God alone. For if we had stayed on the path to-
ward pursing the singularity of God’s wisdom, we could have “enjoy[ed]  the whole uni-
verse of creation” via its their eminent unity “in God.” Instead, in sin we transform the 
benign multiplicity of our powers and creation’s participated goods into the fully patho-
logical multiplicity of serially fastening our desire for happiness onto sensible thing after 
sensible thing. Augustine describes this dynamic in detail in XII.14, in a passage that 
combines the rhetoric of interiority and the uti/frui shape of desire’s ascent: 
And so [the soul] finds delight in bodily shapes and movements, and because it 
has not got them with it inside, it wraps itself in their images […] In this way it 
                                                
22 Augustine compares this forgetfulness to Adam’s forgetfulness of his vassal-like charge in Genesis 1.28-
30. Cf. XII.17. 
23 Augustine, conf. 2.1.1. 
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defiles itself foully with a fanciful sort of fornication by referring all its business 
to one or other following ends (fines): curiosity, searching for bodily and temporal 
experience through the senses, swollen conceit, affecting to be above other souls 
which are given over to their senses; or carnal pleasure, plunging itself in this 
muddy whirlpool. 
 
Despite Augustine’s qualification that there is a certain extent to which we must engage 
with sensible things in order to carry out the daily responsibilities of our lives, what we 
find in following the continued trail of his search for the imago Dei is that the association 
of the senses’ inherent extroverted multiplicity with the nature of sin ends up shaping his 
entire line of reasoning long after he has finished considering the analogies from the 
“outer man.” As one might already see, the desire for self-knowledge is a prime candidate 
for naming a comparatively virtuous progression towards non-adventitious interiority and 
singularity (viz. the immanence of reflection and the singularity of knowing oneself). In 
many ways, the terms that make up the trajectory of his forthcoming dilemma regarding 
self-knowledge are already nascently present within his comparison of these lesser trini-
tarian analogies.  
b. The Promise of Intelligible Unities between Knower and Known 
Before proceeding to consider the specific case of self-knowledge, however, we must 
first attend to the higher trinitarian analogy that Augustine finds in the intellect’s 
knowledge of truth in general and the will’s subsequent love of that knowledge. Despite 
the promise that Augustine unquestionably associates with the union between knower and 
known, it is important to note at the outset that even here Augustine continues to warn his 
readers about the trap of desire’s getting sinfully “stuck” in a vain pursuit of knowledge 
apart from “referring” it to final end of divine wisdom. Augustine names this temptation 
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as that of aimless intellectual “curiosity,” which occurs with the penultimate “loveliness” 
of knowledge can so “inflame” our desire for happiness that we are “carried away by the 
mere love of knowing unknown things for no known reason” at all (X.2-3). When we en-
gage in this type of learning, knowledge becomes an end in itself and thus falls sinfully 
short of the true image of God being fulfilled in us. Accordingly, even in seeking—and 
analyzing the nature of knowledge—Augustine is insistent that we must always inten-
tionally press forward (and upward) in the “desire to know what remains” (X.2). 
  With this qualification in place, we can proceed to observing that at the heart of 
the promise that he encounters in considering the nature of knowledge stands one of Au-
gustine’s most original philosophical and theological contributions. This contribution is 
his analysis of the mental phenomenon that he names as the “inner word” (verbum interi-
us). Briefly defined, the inner word is what emerges in the intellect when it comes to 
know (or understand) something for the first time. There is a certain analogy to be made 
between the sensitive phantasia and the inner word: as the former is the interiorized im-
age of a sensible thing, so is the latter the interiorized knowledge of any given thing. The 
decisive difference, of course, is that the knowledge that an inner world yields entails 
grasping, not any of the endlessly vacillating sensible qualities of a thing, but rather one 
of the intelligible forms that characterizes a thing’s substance (e.g. gold, an animal, or a 
human being) or one of its forms of excellence (e.g. goodness or justice).  
According to Augustine, when the mind understands these forms, the knowledge 
that it thereby secures emerges in the intellect as a preverbal and prelinguistic “word” that 
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forms the immanent, signifiable basis for any subsequent external words that we utter in 
order to explain our understanding to others. As Augustine writes in IX.12: 
We conceive true knowledge of things […] as a kind of word that we beget by ut-
tering inwardly [habemus et dicendo intus gignimus], and that does not depart 
from us when it is born. When we speak to others we put our voice or some bodi-
ly gesture at the disposal of the word that abides within, in order that by a kind of 
perceptible reminder the same sort of thing might happen in the mind of the lis-
tener as exists in and does not depart from the mind of the speaker. 
 
As one probably expects, Augustine imports the verbal (i.e. word, utter, speak) and natal 
(i.e. conceive and beget) metaphors to describe the nature of knowledge from the biblical 
and trinitarian discourse that we noted above regarding the Son’s (or Word’s) eternal 
“begottenness” from the Father. As the Father “utters” the Word (or “begets” the Son) as 
the eternal form of all truth, so too does our intellect “utter” a word when we understand 
any created form. For the moment, however, what is most important to underline here is 
to recall that this inner word implies a formal unity between the knower and the known. 
Hence, Augustine can affirm that it is in the word that the knower is “most like the thing 
known and most its image” (XV.22).  
In order to complete the trinitarian analogy centered on the inner word, Augustine 
needs to pair this phenomenon with two other elements in the “inner man:” (1) some kind 
of created analogue in the mind for the eternal fullness of the Father as that “from which” 
the Son/Word is begotten/uttered and (2) a description of the will’s act of love that ties 
together this analogue of the Father with the knowledge of the inner word. Finding and 
articulating the first element is by far the more difficult task and Augustine’s rhetoric re-
flects this fact. Its difficulty parallels the entire problematic that Kant inherited from 
Locke and Hume regarding the relationship between the senses and intellectual 
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knowledge. What is the preceding intensive unity within the knower that makes the sub-
sequent union between knower and known possible in the first place? From Augustine’s 
perspective, of course, that question makes no sense to ask of God: all there is “between” 
Father and Son is the eternal fullness of “wisdom from wisdom” (XV.23). However, what 
are the preceding conditions in humans—viz. in beings who do not always already 
“know” all truth—that makes them capable of grasping intelligible forms amidst the end-
lessly oscillating conditions of creation? For example, to cite Augustine’s formulation of 
the conundrum, how is the mind capable of judging one thing as not good, a different 
thing as good, and yet another as even better (VIII.4-5)? Or how is it capable of judging a 
particular man as “just” or another man as unjust according to an “abiding” form of jus-
tice (VIII.9; IX.11)?  
Amidst the seeming diversity of philosophical opinions that have been formulated 
in response to questions like these, it remains the fact that there are two basic and inher-
ently juxtaposed starting-points between which one must initially choose. The first op-
tion—as diversely advocated by Plato, Kant, and Fichte—begins with the assumption that 
there is an operative division between the interiorized images of the senses and the intel-
lect’s judgments of truth. Once a thinker adopts this starting-point, they are forced to pre-
suppose some kind of epistemic root of knowledge “in” the intellect or the soul that func-
tions as the foundation for all other subsequent knowledge. Plato identifies this root as 
the eternality of formal knowledge in the soul, which each reincarnated person of that 
soul has “forgotten” and must progressively “recollected.”24 As we outlined in the Intro-
                                                
24 Cf. Plato, Meno, 86a-86b. 
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duction, Kant and Fichte connect this root with the a priori (Kant) or pre-reflective (Fich-
te) structure of self-consciousness, which includes a structuring epistemic element (Kant: 
self-consciousness and the categories; Fichte: self-knowledge) that can be deductively 
presupposed in all other knowledge. The second option—the most eloquent advocates of 
which have been Aristotle and Aquinas—begins with the opposed assumption there is a 
positive operative association that can be described between the senses’ extroverted un-
ions and the intellect’s subsequent acts of understanding. This assumption frees one from 
looking for a specifically epistemic root for knowledge in the mind. However, it forces 
you to describe persuasively—as we will discuss at length next chapter—how the intelli-
gible forms are somehow “included among,”25 as Aristotle writes in De anima, the dema-
terialized phantasia delivered to it by the senses to the intellect. 
Overall, it is undeniable that Augustine, especially under the influence of the Plo-
tinus’s Neoplatonic emphasis on the metaphysical supremacy of the “inwardness” of self-
reflection and self-knowledge,26 generally opts for the first of these options as an exten-
sion of his corresponding conceptualization of divine simplicity. However, before pro-
ceeding down that road of interpretation too hastily, an initial qualification might help us 
to refrain from an overly simplistic portrayal of Augustine’s epistemology in De Trini-
tate. Despite not having access to Aristotle’s metaphysics, there are definitely moments 
in De Trinitate when Augustine seems to be having what Edmund Hill has called “good 
aristotelian [sic] doubts” about the Platonic theory of intelligible forms/ideas being in-
                                                
25 Aristotle, DA III, 8, 432a3-7. 
26 Cf. Phillip Cary, Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self: The Legacy of a Christian Platonist (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), 20-44. 
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cluded in the soul itself.27 This is most obvious when he explicitly rejects Plato’s com-
bined theories of recollection and reincarnation (XII.24). Its seems “unlikely,” as Augus-
tine concludes in alluding to the famous scene in Plato’s Meno in which Socrates ques-
tions a slave boy regarding the nature of geometry until he finally gives the correct an-
swers,28 “that everybody was a geometer in a previous life, seeing that they are such a rar-
ity in the human race that it is a job even to find one” (XII.24). Similarly, he seems to hy-
pothesize in the same discussion about the possibility of the mind grasping the “unchang-
ing” intelligible forms of a “square body” through the visual medium of a “spatial image” 
or the “arithmetic of a beautiful piece of music” through the audible medium of hearing 
that music being played (XII.23). On the basis of these observations, Augustine argues 
that it would be wrong to conclude that all of these forms were simply in the soul based 
upon “men [who] had lived here ever before they wore these bodies” (XII.24). Rather, as 
he continues in a remarkable passage the serves as an indication for the route that Aqui-
nas will take in integrating Augustine with Aristotle:  
The conclusion we should rather draw is that the nature of the intellectual mind 
has been so established by the disposition of its creator that it is subjoined to intel-
ligible things in order of nature, and so it sees such truths in a kind of non-bodily 
light that is sui generis, just as our eyes of flesh see all these things that lie around 
us in this bodily light, a light they were created be receptive of and to match. 
 
In response to this passage and others, Hill concludes with the more moderate evaluation 
that Augustine’s Platonism at times seems counterbalanced by an emerging Christian 
                                                
27 Hill, The Trinity, 341. 
28 Plato, Meno, 82a-86b. 
  
  83 
conviction—hard-won from his early days as a Manichean—regarding the “real truth 
value of the material temporal world”29 in relation to the triune Creator.  
Nevertheless, these passages remain on the rhetorical margins of De Trinitate in 
manner that do not influence the main lines of Augustine’s epistemology, especially as it 
is expressed in the ascending trinitarian analogies of the mind. Instead, as one would ex-
pect given the trajectory that he has already established, Augustine much more often fol-
lows the vector of interiority “inside” in order to affirm that God includes intelligible 
forms in the primal unity of the soul. This is the first step of Augustine’s conflation of the 
unity of the soul with the intensiveness of a reflective, epistemic unity. In order to formu-
late this affirmation conceptually, Augustine blends this broadly Platonic epistemological 
assumption with an extended use of the Stoic terminology of “impression” that he uses 
throughout to describe the operation of the senses. Accordingly, Augustine speaks of 
formal regulae (VIII.7 and 9) that God has “impressed” on the soul that enable the mind 
to accurately make judgments regarding—to take Augustine’s main examples—a thing’s 
truth, goodness, and justice. Thus, in VIII.4 Augustine writes that our ability to “make a 
true judgment” between different instances of goodness would be “impossible unless we 
had impressed on us [nobis impressa] some notion of good itself by which we both ap-
prove of a thing and also prefer one thing to another.”30 In order to know a thing truly, 
therefore, we must reflectively “consult”31 these inwardly impressed forms and apply 
                                                
29 Hill, The Trinity, 341. 
30 In VIII.8, there is also a negative example that reflects the same meaning. There Augustine explicitly 
denies that there is “standard of likeness impressed [regulam similitudinis impressam]” on our soul that 
would make possible a purely rational judgment (and thus apprehension) of the Trinity qua Trinity. 
31 This rhetorical evaluation—viz. a “consultation” of the eternal forms—of Augustine’s epistemology is 
originally Bernard Lonergan’s. Cf. Bernard J. F. Lonergan, Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas, ed. 
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them outwardly to any given perceived object. In this way, Augustine affirms a primal 
unity of the soul in which true knowledge has been divinely “rolled up and [has] to be 
unrolled in order to be perceived and enumerated” (IX.5). Augustine completes this 
blending of Platonic epistemology and with the Stoic notion of impression by drawing 
upon the inverse notion of “expression,” which, as we have already seen, has its most 
natural meaning in describing how the mind “off-prints” an image in the act of recollec-
tion, in order to specify the relation between the emergence of the inner word and the 
primal impression of forms in the soul. Hence, knowledge is “squeezed out and formed 
[quasi expressa formantur]” (IX.18) when the mind reflectively consults these forms in 
order to make an intelligent judgment. Knowledge only comes to “be” when it is 
“squeezed out” in the mind or, as he mixes his metaphors in this passage in an obvious 
allusion to trinitarian terminology, when it “com[es] to birth” in and as the inner word 
(IX.18). 
In the wake of this immanent birth of knowledge, the third element finally comes 
into view: the embrace of this knowledge such that it becomes “loved knowledge [amata 
notitia]” (IX.15). If Augustine attributes desire/intention to the will and the inner word to 
the intellect, then in the matter of love the action returns again to the will. It is perhaps 
only here when the question of love comes on the scene that the clear progression of the 
desiderative search for knowledge towards a teleological intensive unity within oneself 
that mimics (and culminates in) God’s essence as the amorous unity of truth comes into 
sharpest relief. This teleological unity occurs as a result of the will’s amorous embrace of 
                                                                                                                                            
Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran, vol. 2, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan (Toronto: 
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true knowledge. It is thus an immanent unity of love. This third form of intensive unity 
occurs penultimately in loving creation’s participated truths and ultimately in loving God 
“face-to-face.” Augustine attributes this amorous capacity to the will as an implication of 
his observation that the will’s potential for loving includes, in addition to a terminal rela-
tion to the originating desire to know, a kind of estimative and assimilative function vis-
à-vis the conceived and begotten inner word.32 As he writes at the end of Book IX:  
The same appetite with which one longs open-mouthed to know a thing becomes 
love of the thing known when it holds and embraces the acceptable offspring, that 
is knowledge, and joins it to its begetter. (IX.18) 
 
As this passage makes clear, the initial emergence of an inner word of knowledge in the 
mind is itself a preliminary affair. Everybody has experienced that what can be initially 
taken as the most profound “Aha!” can quickly degenerate into little more than a momen-
tary mistake or a hypothesis that should have been rejected outright from the very start 
(cf. IX.15). That deliberative gap between provisional understanding and convinced as-
similation of the knowledge proposed by an inner word as part of the mind’s habitual 
constitution moving forward is exactly the space that Augustine reserves for love. As 
Augustine writes in IX.13: “So love, like something in the middle, joins together our 
word and the mind it is begotten from, and binds itself in with them as a third element in 
a non-bodily embrace, without any confusion.” In this embrace, the initial intentional 
bond between knower and known blossoms into the volitionally tied union between lover 
                                                
32 The Stoic notion of voluntary assent would seem to be behind this estimative function, which Augustine 
then synthesizes with Christian and Platonic emphases on love. According to Cicero (Academica, I.9.40), 
this voluntary character of assent to impressions was one of Zeno’s innovations. Cf. Hankinson, “Stoic 
Epistemology,” 64-66 and Brad Inwood, Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism (Oxford: 
Clarendon/Oxford University Press, 1985), 42-102. 
  
  86 
and loved: the known as known has now become part of the knower. In the wake of this 
embrace, the desire to know is fulfilled in the amorous pleasure of finding and cleaving.   
 The summative trinitarian analogy that Augustine sets forth on the basis of these 
three elements is the analogy pertaining to the inner man that he speaks of most regularly: 
memory (memoria), intelligence (intelligentia), and will (voluntas). It is noteworthy, as 
we will expand up in the next section, that Augustine names the first term as “memory,” 
as opposed to, for example, a term drawn from the semantic range of the impres-
sion/expression conceptual pair. Nonetheless, “memory” not only has a long attested 
connection with the Platonic theory of recollection, but it also, and probably more im-
portantly, chimes with his moral admonition for the mind’s intellectual powers to “re-
turn” from its engagement with sensible things in order “remember” its intellectual nature 
and the corresponding source of its ultimate happiness. As we will see, the choice of 
memory within this triad contributes significantly to the terms of the dilemma that he fac-
es when he applies it in connection with the special instance of self-knowledge. 
Before finally turning to consider this dilemma, we should note the two deficien-
cies with the general analogy of mind/intelligence/voluntas that can be articulated in 
terms of the ascent toward the most transparent instance of the imago Dei. The most ob-
vious deficiency—drawn from the vector of multiplicity/singularity—is intrinsic to the 
nature of human knowledge and will not be solved short of the eschatological teleology 
of our knowledge and love passing into the union with the utter simplicity of divine wis-
dom: whereas the human intellect must accumulate knowledge “bit by bit” (XV.23) 
through a multiplicity of inner words, God simply “knows all things in himself” in the 
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eternal singularity of the divine Word (XV.23). However, the second deficiency—drawn 
from the vector of exteriority/interiority—directly contributes to Augustine’s affirmation 
of the uniqueness of self-knowledge: even though it requires an “inward” consultation, 
the act of intelligibly knowing an exterior object still results in an enacted trinitarian 
analogy that involves two distinct beings (viz. the intelligent knower and the known ob-
ject). Therefore, as Augustine admonishes the reader in a final turn in the “gradual ascen-
sion toward the interior” (XII.13),33 “Let the mind […] turn on to itself the intention of 
the will [intentionem voluntatis], which had it straying about through other things, and 
think about itself [se cogitet]” (X.11) in the desiderative search for self-knowledge.  
c. The Uniqueness of Self-Knowledge and the Crux of Augustine’s Dilemma 
Given the trajectory that Augustine has set for himself, it is not difficult to explain his 
attraction to self-knowledge (and its completion in self-love) as the centerpiece of the 
highest penultimate fulfillment of the imago Dei. Not only does it resonate with the Plo-
tinian emphasis on the metaphysical superiority of self-knowledge and Augustine’s own 
version of the simple analogue of God’s triune essence, but it also addresses the short-
coming noted above in the analogy found in knowing an adventitious object. In contrast 
to when the mind secures knowledge of an exterior object, “[W]hen the mind knows it-
self it is the sole parent of its knowledge, being itself the thing known and the knower” 
(IX.18). Whenever the mind understands itself, it begets a true word about itself that is 
genuinely identical with itself (XIV.10, 13), a la the eternal relationship between the Fa-
                                                
33 This translation is Gilles Emery’s. Cf. Gilles Emery, “Trinitarian Theology as Spiritual Exercise in 
Augustine and Aquinas,” in Aquinas the Augustinian, ed. Michael Dauphinais, Barry David, and Matthew 
Levering (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2007), 14. 
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ther and the Son. Likewise, the mind can then embrace itself in love, thus “[coupling to-
gether] begetter and begotten” (Ibid.), a la the Spirit’s eternal bond of love in the Trinity. 
In these moments of reflective epistemic self-identity and self-love, so Augustine’s rea-
soning goes, we analogically embody as far as we can in this life—enigmatically as 
through a mirror (per speculum; 1 Cor. 13.12; XV.14) to be sure—the unchangeable and 
infinitely simple intensive identity of the Trinity. 
 However, the crux of Augustine’s dilemma—as with Kant’s and Fichte’s analo-
gous difficulties—arises when he tries to conceptualize the relation between the preced-
ing, pre-reflective conditions for self-knowledge and the nature of the reflective act itself. 
In addition to his overarching commitment to the necessity of drawing the analogy be-
tween divine simplicity and self-knowledge in terms of them both being completely non-
adventitious, the contours of Augustine’s proposed solution to this immanent relation is 
determined by two incompatible factors that Augustine is forced to try to reconcile in his 
completed account of self-knowledge. As I will argue below, the terms of this forced rec-
onciliation end up producing the circular incoherence characteristic of the reflection theo-
ry: the very intensive unity that he is trying to explain (viz. the mind’s self-knowledge) 
ends up being presupposed (viz. the mind has “always” known itself) as the basis for the 
reflective act that supposedly teleologically (re)secures the mind’s knowledge of itself. 
As a result, Augustine is forced to conflate all three types of intensive unity that his theo-
logical framework suggests—the primal unity of the soul, epistemic unity of self-
knowledge, and the teleological unity of love—into a single unity that is always already 
given in the soul. 
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 The first of these factors is that Augustine acknowledges the phenomenological 
weight of what would seem to be the common experience of realizing—coming to 
“know”—something about oneself “for the first time.” Accordingly, at various points he 
is willing to apply to the mind the same terms that he uses to describe something external 
that it is possible to know (i.e. a “knowable”) and “is not known [yet]” (IX.18). Thus, in 
this type of context he can vividly describe self-knowledge as a process that progresses 
from that which is knowable to that which is in fact known. For instance, in an initial 
consideration of self-knowledge in IX.18, Augustine makes the point explicit immediate-
ly after observing that when the mind knows itself it is simultaneously “knower and 
known:” 
[The mind] was however knowable to itself [sibi ipsa noscibilis] even before it 
knew itself [antequam se nosset], but its knowledge of self was not in it while it 
did not know itself [notitia sui non erat in ea cum se ipsa non nouerat]. There-
fore, as it gets to know itself [cognoscit se parem sibi notitiam sui] it begets a 
knowledge of itself that totally matches itself, since it does not know itself less 
than it is, nor is its knowledge different in being from itself, not only because it is 
doing the knowing but also because what it is knowing is itself. 
 
This commentary is striking because it occurs in a context in which he is addressing the 
nature of knowledge in general. As an extension of this general discussion, he then eluci-
dates here an account of self-knowledge that denies that it is—to recall our terminology 
from the Introduction—something exceptional in comparison to other instances of 
knowledge specifically in regard to its passage from a latent state of knowability to one 
of being known. Just as there are many other things that are in principle knowable to the 
mind—and that become known through the emergence of an inner word of knowledge—
so too does he seem to consider that the mind might progressively become known to it-
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self as well. Despite encountering conceptual problems that cause him to backtrack from 
this initial explanation of self-knowledge, Augustine remains committed to explaining 
what exactly occurs when the mind epistemically “realizes” something about itself and 
thereby begets an auto-referential inner word.  
 In addition to this general observation, Augustine is also committed to attributing 
a certain soteriological significance to an analogous “self-recognition” (se recognoscit, 
XIV.8) that occurs when a person whose desire for happiness had become “stuck” in sen-
sible delights (re)turns to itself (cf. X.11)—by grace and through faith in Christ (cf. 
XIII.13-24)—to intend intelligible things and thereby “remembers” (cf. X.13, XIV.9) its 
intelligent nature that bears the image of God. The specific point of analogy of this “re-
membering” with the kind of self-knowledge described above in which we pass from be-
ing merely knowable to being known is found in not only it is reflective character, but 
also in its inherently contingent nature. The contingency of this reflective act of remem-
bering is punctuated by Augustine’s repeated use of the subjunctive jussive in Book X.11 
and 12 in an attempt to incite his readers toward the reflective act: “Let the mind then 
recognize itself [cognoscat ergo semetipsam] […] and think about itself [se cogitet]” and 
“Let the mind then not go looking for a look at itself [se quaerat cernere] as if it were 
absent, but rather take pains to tell itself apart as present.” At any given moment, our 
“reason or the intellect […] may appear […] to be in a coma, at another to be small, at 
another to be great,” indeed they might be “so worn away as to be almost nothing, or 
faint and distorted,” but nevertheless the “human soul is never anything but rational and 
intellectual” (XIV.6). Accordingly, Augustine repeatedly urges his readers to return to 
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and thus remember themselves by directing their minds toward considering that which is 
“more inward”(X.11)—their own intellectual powers—than any of the sensible things 
they may have been inordinately desiring. The contingency of this reflective act is unmis-
takable in De Trinitate; it stands at the very heart of the spiritual and pastoral concerns 
that periodically shine through Augustine’s often diffuse exposition of self-knowledge. 
For in turning inward to form the intensive unity of self-knowledge we not only turn 
away from our sinful forgetfulness of our intellectual nature, but we also—so Augustine 
reasons—gradually turn toward the Creator whose impression is found therein (XII.16) 
and who is in this precise sense, as Augustine seminally writes in the Confessions, “more 
interior to me than I am to myself” (interior intimo meo).34 
As I have already suggested, the second factor that influences Augustine’s ac-
count of self-knowledge is juxtaposed with this commitment to the importance of a con-
tingent reflective act. This factor can be described as Augustine’s commitment to con-
ceiving of the mind as a simple intellectual and immaterial unity that thereby grounds its 
knowledge of everything else. More specifically, it can be described in terms of his stout 
defense of this notion when faced with the familiar enigma of how to describe the relata 
of self-knowledge (i.e. what is known and what is doing the knowing?) and its relation to 
the subject/object division. Obviously, Augustine does not use the phrase self-
consciousness or even “subject” and “object.” However, the problem he is trying to solve 
here is uncannily similar with that which we described in the Introduction as whether the 
pre-reflective unity of self-consciousness involves a kind of primal self-knowledge. Ex-
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pressed in Augustine’s terms: if the mind is simultaneously characterized by something 
knowable, knowing, and known, “what are we to say then? That the mind knows itself in 
part and does not know itself in part?” (X.6).  
  One of the surest signs that Augustine is wrestling with some of the same mental 
phenomena as those that are analytically interrogated in the genealogy from Kant to 
Schleiermacher can be found in the fact that he lingers over one of the key qualitative ef-
fects—namely the “presence” of a synthesized “I”  that accompanies certain first-order 
processes—that we have thematized as being associated with the relation between phe-
nomenal consciousness and self-consciousness. For example, when trying to make more 
precise sense of what it would mean to speak—as he did in the passage quoted above—of 
the mind “not know[ing] itself,” Augustine repeatedly cites the evidence of the mind 
“knowing” that “itself” is doing something else: “it knows itself knowing something” 
(X.6, 13), “it knows that it lives” (X.6, 13), and, in a Cartesian-like catch-all list in X.14, 
“all minds know for certain” that they have the “power of living, remembering, under-
standing, willing, thinking, knowing, judging, [and doubting].” When he glimpses this 
implied relation, Augustine is faced with that same moment of conceptual decision that is 
determinative for whether a thinker successfully avoids the trap of the reflection theory. 
Either one can describe the primal pre-reflective unity that makes this immanent aware-
ness possible as itself a form of self-knowledge (e.g. Kant/Fichte) or one can try to avoid 
associating any epistemic connotations with it at all (e.g. Hölderlin/Novalis and Schlei-
ermacher). In this sense, the crux of the dilemma that we have arrived at in Augustine is a 
very familiar one indeed. 
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 There are certainly moments when Augustine uses rhetoric that could be lever-
aged in the direction of the latter option. For instance, he can speak of these acts as being 
characteristic of an immanent “presence” that is always “present to thinking [cognitioni 
adest]” (X.10). Similarly, at one point he talks of the mind always being “present” and 
“available” to itself, “ready to be understood by itself by its thought about itself” 
(XIV.14). However, as the passages above illustrate, he almost always chooses instead to 
conflate such “presence” into a self-relation that is always already epistemic. As he asks 
and answers in X.5, “How [could it be] that a mind which does not know itself knows 
itself knowing something else? It is not that it knows another mind knowing, but itself 
knowing. Therefore it knows itself. And then when it seeks to know itself, it already 
knows itself seeking. So it already knows itself.” 
 In the end, as I have suggested throughout, the cumulative force of the metaphysi-
cal assumptions that define his trajectory of ascent to focusing on self-knowledge as the 
imago Dei make it nearly impossible that he would opt for an explanation other than the 
one implied in this conflation and the insistence of a primal epistemic self-relation that 
goes along with it. There is, of course, another plausible way of answering Augustine’s 
question above: “How [could it be] that a mind which does not know itself knows itself 
knowing something else?” It could be that the mind only comes to know itself strictly 
speaking—and the specific nature of its intellectual powers—through the very act of 
knowing other things. In fact, as we will see next chapter, this is precisely the type of ex-
planation that Aquinas, via Aristotle, ends up defending. However, for this answer to ap-
pear plausible to Augustine he would have to reconsider, first, the role of the senses’ in-
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herent extroversion in securing knowledge in general. This is because Augustine’s epis-
temology includes in itself a reflective act in order to consult the intelligible forms “with-
in.” This assumption already inhibits a theorization of knowledge in general from becom-
ing the necessary preamble for subsequent acts of self-reflection. In addition, this answer 
would also violate the non-adventitious ideal that Augustine repeatedly uses to draw the 
analogy between created self-knowledge and the simplicity of divine self-knowledge be-
cause it necessarily links self-knowledge with preceding acts of knowing external, adven-
titious objects. Such an idea that the acts through which we know external objects could 
somehow “include” the intelligible forms that subsequently lead to self-knowledge is 
completely foreign to Augustine’s thought in De Trinitate. It was foreclosed to him both 
by the Neoplatonic epistemological resources available to him and by his own formula-
tion of the Creator-creature analogy and conceptualization of divine simplicity.  
 The resulting dilemma that Augustine faces is the difficulty of affirming the undi-
vided unity of the mind as the prerequisite for knowledge (and all sorts of other activities) 
with the contingent emergence of its self-knowledge. The threat of the latter to the former 
is that it introduces a division between that which knows (i.e. a knowing subject) and that 
which passes from a state of knowability to one of being known (i.e. a known object). 
The degree to which Augustine is aware of this tension is reflected in, for instance, the 
rhetoric involved in his response to his own question cited above as to whether or not we 
should say that the mind “knows itself in part and does not know itself in part” (X.6). In 
response to this theoretical description, Augustine offers a rousing defense of the mind’s 
indivisible wholeness, the tone of which, both in its passionate conviction and strained 
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rhetoric, prefigures the Romantics’ own spirited advocacy of a non-cognitive version of 
such an “absolute unity:”  
But it is absurd to say that the whole of it does not know what it knows: I am not 
saying “it knows the whole,” but “What it knows, the whole of it knows.” And so 
when it knows some of itself, which only the whole of it can do, it knows its 
whole self [totam se scit]. For it knows itself knowing something, and only the 
whole of it can know something; so it knows the whole of itself [scit se igitur to-
tam]. Again, what is so known to the mind as that it is alive? It cannot both be 
mind and not be alive, particularly as it has in addition the fact that it is intelli-
gent; even the souls of animals live, though they are not intelligent. So just as the 
whole mind is, in the same way the whole mind lives. But it knows that it lives; 
therefore it knows its whole self. 
 
The decisive logic of this passage turns on his initial distinction between the incorrect-
ness of saying that the mind “knows the whole” versus the accuracy of saying that “what 
it knows, the whole of it knows.” The crucial difference between the two formulations for 
Augustine is that the former phrase introduces a division—the mind (subject) knowing 
the whole (object)—into the mind’s simple unity with itself that Augustine tries to defend 
throughout De Trinitate in deference to the analogy he is trying to draw with the Trinity’s 
eternal simplicity. The latter phrase instead strains to maintain the affirmation that the 
mind is a simple intellectual unity—”what it knows, the whole of it knows.”  
 Augustine expands upon this concern in Book XIV.8. In that context, he writes at 
length about the absurdity of trying to distinguish between the mind as “one thing” and 
its epistemic “view” (conspectus) of itself as “another thing” (aliud): 
Does it then see one part of itself with another part of itself when it gets a view of 
itself by thinking, just as with some parts of our bodies which are the eyes we get 
a view of the other parts of our bodies which can be in our view? What an absurd 
idea! […] [I]f it has changed places in order to be viewed, where will it stay in or-
der to view? Does it double up, as it were, in order to be both there and here, that 
is both where it can view and where it can be viewed, so that in itself it is viewing 
and in front of itself it is viewable?  
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This passage is remarkable in its acuity regarding the conceptual traps that inevitably ap-
pear in trying to theorize the mind’s epistemic reflection upon “itself.” It suggests that 
Augustine is generally aware of the specter of circularity that he is nonetheless not entire-
ly able to escape in the end. This is because he still must formulate some kind of answer 
to this question: if one cannot find any coherent way of describing the mind coming to 
know itself based on a concern for affirming the mind’s essential unity, how then should 
we describe the preceding ground for the mind’s self-knowledge? Given his metaphysical 
commitments, Augustine is left with no other choice but to affirm that the nature of the 
mind’s intensive unity somehow includes within itself a primal, reflective self-knowledge 
always already given in the soul. Once the outlet of adventitious knowledge is excluded, 
“where” else could the mind epistemically “find” itself except in and “through itself” 
(XV.22)? Accordingly, as he writes following the passage above regarding the absurdity 
of introducing a subject/object division into the mind’s “view” of itself, “[T]he only al-
ternative left is that its view is something that belongs to its own nature, and that when 
the mind thinks about itself its view is drawn back to itself not through an interval of 
space, but by a kind of non-bodily turning around [incorporea conversione revocetur]” 
(XIV.8).  
What does the mind thereby “find” in this turning around on itself: a “secret kind 
of knowledge [arcana quadam notitia]” (XIV.8) of itself that Augustine—understandably 
given its Platonic precedents—labels as a special kind of “memory.” Hence, the mind 
always “knows itself by being somehow its own memory of itself [sibi memoria sui]” 
(XIV.8). Elsewhere in De Trinitate, he tries to distinguish this self-memory from any 
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memories contingently received from sensible phantasia by predictably adding modifiers 
that emphasize its primal interiority. Thus he speaks of the “inner memory of the mind 
with which it remembers itself [interiorem mentis memoriam qua sui meminit]” 
(XIV.10), the “the hidden depths [abstrusior profunditas] in our memory” (XV.40), and 
our “primordial memory [memoriae principali]” (XV.41). Like Fichte long after him 
would do as well in positing an exceptional self-knowledge (viz. a self-consciousness in 
which everything is “absolutely one and the same”), in declarations such as these Augus-
tine strains to bring together the relata involved in self-knowledge into the closest possi-
ble primal relation to the point that the supposition of there being any meaningful distinc-
tion (or division) between is eventually excluded in order to salvage the mind’s primal 
intensive unity: “What it knows, the whole of it knows.” Or put differently: the whole of 
it “already knows itself” (X.5).  
There are, as one might expect, significant conceptual costs to pay for embracing 
this solution. At an initial level, this solution vitiates any meaningful application of his 
former talk of the mind “get[ting] to know itself.” Similarly, it conflates the soteriologi-
cal/teleological call to “return” and “remember” oneself into the broader affirmation that 
the mind always already knows itself. Hence, to “remember” oneself in this regard is lit-
erally to recall something that you really and fully had known before. In order to describe 
this dynamic, Augustine leans heavily on the distinction that it is “one thing to know one-
self [non se nosse], [and] another not to think about oneself [non se cogitare]” (X.7, cf. 
XIV.9). Thus even though we can “forget” our true intelligent nature (and corresponding 
telos) by misdirecting our desires onto sensible things, Augustine affirms that somewhere 
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in the “recesses of the mind [abdito mentis]” (XIV.9) there endures a self-knowledge 
(and here self-love as well) such that that he believes that this affirmation is true: “the 
mind always remembers, always understands and loves itself [semper sui meminisse sem-
perque se ipsam intellegere et amare], even though it does not always think about itself 
as distinct from things are not what it is” (XIV.9). 
 More troubling, however, is the explicit circularity that Augustine is forced to en-
dorse when he tries to explain the relevance and virtue of the contingent reflective act in 
terms of it being the highest penultimate analogy of the imago Dei. The best example of 
this explicit circularity occurs in an extended passage in XIV.13.35 In the lead-up to this 
passage, Augustine is attempting to clarify the difference between adventitious 
knowledge of temporal things and the mind’s non-adventitious knowledge of itself. As 
one would expect, he designates the decisive difference as lying in the fact that in adven-
titious knowledge there is a gap—ontological and temporal—between knowables [cogno-
scibilia] and our knowledge [cognitione] of them. In these cases, the knowables preexist 
and partially ground the knower’s knowledge of them: “the knowables beget the 
knowledge, not the knowledge the knowables” (XIV.13).36 However, as Augustine states 
                                                
35 A parallel example can be found in XIV.10: “For if we refer to the inner memory of the mind with which 
it remembers itself and the inner understanding with which it understands itself and the inner will with 
which it loves itself, where these three are simultaneously together and always have been simultaneously 
together from the moment they began to be, whether they were being thought about or not, it will indeed 
seem that the image of the other trinity belongs only to the memory. But because there can no word in it 
without thought—we think everything we say, including what we say with the inner word—that is not part 
of any people’s language—it is rather in these three that this image is to be recognized, namely memory, 
understanding, and will.” 
36 It is just the reverse with God, i.e. “knowables” (from our perspective) exist in the first place precisely 
because God always already knows them: “It is true of all [God’s] creatures, both spiritual and corporeal, 
that he does not know them because they are, but that they are because he knows them” (XV.22). 
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succinctly, “in the case of the mind it is not so” (Ibid.). The entire passage that follows is 
crucial enough to be quoted at length: 
The mind, after all, is not adventitious to itself, as though to the mind which al-
ready was came from somewhere else the same mind which was not yet; or as 
though it did not come from somewhere else, but in the mind which already was 
should be born the same mind which was not yet, just as in the mind which al-
ready was arises faith which was not before; or as though after getting to know it-
self it should by recollection see itself fixed in its own memory, as if it had not 
been there before it had got to know itself. The truth of course is that from the 
moment it began to be it never stopped remembering itself, never stopped under-
standing itself, never stopped loving itself, as we have already shown. And there-
fore when it turns to itself in thought, a trinity is formed in which a word too can 
be perceived. It is formed of course out of the very act of thought [formatur 
quippe ex ipsa cogitatione], with the will joining the two together. It is here more 
than anywhere that we should recognize the image we are looking for. 
 
The circular dissonance in this passage is found when we try to specify exactly what oc-
curs in the mind’s acts of turning back onto itself in “remembrance.” On the one hand, it 
appears—and this is precisely the point of contrast to adventitious knowledge—that the 
trinitarian unity of self-knowledge and self-love has always been and has “never” ceased 
to be since the mind “began to be.” On the other hand, and in the sentences immediately 
following, Augustine wants to maintain that the reflective act itself of “recollection” and 
“turn[ing] to itself in thought” actually generates this intensive unity through the temporal 
begetting of an inner word and the coupling action of the will. In Augustine’s version of 
the reflection theory, the mind’s epistemic self-unity is depicted both as something that is 
always already realized and something that is contingently forged through the mind’s 
recollective reflection upon itself, which is an act—and here is the nub of its circularity—
paradoxically based on a preceding epistemic self-unity.  
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 There will likely be some readers of Augustine who object to my virtually unqual-
ified criticism of this circular inconsistency, which I take to be insoluble based upon the 
metaphysical assumptions regarding desire, knowledge, the senses, and the Creator-
creature relation that combine to determine the trajectory that leads him here in De Trini-
tate. For example, in his commentary on the extended passage cited above, the venerable 
Edmund Hill admits that there is a “certain uncertainty or haziness” involved in Augus-
tine’s juxtaposed affirmations that the mind “never stopped remembering, understanding 
and loving itself” and that this very same “trinity” really does “emerg[e] when the mind 
actually thinks about itself.”37 However, Hill quickly attempts to ameliorate this “hazi-
ness” by suggesting that the difficulty Augustine encounters here is “more a matter of 
vocabulary than substance.”38 His elaboration of this argument is illuminating both in its 
content and in its preliminary references to the comparative conceptual clarity that Aqui-
nas accomplishes through his modified Aristotelianism: 
Augustine seems to lack that very convenient sliding-scale terminology of poten-
cy and act which Aristotle bequeathed to the scholastics. But what in fact he is 
saying is that the mind is always the triune image of God potentially, but that this 
image is only activated by an act of thought. This is one respect, of course, in 
which the image falls infinitely short of its exemplar, where in Aquinas’s lan-
guage there is no potentiality but pure act, and where therefore in this case the 
Word is eternally being begotten by an eternal divine act of thought or genera-
tion.39 
 
Hill is entirely right in his judgment that the specific inconsistency in the passage above  
could be solved—and indeed Aquinas does solve it—through this kind of distinction be-
tween the potentiality and actuality of the image of God.  
                                                
37 Hill, The Trinity, 393. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
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 However, he is altogether too optimistic in suggesting that Augustine’s circular 
inconsistency can be covered over by simply claiming that he really “meant” something 
like the potency/act distinction that Aquinas would make explicit. In fact, it is worth not-
ing that Augustine had several conceptual pairs at his disposal that would have captured 
this kind of nuance if only he had employed them more exhaustively in specifying the 
higher instances of the trinitarian analogy. For example, his own terminology that he uses 
in passing in De Trinitate could have allowed him to say that the image’s pre-reflective 
latency was “impressed” on (imprimitur, XII.16) or “subjoined” to (subjuncta, XII.24)) 
or was “formable” (formabilis, XV.26) within the soul, but had to be “expressed” (ex-
primitur, XI.6) or “put together” (adjungit, XI.15) or “formed” (formata, XV.26) in the 
act of reflection. However, to opt for any these formulations explicitly in describing the 
realization of the trinitarian image would have required a wholesale reconsideration of his 
epistemology, particularly his construal of the senses’ relation to knowledge and his par-
allel insistence that the triune image had to be as non-adventitious as God’s own self-
knowledge. For, as I have tried to show in this chapter, once these metaphysical assump-
tions define the vectors involved in Augustine’s desiderative ascent, he is left no other 
choice but to affirm that what the act of reflection finds “in itself” is not the potency to 
know itself, but rather the always already secured—and thus truly non-adventitious—
knowledge of oneself. For, according to Augustine’s epistemological and soteriological 
presuppositions, the mind simply cannot find any knowledge of itself that is dependent 
on its preceding “straying about” with any non-adventitious perceptions. Rather, all it 
knows about itself must be known in and “through itself” alone. Aquinas, as we will see 
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next chapter, solves this conundrum by insisting not only that the senses play a much 
more positive role in our process for intelligently knowing things (including ourselves), 
but that this reliance on our senses is part of a native and morally benign extroversion that 
simply reflects another aspect of our metaphysical deficiency in comparison with God’s 
utter and eternal simplicity.  
 In this regard, the most troubling implication of Augustine’s dilemma regarding 
self-knowledge and the image of God goes beyond its logical inconsistencies. Rather, in 
the end, the larger question that emerges out of this dilemma has to do with the ascent of 
desire itself. As I have suggested throughout, the entire structure and methodology of De 
Trinitate leads one to expect that the highest penultimate instance of the trinitarian image 
of God would occur in a contingent act of self-knowledge and self-love that yields an in-
tensive teleological unity that presages our eschatological union with God. All of the vec-
tors that define his ascent of desire point in this direction, especially his sustained affir-
mation that the more we desire and love God, the more we hasten toward our perfect 
happiness in union with God, the more intensively unified (i.e. not “lost in multiplicity) 
we become. However, when we finally arrive at Augustine’s description of this teleologi-
cal unity what we find is that he has undermined the integrity of that contingent desidera-
tive process that virtually defines the course of a human life. This undermining occurs 
because the primal, epistemic, and teleological intensive unities all end up getting con-
flated into a single affirmation: we have always already known and loved ourselves. The 
net effect is a lingering concern that Augustine empties the ascent of desire toward an 
increasing intensive unity of much genuine significance at all. For if, as Augustine sug-
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gests, we have always already wholly known ourselves such that we only have to “re-
member” this prior understanding, does this not at least risk implying that every other 
aspect of this desiderative life (e.g. exterior, sensible, material) is structured—not as a 
progressive ascent—but rather as a quite regrettable “straying about”? As we will turn to 
consider next chapter, this is yet another front on which Aquinas’s affirmation of a native 
extroversion in human knowledge will help to solve a conceptual inconsistency that re-
sults from Augustine’s strained attempt to hold together his overarching theological 
framework and the fundamental shape of his epistemology. Thankfully, however, as we 
will see shortly, Aquinas formulates this comparative conceptual clarity even while sim-
ultaneously salvaging and even extending the explanatory reach of Augustine’s seminal 
insight regarding human desire. In and through the conceptual precision Aquinas’s trans-
position of this insight, the promise of Augustine’s overarching framework finally shines 
through: desire really does thrust us into what is intended to be a genuine ascent of desire 
through a world of lesser goods “back” to our Creator as “the most high good” (XIII.10) 
in relation to whom we were created for an eschatological telos in which we will experi-
ence the fullest intensive unity of all. For in knowing and loving God “face to face,” 
“[W]e shall be like him because we shall see him as he is” (XV.21).  
III. Summary and Conclusion 
 
As we stated at the outset, the aim of this chapter has been to engage in a close reading of 
the second half of Augustine’s De Trinitate in order to accomplish two purposes in rela-
tion to our overall trajectory of resourcing the theological anthropologies of Augustine 
and Aquinas in order to resituate the intensive unity that is self-consciousness. First, we 
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have established the basic shape of Augustine’s seminal insights into the interrelated na-
ture of desire, knowledge, and the corresponding varieties of intensive unity (i.e. primal, 
epistemic, and teleological) that diversely characterize human existence. As we saw, the-
se insights are shaped by his overarching exitus-reditus framework for understanding the 
Creator-creation relation. In terms of knowledge, this relation entails that creation is con-
stituted as a realm of forms (or essences or souls), each of which bears a deficient simili-
tude to the divine essence, that function as the hierarchical ontological organization of 
reality and the mediating condition for understanding the intelligible patterns of its truth. 
In terms of desire, this relation entails that all creatures desire their perfect happiness, 
which in intelligent beings manifests as a desire to know truth. This desire to know finds 
penultimate satisfaction in the participated truths of creation secured in inner words of 
understanding and ultimate satisfaction in knowing God “face-to-face.” When combined 
with the terms that establish the shape of his search for the trinitarian imago Dei, this 
overarching framework suggests a threefold diversity of intensive unity that each bear a 
different similitude to the singularity of the divine essence as the self-reflective unity of 
truth: (1) a primal unity given in the soul itself; (2) an epistemic unity that contingently 
arises in self-knowledge; and (3) a teleological unity that occurs in an individual as the 
multiplicity of one’s temporal desires/loves eschatologically converge upon God as one’s 
highest good and perfect happiness.  
 Second, however, we also described an Augustinian version of the reflection theo-
ry that we witnessed in the Introduction as characteristic of the Kantian and Fichtean ex-
planations of self-consciousness. The allure of this theory, which attempts to circularly 
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ground the self-knowing individual through reflection, ends up leading Augustine into a 
dilemma that forces him to conflate the three intensive unities into a single reflective uni-
ty always already epistemically given in the soul. The predictable circular result arrives 
when Augustine asserts that this primal and exceptional self-knowledge is—in the form 
of a “primordial memory” of ourselves—the causal ground for knowledge in general and 
in particular of reflective acts in which the intensive unity of self-knowledge (and self-
love) is supposedly contingently forged as well. As we have seen, the twin conceptual 
culprits of this conflation are the terms of Augustine’s general epistemology, which as-
serts that all knowledge requires a reflection on forms (regulae) impressed upon the soul, 
and his insistence that the imago Dei must be as non-adventitious as God’s own self-
knowledge. The result of the conflation stemming from these assumptions not only pre-
vents the promise of a diversity of deficient intensive unities from coming into view, but 
also threatens to undermine the integrity of the ascent of desire as something that has its 
own climactic teleological intensive unity both penultimately in this world and ultimately 
in union with God.  
 My strategy from here, as I have signaled throughout, will be to turn to the way 
that Aquinas’ explanatorily expands Augustine’s account of the Creator-creature relation, 
even as he solves the latter’s dilemma by transposing his insights into an Aristotelian 
metaphysical and epistemological framework. As we will see, the most decisive elements 
that Aquinas adopts in this act of translation are Aristotle’s account of the soul and his 
unique way of construing a “vertical” (i.e. positive) relation between the senses and intel-
lect. This vertical relation then enables Aquinas to affirm that both the senses and inte
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lect are characterized by a native extroversion that precedes any reflective act “within.” 
This revised epistemology thus allows Aquinas to capitalize on that which Augustine 
conflates. In Chapter 2, we will show how he successfully separates out the soul as the 
cause of our most primal intensive unity devoid of any self-knowledge. Similarly in Chap-
ter 3, we will show how he extends this solution by precisely articulating the anthropo-
logical capacities that are actualized in the soteriological/teleological alignment of our 
desire/love in relation to God. The terms of this Thomist solution to Augustine’s dilemma 
will then form the conceptual basis for translating Freud’s discovery of primary identifi-
cation (Chapter 4) and reframing the riddle of self-consciousness as a fourth type of di-
vinely-deficient intensive unity (Chapter 5). 
 Before turning to Aquinas, however, I want to close with one concluding observa-
tion regarding the seminal way that Augustine formulates the Creator-creation relation. 
As will become clear, Aquinas fully embraces the connection that Augustine assumes 
between God as the triune perfection of self-knowledge/self-love and the created shape of 
the imago Dei. Given the preceding critique of Augustine’s application of this under-
standing of God in specifying the imago Dei, a perceptive reader might fairly inquire, 
“Don’t the logical inconsistences involved in the reflection theory apply to this doctrine 
of God?” The answer is found by recalling that all the inconsistencies that result when 
analyzing the act of reflection in the human mind arise because of the temporal gap be-
tween some kind of pre-reflective unity that underlies reflection and the contingent unity 
that is somehow forged in the act of reflection itself. In God, however, there is no such 
temporal gap at all between what we have called primal, epistemic, and teleological in-
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tensive unities; God truly does always already know and love the divine essence and the 
divine essence truly is the eternality of that act of self-knowledge and self-love. There is, 
quite simply, nothing pre-reflective in God. What Aquinas helps to clarify vis-à-vis Au-
gustine is how to explain the metaphysical deficiency of a human being in whom there is 
much that is primally pre-reflective and yet is no less always already created in the image 
of God.  
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Chapter 2 
Aquinas’s Solution I:  
The Aristotelian Soul and the Verticality of Knowledge 
 
 
Last chapter I accomplished two tasks in conversation with Augustine’s De Trinitate in 
relation to my overall attempt to reframe the riddle of self-consciousness and redescribe 
its theological significance. First, I detailed Augustine’s Christian appropriation of the 
Neoplatonic exitus-reditus scheme in order to explain creation’s analogical origin in God 
and its teleological return to God. According to Augustine, creation’s exitus from God 
occurs through a dispersion of deficient intelligible forms into a materially-mediated hi-
erarchy of beings. Similarly, its reditus back to God occurs, in the highest degree, in the 
ascent of human beings as they are propelled by a desire to know the truth mediated by 
those forms. This ascent finds its ultimate fulfillment in union with God as the eminent 
unity of all truth. I also argued that one of the promises of this overarching Augustinian 
framework is that it suggests that human existence is characterized by three types of in-
tensive unity—the primal unity of the soul, the epistemic unity of self-knowledge, and 
the teleological unity of desire/love—that are each analogically similar to the supreme 
unity of the divine essence in different ways. 
Second, I identified a version of the reflection theory operative in Augustine’s 
search for the imago Dei. The resulting pitfalls of this theory were evident in a dilemma 
that ends up forcing Augustine to conflate the three types of intensive unity suggested by 
his own framework into a single epistemic one always already given in the soul. As a re-
sult, he circularly vacillates between affirming, on the one hand, a primal self-knowledge 
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(and self-love) in the human mind and, on the other hand, a contingent realization of this 
epistemic unity as forged through discrete acts of self-reflection and self-love. As I have 
argued at length, it is this Augustinian version of the reflection theory that justifies his 
inclusion in an overall inquiry regarding self-consciousness. Just as—broadly speaking—
Kant, Fichte, Hölderlin/Novalis, and Schleiermacher were all trying to explain the imma-
nently given conditions that furnish the necessary self-differentiated conditions requisite 
for intelligent knowing, so too was Augustine wrestling with the same phenomenon out 
of the conviction that such a primal intensive unity represents a deficient imago of divine 
simplicity, a trace of the eminently intelligent Creator who is always already interior in-
timo meo. 
Against the backdrop of this Augustinian framework and dilemma, the next two 
chapters will be devoted to showing how Thomas Aquinas solves Augustine’s dilemma 
and, in doing so, finally capitalizes on the initial promise of affirming a diversity of in-
tensive unities as tying together the trajectory of human existence, the interrelated capaci-
ties of knowledge and desire, and the corresponding extroverted/intensive unities that 
they thereby make possible. As will become clear, Aquinas accomplishes this by crea-
tively transposing Augustine’s seminal insights into a more precise, largely Aristotelian, 
metaphysical and epistemological framework. The result of this transposition is an Au-
gustinian-Aristotelian theological synthesis, punctuated by Aquinas’s own seminal con-
tributions, that actually ends up expanding the explanatory reach of Augustine’s basic 
approach to the Creator-creation analogical relation. By articulating the metaphysical 
framework that makes this transposition possible, and the theological anthropology that 
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issues from it, we will simultaneously find a more coherent Augustinianism and an intel-
lectual tradition robust enough to serve as a midwife for translating Freudian identifica-
tion (Chapter 4) and resituating self-consciousness as a fourth type of intensive unity 
(Chapter 5). 
The organization of this chapter and Chapter 3 can be understood in a couple of 
different ways. Most centrally, in this chapter we will see how Aquinas draws upon Aris-
totle’s metaphysical account of the soul and the intellect in order to undo Augustine’s 
conflation of the first two types of intensive unity: the soul and self-knowledge. The re-
sult is that he successfully separates out the soul as the cause of the most primal type of 
intensive unity in an individual—the indivisible and always already defined unity of its 
existence—in a manner that denies any kind of primal self-knowledge in the human intel-
lect. In Chapter 3, we will then see how Aquinas accomplishes something similar by re-
formulating the nature of Augustine’s teleological/desiderative/amorous intensive unity 
via Aristotle’s metaphysics of appetite.  
This basic organization also reflects a key feature of Aquinas’s account of the 
soul that allows him to escape the conceptual traps that Augustine sets for himself by in-
sisting on the “inwardness” of knowledge (via God’s impressio of forms upon the soul) 
and a corresponding disjunction between the senses and intelligence. This feature, which 
I briefly touched upon in the Introduction, holds that one of the chief ways that the capac-
ities (or “powers” or “faculties”) of sensitivity and intelligence are related is that they are 
both constituted by a generic power of “knowledge” and a correlative power of “desire.” 
Or in Aquinas’s nomenclature: each “part” or “layer” of the soul (i.e. a sensitive layer 
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and an intelligent layer) is constituted by a power of apprehension (apprehensio) and a 
power of appetite (appetitus). Generally expressed, the difference between an apprehen-
sive and an appetitive power is the difference between the cognitive interiorization of a 
patterned form and a derivative response of attraction or repulsion to that interiorized 
form. Or as Aquinas puts it: “[I]t belongs to one faculty to have within itself something 
which is outside it, and to another faculty to tend to what is outside it.”1  
More specifically, an apprehensive power makes possible the interiorization of a 
form—whether as a sensible or intelligible “pattern”—that is thereby “in” the individual 
as the known is in the knower. Thus for Aquinas there are two types of knowledge (i.e. 
sensitive and intelligent) that correspond respectively with the sensitive and intelligent 
apprehensive powers. Hence the sensitive apprehensive power (i.e. the senses) makes 
sensible forms (e.g. the visible, the audible, etc.) interior to an individual as phantasms 
(Aquinas’s term for phantasia),2 while the intelligent apprehensive power (i.e. the intel-
lect) renders intelligible forms (e.g. plant-ness, bear-ness, triangle-ness) immanently pre-
sent as inner words of understanding. Already one can see how this analogy allows Aqui-
nas to tie together that which Augustine tends to separate: the analogous unions of sensi-
tive phantasms and intelligent inner words are brought together under the generic banner 
of apprehension as a union between knower and known.3  
Conversely and derivatively, an appetitive power then responds to that interior-
ized form as a good (and therefore attractive) or an evil (and therefore evil) from the in-
                                                
1 Aquinas, ST I.59.2 
2 In the Latin: phantasmata. 
3 Cf. Aquinas, ST I.16.1. 
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tentional perspective of the individual. Even though we will have to add some nuance to 
this declaration based upon Aquinas’s metaphysical understanding of appetite, the nature 
of these responses generally fits under the banner of what we normally consider as mani-
festations of desire and/or emotion. Accordingly, appetitive responses of attraction can 
include love, desire, and pleasure, while parallel responses of repulsion include hate, 
aversion, and pain. Based upon this general framework, Aquinas affirms that there is both 
a sensitive appetite (i.e. the “passions” of the soul) and a distinctive intellective appetite 
(i.e. the will) that are each correlative to their respective apprehensive power.4 To state a 
point to which we will return often, one of the immediate results of this account of appre-
hension and appetite is that our overall interest in the interrelation between knowledge 
and desire is placed within a metaphysical framework precise enough to explain their dis-
tinctive operations, even while also expanding our notion of each by enumerating several 
different types of knowledge (described in this chapter) and desire (described in Chapter 
3) that are nonetheless metaphysically analogous as powers of apprehension and appetite.  
 If this is the formal organization that shapes the course of this chapter and Chapter 
3, what will become increasingly clear is that these chapters are also held together by a 
theme implicit throughout Aristotle’s metaphysics that Aquinas expands upon and that 
we will end up constructively extending at length in Chapters 4 and 5. Concisely stated, 
this theme is connected with Aristotle’s inclination to relate all human capacities (e.g. the 
senses, desire, the intellect, and the will) in a vertical (i.e. non-disjunctive) manner such 
that each of these capacities end up making some positive contribution to the overall tele-
                                                
4 Cf. Ibid., I.80.2. 
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ological perfection of that being. In light of this intrinsic link to teleology, we will also, 
following the lead of Bernard Lonergan, refer to this metaphysical insight as “vertical 
finality.”5 For an Aristotelian and a Thomist, the multifaceted explanatory relevance of 
such a vertical continuum between human capacities serves as the conceptual bulwark for 
remedying any proposed disjunction between the powers of the soul such as Augustine 
perpetuates between the senses and the intellect. 
Obviously, the idea of a hierarchy existing between different human capacities, 
with intelligence being the most noble and “divine,” was not at all foreign to Augustine’s 
anthropology. However, the difference between a mere hierarchy of capacities and Aris-
totle’s distinctive emphasis on their vertical interrelation is precisely the notion that all 
these capacities are interrelated to one another in the sense that the lower powers can all 
secondarily contribute to the perfection of a human being’s singular telos as primarily 
accomplished through the higher capacities of intelligence.6 As we will see, Aquinas re-
lies upon this Aristotelian theme in order to affirm the created and teleological goodness 
                                                
5 For Lonergan, vertical finality names an idea implicit in both Aristotle and Aquinas that ties together the 
multilayered isomorphism between ontology and epistemology that is bridged in the union of knower and 
known and also points to the absolute unity of ontology/epistemology in the divine essence. Ontologically, 
which is the aspect of it being described here, it names the way that reality (and the living creatures that 
populate reality) is organized such that lower-level entities have horizontal ends in themselves, but can also 
can combine with other entities/processes in order to produce a fertility that realizes a higher end. One of 
Lonergan’s favorite examples is the way that oxygen has certain essential ends and characteristics on its 
own. However, when is joined together with the fertile plurality of other elements and processes, it often 
vertically participates in a much more excellent end, namely, sustaining human life. Epistemologically, 
vertical finality then names the way that intelligent knowledge similar proceeds from lower level insights 
(e.g. addition) to a higher-level insights (e.g. calculus) that necessarily incorporate the former. As the chap-
ter proceeds, we will touch upon both of these aspects of vertical finality again. For Lonergan’s writing on 
vertical finality, cf. Bernard J. F. Lonergan, “Finality, Love, and Marriage,” in Collection, ed. Frederick E. 
Crowe and Robert M. Doran, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1988), 4:17-52 and Insight, 3:470-76.  
6 As I employed the term above, I intend the word “positively” as the opposite of disjunctively. In other 
words, as I discuss at length below, the type of disjunction that Augustine maintains between the senses and 
the intellect is unthinkable for an Aristotelian. Instead, the senses must somehow, as we will see below, 
positively contribute to the intellect’s vertically “higher” operations of grasping intelligible forms. 
  
  114 
of all human capacities as potentially aligned in our (re)union with God. Similarly, we 
will also draw upon the explanatory relevance of vertical finality in making our construc-
tive proposal in conversation with Freud that there is a distinctive power of identification 
in human beings that explains the origins and fragile perpetuation of egoic self-
consciousness.  
 For the moment, however, we must first become more acquainted with the basics 
of Aristotle’s metaphysical framework and Aquinas’s derivative account of the soul and 
the apprehensive powers as a means for reformulating a more internally coherent and 
maximally explanatory Augustinianism. Our itinerary toward accomplishing those ends 
will run through four sections. First, I will begin with a primer on Aristotle and Aquinas’s 
Aristotelianism as centered on two conceptual cornerstones of Aristotelian metaphysics: 
the four-fold theory of causation and the relation of passion to action (and potency to act). 
This primer will pay dividends in the following chapters not only because Aquinas’s ac-
count of the appetitive powers (Chapter 3) presupposes this Aristotelian background, but 
also because our constructive proposals in Chapter 4 and 5 will assume the broad validity 
of these concepts as well. On the basis of this foundation, in the second section I will turn 
to the way that Aquinas appropriates and extends Aristotle’s understanding of the soul as 
the first actuality of a living being. Thirdly, I will describe the way that Aquinas deriva-
tively formulates the interrelation between sensitive and intelligent apprehension in a 
manner that successfully resituates the intensive unity of self-knowledge as strictly de-
pendent upon the extroverted unions of the senses and the intellect. Fourthly, I will draw 
these threads together in order to show how Aquinas constructively synthesizes his Aris-
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totelianism with Augustine’s joint emphases on (a) creation’s analogical participation in 
the truth and perfection of God’s triune self-knowledge and (b) human intelligence, and 
particularly the occurrence of the inner word, as the chief site of the imago Dei. Lastly, I 
will close by summarizing our findings and also outlining a crucial conceptual gap that is 
opened up by Aquinas’s otherwise successful solution to Augustine’s dilemma. As we 
will see, the nature of this gap, and its relation to the two intensive unities of the soul and 
self-knowledge that Aquinas metaphysically clarifies and distinguishes, points to the ex-
act conceptual space into which we will situate egoic self-consciousness as a fourth type 
of intensive unity. 
I. A Primer on Aristotelian Metaphysics: Causation and Passion/Action 
 
Aristotle’s theorization of the fourfold character of causation and the relation of passion 
to action stand as central pillars of the Aristotelian scientific ideal: the explanatory analy-
sis of being and beings according to their causes. The desired culmination of this pursuit 
is the distinctive telos of philosophy, wisdom (sophia), which in its epistemic dimension 
consists in the knowledge of the “first causes and […] principles of things.”7 Especially 
given the fact that each of these basic metaphysical concepts pass into Aquinas rather di-
rectly, we will examine each of them in more detail before moving onto their conver-
gence in an account of the soul.   
As a method of inductively proceeding toward the knowledge of causes and prin-
ciples, Aristotle identifies four types of causes—material, formal, final, and efficient (or 
moving)—that guide his analysis of being and beings. Aquinas likewise adopts this four-
                                                
7 Aristotle, Met. I, 1, 981b25-26.  
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fold typology of causation,8 although, as we will see later on, he notably expands Aristo-
tle’s general conception of efficient causality in order to include theology’s affirmation of 
creatio ex nihilo as an eminent occurrence of this type of causality. Aristotle takes these 
four causes to be exhaustively applicable across all types of things, from inanimate ob-
jects of nature (e.g. rocks and minerals), to living beings (e.g. plants, animals, and hu-
mans), to products of human artifice (e.g. statues and houses). Given that the themes be-
fore us are mostly bound up with the composition and nature of living beings, most of the 
examples that follow will be drawn from the application of this typology to that realm of 
being that has life. Or as both Aristotle and Aquinas define life: those beings that are ca-
pable of self-movement.9 
Basically defined, a cause “is that on which the being of something else fol-
lows.”10 In the case of living beings, that “something else” is the concrete living thing 
considered as an indivisible whole (i.e. a particular human, a brown horse, a geranium). 
According to Aristotle, the material and formal causes of living things in nature are what 
constitute them as composite, or hylomorphic, beings: a compound of matter (e.g. the ac-
tual “stuff” of which it is made) and two types of intelligible form (e.g. substantial and 
accidental). A living thing’s substantial form is the principle that accounts for the ar-
rangement of a given “parcel of matter”11 (i.e. a pack of flesh and bones or a clump of 
wood and leaves) into an intelligible whole made up of organized parts (i.e. a human or a 
                                                
8 Cf. Aquinas, ST II-II.27.3. 
9 Cf. Aristotle, DA II, 2, 413a21-31 and Aquinas, ST I.18.1-2. See also: Aristotle, Phys., VIII, 4-6, 254b8-
260a19.  
10 Lonergan, Verbum, 2:144. This is Lonergan’s apt summary of Aristotle, Met. V, 1-2, 1012b33-1014a25. 
11 This phrase comes from Michael J. Loux, “Form, Species and Predication in Metaphysics Z, H, and Θ,” 
Mind 88, no. 349 (1979): 1-23. 
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tree).12 As we will expand upon next section, the decisive link between Aristotle’s meta-
physics and his anthropology arrives in that he strictly identifies a living being’s substan-
tial form with its soul (Gk. psuchē, Lat: anima). The same basic concept is also referred 
to as a thing’s substance (Gk: ousia), species, essence, definition, formula, nature, or 
quiddity.13 Spoken of in the abstract, a substantial form is the universal pattern that has 
been concretized—or enmattered—in a particular member of that species whose being 
can thus be described as “following,” or caused by, this form. In Aquinas’s phrasing, 
“form [is] that by which something subsists [quo aliquid est].”14 On the other hand, acci-
dental forms, or accidents, are the patterned qualities (e.g. size, color, state, location) by 
which a real member of a species concretely is (or subsists as) that type of thing in a cer-
tain way (e.g. a brown horse, Socrates’ white hair, a knowledgeable human).15 As an ad-
dition to these two causes, a living thing’s efficient (or moving) cause and final cause can 
be split into its biological origins and teleology. An organism’s proximate efficient cause, 
the movement that gave rise to its own life as self-moving, can be identified with the fer-
tile agency of its biological progenitors. Likewise, its final cause—that towards which its 
development is teleologically ordered—is a mature individual of its respective species 
(e.g. an adult human, horse, or tree).16  
If the four-fold typology of causation describes different angles of explanation 
vis-à-vis a given thing’s particular qualities, the paired concepts of passion (Gk: pathê; 
                                                
12 One obvious locus classicus is Met. VII. See, for example, 1034b20-1036a13 for a discussion of sub-
stance as that which accounts for the definitional whole of a living thing apart from which the parts can 
only be spoken of “homonymously” (e.g. the finger of a corpse).   
13 This last term being a distinctly Latinate, and thus exclusively Thomist, term. 
14 Aquinas, ST I.13.1.ad2. 
15 Cf. Aristotle, Met. VII, 4, 1029b10-1013a17 and VII, 6, 1031a15-1031b27. 
16 PA, I, 1, 639a-640b4. 
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Lat: pati) and action (Gk: poiêsis; Lat: actio, operatio) are employed to describe a certain 
relation17 between different things entirely (“in another thing”) or between different as-
pects of a single thing (“in itself qua other”).18 The relation between passion and action is 
caused by the occurrence of movement and/or change. As a relation between entities, to 
be active (i.e. to be an agent) means to enact movement or change (i.e. to be a mover); to 
be passive (i.e. to be a patient) means to be that which receives the movement or change 
(i.e. to be moved) and thus is moved to action in a manner consistent in ratio with the ac-
tion of that which moved it. Aristotle’s standard example, which Aquinas adopts repeat-
edly,19 is drawn from the simple relations of heating or cutting:  
The active [poiêtika] and the passive [pathêtika] imply an active and a passive ca-
pacity [dunamis] and the actualization [energeia] of the capacities, e.g. that which 
is capable of heating is related to that which is capable of being heated, because it 
can heat it, and, again, that which is heating is related to that which is being heat-
ed and that which is cutting to that which is being cut, because they are actually 
doing these things [energounta].20  
 
As this passage illustrates, something can only be passively moved by something actively 
moving. As Aquinas writes echoing Aristotle: 
Now whatever is in motion [movetur] is put in motion by another, for nothing can 
be in motion except [as] it is in potentiality [potentia] to that towards which it is 
in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act [est actu]. For motion is 
nothing else that the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality [po-
tentia in actum]. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except 
by something in a state of actuality [aliquod ens in actu].21 
 
                                                
17 According to Aristotle, things can be related according to quantity, action and passion, and measure to 
the measured (as knowledge and perception are a kind of measuring). Cf. Met. V, 15, 1020b26-1020b31. 
18 Ibid., IX, 1, 1046a9-10. 
19 E.g., Aquinas, ST I.18.3.ad1, I.27.1, I.85.2. 
20 Aristotle, Met. V, 15, 1021a15-20. 
21 Aquinas, ST I.2.3. 
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“Thus,” as Aquinas concludes in a manner that brings the connection to Aristotle full cir-
cle, “that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actu-
ally hot, and thereby moves and changes it.”22 
 As a subset of this broad category of passion and action, and as the above passag-
es already suggest, the more specific concepts of potency (Gk: dunamis; Lat: potentia; 
Eng: capacity) and act (Gk: energeia, entelecheia;23 Lat: actus, operatio) come into focus 
when this line of analysis is imported into the description of the intrinsic constitution of 
an individual or being.24 Accordingly: the capacity that enables the agent to move or 
change the patient is known as an active or efficient potency (Gk. dunamis poiêtikê; Lat. 
potentia activa). Likewise, the capacity that enables the patient to be reduced to act is a 
passive or receptive potency (Gk. dunamis pathêtikê; Lat: potentia passiva).25 Potencies 
                                                
22 Ibid. 
23 As he states explicitly in Met. IX, 8, 1050a21-23, Aristotle defines energeia in connection with its se-
mantic origin in the word ergon, meaning “work,” which deepens the metaphor of “movement” as imported 
into the broader concept of “act” as Aristotle employs it. As for entelecheia, Aristotle invented the word, in 
the description of Joe Sachs, “by combining entelēs (ἐντελής, ‘complete, full-grown’) with echein (=hexis 
to be a certain way by the continuing effort of holding on in that condition), while at the same time punning 
on endelecheia (ἐντελέχεια, ‘persistence’) by inserting ‘telos’ (τέλος, ‘completion’).” As Sachs concludes, 
“This is a three-ring circus of a word, at the heart of everything in Aristotle’s thinking.” Cf. Joe Sachs, 
Aristotle’s Physics: A Guided Study, Masterworks of Discovery (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University 
Press, 1995), 245. 
24 Carrying out this analytical strategy of course involves a necessary analogical expansion of our natural 
conception of “movement,” which is typically connected with bodily movements (i.e. locomotion or 
kinêsis). 
25 E.g. Aristotle, Met. V, 15, 1021a15-18 and Aquinas, ST I.25.1. As Lonergan explicates at some length 
(cf. Verbum, 121-128), there are instances in which Aquinas applies a slightly difference account of ac-
tive/passive potency drawn from Avicenna. In these instances, the recognizably Aristotelian focus on the 
“other” or self “qua other” is dropped in favor of simply speaking of a potency as a principle of action 
without reference to an other. The Avicennist version tends to show up more often in Aquinas’s early writ-
ings (e.g. Sent. and De pot.), whereas in the later Summa Theologiae the Aristotelian version tends to be 
more predominant despite the fact that the Avicennist application is still present as well. For example, in ST 
I.25 Aquinas appeals to the Aristotelian version in the body of the article, but the Avicennist version shows 
up in the third objection. Due to the fact that I am mostly focused on the Summa Theologiae in this chapter, 
I will exclusively speak of active/passive potencies in the Aristotelian sense. 
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and acts are therefore related to one another as principles (or origins) to terms (or ends). 
That which is latently “present” in a potency is made real or actual in its proper act.26  
Analyzing the existence of and the difference between active and passive poten-
cies in any specific type of being requires steadfast attention to one of the cardinal rules 
of Aristotelian metaphysics: as potencies are ordered to acts, so are acts ordered to their 
respective objects.27 Thus the difference between active and passive potencies can be 
concisely stated in terms of the relevance of their respective objects: active potencies 
produce a movement or change vis-à-vis their respective objects; passive potencies are 
moved by their respective objects. As Aquinas echoes: 
Now the nature of an act is diversified according to the various natures of the ob-
jects. For every act is either of an active power or of a passive power. Now, the 
object is to the act of a passive power, as the principle and moving cause: for col-
or is the principle of vision, inasmuch as it moves the sight. On the other hand, to 
the act of an active power the object is a term and end.28 
 
For example, the proper object of the active potency of house-building is an actual house, 
which is made actual through cumulative movements and changes—i.e. the “act of build-
ing”—made to a lump of building materials.29 Similarly, the generic object of the passive 
potency of sight is that which moves it to its proper act (i.e. seeing), namely that which is 
visible.30   
                                                
26 Aristotle expresses the formula for this relation as, “A is in B or to B,” and illustrates the formula through 
a list of paired examples in which the first term is actuality in relation to the second term’s potentiality: a 
building vs. a pile of materials capable of being built together, waking vs. sleeping, seeing vs. eyes that are 
shut but that possess the power of sight, and something shaped out of matter vs. matter itself. Cf. Met. IX, 
6, 1048a37-1048b9.   
27 Aristotle, DA II, 4, 415a14-21. 
28 Aquinas, ST I.77.3. 
29 Aristotle, Met. IX, 8, 1050a24-29. 
30 DA II, 7, 418a26-418b3. 
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Three other distinctions that will prove important in what follows can be enumer-
ated at this juncture in part because they share similar concepts in their definitions to that 
of active/passive potencies and their proper acts, despite not being coterminous with this 
primary relation. First, Aristotle distinguishes sharply between (a) potencies whose acts 
realize their proper ends progressively over time and only completely once the act itself 
has ceased and (b) those potencies whose acts are coincident with their ends. Aristotle 
names the former as “imperfect” or “incomplete”—atelês, lit. without an end31—acts and 
associates them with specifically bodily movements, or kinêsis. The latter he names as 
“complete” or “perfect”—tetelesmenou32—acts and associates them with energeia 
properly speaking. These acts are what Aquinas usually speaks of as operations [opera-
tiones] such as the respective acts of the senses and the intellect.33 As Aristotle writes: 
Of these processes, then, we must call the one set movements [kineseis], and the 
other actualities [energeia]. For every movement is incomplete [atelês]—making 
thin, learning, walking, building; these are movements, and incomplete move-
ments. For it is not true that at the same time we are walking and have walked, or 
are building and have built, or are coming to be and have come to be—it is a dif-
ferent thing that is being moved and that has been moved, and that is moving and 
that has moved; but it is the same thing that at the same time has seen and is see-
ing, or is understanding and has understood [noei kai nenoêken]. The latter sort of 
process, then, I call an actuality, and the former a movement.34 
 
Aquinas adopts this typology directly and consistently describes the difference as that 
                                                
31 Met. IX, 6, 1048b18-23 and DA III, 7, 431a6-8. 
32 Ibid., III, 7, 431a6-8. 
33 Cf. Aquinas, De pot., 10.1.  
34 Aristotle, Met. IX, 6, 1048b26-34. As Lonergan notes (Verbum, 196), many modern translations have 
translated nous and its verbal forms, noēsis and noein, in terms commensurate with a more conceptual in-
terpretation of Aristotle that reflects, in part, the influence of Scotus on modern philosophy and theology. 
Accordingly, the Oxford translation here has “is thinking and has thought.” I have amended the translation 
to reflect what I take to be the more faithful intellectualist interpretation of Aristotle (and Aquinas). The 
entirety of Lonergan’s Verbum is pretty much an extended defense of this interpretation of Aristotle and 
Aquinas. See n. 155 below for another instance of this translation. 
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between imperfect acts (i.e. actus imperfecti) and perfect acts (i.e. actus perfecti).35 Re-
gardless of the terminology employed, Lonergan’s summary of the metaphysical point 
can hardly be surpassed: “A movement becomes in time; one part succeeds another; and a 
whole is to be had only in the whole of the time. On the other hand, an operation such as 
seeing or pleasure does not become in time but rather endures through time; at once it is 
all that it is to be; at each instant it is completely itself.”36 
 Second, Aristotle distinguishes between potencies whose proper acts reach their 
term, their culminating movement or change, by extending into external matter (i.e. an 
external act) versus those that reach their term while remaining within the agent (i.e. an 
immanent act).37 “The difference between the two,” as Aquinas writes while citing Aris-
totle as an authority, “is that the first kind of action is the perfection not of the agent that 
produces the movement, but of the thing moved; whereas the second type is the comple-
tion or perfection of the agent [e.g. understanding, sensation, willing].”38 For example, the 
act of house-building, like all acts of human artifice, realizes a potential perfection im-
manent to a pile of building materials that could not have been realized apart from the 
intelligent agency of the architect and builder. On the other hand, and as Aquinas notes, 
the immanent acts of the senses and the intellect represent the relative perfection and 
goodness of the agent because in and through these acts—precisely as immanent and per-
fect acts—the agent actualizes and thus realizes the proper ends latently embedded within 
the principles of her natural potencies. Such ends are set apart as good ends from priva-
                                                
35 E.g. Aquinas, ST I.14.2.ad2. 
36 Lonergan, Verbum, 2:112. 
37 E.g. Aquinas, ST I.27.1. 
38 Ibid., I.18.ad1.  
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tions (e.g. blindness or deafness), which while technically actualizations of a sort, serve 
as a deprivation of a potency that is nonetheless defined by its “positive principle 
[archê].”39 Thus, as Aristotle writes, “[T]hings which have attained a good end are called 
perfect [teleia]; for things are perfect in virtue of having attained their end.”40 
Third, there is a final distinction be made between natural potencies and habitual 
potencies. Natural potencies, as we will explore in detail in a moment, are those embed-
ded in the species-wide faculties and powers characteristic of a given kind of living thing. 
On the other hand, habitual potencies are those that are progressively acquired by indi-
vidual members of that species as residual effects of particular, contingent acts of their 
natural potencies. The result of acquiring these potencies is that specific acts—which rep-
resent a subset of those made possible by natural potencies—become easier for that indi-
vidual to repeat. For instance, Aristotle applies this distinction to the emergence of 
knowledge in De anima II and III. To epistemically apprehend a truth for the first time is 
the proper act of a natural potency (i.e. called, as we will see, the “passive intellect”).41 To 
subsequently recollect knowledge depends on a derivative habitual potency (i.e. 
knowledge possessed, but not currently in act). Both epistemic potencies, however, are 
ordered to the comparative perfection of knowledge in act, of presently contemplating a 
given object of knowledge.42 
 The definitional, generative, and ontological priority that the entire Aristotelian 
metaphysical scheme accords to act over potency is difficult to overemphasize in grasp-
                                                
39 Aristotle, Met. V, 12, 1019b6-12. 
40 Ibid., V, 16, 1021b20-25. 
41 Cf. DA III, v, 430a10-25. 
42 Ibid., II, 1, 412a23-24; II, 5, 417a22-417b2; III, 5, 430a10-25 and Aquinas, ST I-II.49.1 and 3. 
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ing the overall metaphysical logic that passes from Aristotle into Aquinas. It influences 
nearly every aspect of the way that Aquinas assimilates this metaphysical framework 
with Augustine’s doctrine of God, along with its themes of divine simplicity, the analogi-
cal relationship between Creator and creation, and the intimate connection between di-
vine self-knowledge, God’s triunity, and the imago Dei. For the moment, though, we 
must see how Aristotle’s account of causation converges with the concepts of potency/act 
in his, and by extension Aquinas’s, reenvisioning of the soul in general and, subsequent-
ly, in the vertical relation between the senses and the intellect.  
II. Aristotle and Aquinas on the Soul as the First Actuality of a Living Being 
 
Having outlined his account of causation and the relation of potency to act, the analogy 
that serves as the linchpin of Aristotle’s account of the soul’s relation to matter can be 
stated clearly: the soul (=substantial form) is to matter as actuality is to potentiality.43 
What this analogy means for the constitution of particular living things is that their indi-
vidual lives come to pass through a two-part actualization and determination, the first 
through a living being’s soul and the second through its accumulated accidental forms.  
The first actualization generates their actual life through the fecund actuality of a 
substantial form in and through an informed arrangement of matter. The result of this ac-
tuality is a particularized mode of life. A mode of life, the general types of which we will 
turn to in a moment, is defined by the natural potencies or powers found among the 
members of a species44 and thus analytically traceable to the soul as the unitary and uni-
                                                
43 Aristotle, Met. IX, 6, 1048b7-9 and DA II, 1, 412a6-11. 
44 With the exception of privations. 
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versal “cause and first principle [archê]” of all parts of life manifested in an individual.45 
Accordingly, Aristotle defines the soul as “the first actuality [entelecheia] of a natural 
body which has life potentially [dunamei zōên echontos].”46 Aquinas expresses the same 
metaphysical point through his distinctive vocabulary of essence (essentia), act of exist-
ence (esse), and subsistence. Thus: a thing’s essence “gives actual existence [dat esse ac-
tuale] to the matter and makes it subsist as an individual.”47  
Here we have the initial metaphysical basis upon which Aquinas will separate out 
the soul from Augustine’s conflation of it with self-knowledge. The soul is the efficient 
cause of an individual’s most basic and primal intensive unity, i.e. their existence as an 
indivisible, organic whole with a specific mode of life. Without it, no/thing exists because 
the soul is the universal “whence” of every contingent act of existence and thus of every 
subsequent intensive or extroverted unity as well. Following this primal actualization, the 
second actualization occurs gradually as a particular living thing contingently accumu-
lates accidental forms or qualities through the actualization of their natural potencies in 
and through their distinctive operations and derivative habitual potencies. From the per-
spective of the first actualization, the potencies of life are themselves already an actuali-
ty. This is what makes them real. From the perspective of the second actualization(s), 
these potencies are but principles that are either still to be actualized and/or are in a con-
stantly vacillating mix of potency and act. This is what makes them imperfectly in act.  
                                                
45 Aristotle, DA II, 2, 413b4-13 and II, 4, 415a14-416b31. 
46 Ibid., II, 1, 412a27-28. 
47 Aquinas, ST I.29.2.ad5.  
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To fill out this account, then, we come to outlining the hierarchical classification 
of souls that both Aristotle and Aquinas set forth. For his part, Aristotle speaks of at least 
five groupings of natural potencies that are “parts” of the soul: vegetative (e.g. nutrition, 
growth, and reproduction), sensitive (e.g. the inner and outer senses), rational or intelli-
gent (e.g. reasoning and knowing), locomotive (e.g. walking or running), and desiderative 
(e.g. appetites). From these Aristotle, and Aquinas following him, identifies the first three 
groupings (vegetative, sensitive, and intelligent) as connected to distinct types of souls.48 
Vegetative (or nutritive) souls, usually associated with plants, furnish potencies for nutri-
tion, growth, and reproduction.49 Sensitive souls, associated with non-rational animals, 
furnish potencies for the external senses (touch, sight, smell, hearing, taste),50 the inner 
senses (e.g. imagination, memory, and common sense),51 and the sensitive passions (e.g. 
love, anger, fear, pleasure).52 Finally, intelligent or rational souls, associated with humans 
and any immaterial substances (e.g. Aristotle: God, prime movers; Aquinas: God, an-
gels), furnish the potencies necessary for the intelligent acts of knowing and willing.  
 Aristotle and Aquinas jointly explicate the hierarchical relationship between these 
three types of souls in a few different ways that are relevant to us. First, each compara-
tively higher type of soul includes within it the potencies of the previous level without 
sacrificing the intrinsic intensive unity of a substantial form. Aristotle draws his favorite 
analogies for this dynamic, both of which Aquinas likewise employs,53 from the mathe-
                                                
48 Aristotle, EN, I, 13, 1102a27-1103a10. 
49 DA II, 2, 413a21-413b13 and II, 3-4, 414a29-416b29. 
50 Ibid., II, 5-12, 416b32-424b19. 
51 Ibid., III, 2-3, 425b11-429a9. 
52 Ibid., I, 1, 403a3-403b19. 
53 Cf. Aquinas, ST I.76.3 
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matics and geometry-loving Pythagorians. Thus each type of soul is a unity unto itself, as 
if it were a number (i.e. an integer) to which another can be added or subtracted in a way 
that yields another indivisible unity.54 Similarly, a higher soul is like a “pentagon” that 
implies a quadrilateral just like “triangle is implied by the quadrilateral.”55 Accordingly, 
all sensitive animals possess the capacities for nutrition and growth, despite the fact that 
in plants these vegetative potencies are “divorced from the sensitive faculty.”56 Likewise, 
humans, as rational animals, possess the capacities and faculties intrinsic to both vegeta-
tive and sensitive souls. However, the higher organisms still only have a single soul that 
furnishes all of their given potencies. Therefore, as Aquinas writes, “the intellectual soul 
contains virtually whatever belongs to the sensitive soul of brute animals, and to the nu-
tritive souls of plants”57 despite the fact that in animals and plants their respective poten-
cies exist apart from intellectual potencies. Thus, the “capacity to absorb food may exist 
apart from all other powers [e.g. in plants], but the others cannot exist” apart from the 
nutritive potency of absorbing food.58 In the same way, in a metaphysical foregrounding 
of the vertical relation to which we will turn shortly, the capacity for sensitive apprehen-
sion is a prerequisite for intelligent apprehension.  
 Second, just as we found in De Trinitate, there is a progression from mere materi-
ality to an increasing immateriality. Aquinas nicely describes this progression in terms of 
a correlation between whether the faculty itself has a materiality to it (viz. a “corporeal 
organ”) and whether its mode of union with its moving object is material or not (viz. a 
                                                
54 Aristotle, Met. VIII, 3, 1043b33-1044a14. 
55 DA II, 3, 414b20-32. 
56 Ibid., II, 3, 415a2-4. 
57 Aquinas, ST I.76.3. 
58 Aristotle, DA II, 2, 413a 31-33. 
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“corporeal quality”).59 The vegetative operations are material in both regards such that 
their acts are “performed by a corporeal organ […] by virtue of a corporeal quality”60—
e.g. the intestine digesting food through mechanical and chemical digestion. Next, ac-
cording to Aquinas, the sensitive operations each have a corporeal organ, but are moved 
by sensible forms in a manner that does not require an accompanying corporeal quality—
e.g. the eye seeing visible forms from which the pupil is obviously physically separated. 
Finally, the intellectual powers are entirely immaterial, as they do not have any kind of 
organ or corporeal quality to their mode of union.61 
 Third, and lastly, the respective potencies associated with the three types of souls 
are hierarchically ordered toward one another according to their diverse capacity for in-
corporating a multiplicity of forms into their own existence. Or, as Aquinas puts it, the 
higher the power, the more general and universal is its object. At the bottom of this hier-
archy, an organism with a vegetative soul only “has” their own substantial and accidental 
forms, which they do not in fact “know” at all. All it has, as Aquinas writes, is the “being 
[esse] proper to it.”62 Expressed in another manner, the vegetative powers’ “object […] is 
only the body that is united to that soul.”63 However, organisms with sensitive and/or in-
telligent potencies—i.e. those with some epistemic power—are capable of receiving 
forms beyond their own ontological form via form’s gnoseological significance as a prin-
ciple for the epistemic identity between knower and known. The cognitive powers of the 
                                                
59 Cf. Aquinas, ST I.78.1. 
60 Ibid. 
61 “For,” as Aristotle famously expresses this contrast between the senses and the intellect, “the faculty of 
sense-perception is not independent of the body, whereas the intellect is distinct.” Cf. DA III, 4, 429b3-4. 
62 Aquinas, De causis, prop. 18. 
63 ST I.78.1. 
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sensitive soul are capable of receiving the patterned data of sensible forms that are com-
mensurate with each of the requisite senses. In other words, the sensitive apprehensive 
powers have as their generic object “every sensible body [omne corpus sensibile], not 
only the body to which the soul is united.”64 This hierarchical placement of sensation lies 
behind one of Aristotle’s most influential dictums: “actual sensation is of particulars, 
while knowledge is of universals.”65 Lastly, as this dictum suggests, the potencies of in-
telligence enable these beings to grasp the substantial and accidental intelligible forms 
that cause and explain particular sensible occurrences. To a certain extent, as we will ex-
plore in a moment, these potencies also enable intelligible beings to reproduce intelligible 
forms through the typical externality of the practical arts. The generic object of these 
powers is thus the highest and most general of all: it is “all being” (omne ens)66 according 
the universality of its intelligible causes. Accordingly, in one of the Aristotelian phrases 
that shows up most often in Aquinas, the intellect gives beings the capacity of potentially 
“becoming all things” (Gk: panta ginesthai; Lat: posse omnia fieri) in and through its 
proper act of knowing because “actual knowledge is identical with its object” formally 
speaking.67 Aquinas expresses the same point through the expected Augustinian termi-
nology of knower and known. As he writes in his commentary on the Liber de Causis, the 
highest form of life is capable of having “other things in itself […] since knowledge is 
accomplished because the known is in the knower, not materially, but formally.”68  
 
                                                
64 Ibid. 
65 Aristotle, DA II, 5, 417b21-24. 
66 Aquinas, ST I.78.1. 
67 Aristotle, DA III, 5, 413a10-17. 
68 Aquinas, De causis, prop. 18. 
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III. The Apprehensive Powers and the Verticality of Knowledge 
 
On the other side of outlining the Aristotelian metaphysical background for Aquinas’s 
account of the soul, we are now in a position to see how Aquinas creatively employs this 
framework in order to remedy Augustine’s dilemma regarding the inwardness of intelli-
gent knowledge and the character of self-knowledge. As I suggested at the outset of the 
chapter, the key to Aquinas’s positive theorization of the relation between the senses and 
the intellect lies in his appropriation of Aristotle’s multifaceted inclination to vertically 
relate all the powers of the soul as somehow capable of making a secondary contribution 
to the singular telos of a human being as primarily accomplished through the intelligent 
powers. In what follows in this section, I will set out how Aquinas describes the vertical 
relation between the apprehensive powers (i.e. the senses and the intellect). Chapter 3 
will then expand upon this line of interpretation in order to describe the analogous verti-
cal relation that Aquinas theorizes between the sensitive and intellective appetites as part 
of his redescription of the teleological/eschatological intensive unity made possible by 
the will’s capacity to love. 
Specifically expressed, the crucial insight furnished by Aristotle’s emphasis on a 
vertical continuum of powers in the soul is that he provides the resources for affirming 
that the different generic “parts” or “layers” of the soul (e.g. sensitive, intellectual) func-
tion both “on their own” (i.e. horizontally) and positively in relation to one another (i.e. 
vertically). For example, as I will describe in more detail in a moment, the five external 
senses (i.e. touch, sight, smell, hearing, taste) have their own horizontal functions defined 
by principled operations (i.e. to feel, see, smell, hear, and taste) that interiorize sensible 
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forms as phantasms. However, according to Aristotle, in the rational/intelligent soul of a 
human being the external senses’ active term (i.e. phantasms) also vertically contribute to 
the higher operations of the intellect and thus to an end that surpasses the ends intrinsic to 
their own acts (i.e. vertical finality). This vertical contribution, as we will explore further 
in a moment, is found in that phantasms are a necessary “preamble,” a condicio sine qua 
non, without which the human intellect cannot be moved to its own act of apprehending 
intelligible forms. As Aristotle writes in De anima, “[N]o one could ever learn or under-
stand anything without the exercise of sense-perception.”69 Here we have in nuce the Ar-
istotelian insight that Aquinas appropriates in order to affirm that the human intellect is 
characterized by a native extroversion that precludes—pace Augustine—the possibility 
that an individual always already possesses intelligent self-knowledge. Instead, what we 
will find is that the intensive unity of self-knowledge is strictly derivative from the extro-
verted apprehension of intelligible forms as “presented” by the external senses and interi-
orized, to foreground one of Aquinas’s most decisive transpositions of Augustine, as an 
inner word through the intellect’s acts of understanding and judgment.  
My strategy for explicating how Aquinas articulates this vertical relation between 
the senses and the intellect in conversation with Aristotle will pass through two subsec-
tions. First, I will set forth Aquinas’s understanding of the “horizontal” principle of sensi-
tive apprehension and its specific division into external and internal sensitive powers. In-
cluded in this discussion will be a brief constructive emendation of Aquinas’s list of the 
internal senses in order to include two additional internal senses—proprioception and 
                                                
69 Aristotle, DA III, 8, 432a7-8. 
  
  132 
equilibrioception—based upon the findings and terminology of modern physiology and 
neuroanatomy. These additions, which I will argue are commensurate with Aquinas’s 
metaphysical principles, will prove to be crucial from the perspective of our overall tra-
jectory vis-à-vis egoic self-consciousness and primary identification. Second, I will turn 
to Aquinas’s account of the vertical dependence of the intellect upon sensitive phantasms, 
the nature of the intellect’s primary acts of understanding external objects presented by 
the senses, and its derivative acts of self-knowledge and practical knowledge.  
a. Sensitive Apprehension: The External and Internal Senses 
In enumerating the specific powers that together constitute the generic power of sensitive 
apprehension, Aquinas makes a strict division between external and internal senses. The 
five external senses—sight, hearing, smell, touch, taste as embedded within their respec-
tive organs—are passive potencies that are moved to their proper acts of sensing by ex-
ternally present sensible forms (i.e. that which is visible, audible, olfactory, tactile, gusta-
tory).70 Once moved, these acts render the sensible forms immanently as dematerialized 
phantasms. Aquinas is repeatedly clear, based upon the Aristotelian dictum just cited 
above, that sensitive forms themselves are caused by accidental intelligible forms that 
account for the patterns that exist between their particular sensible occurrences (e.g. 
greenness, hotness, wetness, bitterness, high-pitchedness). The senses themselves, how-
ever, cannot “know” anything of these intelligible causes or the resulting patterns that 
exist beyond the particular. Instead, sense-knowledge is only of the particular, which is 
thereby rendered within the undifferentiated flux of phenomenal consciousness.  
                                                
70 Aquinas, ST I.78.3. 
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 To these five external senses, Aquinas adds four internal senses: the estimative 
power (aestimativa), memory (memoria), imagination (imaginatio), and the common 
sense (sensus communis).71 In order to promote brevity and a lack of duplication in dis-
cussion, I will delay treating the estimative power at length until Chapter 3 because, as 
will become clear at that juncture, its acts are closely bound up with determining the op-
erations of the sensitive appetite. Since this is the case, bracketing our discussion of it for 
the moment will not jeopardize our primary trajectory of understanding the horizontal 
and vertical interrelation of sensitive/intellectual apprehension.72 Furthermore, and as I 
referenced above, based upon the findings of contemporary physiology and neuroanato-
my, we will add two further internal senses—proprioception and equilibrioception—that 
Aquinas does not describe, but which I consider to be fully reconcilable with the Aristo-
telian/Thomist account of sense-cognition. Accordingly, there are five internal senses for 
us to presently consider: memory, imagination, proprioception, equilibrioception, and the 
common sense.  
Following our discussion of De Trinitate, grasping the memorative and the imagi-
native powers is not overly difficult. The former is the habitual potency that stores sensi-
ble forms once they have been received; the latter is that through which they can be reac-
tualized and thus immanently re-rendered. The only thing to note in passing is that Aqui-
nas combines the Aristotelian concepts of habitual potencies and the distinctive layers of 
the soul in order to affirm clearly that each layer of the soul in which there is apprehen-
                                                
71 Ibid., I.78.4. 
72 Briefly summarized, the estimative power explains how animals are capable of evaluating certain sensi-
ble forms as pleasurable or useful (or not) on the basis of non-sensible criteria (e.g. the way a bird knows a 
stick is useful for building a nest). Cf. Ibid. 
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sion also has a distinct memorative power that stores those forms once they have been 
apprehended and from which they can be recalled. Accordingly, Aquinas’s affirmation of 
a diversity of epistemic powers—i.e. sensitive and intelligent—leads him to affirm a par-
allel diversity of memorative powers within each of those layers of the soul.73 As we will 
see a bit further on, this precise metaphysical account of memory, both in its diversity 
and its intrinsic habitual relation to a specific apprehensive power, significantly contrib-
utes to how Aquinas revises Augustine’s imago Dei triad of memory, intelligence, and 
the will.  
 This leaves us with considering what is a close and, from the perspective of our 
overall trajectory vis-à-vis self-consciousness, important interrelation between proprio-
ception, equilibrioception, and the common sense. If, as Aquinas affirms, the sensitive 
powers are differentiated from the vegetative powers because their generic object reaches 
beyond the merely material reactions within the bounds of an organism’s corporeal body, 
then proprioception and equilibrioception can be described as the sensitive potencies that 
can sense an individual’s own embodied position within the rest of sensible reality. Pro-
prioception does this by sensing the relative position and state of different muscles (i.e. 
stretched, relaxed, and the speed with which it is proceeding from one state to the other). 
The primary organs responsible for these acts of sensation (i.e. the proprioceptors) have 
been identified as the muscles spindles and tendon organs that, for example, can be found 
in the arms, legs, and neck. Similarly, equilibrioception senses the body’s rotational 
movements (i.e. the head moving) and linear acceleration (i.e. going up or down, forward 
                                                
73 Cf. Ibid., I.79.6. 
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or backward) via the vestibular system in the inner ear (i.e. semicircular canals and the 
otolith organs).  
 One of the characteristics that clearly sets proprioception and equilibrioception 
apart as internal senses is that they are both subject to ongoing habitual formation, espe-
cially as a derivative result of the will’s executive agency (as we will detail next chapter) 
over the locomotive powers. In contrast, the exterior senses are “are not susceptible of 
habits, but are ordained to their fixed acts, according to the disposition of their nature.”74 
In this regard, they stand in an analogous relation to memory and the imagination, which, 
as Aquinas writes while citing Aristotle as an authority, “admit of certain habits whereby 
man has a facility [fit bene] of memory […] or imagination.”75 For instance, pretty much 
every new kinesthetic skill, whether basic (e.g. crawling, walking) or advanced (e.g. ath-
letic or artistic), requires a gradual habituation of the relevant proprioceptors to sensing 
the associated coordinated muscular movements. Without that habituation, for instance, it 
would be impossible to maintain coordinated kinesthetic movements in environments de-
void of light. Likewise, the habitual formation of equilibrioception is responsible for what 
is known as the vestibular-ocular “reflex,” which is responsible for coordinating visual 
data received through the eyes with the direction of the head’s movement. This learned 
coordination between different sensitive powers, external and internal, yields the familiar 
experience of a visual field that remains stable even when the head moves (i.e. our eyes 
“automatically” move left when our head turns to the right).76 
                                                
74 Ibid., I-II.50.3.ad3. 
75 Ibid. 
76 On the learned nature of this “reflex,” cf. Jay M. Goldberg et al., The Vestibular System: A Sixth Sense 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 409-26.  
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 Lastly, according to Aquinas’s interpretation and extension of Aristotle’s brief 
discussion in De anima (and, it should be added, in all likelihood Augustine’s strikingly 
similarly discussion of the “sensus interior” in De libero arbitrio),77 the act of the com-
mon sense is that which integrates all of the “incoming” sense data into a single, contem-
poraneous flux of phenomenal consciousness. Without this integrating act, the signifi-
cance of which we will return to in subsequent chapters, this sense data would remain 
temporally and topographically uncoordinated. This is because there is no potency in the 
external senses that self-evidently has anything “in common” with the rest of senses. 
Thus while the eye can distinguish black from white and the tongue can do the same be-
tween bitter and sweet, each of them lacks any capacity whatsoever through which to 
“distinguish,” as Aquinas writes as an example, “white from sweet.”78 Therefore, in a 
striking phrase to which we will return given its suggestive relevance for thematizing 
self-consciousness, without an additional sensitive act it would be “as though [these dis-
tinct sensations] were sensed by two different men, one perceiving sweet and another 
white; I this and you that [ego sentio hoc, et ille illud].”79 
To so distinguish is the proper act of the common sense. In order to describe this 
distinct act more concretely, Aquinas writes that it resembles a kind of sensitive judgment 
or interpretation: 
There must be one single faculty which ‘says’ [dicat] that sweet is not white, pre-
cisely because this distinction is one single object of knowledge. [This] saying 
[dictio] is the interpretation of an inward apprehension [interpretatio interioris 
apprehensionis]; and [this] saying is a single act.80   
                                                
77 Cf. Augustine, lib. arb. 2.3.20-2.5.50. 
78 Aquinas, In De anima III, lect. 3, n. 603.  
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid., III, lect. 3, n. 604. 
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The resulting synthetic term of this “saying” is that sensitive data are organized such that 
in individual experiences them simultaneously as localized sensations/phantasms “in” or 
“around” the various sensitive regions of the body (i.e. something is simultaneously felt 
as “liquidy” and tasted as “sweet” “in” in the mouth). As Aquinas continues:  
[There is] a simultaneous apprehension of the two [sensations]; they are both 
known in the same instant as they are known to be different. Obviously, then, they 
are known at once and together. Hence, as one undivided faculty perceives the 
difference between them, so in one undivided moment both are apprehended.81 
 
Given its decisive role within the sensitive faculty, Aquinas labels this power of common 
sight as the “principle and term of all sensibility.”82 For it stands as the “common root” 
from which “sensitivity flows to the organs of all five of the senses”83 and to which the 
data of their individual acts return in order to be collated into a sensible term distin-
guished by its coordination of these bits of data into an integrated, phenomenal whole.  
 Before moving on from this summative treatment of sensitive apprehension, we 
should pause here to comment upon what many might consider to be a convergence be-
tween our overall inquiry into self-consciousness and the various ways that the common 
sense (or a general “internal sense”) has been configured by classical, late antique, medi-
eval, and modern thinkers. Obviously, in our present context we cannot offer anything 
like an exhaustive account of all the potentially relevant historical and conceptual data 
regarding this theme. However, what we can do is make a few observations in order to 
justify why we are not spending more time exploring a more direct connection between 
                                                
81 Ibid., III, lect. 3, n. 605. 
82 Ibid., III, lect. 3, n. 609. 
83 Ibid. 
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self-consciousness and the common sense. Such a link would most likely be suggested on 
the basis of an assumed connection between similar-sounding passages found, on the one 
hand, in earlier sources such as Aristotle and Augustine and, on the other hand, modern 
sources such as Kant or Locke. The earlier sources, versions of which can be found in 
Aquinas as well, assign this common/internal sense with the seductively reflective-
sounding function variously described as “perceiving that we see and hear,”84 or “sensing 
that [the animal sees] when it sees,”85 or “not only sens[ing] the things it receives from 
the five bodily senses, but also sensing that they are sensed by it.”86 The modern sources 
then pick up the general and long-attested notion of an “inner sense” and appropriate it, 
within a philosophical milieu now dominated by thematizing self-consciousness, in terms 
that are in fact fully indicative of the reflection-theory. As Kant writes, “[The] inner sense 
[is that] by means of which the mind intuits itself, or its inner state.”87 Locke even more 
explicitly equates the “internal Sense” as that through which the mind “reflect[s] on its 
own Operations within it self.”88  
 The reason, however, that we are not pausing longer over the possibility of this 
convergence is simply because, in my judgment, the type of sensitive power that Aristo-
tle, Augustine, and Aquinas are discussing has nothing directly to do with the modern 
riddle regarding the origins of self-differentiated egoic consciousness. In the passages in 
question, these thinkers are neither wrestling with how we perceive that I qua I (i.e. as a 
                                                
84 Aristotle, DA III, 2, 425b12.  
85 Augustine, lib. arb. 2.4.10.39. 
86 Ibid., 2.4.10.38. 
87 Kant, KrV, A22/B37.  
88 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1975), II.1.4. 
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self-consciousness subject) see or hear that as an object qua object (or a thing qua thing), 
nor are they addressing the “mind’s” reflection on “itself.” Such a misreading anachronis-
tically reimports the terms of self-consciousness, self-differentiated intelligent 
knowledge, and “the mind” in a manner that creates exactly the type of conceptual confu-
sion regarding different types of capacities that, as we noted in the Introduction, plagues 
so much of modern philosophical thought. Instead, these earlier sources are simply in-
quiring into how the acts of the individual senses are brought together in an integrated 
manner given the obvious capacitive limitations of each sense. As Augustine rhetorically 
asks his interlocutor in De libero arbitrio, “Do we also sense hard and soft by seeing?” or 
“Can we settle what pertains to each sense by means of any of these [five] senses?” Ob-
viously not, Augustine assumes. Instead, we must affirm that there is a common, “‘inter-
nal sense’ to which the familiar five senses convey everything”89 such that we thereby 
unitedly sense (via an internal sense) all that we diffusely sense (via our external senses). 
When viewed through anachronistic lenses, this integrating function of the common sense 
might appear to have the faint glint being a kind of “reflection” on the act of sensing, but 
in context it is simply a way of affirming that sensitivity has a single principle and term. 
In this regard, the common sense is most closely allied not with the act of intelligent re-
flection, but rather with the fact that there is a single pre-reflective flux of phenomenal 
consciousness in the first place. 
 One more note, however, is in order for the sake of bookmarking something that 
is indeed indirectly significant about the common sense that we will in fact return to 
                                                
89 Augustine, lib. arb. 2.38.27. 
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when explicitly reframing egoic self-consciousness in Chapter 4 and 5. The genuinely 
significant fact about the common sense for our purposes is that its act results in a kind of 
intrinsic ordering of phenomenal consciousness (i.e. its contemporaneousness, its topo-
graphical distribution around/in the body) without itself entering into phenomenal con-
sciousness. Despite the fact that its effects are embedded in the resulting phenomenal 
consciousness, we are never conscious of common sense-ing in itself, nor can we alter its 
act through volitional control. In this precise sense, the act of the common sense is an un-
conscious act that nonetheless causes effects of which we are conscious in various ways. 
For this reason, it will prove to be of some importance in forging at least one conceptual 
link between our Aristotelian/Thomist anthropology and our corresponding translation of 
Freud and his thematization of the relation between “the unconscious” and the develop-
mental origins of egoic self-consciousness. 
b. Intelligent Apprehension and Its Vertical Dependence on Phantasms 
In turning to consider the metaphysical principles of the human intellect, we have arrived 
at the most pivotal juncture of Aquinas’s remedial transposition of Augustine into a 
broadly Aristotelian metaphysical and epistemological framework. For it is here that 
Aquinas finds a positive account of the vertical relation between the senses and the intel-
lect that avoids Augustine’s problematic emphasis on a primal self-knowledge that inten-
sively grounds all other intelligent knowledge. Instead, Aristotle furnishes the metaphysi-
cal resources required for affirming a native epistemic extroversion in human beings such 
that the intensive unity characteristic of self-knowledge is strictly derivative from intelli-
gently understanding external objects as presented by the senses. Based upon this order-
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ing, the intensive unities of the soul and self-knowledge can be strictly separated and dif-
ferentiated as well. As we will begin to describe in this section and then expand upon in 
the next section, Aquinas then moves beyond Aristotle in order to creatively integrate 
Augustine’s insights regarding the inner word and the deficient, participatory character of 
the imago Dei into a fully theological anthropology. 
 The cornerstone of Aquinas’s explication of this ordered relation between sense-
knowledge, the intellect’s native extroversion, and the strictly derivative nature of self-
knowledge can be found in his adoption of Aristotle’s affirmation that there are two spe-
cific operations that constitute the generic power of intelligent apprehension: speculative 
acts and practical acts.90 The intellect’s speculative acts are immanent acts the terms of 
which yield an understanding of intelligible truth. In contrast, its practical acts are exter-
nal acts that “reproduce” those intelligible patterns onto/into external objects in order, so 
to speak, to in/form them (e.g. an artist shaping a stone into the shape of a human). Since 
one cannot externally reproduce that which one has not already speculatively grasped, 
this basic distinction, when combined with the derivative nature of self-knowledge, leads 
to an overarching three-fold ordering among the intellect’s operations that will serve as 
our outline moving forward in this section: (1) sensory-based speculative knowledge of 
external objects, (2) the specific case of speculative self-knowledge, and (3) practical 
knowledge. As just indicated, the order of these three is not accidental: the first operation 
serves as the basis for the second and third operations without which they could not oc-
cur. On the basis of sensory-based speculative knowledge of external objects, the intellect 
                                                
90 Cf. Aristotle, DA III.10.433a14-15 and Aquinas, ST I.14.16. 
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can pivot, so to speak, either “inwardly” in acts of reflective self-knowledge or “outward-
ly” in intelligibly patterned acts of embodied, practical performance.  
1. The Speculative Intellect   
 
Generally speaking, the object of the speculative intellect is being (Gk: ὄν; Lat: ens) qua 
intelligibly knowable. As just stated, the immanent term of its act, and its relative perfec-
tion, is a knowledge of truth. Its ultimate perfection, the culmination of the natural desire 
to know, is the knowledge of all intelligible truth. Since being’s intelligibility is caused 
by forms, it follows that the intellect is moved to act through some appearance or repre-
sentation of these intelligible forms as its moving object. To say this however is only to 
formulate the crux of the analytical problem connected with intelligence: given the ten-
sion between, on the one hand, the enmattered particularity of forms and, on the other 
hand, the universality of knowledge and the intellect’s inherent immateriality, how is the 
intellect moved by intelligible forms to its act of knowledge? What is the mode of its “re-
ceiving the form”91 of the known object? 
 In contrast to Augustine’s approach to this question based upon the reflective con-
sultation of forms in the soul,92 Aristotle and Aquinas steadfastly hold that the similitude 
through which intelligible forms are apprehended, what they call the intelligible species,93 
is somehow “included among the sensible forms”94 such that phantasms can be affirmed 
as the necessary vertical contribution of the senses to the higher acts of the intellect. To 
repeat Aristotle’s declaration cited above, without the preceding sensitive acts that pro-
                                                
91 Aristotle, DA III, 4, 429a15-17. 
92 This rhetorical evaluation—viz. a “consultation” of the eternal forms—of Augustine’s epistemology is 
originally Lonergan’s. Cf. Lonergan, Verbum, 2:192. 
93 Aquinas, ST I.14.2, I.55.1, I.85.2. 
94 Aristotle, DA III, 8, 432a3-7.  
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duce phantasms, “no one could ever learn or understand anything.”95 Indeed, the fact that 
all intelligent knowledge is dependent on phantasms seems self-evident to Aquinas: “An-
yone can experience this of himself, that when he tries to understand something, he forms 
certain phantasms to serve him by way of examples, in which as it were he examines 
what he desires to understand.”96 From this starting point, the intellect somehow abstracts 
the universal from its presentation in the sensibly-presented (or imagined) particular.  
In order to articulate a theory for how the intellect does this, Aristotle sets the pa-
rameters for an approach that Aquinas adopts and expands via the Augustinian inner 
word. This begins by positing that the intellect’s relative perfection occurs through two 
sequential operations—understanding and judgment—that are related as first act to se-
cond act. I will offer a preliminary definition of each before proceeding to explore each 
of them in more detail below. Understanding accomplishes the initial abstraction of the 
intelligible species, which Aristotle and Aquinas most often associate with the known 
thing’s formal unity or definition, from the phantasms. Thus, its operation yields an in-
sight of understanding that answers the question: “What is it?” (Gk: ti estin;97 Lat: quid sit 
or quod quid est). Judgment follows upon understanding by taking this presumed formal 
and indivisible unity and, by returning to the particularity of sensible data, testing its va-
lidity in detail through a cognitive process known as composition and division (Gk: sun-
thesin kai diaipesin;98 Lat: composition vel divisio). Judgment thereby answers the ques-
tion of truth (or falsity) strictly speaking: “Is it?” (Lat: an sit?), viz. “Is this understanding 
                                                
95 Ibid., III, 8, 432a 7-8.  
96 Aristotle, ST I.84.7. 
97 Aristotle, APo, II, 2, 89b33-35. 
98 Met. VI, 4, 1027b17-22. 
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true?” or “Does this understanding correspond with reality?” One of Aquinas’s decisive 
philosophical and theological contribution occurs, as we will see in a moment, in identi-
fying the term of each of these operations as coinciding with what Augustine describes as 
the emergence of an inner word.  
 At the heart of Aristotle’s solution to the problem of how the intellect successfully 
abstracts intelligible species from phantasms is his assertion that there is both an active 
potency and a passive potency—each of which actualize as immanent acts—within the 
selfsame intellect. In De anima III.5, the locus classicus for this assertion, Aristotle semi-
nally—if notoriously enigmatically—compares the intellect’s active potency to a kind of 
shining light and its passive potency with that which is capable of potentially becoming 
all things formally. The grounding logic for this comparison is that everything in nature 
has an active and a passive principle related to forms, the most common example being 
the composite union of form (active) and matter (passive). So too in the intellect is there 
similarly an active and a passive principle, albeit in this case without matter: 
Since in the whole of nature there is something which is matter to each kind of 
thing (and this is what is potentially all of them), while on the other hand there is 
something else which is their cause and is productive by producing them all—
these being related as an art [technê] to its material—so there must also be these 
differences in the soul. And there is an intellect which is of this kind by becoming 
all things [tō panta ginesthai], and there is another which is so by producing all 
things [tō panta poiein], as a kind of positive state, like light does: for in a way 
light too makes colors which are potential into actual colors. And this intellect is 
distinct, impassible [apathês], and unmixed, being in essence activity [tō ousia ōn 
energeia].99 
 
This crucial distinction passes directly into Aquinas in what he describes as the dynamic 
relation of the active (or agent) intellect (intellectus agens) and the passive (or possible) 
                                                
99 DA III, 5, 430a10-17.  
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intellect (intellectus possibilis). The trick to following the connection between this dis-
tinction and the two operations of understanding and judgment is to see that the interrela-
tion between the intellect’s active and passive potencies occurs twice—once in the opera-
tion of understanding and again in the operation of judgment. In each case, the terminal 
object of the active intellect coincides with the object that moves the passive intellect to 
its proper act of understanding. This single object (both terminal and moving) is the intel-
ligible species as it has been illuminated—and thus successfully abstracted from phan-
tasms—by the active intellect. As Aquinas writes, the active intellect “throws light on the 
phantasm” and thereby “abstracts the intelligible species from the phantasm.”100 Just as 
illuminated colors thereby naturally move the passive potency of sight, so does the illu-
minated intelligible species thereby move the passive intellect to its proper act of 
knowledge. Accordingly, understanding and judgment are, properly speaking, perfect 
acts of a passive potency with immanent terms—thereby fulfilling a relative perfection of 
the agent (i.e. the knower). 
 In understanding, this two-fold process between the active and the passive intel-
lect begins with the flux of sensible data rendered in phantasms and the inquiring mind 
discursively reasoning its way towards the unifying insight that is understanding.101 Even 
though there are many things that intelligent beings might take for granted after the cu-
mulative force of multiple insights of understanding, there is, as we noted in our discus-
sion of self-consciousness and the subject/object distinction in the Introduction, nothing 
                                                
100 Aquinas, ST I.85.1.ad4.  
101 Lonergan summarizes the point well: the “process of reasoning ends, not in the multiplicity of the pro-
cess, but in a synthetic view of the whole” (Verbum, 24, n. 51). On the relation of the process of reasoning 
to its terminus in understanding, see Aquinas, ST I.14.7 and II-II.8.1.ad2. 
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automatic in grasping why a certain set of sensible data should be considered as a single 
intelligible object and thus, causally speaking, as an object that is explanatorily more 
basic than the aggregate of its sensible accidents. Accordingly, like a light shining in the 
dark until it strikes upon the form of an object that reflects back its light, the active intel-
lect enacts its terminal movement or change “on” the phantasms themselves: no longer 
simply a flux of accidental sense data, now they shine with the indivisible unity of formal 
intelligibility, universality, and definition. Lonergan memorably correlates the palpably 
experiential character of this qualitative change with the impulse to shout, “Eureka!” 
when the intellect hits upon a newfound intelligible unity.102  
In effecting this qualitative change, the active intellect illuminates the intelligible 
species by which the passive intellect is moved to its act of understanding.103 It thereby 
apprehends the universal form of whatever enmattered particular is under consideration 
and, in fact, is now known by way of the similitude of this form now being in the intellect 
of the knower by way of its illuminated intelligible species.104 In this operation of under-
standing, the ontological and epistemic function of form comes full circle in their deci-
sive convergence within the intellect of the knower. Lonergan succinctly states the signif-
icance of this convergence in the precise coherence of the analogy that comes into focus 
as just this point: “insight is to phantasm as form is to matter.”105 Aquinas’s preferred 
nomenclature is to forthrightly state, in a manner that is disarming in its lack of Kantian 
                                                
102 Lonergan, Verbum, 2:25, 45. 
103 Aquinas, ST I.85.2. 
104 Ibid., I.85.8.ad3.  
105 Lonergan, Verbum, 2:38. 
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anxiety, that the intellect’s proper object “is the quiddity of a material thing.”106 Or in 
more detail: “[T]he active intellect abstracts the intelligible species from the phantasm, 
forasmuch as by the power of the active intellect we are able to disregard the conditions 
of individuality, and to take into our consideration the specific nature [of the thing 
known], the similitude of which informs the passive intellect.”107 
There are two key epistemological and metaphysical features of the intelligible 
form as understood that are important to note before proceeding to the nature of judg-
ment. First: the intelligible form as understood is detachable as an object of rational in-
quiry, as an idea or definition, from any enmattered and particular instance of it. This is 
what makes intelligible forms universal. This detachability results despite the fact that the 
human intellect requires sensible instances of these forms for their initial apprehension. 
As one would expect, Aquinas’ chief examples of these intelligible forms are the sub-
stances of living things. Thus, for example: 
Humanity understood [quae intelligitur] is only in this or that [human being]; but 
that humanity be apprehended without conditions of individuality, that is, that it 
be abstracted and consequently considered as universal, occurs to humanity inas-
much as it is brought under the consideration of the intellect, in which there is a 
likeness of the specific nature, but not of the principles of individuality.108 
 
Even with the primacy of these substances noted, however, both Aristotle and Aquinas 
make it clear that this same intellectual operation is responsible for apprehending other 
abstract intelligibilities beyond the scope of formal biology: to grasp the abstract univer-
sal that causes the particular instance of any repeating intelligible pattern is the proper act 
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of the intellect regardless of what the type of pattern being considered at any given mo-
ment.  
Other thinkers, such as Lonergan, have extended this basic insight in order to 
align it with post-Enlightenment philosophical concerns and the modern proliferation of 
sciences. For example, when taking these sources together, understanding can be named 
as the operation responsible for apprehending the universal and indivisible patterns that 
constitute the requisite objects that organize the natural sciences (e.g. the genera and spe-
cies of animals),109 theoretical sciences (e.g. theorems, axioms, laws, and formulae),110 
social sciences (e.g. paradigms),111 medicine (e.g. diseases and cures),112 and the practical 
arts (e.g. houses, machinery, electronics).113 Despite the fact that modern versions of these 
sciences and disciplines are typically ignorant of Aristotelian psychology, their contem-
porary practitioners still prove the metaphysical point by doing their work according to 
hypotheses, models, theorems, laws, and axioms.  
For our purposes, however, the most important aspect of this extension for our 
overall inquiry into self-consciousness (and one to which we will return in due time) can 
be found in that it underlines the fact that grasping an object qua object (or a thing qua 
thing), “a unity, identity, [a] whole in data,”114 is itself the result of an intelligent act of 
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understanding. In fact, to grasp the intelligible genera of “object” or “thing” is, according 
to Lonergan, the insight that unlocks, propels, and grounds all other intelligent inquiry, 
viz. “the thing is the basic synthetic construct of scientific thought and development.”115 
For by illuminating a “concrete unity [and] totality of spatially and temporally distinct 
data,”116 this insight of an a “thing” successfully parcels out sensible wholes that can suc-
cessfully be isolated for further intelligent investigation: e.g. what kind of thing is that 
thing? When combined with the Aristotelian/Thomist insistence on the native exteriority 
of the human intellect, we are lead to a significant formulation that stands as an inverse to 
the reflection theory: we must first come to extrovertedly know external objects qua ob-
jects before we can ever procede to intensively grasp ourselves as an objectified thing as 
well. This sequence follows because the human intellect, by its very nature, requires a 
certain grasp of the universal whole, concretely presented to it “in the [sensible] particu-
lars,”117 before it can proceed to grasp any corresponding parts of that whole, even the 
objectified whole that we (eventually) come to know as “myself.”118 This initial grasp of 
the universal is furnished by the operation of understanding. 
 Second, acts of understanding are in principle synthetically related to one another. 
The affirmation here is not that the intellect comes to understand many things simultane-
ously through a multiplicity of intelligible species, but rather that through a single intelli-
gible species—and therefore a single act of understanding—it comes to know the causes 
and principles of being from an increasingly higher viewpoint of synthesized intelligibil-
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ity.119 This possibility of synthesis is what relates speculative understanding to wisdom—
the unitary grasp of principles and causes—within the Aristotelian and Thomist frame-
works. The pinnacle of wisdom is to understand all things at once in a synthesized view 
of their proper order as determined by the hierarchy of their causes and principles. The 
synthetic character of understanding is the epistemic version of what Aristotle and Aqui-
nas set forth ontologically in affirming the irreducible unity of substance in higher forms 
of life even though their souls incorporate the potencies of lower forms of life. Accord-
ingly, to understand the idea of a human being (a rational animal) implicitly includes the 
idea of a thing, a vegetative organism, and a non-rational animal even though it includes 
the notion of rationality as well.120 Likewise: 
The intellect does not understand a house by understanding the foundation and 
then the walls and then the roof, but it understands all of these together insofar as 
one thing is constituted from them.121  
 
Perhaps more clearly and consistently than either Aristotle or Aquinas, Lonergan repeat-
edly appeals to this synthesizing feature of understanding to make sense of how people 
intelligently make progress toward mastery in any given domain of knowledge. Thus in 
mathematics: understanding integers gives way to understanding addition, which gives 
way to the further universal notions of “multiplications, powers, subtraction, division, 
and roots”122 and eventually algebra, geometry, and calculus. The crucial point is this: the 
higher unities of understanding presuppose the lower levels of understanding without 
consciously reduplicating them or thinking about them as an included aggregate. Just as 
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the soul of a human being just does include the vegetative principles of nutrition and 
growth, so too Newton’s general binomial theorem just does include within it the basic 
understanding of integers, addition, and powers. Here again the ontological and epistemic 
notions of form converge at a crucial point in explaining the intellect’s acts and corre-
sponding objects. 
 Having outlined understanding in more detail, we can turn back to consider the 
nature of judgment in comparison. If understanding yields a grasp of the relevant intelli-
gible form as universal, judgment returns to the accidental particulars to confirm and per-
fect the initial insight of understanding. In an especially transparent turn of phrase, Aqui-
nas expresses the interconnected foci of understanding and judgment in terms of his dis-
tinctive emphasis on the particularity of existence: “[T]here are two operations of intel-
lect […] the first operation regards the quiddity of a thing; the second regards the exist-
ence [esse] of that thing.”123 In attending thus to the concreteness of existence, in the op-
eration of judgment the intellect in a way attempts to retrace—so to speak—the order of 
being as an organic unity of actual form and matter in the order of knowledge by com-
prehending all the “the properties, accidents, and the various relations” of the given intel-
ligible object under consideration.124 Just as the particular accidents of a thing depends 
entirely on its substance, so in judgment does the intellect try to comprehend a thing’s 
concrete accidents on the basis of understanding’s grasp of its substance.  
 In both its confirmatory and perfecting aspects, judgment depends upon a discur-
sive process known as composition and division. The conceptual backdrop for this pro-
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cess comes from Aristotle’s mapping of grammar onto the dynamics of knowledge. Ac-
cordingly, composition runs parallel to affirming a proposition—e.g., “the woman is 
tall”—that attaches an predicate (e.g. tallness) to a given subject (e.g. a woman). In this 
way, “our intellect predicates the composition of one thing with another.”125 Similarly, to 
negate such a proposition is to divide that predicate from that subject. Only when such 
propositional conclusions come into play does the actual question of truth (or falsity) 
arise vis-à-vis the intellect’s operations. This is because intelligible forms in themselves 
are never per se true or false. To simply grasp the ideas of, for example, the predicates 
signified by “tall” or “woman” or even mythical predicates such a “goat-stag”126 or a “ra-
tional winged animal”127 is to know nothing of truth or falsity. Only when the question of 
the real (or lack of) correspondence between these predicates and actual things arises 
does the intellect make a judgment concerning the relative truth of its insights of under-
standing.128 
 As a confirmation, judgment applies the intelligible form from understanding and 
tests it as a explanation for all the relevant “accidental” points of data that are either im-
mediately present to the senses or recalled as relevant evidence by memory and/or the 
imagination. If the given intelligible form fails to correspond with the object, the result 
will be explanatory discordance, variance, and therefore disconfirmation. This will inevi-
tably be the result if, as Aquinas writes laconically, one tries to apply the “definition of a 
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circle […] to a triangle.”129 If the intelligible form corresponds with the object, however, 
then the active intellect will again illuminate aspects of the phantasmic data that shine 
back with an intelligible species that confirms the hypothesized formal unity. For exam-
ple, Aquinas is fond of the example of an approaching body that one gradually under-
stands in increasing degrees of confirmation and precision: “when a thing is seen afar off 
it is seen to be a body before it is seen to be an animal; and to be an animal before it is 
seen to be a man, and to be a man before it seen to be Socrates or Plato.”130 Or, if one has 
postulated (a la Copernicus and Kepler) that the solar system can most intelligibly be de-
scribed in terms of a heliocentric model, then one (e.g. Galileo) will be delighted to see 
that Venus exhibits a full set of phases that are explainable only if it—like the earth—
rotates around the sun.   
 As a perfecting, judgment fills out a determinate knowledge of the parts that make 
up the whole that has been grasped by understanding its intelligible unity. It thus seeks, 
following the Aristotelian ideals of science and wisdom, to reduce and resolve all aspects 
of data to their respective principles and elements (i.e. resolutio in principia).131 For ex-
ample, to grasp the definition of a human being as a rational animal does not, as the bur-
geoning departments for human biology and neuroscience prove, give with it an exhaus-
tive knowledge either of all the essential parts of human beings (e.g. flesh, bones, senses, 
a brain, organs, appendages, etc.) or the accidental qualities of any particular human be-
ing. Nonetheless, it is the grasp of the intelligible whole that lays the foundation for the 
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intelligible illumination for how all the parts fit together as an organic and indivisible 
whole. While citing Aristotle as an authority, Aquinas describes this progression from the 
universal to the determinate knowledge of each part in terms of the progression from in-
complete (and thus imperfect) to complete (and thus perfect) knowledge: 
The perfect act of the intellect is complete knowledge, when the object is distinct-
ly and determinately known; whereas the incomplete act is imperfect knowledge, 
when the object is known indistinctly, and as it were confusedly. A thing thus im-
perfectly known, is known partly in act and partly in potentiality, and hence the 
Philosopher says (Phys. I, 1), that “what is manifest and certain is known to us at 
first confusedly; afterwards we know it by distinguishing its principles and ele-
ments.” Now it is evident that to know an object that comprises many things, 
without proper knowledge of each thing contained in it, is to know that thing con-
fusedly. In this way we can have knowledge not only of the universal whole, 
which contains parts potentially, but also of the integral whole; for each whole 
can be known confusedly, without its parts being known.132 
 
Here the full parallel that Aquinas makes between essence/existence and understand-
ing/judgment comes into focus: just as existence is the perfection of that which is none-
theless the irreducible ground of its act (i.e. essence), so does judgment perfect that which 
is likewise its prerequisite act (i.e. understanding). 
 Regardless of whether it connotes confirmation or perfection, the illuminated spe-
cies of the active intellect moves the passive intellect to its proper act of judgment itself. 
Aquinas also regularly regards this act of the intellect as assent (assentire): 
For by the very act of relating the principles to the conclusions [we assent] to the 
conclusions by reducing them to the principles. There, the movement of the one 
who is thinking is halted and brought to rest. [Thus] discursive thought leads to 
assent, and assent brings thought to rest.133 
 
                                                
132 ST I.85.3.  
133 De ver., 4.1.  
  
  155 
In assent, the intellect is brought to rest—at least proximately speaking—because it has 
attained its proper object: the intelligible truth of being. For the act of assent is the perfec-
tion of the speculative intellect because in this terminal act it has been “perfected by the 
clear sight of truth [perfecti per plenam visionem veritatis].”134 
 Finally, in preparation for next section, we can briefly note the way in which this 
overview of the intellectual operations of understanding and judgment brings us to the 
precise point of insertion for the Augustinian tradition of the inner word within the 
broader Aristotelian account of the intellect. The relation can, in fact, be concisely stated. 
“The act of the intellect,” Aquinas declares in De veritate, “terminates in an inner word 
[terminatur ad verbum interius].”135 More specifically, Aquinas identifies the immanent 
term of each of the intellect’s operations, which are completed in the act of the passive 
intellect, with the conception of a prelinguistic—linguae nullius—inner word. As he 
writes in his commentary on the gospel of John: 
[T]hat is properly called an interior word which the one understanding forms 
when understanding. Now the intellect forms two things, according to its two op-
erations. According to its operation which is called “the understanding of indi-
visibles,” it forms a definition; while according to its operation by which it unites 
and separates, it forms an enunciation or something of that sort. Hence, what is 
thus formed and expressed by the operation of the intellect, whether by defining 
or enunciating, is what the exterior vocal sound signifies. […] Hence, what is thus 
expressed […] is called an interior word. Consequently it is compared to the intel-
lect, not as that by which the intellect understands, but as that in which it under-
stands, because it is in what is thus expressed and formed that it sees the nature of 
the thing understood.136 
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Even though Aristotle, like many Hellenic philosophers, made the double distinction be-
tween spoken words and the inner mental phenomena of which they are signs,137 only in 
Augustine do you find the origins of a triple link between a pre-reflective ground of 
knowledge, the pre-linguistic emergence of that knowledge in understanding, and exter-
nal words as signs of that knowledge that not only chimes with the data of mental phe-
nomena, but also forges the essential connection to trinitarian doctrine. Nonetheless, Ar-
istotle’s reinterpretation of form’s relationship to materiality and the intellect’s distinctive 
operations, both of which are tied together by the keystone of the relation between poten-
cy to act, enabled Aquinas to transport that all-important triple link onto more coherent 
metaphysical soil. 
2. The Specific Case of Speculative Self-Knowledge  
 
As I noted at the opening to this section, from the starting-point of the acts of the specula-
tive intellect, the intellect can then pivot either “inwardly” or “outwardly.” When it pivots 
inwardly, it reflectively aims at the intensive unities of self-knowledge. The mere fact 
that this account of self-knowledge originates on the basis of prior acts of knowing some-
thing external already marks the most important difference between the Aristotelian 
framework and the Augustinian insistence on the non-adventitious character of self-
knowledge. In this framework, “knowledge of self is not a starting point” that secures the 
self’s originary intensive unity, as it is for Augustine (and Descartes and Fichte), but ra-
ther something apprehended “at the very end of the process of first-order knowing.”138 Or, 
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as we expressed the point above, our native epistemic exteriority requires that we must 
first know that something else is a thing before we are able to reflectively pivot in order 
to apprehend that we are ourselves are a objectifiable (and thus knowable) “thing” among 
other things as well. Despite the retrospective novelty of this position from within an in-
tellectual milieu dominated by Cartesian and Kantian depictions of the riddles surround-
ing self-consciousness, for Aquinas the metaphysical logic behind his position ended up 
seeming rather straightforward: 
Everything is knowable in so far as it is in act, and not, so far as it is in potentiali-
ty […] Now the human intellect is only a potentiality […] just as primary matter 
is a potentiality as regards sensible beings; and hence [the intellect] is called pas-
sive [possibilis]. Therefore in its essence the human is potentially understanding. 
Hence it has in itself the power to understand, but not to be understood, except 
[as] it is made actual.139  
 
“Therefore,” as Aquinas declares in a direct deviation from Augustine via Aristotelian 
terminology, “the intellect knows itself not by its essence, but by its act.”140 The only 
qualified exception to this declaration are the first principles—e.g. the whole is greater 
than the parts and the principle of non-contradiction—that are included, not as objects of 
knowledge that are known in themselves prior to discrete acts of understanding, but ra-
ther are intrinsic to the active intellect and thus the “nature of intelligence as such.”141 
 Generally speaking, Aquinas explains this declaration that the human intellect 
does not know itself by its essence by focusing in on the intelligible species illuminated 
by the active intellect in speculative knowledge. The pivot of self-knowledge occurs as a 
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pivot on the intelligible species themselves. Because of the formal identity that occurs in 
speculative knowledge between known and knower, the intelligible species—as the me-
dium of knowledge—can double as both a principle of knowledge, a formal similitude, of 
both the known and the knower: 
For as sense in act is the sensible in act, by reason of the sensible likeness which 
is the form of sense in act, so likewise the intellect in act is the object understood 
in act, by reason of the similitude of the thing understood, which is the form of the 
intellect in act. So the human intellect, which becomes actual by the species of the 
object understood, is itself understood by the same species as by its own form.142 
 
It is as if in illuminating the intelligible species of the object known that the agent intel-
lect illuminates a form of its own intelligible act, which, as Aristotle notes in De anima, 
is just as intelligible as the object it illuminates.143 Aquinas makes the analogy with visi-
ble light explicit in De veritate: 
Physical light is seen through itself only in so far as it is the reason for the visibil-
ity of visible things and a kind of form making the actually visible […] Similarly, 
we understand the light of the agent intellect, in so far as it is the reason for the in-
telligible species, making the actually intelligible.144 
 
Accordingly, the human intellect knows that it knows through the illuminated species of 
its own preceding acts of intelligible knowing, which thus—following the above analy-
sis—simultaneously serves as the moving object of the passive intellect that actualizes 
self-knowledge. Therefore, as Lonergan effectively summarizes, the “soul does not know 
its own essence by its own essence; but in some fashion it does know its own intellectual 
light by its own intellectual light.”145 
                                                
142 Aquinas, ST I.87.1.ad3. 
143 Cf. Aristotle, DA III, 4, 430a1-3. 
144 Aquinas, De ver., 10.8.ad10 (2nd series). 
145 Lonergan, Verbum, 2:91. 
  
  159 
 Out of this general approach, however, both Aristotle and Aquinas crucially dis-
tinguish between two types of self-knowledge: particular and universal. Aquinas de-
scribes the difference between the two in the following passage that is worth quoting at 
length: 
Therefore the intellect knows itself not by its essence, but by its act. This happens 
in two ways. In the first way, particularly, as when Socrates or Plato perceives 
that he has an intellectual soul because he perceives that he understands. In the 
second way, universally, as when we consider the nature of the human mind from 
knowledge of the intellectual act. […] [The] difference between these two kinds 
of knowledge […] consists in this, that the mere presence of the mind suffices for 
the first; the mind itself being the principle of action whereby it perceives itself, 
and hence it is said to know itself by its own presence. But as regards the second 
kind of knowledge, the mere presence of the mind does not suffice, and there is 
further required a careful and subtle inquiry. Hence many are ignorant of the 
soul’s nature, and many have erred about it.146 
 
Particular self-knowledge is that by which one perceives the intelligible patterns of one’s 
own acts and qualities both in themselves (and thus as distinct potencies) and as a collec-
tion of accidents that together constitute the unified existence of an individual being with 
a correspondingly singular soul.147 This type of knowledge is possible on the basis of 
one’s own operations and, through its actual occurrence, we forge exactly the type of re-
flective intensive unity—in which one being is both knower and known—so valorized by 
Augustine (and a whole host of others). Universal self-knowledge, on the other hand, 
takes the extra step of asserting the particularity of your soul as an essential principle 
universally “common to all souls.”148 To judge this to be the case requires, like all acts of 
judgment, attention to all relevant data whether they are immanent or external to oneself.   
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3. The External Acts of Practical Knowledge 
 
If the intellect can pivot “inwardly” in self-knowledge, then it can equally pivot “out-
wardly” in acts of practical knowledge. Just as actual speculative knowledge serves as the 
basis for acts of self-knowledge, so does speculative knowledge become the efficient and 
final cause of the patterned acts of the practical intellect. As this comparison already sug-
gests, the speculative and the practical acts of the intellect differ, as Aristotle writes, “in 
respect of end.”149 The knowledge which is the term for speculative acts of the intellect 
becomes the starting-point for practical acts that realize a formally identical end. Whereas 
the end of the speculative intellect is the passive apprehension of formal identities, the 
object of the practical intellect is the active production (Gk: poiêsis; Lat: facere) of for-
mal identities.   
 The most obvious example of the practical intellect in act can be found in the pro-
duction of tangible artifacts. Both Aristotle and Aquinas commonly cite the building of 
houses as a stock example.150 Hence, there is such a thing as the speculative knowledge of 
the art [Gk: technê; Lat: ars] of house-building. It would give the knower the habitual 
potency of conceiving a house as an organic whole, the principle parts of a house in gen-
eral, the necessary ratios for building an aesthetically pleasing and useful house, and 
some of the required or recommended materials for such an enterprise. When the builder 
then turns to build an actual house, that general knowledge serves as the form for the 
practical intellect’s envisioning and planning the patterned activity for realizing that form 
in the particularities of material production. This form is the efficient cause of the pro-
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duction as the principle from which the operation proceeds and without which it would 
not occur; it is the final cause as the teleological form to be concretely realized. Accord-
ingly, there is a genuine sense in which the practical arts reverse the course of the specu-
lative sciences. As Aquinas writes, “[In the] sciences, demonstrated conclusions are 
drawn from the principles, while […] in the arts, general forms are particularized as to 
details: thus the craftsman [artifex] needs to determine the general form of a house to 
some particular shape.”151 
 Despite being the most commonly cited example, the external artifact is not the 
only end of the practical intellect’s acts. There are two kinds of non-transitive acts (i.e. no 
house is being built, no statue is being created) that are tied to the practical intellect that 
are worth mentioning before proceeding. In both of these cases, instead of making anoth-
er entity as an artifact per se, the practical intellect enables an intelligent being to become 
herself a kind of embodied work of art by realizing a given form in practical acts. The 
first of these practical acts is a self-referential extension of the house-building example. 
In this case, however, the technê or art is a habitual skill such as dancing, singing, or 
speaking in which the body, so to speak, becomes a living artifact of a habitually-learned 
skill. Interestingly enough, Aquinas compares the relationship of inner words to outer 
words along just these lines: “[J]ust as there preexists in the mind of a craftsman a certain 
image of his external artifice [exterior artificii], also does there pre-exist in the mind of 
one who pronounces an exterior word a certain exemplar of it.”152 The second of these 
self-referential practical arts occurs in and through the habits of prudence (Gk: phronēsis) 
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the practical intellect sets out the means whereby a person takes up concretely virtuous 
acts. In this case, the form that identifies the intelligible pattern of the resulting acts is not 
a skill (a technê) per se, but rather—as we will discuss at length next chapter—the virtues 
themselves as the operative perfections of a human being.153  
IV. With and Beyond Augustine Via Aristotle: Participation and The Triune Creator  
 
My goal in this last section is to show as briefly as possible how Aquinas takes the ele-
ments of the Aristotelian metaphysical framework just outlined—the four causes, the pas-
sion/action relation, and the reconfigured account of form’s ontological and epistemic 
functions—and assimilates them to Augustine’s theological emphasis on creation’s par-
ticipation in that which is eminently and simply united in God. The resulting creative 
synthesis not only, as we have already witnessed, successfully differentiate intensive uni-
ties of soul and self-knowledge, but it also adds precision to (a) the exitus-reditus descrip-
tion of creation and (b) the inner word’s centrality as the preeminent created analogy of 
the Trinity. These connections back to Augustine will follow in two sequential subsec-
tions. First, we will examine Aquinas’s understanding of God as creation’s efficient and 
final cause. Second, we will turn to examine Aquinas’s adaptation of the Augustinian 
psychological analogy for the Trinity in light of Aristotle’s theorization of the intellect 
and the way in which this adaptation shapes his distinctive version of the trinitarian ima-
go Dei as a deficient participation in God’s eminent mode of intelligent life. 
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a. God as the Efficient and Final Cause of Creation  
The exigency of Aquinas’s enterprise to assimilate Aristotle’s metaphysics to Augustini-
an orthodoxy is not, of course, driven by the fact that Aristotle fails to find a place for a 
divine being within his metaphysics. For instance, Aristotle famously writes of the ra-
tional grounds for affirming a being who prevents an infinite regress in reducing beings’ 
movements and changes to their efficient principles. Therefore, in Metaphysics XII he 
declares, “There is a mover which moves without being moved, being eternal, substance, 
and actuality.”154 Aquinas clearly concurs with the logic of this position by including it as 
the first and “most manifest” of the quinque viae for proving God’s existence in I.2.3. 
There he affirms God as the first mover (primum movens) and pure act (actus purus), the 
cause of all other acts and thus devoid of all passive potencies. Similarly, later on in the 
same book of Metaphysics Aristotle strikes a strongly Augustinian-sounding tone by 
musing about the self-reflective act that must define a divinely intelligent being: 
The nature of the divine intellect [nous] involves certain problems; for while 
thought [dokei] is held to be the most divine of phenomena [theiotaton], the ques-
tion what it must be in order to have that character involves difficulties. For if it 
thinks nothing, what is there here of dignity? It is just like one who sleeps. And if 
it thinks, but this depends on something else, then (as that which is its substance is 
not the act of thinking, but a capacity [dunamis]) it cannot be the best substance 
[aristē ousia]; for it is through intellection [noein] that its value belongs to it […] 
Evidently, then, it thinks that which is most divine [theiotaton] and precious, and 
it does not change; for change would be change for the worse, and this would be 
already a movement. […] Therefore it must be itself that the intellect understands 
[auton ara noei] (since it is the most excellent of things), and its understanding is 
an understanding of understanding [estin hē noēsis noēseōs noēsis].155  
 
                                                
154 Aristotle, Met. XII, 7, 1072a19-36. See also, Phys. VIII, 5-6, 256b13-260a19. 
155 Met. XII, 9, 1074b15-34. See n. 34 above for my translation of “noēsis noēseōs.” 
  
  164 
Again, the influence of this passage on Aquinas is evident when he, for example, cites it 
as an authority in his declaration that God’s “act of understanding is his substance” be-
cause if this act were “other than his substance, it would follow, as Aristotle says in Met-
aphysics XII, that something else would be the act and perfection of the divine sub-
stance.”156 
 Nonetheless, the problem with Aristotle’s nous for an Augustinian theologian like 
Aquinas arrives in the fact that Aristotle explicitly denies two of the most important 
claims inherent to Augustine’s Christian emphasis on participation: (1) that there exists 
an immaterial, transcendent referent—a separate substance—for the analogical forms or 
patterns encountered in nature and (2) that this referent is identical with the creative 
source of being and matter ex nihilo. On the first front, Aristotle’s critical judgment vis-à-
vis the broadly Platonic theory of participation is particularly pointed. As he declares in 
Metaphysics,  “[T]o say that [the forms] are patterns and the other things share in them is 
to use empty words and poetical metaphors.”157 On the second front, Aristotle asserts that 
matter must itself be eternal because the movements and changes observed in nature “al-
ways” presuppose “an underlying something.”158 For Aristotle, affirming a prime mover 
does not at all imply something that is axiomatic to an Augustinian theology of creation: 
a qualitative division in being between that which is eternal and that which is temporal. 
Rather, as Aristotle’s position itself illustrates, the movements inherent to enmattered be-
ing could be eternally caused by the prime mover. Aristotle’s positions on both of these 
                                                
156 Aquinas, ST I.14.4. 
157 Aristotle, Met. I, 9, 991a20-31. See also: XIII, 5, 1079b24-35. 
158 Phys. I, 7, 190a13-21. 
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fronts serve as a reminder that—even after accounting for the supporting contributions of 
Boethius, Pseudo-Dionysius, and Albert the Great—Aquinas’s assimilation of the Aristo-
telian emphasis on substantial form with the Platonic and Augustinian emphasis on ana-
logical participation was born not from a prima facie self-evidence, but rather through the 
original and creative contributions of genius.159 
In order to accomplish this integration of Aristotle’s metaphysical framework 
with Augustine’s participatory rendering of faith’s affirmation of creatio ex nihilo, Aqui-
nas expands the notion of efficient causality to include the origin of being as a sui generis 
act of efficient causality,160 an act in which being itself, inclusive of form and matter, is 
the effect or “production” of an agent (i.e. the Creator).161 This expansion enables Aqui-
nas to make the necessary distinction not found in Aristotle: whereas divine being is eter-
nally “necessary”162 and “self-subsisting,”163 created or universal being164 came into being 
through a free act of God’s will.165 On account of this, Aquinas concludes that the “being” 
of all created “beings,” that genus in which all actual entities in creation share, is not a 
genus in which God is also included.166 Rather, a la Augustine, the being of created be-
ings is a deficient participation of that which God is eminently, eternally, and necessarily. 
As Thomas pronounces in I.44.1, “[A]ll beings apart from God are not their own being, 
                                                
159 Cf. Lonergan, Verbum, 2:9-10, 38 and Rudi A. te Velde, Participation and Substantiality in Thomas 
Aquinas (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995), esp. ix-xiv. 
160 Aquinas, ST I.2.3. Aquinas was clearly influenced and helped by the precedent of Avicenna in expand-
ing Aristotelian causality to include the divine production of being itself, not just of motion. Cf. Etienne 
Gilson, “Notes for the History of Efficient Causality,” in Medieval Essays (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 
2011), 150-78. 
161 Aquinas, ST I.44. 
162 Ibid., I.2.3. 
163 Ibid., I.3.2.ad3. 
164 esse creatum (e.g. ST I.8.1) and esse commune (e.g. ST I.2.4.ad1) 
165 Ibid., I.19.3, I.19.4, and I.46.1 
166 Ibid., I.3.5. 
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but are beings by participation. Therefore it must be that all things are diversified by the 
diverse participation of being, so as to be more or less perfect, are caused by one First 
Being, who possesses being most perfectly.”167 
From this starting-point, Aquinas then identifies the mode of creation as akin to 
an act of the Aristotelian practical intellect. As just outlined above, a practical act of the 
intellect requires an exemplary, speculative basis. Even though the metaphysical “slot” 
that it fills is entirely Aristotelian, Aquinas’s specification of this exemplary basis is also 
thoroughly Augustinian. The exemplary, speculative basis of this practical act of creation 
is God’s own self-knowledge whereby God knows both Godself and all other things “be-
cause his essence contains the likeness [similitudinem] of things other than himself.”168 
Therefore: 
God’s knowledge stands to all created things as the artist’s to his products. But 
the artist’s knowledge is the cause of his products [artificiatorum], because he 
works [operatur] through his intellect; and so the form [forma] in his intellect 
must be the principle of his activity, as heat is of the activity of heating.169  
 
God is, in short, the “artisan of the universe”170 and the “builder of all things.”171 There is 
then a certain sense, heavily qualified of course, in which Aquinas can speak of God’s 
essence as the “form” of creation,172 the intelligible “pattern” that eminently holds togeth-
er all of creation’s intelligible patterns. Again, specifying the way in which this is so is 
governed by the rule of Augustine’s doctrine of divine simplicity: “Whatever is divided 
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and multiplied in creatures exists in God simply and unitedly.”173 God’s eminence as a 
form is thus defined precisely in that God’s essence is not subject to the composite multi-
plicity of forms, nor the receptive potentiality of matter to form, encountered in nature, 
even though the perfections of all created forms are eternally and eminently found in this 
one self-subsisting form. As such, the divine essence is set apart as a self-subsisting form 
“that cannot be received in matter” and is thus supremely “individualized precisely be-
cause it cannot be received in another [potest recipi in alio].”174 
 Instead, creation takes shape a deficient profusion, an emanation, of God’s intelli-
gible perfection. Hence, the hierarchy of creation’s forms, whether substantial or acci-
dental, is patterned as a diffuse representation of God’s perfect goodness and truth: 
For [God] brought things into being in order that his goodness might be commu-
nicated to creatures, and be represented by them; and because his goodness could 
not be adequately represented by one creature alone, he produced many and di-
verse creatures, that what was wanting to one in the representation of the divine 
goodness might be supplied by another. For goodness, which in God is simple and 
uniform, in creatures is manifold and divided and hence the whole universe to-
gether participates the divine goodness more perfectly, and represents it better 
than any single creature whatever.175 
 
In order to add precision to this description of how a creature represents the Creator, 
Aquinas adopts the broad distinction—detectable in both Aristotle and Augustine—
between a thing’s definitional truth and its idiosyncratic and vacillating forms of excel-
lence (Augustine) or actualized perfection/goodness (Aristotle). He does so, as already 
outlined above, through his distinction between essence and existence, the detailed meta-
physics of which is thoroughly Aristotelian even as Aquinas conceives the distinction as 
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ontologically reflective of God’s truth and goodness. If, in creatures, a thing’s essence 
(=substantial form) gives a concrete thing its definitional mode of its actual existence (dat 
esse actuale) and the principled potencies for its subsequent acts, then the eminently sim-
ple basis for this crucial distinction in creatures can be found in that in God—because 
there is no intrinsic potentiality in the divine essence—there is no distinction between 
essence and existence. Rather, “God is not only his own essence [sua essentia],” but “al-
so his own existence [suum esse].”176 Therefore, a la Augustine, in God’s being truth and 
goodness are strictly and absolutely convertible, despite the fact in created beings they 
name a logical distinction, grounded in the difference between essence as actualized defi-
nition and existence as actualized perfection,177 in their analogical participation in the 
Creator. 
 In this blending of the Aristotelian substance with Augustinian participationism 
within Aquinas’s innovative rendering of creation and essence/existence, Thomas master-
fully ties together creation’s intelligible exitus from God with the Creator’s efficient cau-
sality and its reditus to God with the Creator’s final causality. As the intelligible mode of 
creation’s deficient emanation from God, substantial forms are not only the ontological 
principle that causes the existence of creatures, but they are also the intermediary cause 
through which God “properly causes existence in creatures” and is thus continually pre-
sent in power to those creatures “as an agent is present to that in which its action is taking 
place.”178 In this way, form is much more than the mode of creation’s primal intelligible 
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emanation from the Creator; it is also the mode of the Creator’s ongoing generative and 
providential causation of every living being’s intensive unity of existence. In expressing 
this ongoing presence of the Creator through the mediation of forms, Aquinas deftly in-
corporates Augustine’s emphasis on God’s intimate interiority to every creature with Ar-
istotle’s emphasis on agential causation:  
Now since it is God’s nature to exist, he it must be who properly causes existence 
in creatures, just as it is fire itself [that] sets other things on fire. And God is caus-
ing this effect in things not just when they begin to exist, but all the time they are 
maintained in existence, just as the sun is lighting up the atmosphere all the time 
the atmosphere remains lit. During the whole period of a thing’s existence, there-
fore, God must be present to it, and present in a way in keeping with the way in 
which the thing possesses its existence. Now existence is more intimately and 
profoundly interior to things [profundius omnibus inest] than anything else, for 
everything as we said is potential when compared to existence. So God must exist 
and exist intimately [intime] in everything.179 
 
By alluding to Augustine’s seminal interior intimo meo in a passage otherwise dominated 
by Aristotelian logic, Aquinas pens one of the most elegant demonstrations of his creative 
assimilation of one to the other.  
 Similarly, the principled potencies that are given existence by a thing’s substantial 
form are all ordered toward acts that, according to their respective principles of operation, 
are likewise similitudes of God’s intelligibility, perfection, and goodness180 and together 
constitute the final end towards which God undertook the act of creation: a communica-
tion of divine perfection and goodness.181 The constant drive to reduce potency to act, 
which pulses through the existence of every creature, represents the coterminance of the 
desire for a creature’s own perfection and the proportional degree of their natural desire 
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for returning to God: “All things, by desiring their own proper perfection [appetendo 
proprias perfectiones], desire God himself [appetunt ipsum Deum], inasmuch as the per-
fections of all things are so many similitudes of the divine being [divini esse].”182 As 
such, God is the final cause of creation,183 the teleological reditus of all creaturely desires 
and perfections.  
Within this general framework, just as Augustine affirms as well, the teleological 
perfection of rational creatures has a distinctiveness unto itself. Even though all the natu-
ral ends of things are “good” in themselves and thus generally reflective of the divine 
goodness, only rational creatures are created with the capability of “closing the loop” 
back to the unity of intelligible knowledge and being that is the principle and telos of 
their existence: antepenultimately in grasping creation’s intelligible forms, penultimately 
in the gift of faith, and ultimately in the beatific contemplation of God.184 By making pro-
gress in this “voyage” of ascent, to recall Augustine’s terminology, intelligent creatures 
gradually move toward a final end that coincides with the principle of their own creation: 
the divine essence itself.185 Such is the beautiful logic through which Aquinas knits to-
gether Augustine’s exitus-reditus scheme with Aristotle’s conception of efficient and fi-
nal causation. As he writes in the programmatic statement near the beginning of the 
Summa, God is the “beginning of things and their last end [principium rerum et finis 
earum], and especially of rational creatures.”186  
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b. Revisiting the Inner Word: Participation in the Intelligence of the Triune God 
It is here in returning to the main thematics—trinitarian doctrine and the imago dei—in 
which Augustine first formulated the inner word’s significance that our inquiry in this 
chapter finally comes full circle. Only here does the full sweep of Aquinas’s creative 
transposition of Augustine’s seminal insights onto more consistent metaphysical and 
cognitional soil via Aristotle come into complete focus. Once again, the terms of this as-
similation, even at this last stage, are multifaceted. Not only is this true on a general con-
ceptual level, but there is the additional complicating factor of Aquinas having to account 
for an entire set of problems associated with the doctrine of the Trinity, along with its at-
tendant surfeit of terminology, that is entirely foreign to Aristotle’s thought. One of the 
signs of this complicating factor is the ever-present influence of Augustine’s entwining of 
cognition (and knowledge) and volition (and love) not only because he takes this to be an 
accurate description of human operations, but also because of their respective analogical 
connections to the divine Word and Spirit in specifying the trinitarian imago Dei. Even 
though Aristotle certainly speaks of the will as a power of the soul,187 he does not empha-
size it—nor tie it closely to his account of the intellect—nearly to the degree that Augus-
tine (and Aquinas following him) does. However, as was the case with incorporating cre-
atio ex nihilo into Aristotle’s theory of causality, there is an refined economy to Aqui-
nas’s reformulation of the Augustinian psychological analogy on the other side of Aristo-
tle’s theorization of the intellect that helps make succinct description of its basic shape 
possible at the close of this chapter.  
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Because of the analogical character of the matter at hand, one can either begin 
rhetorically with a description of the triune character of God’s eminent act of understand-
ing and then proceed to its deficient participations in other intelligent beings (angels and 
humans, according to Aquinas) or one can travel the other way from created intelligence 
back to God by way of the classical analogical roads of negation, eminence, and causali-
ty.188 In light of the familiarity with trinitarian doctrine established last chapter and with 
Aristotle’s theory of the intellect in this chapter, I am going to begin with God’s triune 
act of understanding and then proceed to its deficient participations in angels and human 
beings. This will allow us to close with a definitive statement regarding Aquinas’s solu-
tion to the problem with which we began: the relation of the human mode of intelligent 
life—intensively given to it by the soul—and the derivative status of human self-
knowledge in relation to the eternality of God’s self-knowledge.  
 Two distinctive elements of Augustine’s trinitarian theology that pass directly into 
Aquinas are important to recall at the outset: (1) God’s eminent simplicity entails that all 
appellations of God are common to the divine essence, and thus to all three divine per-
sons, except those that pertain directly to specifying the personal relationships between 
Father, Son, and Spirit; and (2) God knows and loves all of creation simply in perfectly 
knowing and loving Godself in the singularity of the divine Word and by the amorous 
bond of the Spirit. As we saw above, Aristotle affirms a non-trinitarian and non-
participated version of the latter element by positing the metaphysical superiority of di-
vine self-knowledge inasmuch as such knowledge does not require the apprehension of 
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another form outside of itself. As one would expect, Aquinas takes full advantage of this 
close point of affinity between Augustine and Aristotle in order to resituate these Augus-
tinian distinctives regarding the Trinity, and in so doing, to reaffirm the psychological 
analogy as the chief “side door through which we [can] enter for an imperfect”189 glimpse 
of the triune God. As we will see in a moment, the resulting synthesis enables Aquinas to 
formulate the metaphysical link between God’s perfect life of knowing and loving with 
its deficient participations in a more cohesive manner than Augustine was able to do.  
 In addition to building upon their shared viewpoint regarding the metaphysical 
superiority of divine self-knowledge, Aquinas crucially weaves two other concepts from 
Aristotle’s account of the intellect into his version of the Augustinian psychological anal-
ogy. First, and most basically, Aquinas forges a metaphysical and terminological parallel 
between Aristotle’s principled relation of potency and act, and the well-attested trinitarian 
concept of procession [processio], which Thomas draws from biblical,190 credal,191 and 
patristic sources.192 Both are used to describe the trinitarian relations of origin of (a) the 
Son/Word from the Father (b) the Spirit from the Father and Son. As the Son is eternally 
generated by the Father, he proceeds from the Father.193 Likewise, as the Spirit is eternal-
ly spirated by the Father and the Son, so too does the Spirit proceed from the Father and 
the Son.194  
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 The terms of this parallel between the principled relation of potency/act and the 
traditional processional language for the Trinity allows Aquinas to import the richly ana-
logical notion of act, no longer simply into language about the divine essence as a whole 
as actus purus, but now into the intra-Trinitarian relations themselves. Accordingly, 
Aquinas (re)conceives the processions of Word and Spirit in analogical terms that reflect 
the Aristotelian notion of perfect, immanent acts of intellect and will. The result is a re-
conceptualization of procession that incorporates the idea of act within its very definition 
even as it is analogically applied to God: “procession always supposes action.”195 To be 
sure, Aquinas is abundantly clear that in God there is neither potency nor a multiplicity of 
acts corresponding respectively to the will and intellect.196 Even though he employs the 
Aristotelian terminology of act, Aquinas faithfully follows Augustine in this insistence: 
God is a single, eternal act in which knowledge and love perfectly coincide.  
Nonetheless, Aquinas pushes the analogical bounds of the ordered relation be-
tween principle and act to the point where the divine persons themselves are analogically 
compared with an eminent version of this relation. Whereas in human beings the princi-
ple of an act always presupposes some potency from which the act originates, Aquinas 
compares the Trinity to an eternal act of self-knowledge and self-love in which there nev-
er “was” any principled potency, but nevertheless in which the relations of principled 
origin are manifest even in the perfection of act.197 Just as the act of a finite intellect like-
wise makes manifest its principled relation to its potency, so too do the principled rela-
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tions of the divine act of knowledge and love subsist and it is these “subsisting rela-
tions”198 that Aquinas identifies as the three divine personae that nonetheless share a 
common essentia as a single act. The resulting definition of “principle” is thus one that 
has been properly generalized—through the sieve of the via negationis—so as to be ap-
plicable to God and commensurate with the above parallel between procession and im-
manent action: “the word ‘principle’ signifies only that whence another proceeds.”199  
Therefore, the Father is the principium of the Son200 and the Father and Son are 
the unified principium of the Spirit201 according to the ordered relations presupposed by 
the analogy of the respective acts of the intellect and the will: 
Though will and intellect are not diverse in God, nevertheless the nature of will 
and intellect requires the processions belonging to each of them to exist in a cer-
tain order. For the procession of love occurs in due order as regards the proces-
sion of the Word; since nothing can be loved by the will unless it is conceived in 
the intellect. So as there exists a certain order of the Word to the principle whence 
He proceeds, although in God the substance of the intellect and its [Word] are the 
same; so, although in God the will and the intellect are the same, still, inasmuch 
as love requires by its very nature that it proceed only from the [Word] of the in-
tellect, there is a distinction of order between the procession of love and the pro-
cession of the Word in God.202 
 
According to the terms of this analogy, Aquinas reconfigures Augustine’s trinitarian ima-
go Deo of memoria, intelligentia, and voluntas into his own triad of principium verbi, 
verbum, and amor.203 Aquinas drops memoria because memory, following Aristotle, is a 
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habitual potency and thus totally foreign to God’s pure act.204 By replacing it with prin-
cipium verbi, Aquinas lands on a designation that is generic enough, despite being de-
scriptively exact, to be applied to both God’s act of understanding and the human intel-
lect’s deficient acts of understanding. The appellation holds even though the analogical 
distance between the principium verbi in God and in the human intellect could scarcely 
mark a greater qualitative divide: in God the principium verbi names the always active 
principle from “whence [a quo]”205 the entire glory of the Godhead eternally proceeds and 
thus that on which the being and existence of all things depends; in human beings the 
principium verbi, far from being the always active whence from which the universal prin-
ciple of all things proceeds,206 is the proper designation for the pre-reflective potency of 
the passive intellect’s capacity for being able to become all things (posse omnia fieri) by 
being moved to its proper act of understanding. In this way, Aquinas maintains the basic 
terms of Augustine’s psychological analogy even while translating the Bishop’s axiomat-
ic commitment to God’s triune simplicity by incorporating Aristotle’s metaphysics of act 
into the very heart of his doctrine of the Trinity. This incorporation then enables Aquinas 
to utilize action as the analogical keystone between God, creation, and especially those 
creatures who participate in the similitude of intelligence and thus volition as well. As 
Aquinas writes in I.27.5.ad3, “God understands all things by one simple act; and by one 
act also he wills all things.”  
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 Second, and lastly, Aquinas imports the Aristotelian version of the axiom that the 
principle of an act of understanding is the similitude of an intelligible species to specify 
more exactly Augustine’s insight that God’s eminent intelligence is marked by the singu-
larity of God’s Word while participated intelligence is deficiently marked by the multi-
plicity of inner words. When combined with the above account of procession, Aquinas’s 
importation of Aristotle’s account of intelligible species results in a reconfigured hierar-
chy of intelligent life that maintains Augustine’s insistence on the metaphysical preemi-
nence of self-knowledge even while successfully reappraising the human intellect’s de-
pendence on intelligible species abstracted from sensible forms. According to Aquinas, 
there are three forms of intelligent life—God, angels, and humans207—and they are or-
dered according to the source and relative universality of the intelligible species upon 
which their act of understanding is based and their inner word expresses. The more im-
manent and the more universal the species, the higher the form of intelligent life. Aquinas 
describes the criteria of immanence through a striking extension of the Augustinian rheto-
ric of intimacy: the higher the intelligence the more “intimate and without diversity [inti-
mum et absque diversitate]”208 is the procession of its knowledge from its principle. Simi-
larly, Aquinas describes the criteria of universality through a reference to Aristotle’s il-
luminative metaphor for the active intellect: the stronger the light of any intellect’s pow-
er, the more expansive and unitary is the sweep of its knowledge.  
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In God, there is but one “one intelligible species” and it is identical with the di-
vine essence itself.209 Accordingly, there is a single Word in God that is, “perfectly one 
with the source from whence he proceeds without any kind of diversity.”210 Hence the 
Son is the “perfect image of the Father.”211 By this Word, which is the immanent term and 
thus the conceptum (viz. that which is conceived)212 of God’s act of understanding, God 
perfectly knows Godself and all other things as well: 
For God by knowing Himself, knows every creature. Now the word conceived in 
the mind is representative of everything that is actually understood. Hence there 
are in ourselves different words for the different things which we understand. But 
because God by one act understands Himself and all things, His one [and] only 
Word is expressive not only of the Father, but of all creatures.213 
 
As the eminent intelligent being with a singular act of understanding that encompasses 
both Godself and all of creation, God is the “prima lux,”214 the first light from which eve-
ry other intelligent light is “derived [derivatum]”215 as a participation. For, as Lonergan 
writes, the divine intellect enjoys such a “summit” of intelligent “sweep and penetration” 
that its “act of understanding is one, yet it embraces in a single view all possibles and the 
prodigal multiplicity of actual beings.”216  
 The next highest form of intelligent life, according to Aquinas,217 belongs to an-
gels. As immaterial beings, the species for their knowledge—like God’s—do not origi-
nate externally through the senses, but rather are intrinsic to their essence. Whereas the 
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human soul only includes the power to abstract species from sensible forms, the angelic 
essence “is naturally complete by intelligible species, in so far as they have such species 
connatural to them, so as to understand all things which they can know naturally.”218 The-
se connatural intelligible species give angels a natural knowledge of self, knowledge of 
corporeal things, and a general knowledge of God219 that does not pass from potency to 
actuality.220 Instead, intelligible knowledge is “not generated in the angels, but is present 
naturally.”221 Thus, an angel, again like God, naturally “understands himself by his 
form”222 and material things by that same form. “[A]s God knows material things by his 
essence, so do the angels know them, forasmuch as they are in the angels by their intelli-
gible species.”223 If there appears to be a similarity between Aquinas’s account of angelic 
knowledge and Augustine’s non-adventitious ideal for human knowledge, this parallel 
may amount to more than an accidental coincidence. Indeed there are a few instances in 
which Aquinas seems to directly appropriate Augustine’s terminology from De Trinitate 
regarding non-adventitious self-knowledge and applies them to angelic knowledge in-
stead. For example, Aquinas describes intelligible species in angels as originating in the 
fact that “God impressed [impressit] upon the angelic mind the similitudes of things 
which [God] produced in their own natural being.”224 Or even more strikingly: “In every-
one of these spiritual creatures, the forms of all things, both corporeal and spiritual, were 
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impressed by the Word of God.”225 Similarly, in a choice of phrase that seems to pay 
homage to Augustine even amidst a direct critique of his predecessor in its implications 
for human self-knowledge, Aquinas succinctly declares in the Summa Contra Gentiles, 
“In [angels] the intellect does not proceed to self-knowledge from anything exterior, but 
knows itself through itself [per se cognoscit seipsum].”226 
For now, however, we must stay with Aquinas. Despite the number of striking 
similarities between God and angels, the chief difference between them on the level of 
intelligible species227 can be found in the fact that there is a multiplicity of intelligible 
species in angels such that they know different things by different species. In fact, Aqui-
nas concludes that the various angelic species (in the ontological sense), all of which only 
have a single member (viz. each angel is its own species),228 are ordered according to the 
relative universality of the intelligible species that give rise to their understanding. The 
more unitary and singular their intelligible species the higher and more perfect is their 
essence: “Thus the higher the angel is, by so much the fewer species will he be able to 
apprehend the whole mass of intelligible objects. Therefore his forms must be more uni-
versal; each one of them, as it were, extending to more things.”229 The illustration that 
Aquinas immediately offers functions as a perfect transition to the last form of intellec-
tion: “An example of this can in some measure be observed in ourselves. For some peo-
ple there are who cannot grasp an intelligible truth, unless it be explained to them in eve-
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227 Obviously, however, this is far from the only degree of deficiency that angels possess in comparison to 
God. For example, Aquinas denies that their understanding is their substance (ST I.54.1) or that all of their 
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ry part and detail; this comes of their weakness of intellect: while there are others of 
stronger intellect, who can grasp many things from few.”230 
In “ourselves,” then, there is a final (and lowest) form of participated intellectual 
life. As we have already noted at length above, our intellect depends on abstracting and 
illuminating the required intellectual species for its acts of understanding from external, 
material forms as apprehended through the senses and virtually rendered by phantasms.231  
Only on the basis of these prior acts of understanding can humans come to know them-
selves intelligibly. Thus, even though the human intellect can in fact proceed to a closer 
and closer intensive approximation of principle and its processions of knowledge in its 
acts of self-knowledge (as knower and known hasten towards becoming one), this pro-
cess does not change the fact that it is constitutively and naturally the lowest on the hier-
archy because it always “take[s] the first beginning of its knowledge from without [ab 
extrinseco].”232 At this juncture Aquinas’s constructive critique and transposition of Au-
gustine’s theory of knowledge has come full circle: all the human intellect has, through 
its own essence, is a passive potency to intelligible things and an active potency for illu-
minating their species. Put differently, whereas for God and angels the intensive unity 
furnished by their substantial form includes the always already actualized fullness of their 
intelligent knowledge, for human beings their souls only furnish an intensive unity of ex-
istence that must pass through extroverted epistemic unions before they can return inward 
to forge the higher intensive unity of self-knowledge. As Aquinas writes clearly in I.79.2, 
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“Therefore the angelic intellect is always in act as regards those things which it can un-
derstand, by reason of its proximity to the first intellect, which is pure act,” whereas “the 
human intellect, which is the lowest in the order of intelligence and most remote from the 
perfection of the divine intellect, is in potentiality with respect to intelligible things.” 
 Lastly, this created state of imperfect potentiality entails two further differences 
between God’s Word and our inner words of understanding. The first pertains to a differ-
ence that results from the fact that the human intellect must abstract intelligible species 
from particular enmattered forms. This state of affairs requires that the human intellect 
move through two distinct acts—which results in two types of inner words—the first of 
which abstracts the universal from the sensed or imagined particular (understanding) and 
the second of which returns to the particular in the process of composition and division 
(judgment). Because divine and angelic knowledge neither originates in sensed particu-
lars nor progresses from imperfection to perfection, the sequential distinction—and thus 
different types of inner words—between universal and particular knowledge is complete-
ly foreign to them. “Hence the angelic and the divine intellect have the entire knowledge 
of a thing at once and perfectly; and hence also in knowing the quiddity of a thing they 
know at once whatever we can know by composition, division, and reasoning.”233 The 
second difference has stayed with us throughout last chapter and this chapter, and indeed 
we just encountered it again in the passage above comparing angelic and human intelli-
gence. Nonetheless it is worth repeating because of its centrality to both Augustine and 
Aquinas. Whereas God understands Godself and all things in the singularity of one Word, 
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human intelligence must proceed piecemeal through an accumulation and synthesis of 
inner words into increasingly more perfect and summative acts of understanding. Even at 
its earliest and most feeble stages, as the human intellect makes progress down this road 
of learning it moves toward an end (which is also its creative cause) that it does not yet 
know and yet was created to reach as its highest perfection,234 first by the gratuity of 
faith235 and ultimately by the contemplative certainty of speculative sight:236 the first truth 
[prima veritas], the always already (i.e. self-subsisting) eternal essence of the triune 
God.237 
V. Conclusion: Summarizing and Outlining a Gap 
 
In this chapter we have set forth the first step of Aquinas’s solution to Augustine’s di-
lemma in De Trinitate that forces him into circularly conflating the soul and self-
knowledge into a single type of intensive unity. As just detailed, Aquinas sets out the 
general trajectory of his overall solution by constructively drawing upon Aristotle’s met-
aphysical framework in a manner that not only solves Augustine’s dilemma, but also ends 
up transposing several of the most seminal Augustinian insights into his own theological 
anthropology. In particular, I have drawn attention to Aquinas’s decisive appropriation of 
two aspects of Aristotle’s thought: (1) his understanding of the soul and (2) his affirma-
tion of the intellect’s vertical dependence upon the senses. The first aspect allows Aqui-
nas to successfully separate out the soul as the formal cause of a living being’s existence 
according to a hierarchically organized set of potencies that define a certain mode of life. 
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As such, the soul is the source of a human being’s most primal intensive unity: the al-
ways already indivisible wholeness of that individual’s existence.238 The second aspect 
then allows Aquinas to further undo Augustine’s conflation by denying that there is any 
self-knowledge primally actualized in the soul. Instead, the human intellect’s native ex-
troversion—i.e. its vertical dependence upon sensitive phantasms—allows Aquinas to 
fully reposition reflective self-knowledge as a derivative epistemic unity that is only pos-
sible on the basis of the preceding extroverted unities of sensitive and intelligent appre-
hension. In the midst of this corrective ordering of the soul’s relation to self-knowledge, 
the key Augustinian insights that Aquinas successfully transposes, and even expands up-
on, include the nature of creation’s exitus from God as a realm of deficient forms and the 
centrality of the inner word as the chief locus of the imago Dei and therefore of human 
beings’ teleological reditus back to God.   
When viewed from within the course of our overall trajectory aimed at reframing 
the riddle of egoic self-consciousness and reevaluating its theological significance, the 
importance of this chapter will end up being multifaceted and wide-ranging. Obviously, 
given our stated trajectory, Aquinas’s metaphysically-precise and vertically-ordered cate-
gorization of the intensive unities of the soul/self-knowledge and their relation to the ex-
troverted unities of sensitive/intellectual apprehension will serve as an essential starting-
point for every subsequent chapter. This includes our forthcoming overview of his paral-
lel clarification of the teleological intensive unity of desire/love (Chapter 3) and our con-
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structive theorization of egoic self-consciousness as a fourth species of intensive unity 
(Chapters 4-5). As an extension of this main line of relevance, the central metaphysical 
elements that we set forth here in conversation with Aristotle and Aquinas—e.g. poten-
cy/act and the vertical relation between the layers of the soul as teleologically ordered 
toward intelligence—will be taken as explanatorily normative moving forward. This is 
especially important to note because our constructive proposal in translating Freud in 
Chapters 4 and 5 will expand upon these metaphysical elements, and the theological an-
thropology that issues from them, such that it would be largely incomprehensible without 
this framework already in place. In addition, several of the specific observations that we 
underlined above—e.g. the act of the common sense as unconsciously falling outside the 
bounds of phenomenal consciousness and the intellect’s decisive insight of a thing qua 
thing—will return in those constructive chapters as particularly illuminating for theoriz-
ing the origins of self-consciousness. For the moment, however, the most immediate rel-
evance for many of this chapter’s central elements is to be found in their function as a 
necessary preamble to Chapter 3. This is because, as we will see shortly, Aquinas’s un-
derstanding of the sensitive and intellective appetites, both in their horizontal operations 
and their vertical interrelation, presupposes much of the jointly Aristotelian and Augus-
tinian foundation that we have established in Chapter 1 and 2.  
However, before moving on to consider the appetitive powers’ relation to Aqui-
nas’s reformulation of the teleological form of intensive unity, I want to critically note an 
important gap that opens up in Aquinas’s theological anthropology as a result of his oth-
erwise successful uncoupling of the soul from any trace of self-knowledge. As we noted 
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last chapter, one of the central causes of Augustine’s dilemma was his observation—so 
reminiscent of analogous insights later made by the likes of Descartes, Kant, and Fich-
te—that there must be some sort of intensively unifying “self-awareness” that explains 
our self-differentiated and self-conscious sense that “I” am doing certain activities. This 
observation governs, for instance, Augustine’s assertion that “all minds know for certain 
[…]” they are “living, remembering, understanding, willing, thinking, knowing, judging, 
[and doubting].”239  
There is, to be sure, validity in this assertion. Augustine is not wrong in asserting 
that there must be some kind of intensive unity that grounds the differentiation that is 
then bridged in the extroverted union of knower/known. For the act of intelligent 
knowledge does indeed presuppose this differentiation of the self. To combine Fichtean 
and Augustinian formulations via a declaration from De Trinitate X.6: “The mind [i.e. the 
self] knows itself knowing something [i.e. the not-self].” Like many after him, however, 
Augustine’s mistake was not in insisting that intelligent knowledge requires some sort of 
intensive awareness coterminous with the differentiations of self/not-self and sub-
ject/object. Rather, it simply came in trying to explain this self-differentiation in terms of 
reflective self-knowledge. To do so, as we have seen again and again, inevitably leads 
into the circularity of the reflection theory. Knowing oneself qua object simply cannot be 
the basis for the founding of the knowing subject in general.  
Instead, as Aquinas convincingly shows via Aristotle, knowing oneself qua object 
strictly follows from the extroverted unities of knowing external things as presented by 
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the senses. What then accounts for the intensive, differentiated unity of the self that pre-
cedes the intelligent union of knower-known? On this particular question, Aquinas is si-
lent. The terms of his solution vis-à-vis Augustine are enough to firmly exclude self-
knowledge as accounting for the self-conscious subject; however, Aquinas does not put 
anything in the explanatory gap thereby left behind. One might be tempted to simply an-
swer that the soul accounts for this unity. But that answer will simply not hold. The soul 
certainly is the formal cause of the intensive stream of phenomenal consciousness that 
defines the vital baseline of human existence. However, it cannot account for how that 
phenomenal consciousness becomes subsequently “structured,” so to speak, according to 
a differentiation between an intensively coalesced self-conscious subject and the diffu-
sively sensed “not-self” about whom, to recall Fichte’s vivid phrase, initially “nothing 
more can be said.”240  
Aquinas’s silence on this front is not, in the end, all that surprising. This particular 
question “of the self” simply did not preoccupy him in the same way as it did Augustine. 
Where Augustine anxious cycled on the self’s originary unity, Aquinas much more often 
calmly busied himself with the deficient wonder of the intellect’s capacity to “become all 
things.” I have little doubt that this difference largely accounts for why Augustine has so 
much more often been looked to both as a historical source of the “modern self”241 and as 
an active influence upon many of its most prominent, and equally anxious, twentieth-
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Nature and Culture (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 15-165. 
  
  188 
century theorists (or deconstructionists).242 Nevertheless, as I have made clear, one of the 
wagers of this project is that the overall precision of Aquinas’s anthropology, and espe-
cially its almost surgical decoupling of self-knowledge from the fundamental unity of the 
human soul, will prove to be an untapped resource for re-theorizing the pre-reflective ori-
gins of self-consciousness. Even though Aquinas leaves the gap left behind by self-
knowledge unfilled, our hope is to constructively fill that gap when we turn to expand 
Aquinas’s theological anthropology in the process of translating Freud’s discovery of 
primary identification and solving, on the basis of the Thomist solution to Augustine’s 
dilemma, the analogous dilemma that Freud faces in theorizing identification’s develop-
mental relation to the ego. As I have foregrounded throughout, the result will be a theo-
logical anthropology that affirms four types of intensive unity as tying together the shape 
of human existence, each of which is deficiently similar to God’s simplicity in its own 
way: a primal unity of the soul, an identificatory unity with our sensing bodies, an epis-
temic unity of self-knowledge, and a teleological unity of desire/love. Before proceeding 
to that constructive proposal, however, we must first see how Aquinas completes his 
remedy of Augustine’s conflation by precisely reconceptualizing the teleological inten-
sive unity as a vertical alignment of the sensitive/intellective appetites.  
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Chapter 3 
Aquinas’s Solution II:  
The Verticality of Desire 
 
Last chapter we witnessed how Aquinas takes the first step in solving Augustine’s di-
lemma regarding how human beings deficiently resemble the eminent intensive unity of 
God’s simplicity. As we saw, he accomplishes this by appropriating Aristotle’s meta-
physical framework in order to decouple two (viz. the soul and self-knowledge) out of the 
three types of intensive unity that Augustine conflates. Moreover, we also detailed how 
Aquinas was able to set forth this remedy in a manner that simultaneously incorporates 
Augustine’s seminal insights regarding the exitus-reditus structure of creation and the 
centrality of the inner word and the desire to know as the chief sites of the imago Dei’s 
fulfillment. The result of this creative synthesis in Aquinas’s anthropology is a precise 
description of the soul as the unified principle of existence, the intellect’s native extrover-
sion as evident in the vertical relation between sensitive and intelligent apprehension, and 
a reclassification of human self-knowledge as a higher-level intensive unity operatively 
dependent upon the primal intensive unity of the soul and the extroverted unities of sensi-
tive and intelligent knowledge.  
 In this chapter, we circle back in order to pick up the last type of intensive unity 
that Augustine conflates in De Trinitate: a teleological unity of desire/love. We bracketed 
this intensive unity at the opening of Chapter 2 as a result of treating the apprehensive 
powers first and leaving the correlative powers of the sensitive appetite (i.e. the passions 
of the soul) and intellective appetite (i.e. the will) for this chapter. What we will find in 
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turning back to this dimension of Augustine’s dilemma is that Aquinas’s account of the 
appetites accomplishes something closely reminiscent to what we witnessed in his epis-
temology: by elaborating upon a broadly Aristotelian account of appetite, Aquinas pre-
cisely differentiates this third type of intensive unity as the result of a vertical alignment 
of our desire and love in relation to a single apprehended object. As will be shown below, 
according to Aquinas this vertical alignment occurs penultimately via reason’s virtuous 
ordering of our appetites amidst the multiplicity of creation’s goods and ultimately when 
our appetites find their highest good and perfect happiness in union with God. As this 
formulation already suggests, Aquinas’s re-theorization of the teleological form of inten-
sive unity once again serves to expand the explanatory scope of Augustine’s insights re-
garding the nature of desire’s ascent back to God.  
When combined with last chapter’s account of the soul and the apprehensive 
powers, this second half of Aquinas’s solution results in a theological anthropology that 
finally capitalizes on the nascent and unfulfilled promise of the three forms of deficient 
intensive unity—primal, epistemic, and teleological—implied by Augustine’s overarch-
ing theological and anthropological framework in De Trinitate. By specifying the appeti-
tive basis of this vertical alignment, Aquinas coherently thematizes the teleological inten-
sive unity that Augustine struggles to describe in a non-reflective manner. As we have 
repeatedly noted, the result of this struggle is that he becomes caught in the circularity of 
describing this teleological unity as something that is always already reflectively realized 
and yet is also somehow fulfilled in contingent acts of self-knowledge as well. In con-
trast, what we will find on the other side of rounding out the precision of Aquinas’s grasp 
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of the link between knowledge and desire is an ordered account of the primal, epistemic, 
and teleological types of intensive unity in the form of the soul, self-knowledge, and the 
vertical alignment of desire. Based upon filling out this ordered account, we will finally 
be a position to turn to Freudian identification in Chapters 4 and 5. In those two chapters, 
I will set forth my constructive proposal that egoic self-consciousness is a fourth species 
of intensive unity, grounded in the discrete acts of an “identifying” layer of the soul, that 
vertically establishes the self-differentiated conditions required for the higher operations 
of intelligence. 
As way of recalling this framing connection with my overall inquiry into self-
consciousness as a species of intensive unity, it is worth remembering that we first came 
across the theme of desire in the Introduction: in Fichte’s seminal joining together of 
knowledge (viz. the exceptional status of self-knowledge) and desire (viz. the primal drive 
of the self) in the modern discourse of self-consciousness. His emphasis on the “self’s” 
object-less striving (Streben) and longing (Sehnen) to “be infinite” that only “reverts back 
to the self” once it encounters a “check” or “limitation” not only passes directly into Höl-
derlin/Novalis, but also indirectly1 into Freud’s theorization of the drive-filled uncon-
sciousness to which we will turn next chapter. If last chapter’s presentation of Aquinas’s 
epistemology established an alternative (i.e. non-exceptional and non-reflective) frame-
work through which to reconceive the relation between self-consciousness and 
knowledge, this chapter’s parallel treatment of desire/appetite in Aquinas’s theological 
anthropology will similarly serve as the basis to reframe this crucial theme, especially as 
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we will re-encounter it in Freud, so closely bound up to with in the origins of egoic self-
consciousness.   
 One of the features of Aquinas’s account of the appetites that will most signifi-
cantly contribute to this reframing of desire’s relation to self-consciousness is that, strict-
ly speaking, the Thomist “appetite” (appetitus) enables a precise accounting of much 
more than “desire” per se, if by desire we simply mean a striving/longing toward “some-
thing” or, in the Fichtean case, no/thing in particular. Instead, Aquinas elucidates each of 
the appetites as a single generic potency whose acts encompass a wide-range of imma-
nent experiences (e.g. love, desire, pain, pleasure, hatred, hope, joy) that many now hasti-
ly bundle together under the banner of the “emotions.”2 As will become clear in greater 
detail below, the metaphysical principle through which Aquinas successfully organizes 
these experiences holds that an appetite is that through which living beings carry out two 
interrelated capacities: (1) seeking out (e.g. loving, desiring, hoping for) objects that they 
consider to be “good” for their own well-being and (2) resting (e.g. taking pleasure in or 
enjoying) in those goods once they have been procured. Or conversely, if an object is 
contrary to that well-being (i.e. it is considered to be evil), the appetite similarly signals a 
movement away from that object (e.g. hatred, aversion, and pain). Foregrounding this 
metaphysical organization of the appetites already signals one of the most pivotal differ-
ences between Fichte’s (and, as it turns out, Freud’s) Trieb and Aquinas’s appetitus: the 
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notion of emotions, cf. Nicholas E. Lombardo, The Logic of Desire: Aquinas on Emotion (Washington, 
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former presumes that it has “no object at all,” the latter attributes a generic metaphysical 
object to all appetitive acts (viz. goodness).  
As this overview already suggests, Aquinas’s formulation of the natural condi-
tions that ground the possibility of a teleological alignment of the appetites in relation to 
goodness relies heavily on the notion of vertical finality that we established last chapter. 
If the positive vertical relation between the apprehensive powers consists in the senses’ 
necessary contribution of phantasms to the higher end of intellection, then the appetitive 
parallel can be found in that Aquinas insists that the sense appetite is “born to be obedient 
to reason.”3 This natural inclination of the sense appetite entails that its acts can make a 
distinct, horizontally-definable contribution as something to be ordered to the higher 
goods furnished by intelligence. When it is so ordered, the sense appetite becomes, in 
Aquinas’s vivid phrase, “rational by participation,”4 such that there occur sensitive pas-
sions that “chime” on a lower level with the will’s own appetitive movements. When the 
appetites move with such close resonance with one another there results an intensive 
alignment in relation to an intelligible good as extrovertedly apprehended by the intellect 
and then appetitively loved/desired/enjoyed by the will: everything appetitive in us (in-
tensive) is enjoying the apprehensive interiorization of that (extroverted). As the chapter 
proceeds, what we will find is that this teleologically vertical relationship between the 
will and the sensitive appetite includes several different aspects—e.g. the will’s power of 
consent over the passions and the possibility of the will’s acts “overflowing,” as Aquinas 
calls it (refluentia or redundantia), to the sensitive appetite—that will expand our under-
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standing of vertical finality in ways that will play an important role in the chapters to 
come.  
In light of this impending shift to theological construction, I should also note that 
the rhetoric in this chapter reflects a noticeable shift away from the explicit inclusion of 
Augustine and Aristotle as detailed interlocutors. This shift has nothing to do with wheth-
er or not Aquinas relies on these two figures in setting forth his understanding of the ap-
petitive powers. There is no question at all that he does.5 Instead, it simply signals the fact 
that the last two chapters have served to introduce the necessary philosophical, theologi-
cal, and metaphysical backdrop for grasping Aquinas’s explication of the appetites with-
out continuously including its genealogical sources in detail. As an expansion upon the 
sufficiency of this background, this chapter is more squarely focused on rounding out 
Aquinas’s solution to Augustine’s dilemma, and the metaphysically-precise theological 
anthropology in which that solution is embedded, in preparation for the constructive pro-
posals that follow. 
On account of this, the organization of this chapter reflects a rather straightfor-
ward exposition of Aquinas’s rendering of the metaphysical nature of the sensitive and 
intellective appetites both in their horizontal principles and in their vertical interrelation 
as teleologically ordered toward their intensive alignment as a result of our extroverted 
union with God. Tracking their vertical interrelation will prove particularly important be-
                                                
5 Even though Augustine and Aristotle would likely rank as the most important influences on Aquinas’s 
understanding of the appetites, there is no parallel in this facet of his thought to the tightness of the meta-
physical relationship that we glimpsed last chapter between Aristotle’s nous and Aquinas’s intellectus. This 
is partly due to Aristotle’s comparative lack of emphasis on the will. In addition, though, Aquinas incorpo-
rates a wider variety of sources in his writings on the appetites than he does when outlining the apprehen-
sive powers. The most important of these other voices are John of Damascus and Cicero.   
  
  195 
cause several aspects of this relation will be repeated—albeit with different nuances—in 
my constructive situating of a distinct identifying layer of the soul “in between” the sensi-
tive and intelligent layers. For the moment, however, the itinerary before us will progress 
through four main sections. First, I begin by introducing Aquinas’s metaphysics of appe-
tite in general, which is distinct from, and yet intimately bound up with, his metaphysics 
of apprehension. From this starting point, I then turn, in the second and third sections, to 
examine the horizontal nature of the sensitive appetite (i.e. the passions of the soul) and 
the intellective appetite (i.e. the will) as generically defined by different aspects of good-
ness. Fourth, I describe the vertical interrelation between these two types of appetite as it 
pertains to their intended intensive alignment in rational/godward virtue and their tragic 
divergence in sin and vice. Lastly, just as I did in Chapter 2, I will close with a summary 
and an outline of another gap in Aquinas’s anthropology that appears in and through his 
account of the appetites. Once again, the nature of this gap will serve to point us to a con-
ceptual space that will prove significant when we turn to Freud in Chapters 4 and 5.   
I. The Metaphysics of Appetite in General 
 
In order to sufficiently make the transitional link with Chapter 2, we ought to begin by 
specifying the precise relation between acts of apprehension and appetitive response ac-
cording to Aquinas. Metaphysically expressed, the appetites stand as passive potencies to 
a form that has been immanently assimilated to the creature by an act of apprehension. As 
Aquinas succinctly declares, “[T]he appetitive power is a passive potency [potentia pas-
siva], which is naturally moved by the thing apprehended: wherefore the apprehended 
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appetible is a mover which is not moved, while the appetite is a mover moved.”6 The na-
ture of this moved movement, as I have already mentioned and will expand upon in a 
moment, is some sort of prompting toward that apprehended object as a desirable good or 
away from that object as a repulsive evil.  
As we briefly touched upon at the opening of Chapter 2, Aquinas further charac-
terizes the difference between apprehension and appetitive response as the difference be-
tween a cognitive interiorization into the knower and a derivative inclination toward (or 
away from) that which has been cognized. As he writes in ST I.16.1: 
Now there is this difference between the appetite and the intellect, or any cogni-
tion whatsoever, that cognition is according as the thing known is in the knower, 
while the appetitive response [appetitus] is according as the desirer [appetens] is 
inclined toward the thing desired [appetitam]. 
 
Or, to repeat a declaration that we have referenced before: “[I]t belongs to one faculty to 
have within itself something which is outside it, and to another faculty to tend to what is 
outside it.”7 In acts of apprehension there is a reception of another object’s form (sensible 
or intelligible), whereas an appetitive response is elicited according to whether or not that 
received form will aid in the perfection of the creature’s own form. Without this initial 
formal assimilation of the object to the knower, however, there is no moving object for 
the appetite and thus it will lie in a state of dormant potency.  
 Once moved, however, the respective acts of an appetite are what Aquinas gener-
ally calls affections (affectiones) of the soul that prompt the individual toward a good or 
away from an evil. As Aquinas writes, “[T]he acts […] of every appetitive faculty tend 
                                                
6 Aquinas, ST I.80.2. 
7 Ibid., I.59.2 
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towards good and evil, as to their proper objects.”8 In a moment, we will turn to discuss 
how apprehended objects are evaluated as good or evil. For now, however, let us stay 
with Aquinas’s general terminology for appetitive movements. When applied to the sen-
sitive appetite, Aquinas typically speaks of these movements as passions (passiones)9 of 
the soul as a species of appetitive affection,10 whereas vis-à-vis the will he is usually con-
tent to simply reference them as the affections of the intellective appetite.11 As mentioned 
at the outset, the names of the specific affections of both appetites roughly correspond to 
what we might call emotions—e.g. joy, desire (or concupiscence), fear, anger, hatred, 
love, hope—but Aquinas maintains a metaphysical and phenomenological clarity about 
appetitive affections that has often eluded the contemporary reflection on the nature of 
“emotions.”12  
 The overarching source of this clarity can be found in the detailed way that Aqui-
nas situates appetitive affections within his broader metaphysical understanding of sub-
stantial and accidental forms, goodness, perfection, being, existence, and actuality. In 
fact, Aquinas first discusses appetite in the Summa Theologiae in the context of defining 
goodness in general in the fifth question of the Prima Pars. According to Aquinas, good-
                                                
8 Ibid., I.20.1. 
9 Aquinas uses the word passio, and its verbal forms such as pati, in three ways (cf. ST I-II.22.1): (1) In a 
general way to signify the reception of anything, (2) the reception of a quality that takes away a negative 
quality (e.g. health takes away sickness), and (3) the reception of a quality that takes away a positive quali-
ty (e.g. sickness takes away health). As Aquinas had received it, the concept of passion had a strong nega-
tive metaphysical connotation that owed much to the orthodox defense of God’s impassivity in the patristic 
christological and trinitarian debates. Accordingly, he affirms that passio “most properly” semantically 
applies to the loss of a positive quality (e.g. sorrow is more properly a passion than joy), despite the fact 
that he also crucially defends the ontological goodness of the passions of the soul as created by God and 
thus potentially ordered to the perfection of human nature.   
10 For instances in which passions are treated as a species of affections, cf. ST I.81.3.ad3, I-II.22.2.sc, I-
II.59.2, and III.15.4. 
11 E.g. Ibid., I-II.82.5.ad1. 
12 Cf. Lombardo, The Logic of Desire, 8-19, 224-71. 
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ness and being are really convertible and only differ logically (i.e. secundum rationem).13 
While being signifies that which has “existence in actuality [esse in actu],”14 goodness 
signifies the perfection of that existence according to the ends specified by the principles 
of a thing’s substantial form. On the basis of these substantial principles, a creature’s ap-
petite(s) propels it to seek its perfection through the accidental forms or qualities (e.g. 
sensitive pleasure, knowledge, virtue) that accrue to an agent through the possession of 
other goods: “for all things desire [appetunt] their own perfection.”15 Hence, Aquinas 
identifies a thing’s substantial form as that through which God wills not only a thing’s 
actual being, but its being in itself and simpliciter as something good and desirable, an 
“end” that is simultaneously the root of all other ends. As that which is the providential 
medium for a thing’s existence, a substantial form is the proximate source of that thing’s 
primal goodness: “For all being, as being, has actuality and is in some way perfect; since 
every act implies some sort of perfection; and perfection implies desirability and good-
ness […] Hence it follows that every being as such is good.”16 As that which defines all 
of a thing’s potencies, that same unitary form furnishes the principles according to which 
a creature seeks to actualize the intensive unity of its perfection. For, as Aquinas moving-
ly writes, “the good of each thing consists in a certain unity, inasmuch as each thing has, 
united in itself, the elements of which its perfection consists.”17  
                                                
13 Aquinas, ST I.5.1.ad1. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid., I.5.1. 
16 Ibid., I.5.3.  
17 Ibid., I-II.36.3. 
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Not only do we have here his Aristotelian expansion of Augustine’s dictum that 
“inasmuch as we exist we are good,”18 but we also begin to encounter the degree to which 
Aquinas is willing to ground desire, both in the sense of the one who desires in and 
through its appetites and the desirability of the proximate objects of one’s appetites, in 
the ontological goodness of creation and the intelligent ordering of the Creator. For inas-
much as all actual things thereby participate in the likeness of the God who is purus actus 
and thus that which is supremely good and desirable,19 then each of these things is there-
by derivatively good and desirable in some way as well.20 So often the object of theologi-
cal suspicion, desire and desirability, for Aquinas at least, are goods created as intrinsical-
ly ordered to the perfection of God’s creation. This point is underlined by the fact that 
Aquinas defines evil—the opposite of goodness—as that which prevents something from 
an end that it was created to realize. Evil has no existence unto itself; it only frustrates the 
good from being realized to its most perfect extent.21 “For evil,” as Aquinas declares, “is 
the absence of the good which is natural and due to a thing.”22  
With this broader metaphysical context established, we can return to and elaborate 
upon our initial definition above that the appetite is the means through which beings natu-
rally tend (1) to seek (appetere) their own perfection by assimilating other goods or, in-
versely, to flee from evils that hinder their perfection and (2) to rest (quiēscere) in those 
goods once they have been possessed or, inversely, to register the pain of evils that are 
                                                
18 Augustine, doct. chr.  I.42 and Aquinas, ST I.5.1.sc.  
19 Ibid., I.6.1-2. 
20 Ibid., I.44.4.ad3. 
21 Aquinas differentiates two types of evil: moral and non-moral (cf. Ibid., I-II.18.2). Moral evil occurs 
when the will chooses a created good in a disordered fashion. Non-moral evil occurs in a particular priva-
tion of a thing’s natural form (e.g. the loss of sight).  
22 Ibid., I.49.1.  
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nonetheless present despite attempts to flee or resist them.23 At this point, it is essential to 
emphasize the appetitive significance of the metaphysical relationship between good and 
evil just referenced: good and evil are not, appetitively speaking, equal metaphysical cat-
egories for Aquinas. Instead, the appetites’ essential object is always of good and only 
secondarily of evil. Accordingly, an appetitive repulsion to an evil always presupposes a 
notion of the good that it hinders and in terms of which it is defined as a derivative con-
trast. Thus:  
[S]ince good is essentially and especially the object of the will and the appetite, 
[and] whereas evil is only the object secondarily and indirectly, as opposed to 
good, it follows that the acts of the will and appetite that regard good must natu-
rally be prior to those that regard evil; thus, for instance, joy is prior to sorrow, 
love to hate.24  
 
Aquinas then concludes with the general rule that punctuates the ontological, appetitive, 
and definitional priority of good in comparison with evil: “what exists of itself is always 
prior to that which exists through another.”25 
In addition, when considering the second appetitive operation—to rest in a good 
possessed—one must keep in mind that by “rest” Aquinas does not mean anything like 
the cessation of the appetite’s act, but rather the exact opposite: the perfection of its act 
that coincides with affections of delighting and enjoying a good that is now possessed. 
The importance of this point can be found in that it is only in connection with the appe-
tite’s operations and affections of rest that a divine exemplar for creaturely appetites can 
be affirmed. For inasmuch as these operations of rest are perfect acts,26 they stand as a 
                                                
23 Ibid., I.19.1. 
24 Ibid., I.20.1. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid., I-II.31.2.ad1. 
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deficient participation of the perfection of God’s appetite, the divine will, the act of 
which eternally “rests” and “delights” in the eminent goodness of the divine essence.27 In 
creatures, however, their native imperfection gives appetite its twofold function of seek-
ing other goods and subsequently “resting therein when possessed.”28  
From this starting point, Aquinas then subdivides these two appetitive operations 
into three possible phases of appetitive response—inclination, movement, and rest—that 
an apprehended good (or evil) can elicit from the appetite. The first two phases (inclina-
tion and movement) belong to the appetite’s “seeking” out of perfecting goods and the 
last phase obviously belongs to the “resting” in those goods that have been possessed. 
The axiomatic function of this threefold subdivision can scarcely be overstated as an or-
ganizing principle of both the Prima Secundae and the Secunda Secundae.29 The most 
                                                
27 Ibid., I.19.1.ad2. 
28 Ibid., I.19.1. 
29 This is despite the fact that several usually reliable interpreters have lodged doubts about the coherence 
of this threefold subdivision. Two criticisms have been most common. First, some (e.g. Nicholas Lombardo 
and Eric D’Arcy) have questioned whether there is any logical difference between inclination and move-
ment. The constructive result of this criticism is the proposal to merge the passions of inclination into those 
of movement (Lombardo: love into desire; D’Arcy: hate into aversion). Second, others (e.g. Frederick 
Crowe) have resisted the idea that love can be the appetitive principle of both movement and rest. This crit-
icism leads to the outright declaration that Aquinas’s mature descriptions of love lack a basic integration to 
the extent that, in Crowe’s judgment at least, a rather elaborate reconstruction project is in order. Both criti-
cisms share the same fatal flaw: the mistaken assumption that inclinatio entails any kind motion or impulse 
in itself. It does not, despite what many other popular connotations of love might lead us to read into Aqui-
nas. Instead, to borrow Michael Sherwin’s phrase aimed at the same cluster of misunderstandings, “inclina-
tio primarily signifies a principle of motion” (Sherwin, p. 78n67) that, in created appetites anyways, fol-
lows immediately from an evaluative judgment of reason of an appetitive object. Nor is the distinction 
merely semantic for Aquinas. Instead, it is his brilliant avenue of affirming that affections of inclination 
(love) and rest (joy) can be affirmed in God, even though affections of movement are only found in crea-
tures. This is because love regards a good regardless of “whether [it is] possessed or not” (ST I.20.1). Thus, 
God has an inclinatio for the divine essence that is eternally the principle of God’s corresponding joy (ST 
I.26.4). This analogy depends on (a) a distinction between affections of inclination and movement and (b) 
love being the principle both of desire (in imperfect creatures) and of joy (in God and in perfected crea-
tures). See: Lombardo, The Logic of Desire, 57-62; Eric D’Arcy, “Introduction and Notes,” in Summa 
Theologiae. Vol. 19, The Emotions (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), 28-29 note c; Frederick E. Crowe, 
“Complacency and Concern in the Thought of St. Thomas,” Theological Studies 20 (1959): 1-39, 198-230, 
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crucial organizing effect of this subdivision of inclination, movement, and rest is to be 
found in Aquinas’s conclusion that all appetitive affections can be categorized, and caus-
ally ordered, in reference to these three phases of appetitive response. Aquinas sequen-
tially details these three phases in ST I-II.23.4:30 
For every mover, in a fashion, either draws the patient to itself, or repels it from 
itself. Now in drawing it to itself, it does three things in the patient. Because, in 
the first place, it gives the patient an inclination or aptitude to tend to the mover: 
thus a light body, which is above, bestows lightness on the body generated, so that 
it has an inclination or aptitude to be above. Secondly, if the generated body be 
outside its proper place, the mover gives it movement towards that place. Thirdly, 
it makes it to rest, when it shall have come to its proper place: since to the same 
cause are due, both rest in a place, and the movement to that place. The same ap-
plies to the cause of repulsion. 
 
In another passage, Aquinas makes the same point by stating that the appetitive phase of 
movement is connected to its origin in inclination and its terminus in rest as the progres-
sive passage from one kind of union to another: (1) an affective union [unio affectiva], 
which consists in merely “having an aptitude for and an inclination to another”31 and (2) a 
real union [unio realis], which consists in the actual “conjunction [coniunctionem] of one 
with the other.”32 The affections of inclination (e.g. love and hate) are associated with af-
fective unions. The affections of rest (e.g. pleasure and sadness) are associated with real 
unions with either desired goods or hated evils. The mode of conjunction that defines the 
difference between affective and real unions depends, as I will detail below, on the nature 
of desired object itself, but the general point to be grasped here still stands: the affections 
                                                                                                                                            
343-82; and Michael Sherwin, By Knowledge and By Love: Charity and Knowledge in the Moral Theology 
of Thomas Aquinas (Washington, DC The Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 76-79. 
30 He repeats these three again, more concisely, at ST I-II.25.2. 
31 Ibid., I-II.25.2.ad2. 
32 Ibid. 
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of movement (e.g. desire and aversion) connote an appetitive “middle space,”33 caused by 
an initial inclination toward or away from an apprehended object that terminates in the 
affections of rest associated with the real presence of a good or an evil.  
The causal interrelation of these three phases of appetite can be spoken of in ei-
ther “direction,” so to speak. In the order of intention the end of the appetitive move-
ment—to rest in the desired good—causes both the affections of inclination and move-
ment. Conversely, in the order of generation, or execution, the initial inclination toward 
an object causes the corresponding affections of movement and rest.34 As we will see, and 
as one might expect, much of the “drama” of the appetites occurs in the second phase of 
movement, for in this stage a creature is dynamically impelled toward an absent good (or 
away from an evil). In contrast, the affections of inclination follow immediately from the 
evaluation of an object as good or evil and, likewise, the affections of rest necessarily fol-
low the conjoined presence of a loved good or a hated evil. 
The next to last element of Aquinas’s metaphysics of the appetitive powers to 
note from this general point of view has to do with exactly how any given apprehended 
object is evaluated, or judged, as suitable (conveniens) to a creature’s relative perfection 
and thus as good or evil. The answer to this question depends on the type of appetite un-
der consideration and, in particular, the relative strength of the cognitive power with 
which that appetite is paired. In this regard, it is important to make clear that Aquinas ac-
tually enumerates three types of created appetite. In addition to the sensitive and intellec-
tive appetites, his metaphysics requires him to include a “natural” appetite associated 
                                                
33 Ibid., I-II.8.3.ad3. 
34 Ibid., I-II.25.1. 
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with the vegetative soul as well. Its inclusion fills out a categorization of the appetites 
according to the degree to which their objects include cognition:  
All things in their own way are inclined by appetite towards good, but in different 
ways. Some are inclined to good by their natural inclination, without knowledge 
[cognitione], as plants and inanimate bodies. Such inclination towards good is 
called “a natural appetite.” Others, again, are inclined towards good, but with 
some knowledge; not that they know the aspect of goodness, but that they appre-
hend some particular good; as in the sense, which knows the sweet, the white, and 
so on. The inclination which follows this apprehension is called “a sensitive appe-
tite.” Other things, again, have an inclination towards good, but with a knowledge 
whereby they perceive the aspect of goodness; this belongs to the intellect. This is 
most perfectly inclined towards what is good; not, indeed, as if it were merely 
guided by another towards some particular good only, like things devoid of 
knowledge, nor towards some particular good only, as things which have only 
sensitive knowledge, but as inclined towards the universal good. Such inclination 
is termed “will.”35 
 
In light of its not having any cognitive power at all, the vegetative layer of the soul can-
not “know” any object as good, and thus it cannot judge it to be good either. Instead, in 
the natural appetite there is simply the “blind”36 search for the goods (e.g. water, CO2, 
and light) that aid in the vegetative perfections of nutrition and growth.  
In the sensitive and intelligent layers of the soul, however, the matter is a good bit 
more complicated. The primary cause of this complication is that Aquinas is adamant that 
it is not within the power of the appetite to judge an object as good or evil. To do so re-
quires a comparative ordering of goods defined by this question: what is the relation be-
tween this creature’s relative perfection and any given aspect of goodness of the appre-
hended object? To make a comparative judgment of particular goods in relation to an end 
                                                
35 Ibid., I.59.1.  
36 Lonergan, Verbum, 2:209.  
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is the quintessential operative domain of discursive reasoning.37 Appetites do not judge; 
their acts simply and naturally consist in responding to the good (or evil) as precedingly 
judged and “defined by reason [bonum rationis].”38 The manner in which reason renders 
its judgment varies rather widely between the sensitive and intellective appetite, as well 
as between different kinds of creatures. For instance, any talk of “reason” must be heavily 
qualified vis-à-vis animals whose souls supply them with a sensitive appetite, but with no 
powers of intelligence. Accordingly, in the next two sections we will specify in much 
more detail the respective ways that reason renders its judgment in relation to each type 
of appetite respectively. For now, it suffices to make clear that the movements of both the 
sensitive and intellective appetites depend entirely on reason’s previous judgment of an 
object as good or evil, as suitable or opposed to the creature’s relative perfection. 
 Finally, before moving on to consider the passions and the will in particular, it 
should be mentioned that the perspectival element that the notion of suitability gives to 
Aquinas’s account of appetite has at times proven difficult for its interpreters to track 
consistently.39 The chief reason for this difficulty seems to be tied to the fact that Aquinas 
requires his readers to steadfastly observe a distinction between material objects, appre-
hended objects, which generically includes material objects (i.e. sensed or derivatively 
                                                
37 Aquinas, ST I-II.13.1. 
38 Ibid., I-II.62.3. 
39 For example, Susan James judges it be “confusing” that Aquinas clearly asserts that the appetitive pow-
ers “are distinguished by their objects” and yet proceeds to enumerate the passions in such a way that they 
include an emotive “relation” to a creature’s perspective and needs. This confusion only arises if one does 
not properly distinguish between material, apprehended, and intentional objects. Cf. Susan James, Passion 
and Action: The Emotions in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 56. For 
more nuanced expositions, see Lombardo, The Logic of Desire, 43-47 and Mark P. Drost, “Intentionality in 
Aquinas’s Theory of Emotions,” International Philosophical Quarterly 31 (1991): 449-60.  
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imagined) and immaterial objects (e.g. intelligible knowledge and virtue),40 and inten-
tional objects, which denote the proximate and ultimate ends that a creature seeks to real-
ize through the means of some desirable aspect of the apprehended object. The contin-
gent, creaturely specific, combination of the intentional object and some aspect of the ap-
prehended object is that which a creature uses to evaluate that object as good or evil.41  
  Keeping track of the precise meaning of these different objects is crucial to fol-
lowing Aquinas’s account of appetite for two reasons. First, the distinction between an 
apprehended and an intentional object explains, for instance, why the same material ob-
ject can elicit a wide diversity appetitive responses not only by different creatures, but 
also from the same creature at different times. For example, a pear (i.e. a material object) 
can elicit varying appetitive responses by way of different aspects of its being (e.g. its 
color, taste, temperature, size, location, value in the market economy, or its scientific in-
telligibility) through which it might become a means for realizing an almost infinite 
number of intentional ends depending on the circumstances. Accordingly, the same pear 
that stood unappealing to me hours before because I had just eaten lunch might now elicit 
a strong appetitive response from me as a suitable afternoon snack in the service of the 
interrelated intentional ends of satisfying hunger, promoting health, and increasing ener-
gy. Without maintaining the distinctions between material, apprehended, and intentional 
objects, Aquinas’s account of appetite would have a difficult time explaining even such a 
basic phenomenon of desire. 
                                                
40 Aquinas, ST I.80.2.ad2. 
41 Cf. Ibid., I.78.4. 
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Second, this distinction is central to explaining the lived gap that often exists be-
tween a creature’s judgment that a certain apprehended object will promote its perfection 
and the degree to which it will actually do so in reality. According to Aquinas, it is im-
possible for any appetite to be attracted to an object that is judged as evil because its nat-
ural constitution inclines it to pursue the creature’s good and to flee from something con-
trary to its good. Nonetheless, it is certainly possible for a creature to judge some aspect 
of an apprehended object as good—an “apparent good”42—even though actually coming 
to possess that object will end up, in truth, hindering or preventing a higher good of per-
fection from being realized in that creature, thereby making that same object an evil in 
this respect.43 This dynamic is, of course, the root of human sin and the vicious habits 
thereby derived and/or reinforced. For when we sin our appetites carry us away to that 
which is in reality tragically contrary to our own perfection that we nonetheless still de-
sire.44 In contrast, human acts that are morally good, from which virtuous habits are de-
rived and/or reinforced, take shape as acts whose proximate objects are intentionally or-
dered, penultimately by reason and ultimately (and graciously) by God, to the highest 
good in which the perfections of all individuals share a common telos. For in those par-
ticular acts of goodness, human beings find their appetites gradually and vertically 
aligned toward the God whose universal goodness is the intelligible “good of every 
good”45 and therefore the last and most perfect end of all human acts.  
 
                                                
42 Cf. Ibid., I-II.8.1. and I-II.9.6.ad3. 
43 Ibid., I-II.78.1. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Augustine, trin. VIII.4. 
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II. Sense Appetite: The Passions of the Soul 
 
As one would expect given the metaphysics of appetite just outlined, the object of the 
sense appetite is the sensible good. Its affections, which Aquinas consistently calls the 
passions of the soul (passiones animae), respond to the good or evil of an object present-
ed either directly by the exterior senses or, derivatively, by the imagination. In addition to 
this causative relationship to sense apprehension,46 the passions also parallel the senses’ 
necessary connection to material transmutation and reliance upon a corporeal organ, 
which Aquinas somewhat vaguely assigns to the changes of “hot or cold” emanating 
from the heart. For example, “anger is said to be a kindling of the blood around the 
heart”47 and in fear “heat abandons the heart”48 resulting in a coldness spreading through-
out one’s body.49 
 Within this one generic appetitive power, Aquinas identifies two specific powers, 
the concupiscible and irascible powers, that give rise to interrelated, and yet distinct, sets 
of passions.50 The concupiscible power responds to an object simply as good (i.e. suita-
ble) or evil; the irascible power considers an object not only as good or evil, but also in 
terms of a “restricted”51 subset of those goods or evils that Aquinas labels as “arduous” 
[arduum].52 He defines arduous in terms of goods that are difficult to possess or evils that 
are similarly difficult to avoid. He makes this distinction between the concupiscible and 
irascible powers within the same generic appetite in order to account for a phenomenon 
                                                
46 Aquinas, ST I.81.1. 
47 Ibid., I-II.22.2.ad3. 
48 Ibid., I-II.44.3.ad3. 
49 Ibid., I-II.44.1.ad1 and I-II.44.3. 
50 Ibid., I.81.2. 
51 Ibid., I-II.25.1.sc. 
52 Ibid., I.81.2. 
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that cannot be reduced to a single principle. As Aquinas describes it: “[S]ometimes the 
soul busies itself with unpleasant things, against the inclination of the concupiscible ap-
petite, in order that, following the impulse of the irascible appetite, it may fight against 
obstacles.”53 In other words, sometimes a creature is faced with an object that in itself is 
perceived as evil—an obstacle to a desired good—but instead of fleeing from the evil as 
would be the impulse of the concupiscible power, the appetitive faculty instead prompts 
the creature to engage that evil. To take a common example, often the desire for the good 
of better cardiovascular health causes people to endure numerous types of pain that they 
would normally avoid.54 In Aquinas’s assessment, the only way to explain this impulse is 
to affirm an appetitive potency, the irascible power, aimed at a slightly more specific ob-
ject—the arduous good or evil—when compared with that of the concupiscible faculty, 
which considers good and evil “simply”55 and “absolutely.”56 
 Taken together, the concupiscible and irascible powers issue in eleven primary 
passions according to Aquinas.57 The six concupiscible passions are grouped together in 
three pairs of contrary passions that are paired together by virtue of belonging to the same 
appetitive phase (inclination, movement, or rest). Their contrariety is based upon their 
respective connectedness to good or evil. For example, love and hate are the initial incli-
nations of the concupiscible power, with the former prompting an attraction to a good and 
                                                
53 Ibid. 
54 Similarly, Aquinas movingly describes Jesus’ struggle in Gethsemane as the natural reaction of the con-
cupiscible passions to avoid “sensible pain and bodily injury” (ST III.18.5), despite the fact that he ulti-
mately endured the cross for the sake of a joy that lay on the other side of it. Cf. Heb. 12:2. 
55 Aquinas, ST I-II.46.2. 
56 Ibid., I-II.23.4.  
57 These eleven are “primary” because they are not exhaustively descriptive for Aquinas, but instead form 
the generic basis for his frequent subdivision of them into a diversity of subspecies within the primary pas-
sion. For example, in ST I.II.35.8 he subdivides sorrow into four subspecies: pity (misericordia), envy (in-
vidia), anxiety (anxietas), and torpor (acedia). 
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the latter an aversion to an evil. In parallel fashion, desire/repulsion (movement) and 
pleasure/pain (rest) are similarly paired together. To these six passions, Aquinas adds five 
more to be considered from the irascible power: hope, despair, daring, fear, and anger. As 
we will see in more detail in a moment, all of the irascible passions are variations within 
the movement phase of appetitive response. 
 Before proceeding to describe each of these passions in detail, we must first make 
it clear how apprehended objects are presented to the sense appetite already evaluated as 
good or evil. Hence, we will first consider the relationship between reason and the sense 
appetite before proceeding, respectively, to the concupiscible and irascible passions of 
the soul. 
a. Particular Reason and the Sense Appetite 
We begin first with a qualification. My immediate concern here is not with the dynamic 
relationship that exists between universal reason, the sense appetite, and the vertical 
manner by which the latter can become “rational by participation.” That will be treated in 
the last section of this chapter, on the other side of outlining Aquinas’s account of the 
will. Instead, the question here is how sense apprehension presents an object to the sense 
appetite as somehow already evaluated as good or evil vis-à-vis the creature’s perfection. 
To what degree can there be a kind of rational judgment within the sensitive layer of the 
soul given that fact that this comparative evaluation seems to presuppose the power of 
discursive reasoning?  
Aquinas answers this question by making two distinctions. First, he distinguishes 
between intentional objects that are appetible to the senses per se versus those that are 
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appetible on the basis of ends not directly perceivable by the senses. The former kind of 
intentional object coincides with sensible qualities of objects that are, in a certain way, 
pleasurable—and thus appetible—to the senses themselves as, for instance, something 
pleasant to taste, beautiful to see, satisfying to hear, or enjoyable to touch (or be touched 
by). Accounting for the appetitive responses that are elicited by these sensed objects re-
quires no rational judgment per se beyond the operative interaction between the sensitive 
power of memory and the senses themselves because there is no comparative abstraction 
in reference to ends beyond the immediacy of the sensible good.58 However, the latter 
kind of intentional object, those that are based on ends not perceivable by the senses, re-
sist this simple explanation. These kinds of intentional objects can be illustrated by Aqui-
nas’s own pair of stock examples: the sheep who senses a wolf and evaluates it as some-
thing more, a “natural enemy,” than can be concluded directly by its color and shape or 
the bird who “gathers together straws, not because they are pleasant to the sense, but be-
cause they are useful for building its nest.”59 In order to account for these types of inten-
tional objects, Aquinas concludes that one of the interior senses must have some connec-
tion to reason for making such an evaluative judgment beyond that which can be per-
ceived immediately by the senses.  
Specifying this “connection” with reason leads to Aquinas’s second distinction: 
the difference in this regard between the respective sense appetites of human beings and 
non-intelligent animals. In non-intelligent animals, Aquinas attributes this capability of 
responding to sensed objects on the basis of non-sensed ends to the operation of the inner 
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sense that we bracketed in Chapter 2: the estimative sense.60 Crucially, Aquinas con-
cludes that the implicit “rationality” of the estimative sense’s acts in non-intelligent ani-
mals must be regarded as something directly imputed by the prevenient rationality of the 
Creator in the form of “instinct.” As Aquinas describes this link between the estimative 
sense and instinct, “Brute animals have a natural instinct imparted to them by divine rea-
son, in virtue of which they are gifted with movements that are […] similar to rational 
movements.”61 
 In humans, however, there is no estimative sense that renders judgments on the 
basis of instinct. Instead, according to Aquinas these sensitive judgments are issued on 
the basis of an interplay between memory and what Aquinas synonymously calls the 
“cogitative power” or the “particular reason [ratio particularis].”62 Even though Aquinas 
follows the demand of his metaphysics to assign this power a corporeal organ, following 
the best medical knowledge of his day he assigns to the “middle part of the head,”63 
Aquinas also argues that the ratio of particular reason in human beings results from its 
“affinity and proximity to the universal reason” in the soul, which “so to speak, overflows 
[refluentia]” into this power.64 As we will see as the chapter unfolds, this notion of an 
“overflow” from a higher power to a lower power opens up another dimension of vertical 
finality—in addition to a lower power contributing a necessary preamble to the higher 
power’s acts—that will prove pivotal for us moving forward. For the moment, however, 
the immediately relevant result of this overflow into the cogitative power is that, just as 
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62 Ibid., I.78.4 and I.81.3. 
63 Ibid., I.78.4. 
64 Ibid., I.78.4.ad5. 
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the intellect “knows many things which the sense cannot perceive” in a comparatively 
eminent manner,65 particular reason gives humans the ability to discursively “[compare] 
individual intentions”66 that have occurred in the past in order to better evaluate the rela-
tive good or evil of a given sensed (or imagined) object in the present.67 On the basis of 
this comparison, particular reason then judges the object’s relative suitability to the crea-
ture’s well-being, which thereby moves the appetite accordingly.  
 This vertical “overflow” of the intelligent rational power also accounts for two 
other features unique to the human sense appetite. First, whereas in non-intelligent ani-
mals the passions lead to immediate locomotion (e.g. fleeing from the enemy), in human 
beings these same passions usually, except in rare cases to be considered later, cannot of 
themselves control the locomotive powers in pursuit of a good or to flee an evil. Instead, 
the immanent promptings of the passions “[await] the command of the will, [the] superior 
appetite,”68 which can execute, mitigate, or resist those impulses. The logic of this affir-
mation follows one of Aquinas’s general metaphysical rules that governs his description 
of the relation between the appetites and which is worth highlighting even at this early 
stage: “wherever we have order among a number of active powers, that power which re-
gards the universal end moves the powers which regard particular ends.”69 Even though 
the sense appetite has a certain degree of horizontal independence in its judgments, the 
higher powers of universal reason and appetite (i.e. the will) usually maintain a vertical 
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position of executive agency in relation to those sensitive judgments and appetitive re-
sponses.  
Second, the “overflow” of the rational power into the sensitive appetite also ex-
plains why the sense appetite in humans is inclined to a far greater range of objects than 
experienced by non-rational animals. These animals, according to Aquinas, are only at-
tracted to what he calls “natural” objects of the sense appetite.70 These sensible objects 
are those that naturally and necessarily serve the physical well-being of the creature (e.g. 
food and drink)71 or the species (e.g. sexual union).72 However, in addition to these natu-
ral objects of attraction and repulsion, human beings are also sensitively moved toward 
what Aquinas calls non-natural objects.73 These arise because particular reason gives 
them the capability to “devise [excogitare] something as good and suitable, beyond that 
which nature requires.”74 For example, this type of non-natural evaluation applies to the 
human capacity to develop highly nuanced preferences for food and drink and intense 
attractions to non-natural inventions (i.e. the products of human artifice) such as those 
that drive the attraction to sensible entertainment, technology, and the accumulation of 
wealth.75 
b. The Concupiscible Passions 
As I already briefly referenced, the six concupiscible passions are ordered as contrary 
pairs associated with each phase of appetitive response: love vs. hatred (inclination), de-
                                                
70 Cf. Ibid., I-II.30.3-4. 
71 Ibid., I-II.30.3. 
72 Ibid., I-II.31.6. 
73 Ibid., I-II.30.3. 
74 Ibid., I-II.30.3. Cf. ST I-II.30.3.ad3 for the specific assignation of this power to the particular reason. 
75 Ibid., I-II.30.4. 
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sire vs. aversion (movement), and pleasure vs. pain (rest).76 The first member of each pair 
of passions corresponds with the appetitive response toward the cognition of a good ob-
ject, and thus one is inclined to that object in love (amor), moved toward that object in 
desire (concupiscentia), and terminally resting in the conjoined presence of that object in 
pleasure (delectatio). Derivatively, since “the quest of a good is the reason for shunning 
the opposite evil,”77 one is disinclined to an evil object in hatred (odium), moved away 
from that object in aversion (fuga), and terminally—albeit tragically—resting in a present 
evil in pain (dolor).  
Aquinas’s usual method for explicating the concupiscible passions, which is a 
strategy which he adopts in order to prevent redundancy, is to move through each pair of 
passions beginning with the one oriented toward a good object and then to contrast this 
more primary passion with the contrary one that leads the creature away from an evil ob-
ject. In what follows, I will adopt this strategy as well. Not only does this way of pro-
ceeding underline Aquinas’s assertion that the appetite’s primary object is goodness (and 
not evil per se), but it also reinforces his commitment that the appetite is good itself and 
thereby created by God as an intrinsic means for progressively pursuing a creature’s per-
fection. 
We begin, then, with love. Aquinas’s most general definition of love is that it is 
the “first,” or principle, “movement […] of every appetitive faculty”78 toward a certain 
end considered as good. From this initial amorous inclination every other appetitive 
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phase or passion “proceeds […] from love as from a first cause [prima causa].”79 This 
definition is broad enough to apply to all three levels of appetite. Accordingly, at the 
lowest level, in the natural appetite, there is a “natural love” that consists simply a living 
thing’s natural inclination toward that which it needs to sustain life. Aquinas describes 
this lowest level of love as the “appetitive subject’s connaturalness with the thing to 
which it tends.”80 To natural love, Aquinas analogously names the first movement of both 
the sensitive and intellective appetite as coincident with their corresponding movements 
of love: “sensitive love,” which he usually calls amor,81 and “intellectual or rational 
love,”82 which he often calls caritas (i.e. charity).83  
As the first movement of the sensitive appetite, the passion of love follows a 
judgment of a sensitive object as suitable to a creature’s perfection. The result is that the 
appetite is moved, as Aquinas describes the initial affective union of love, to a “certain 
complacency in that object”84 that inclines the appetite toward some aspect of that object 
that thereby becomes its intentional object. By way of this amorous inclination, the “ap-
petible object moves the appetite, introducing itself, as it were, into its intention [such 
that] the appetite tends toward that object as something that must really be pursued.”85 In 
contrast, “hatred is [the] dissonance of the appetite from that which is apprehended as 
repugnant and hurtful” to a creature’s goodness, in short that which “bears the aspect of 
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83 Cf. Ibid., II-II.23-27. 
84 Ibid., I-II. 26.2. 
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evil.”86 As one would expect, Aquinas is clear that hatred is always caused by a preceding 
love that is hindered by the apprehended evil. In this sense, love is always the first 
movement of the appetite, never hate in and of itself. For, “nothing is hated, save through 
being contrary to a suitable thing which is loved [and] hence it is that every hatred is 
caused by love.”87 
By clearly stating that love is the first movement of every appetitive faculty, 
Aquinas repeats vis-à-vis self-love the solution, covered at length last chapter, to Augus-
tine’s problematic affirmation of self-knowledge (and self-love) as both a immanently 
realized primal fact and a subsequent unifying of the self that occurs through the reflec-
tive capacities of the intellect and the will. On the one hand, Aquinas is willing to affirm 
that the general feature of love as the seeking out of that which is suitable to one’s own 
good qualifies as a certain kind of “love with which one loves oneself.”88 On the other 
hand, however, this self-love has no actuality in itself. It is only a passive potency—a la 
the passive intellect—to be actualized in the wake of apprehended objects and then sub-
sequently perfected in the occurrence of real union and the corresponding passions of 
rest. Again, the nature of these self-preserving appetitive potencies are indeed attributable 
to a certain kind of primal intensive unity, one which Aquinas calls that of “substantial 
union.”89 However, this unity is attributable, not to any realized state of self-love, but on-
ly to the singularity of a substantial form that gives human beings an intensive existence 
shot through with potentiality and naturally ordered to external goods initially appre-
                                                
86 Ibid., I.29.1. 
87 Ibid., I.29.2. 
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hended through the senses. In other words, Aquinas consistently understands self-love as 
that which naturally launches us towards external goods whose relative goodness we can 
love. In this way, the lover is always “placed outside [herself] and made to pass into the 
object of the beloved.”90 By way of the principles of their substantial form, creatures de-
sire their own good by desiring to be united with other goods, first through the assimila-
tions of apprehension and then through the responses of the appetites,91 the first of which 
is always love.  
In turning to consider the pair of contrary concupiscible passions—desire (concu-
piscentia) and aversion (fuga)—that Aquinas associates with the appetitive phase of 
movement, there are only two observations to make short of the more detailed considera-
tions that follow in connection with the irascible passions. First, aversion is the only pas-
sion to which Aquinas does not devote at least a single questio in the treatise on the pas-
sions. He, and therefore I as well, is content to let the contrast with concupiscence re-
main, in large part, simply implied. Second, following its causation by the appetite’s ini-
tial movement of love, the passion of desire is defined by whether that loved object is 
“really present […] or absent [realiter praesens…absens].”92 Crucially, the mode accord-
ing to which that presence or absence is determined depends entirely on the nature of the 
intentional object itself. For example, the most easily grasped, and perhaps most com-
mon, example of the progression of the sense appetite can be taken from a common se-
quence of eating in which the intentional object (i.e. food) implies a particular mode of 
                                                
90 Ibid., I.20.2.ad1. 
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spatial, physical, and immediately sensible presence or absence: (1) there is an initial 
sensing (or imagining) of an object (e.g. a hamburger), which (2) arouses the inclination 
of an affective union of love (e.g. this is a suitable good for my hunger), which (3) causes 
concupiscence (e.g. I want it!), which (4) spurs directed locomotion either by instinct or 
the will (e.g. grabbing a sensed hamburger or proceeding to the closest burger joint), and 
(5) arrives at a real conjunction of the object to the animal that thereby elicits the passions 
of rest (e.g. Mmmm…). A similar sequence can be imagined when a person desires to do 
a physical activity (e.g. go for a run, rock climb, have sex) when that activity is consid-
ered as an intentional good in itself.93  
In contrast to these examples, however, there are other types of desiderative inten-
tional objects (e.g. a memories, wishes, hopes) in which the mental or cognitional pres-
ence of an object is identical with the intentional object itself. In this case, merely think-
ing about or imagining the object is coincident with the “presence” that elicits the restful 
passion of pleasure (or pain),94 despite the fact they are derivatively connected to sensible 
objects that “absolutely speaking, are absent.”95 With these types of mental objects, “we 
take pleasure in [merely] think[ing] of” these things.96 In this case, the interim appetitive 
phase of desire is usually cut short (and the locomotive powers eliminated entirely), as 
the intended good is attained quickly through the sensitive powers of memory and imagi-
nation. This elastic element of Aquinas’s account of the passions, which enables him to 
include mental intentional objects, will prove constructively significant next chapter be-
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95 Ibid., I-II.32.3. 
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cause it overlaps in a striking way with the affective phenomena that psychoanalysis de-
scribes as the pleasures achieved through fantasy and dreams. 
Finally, we come to the final pair of contrary concupiscible passions—pleasure 
[delectatio] and pain [dolor]—that are associated with the final appetitive phase of rest. 
In itself, of course, pain brings no terminal rest to the appetite because its object as evil 
hinders the appetite from possessing and resting in its intended good. Nonetheless, pain is 
an analogue to pleasure in that it arises from the presence of an evil, just as pleasure fol-
lows from the presence of a good, despite the fact that the appetite still shuns this evil as 
repugnant.97 Aquinas ratifies this parallelism by arguing that the passions of pleasure and 
pain share two conditions that are required for their emergence: (1) real conjunction with, 
and therefore the presence of, a good or an evil and (2) apprehension of this conjunc-
tion.98 In sharing these conditions, pleasure and pain continue to mirror one another even 
in their terminal contrariety. Nonetheless, as one would expect, their contrariety is re-
flected in the opposite connotations that flow from their respective conjunctions: whereas 
pleasure flows from being truly united to one’s desired good, pain follows the conjunc-
tion of an evil because it actively separates the creature from an aspect of its goodness 
and perfection. In pain, the creature still has a “craving for unity [appetitus unitatis];”99 in 
pleasure, that craving has been satisfied and therefore the appetite rests in a state of re-
posing in its now possessed object of love.100  
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In further delving into the nuances of each of these passions, Aquinas identifies 
another parallel between pleasure and pain. He argues that within the genera of sensitive 
pleasure and pain there are distinct species within each that are differentiated by their re-
spective externality and internality, the latter of which he assigns specific names: internal 
pleasure is called joy (gaudium) and internal pain is called sorrow (tristitia).101 The divid-
ing line between internal and external pleasures/pains lies in whether the apprehension of 
the conjoined good/evil occurs through the exterior senses or through the interior senses 
of imagination, particular reason, and memory.102 Through this distinction, Aquinas is 
able to describe in moving detail the dynamic relationship between, on the one hand, the 
immediacy of goods (e.g. the “pleasures of the table or of sexual intercourse”)103 and evils 
(e.g. something scalding to the touch or witnessing the death of a friend)104 that are at 
some point directly conjoined to the senses and, on the other hand, the simultaneous or 
derivative imagining of those goods and evils that inwardly elicit corresponding joys and 
sorrows.105 As Aquinas eloquently writes of the intimate relation between outward pains 
and inward sorrows: “the pains of outward wounds are comprehended in the interior sor-
rows of the heart.”106 This connection that joy and sorrow have with the tensive flexibility 
of the interior senses gives them a greater universality than the immediacy of external 
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pleasures and pains:107 whereas “external sense perceives only what is present,” the inte-
riority of joy and sorrow give them the capacity for responding to that which is “present, 
past, and future.”108 This comparative universality predisposes joy and sorrow, as we will 
see, to be especially apt affections of the intellective appetite. 
c. The Irascible Passions 
In turning to the irascible power’s diverse responses to arduous appetitive objects, Aqui-
nas identifies the five additional passions that I already listed above: hope [gaudium], 
despair [desperatio], daring [audacia], fear [timor], and anger [ira]. Despite being specif-
ically different from them, Aquinas nonetheless insists that these five passions have a 
two-sided causal relationship to the concupiscible passions. He summarizes this causal 
relationship with the following phrase that he draws upon repeatedly: “[A]ll the passions 
of the irascible appetite arise [incipiunt] from the passions of the concupiscible appetite 
and terminate [terminantur] in them.”109 In order to elucidate this orienting principle, 
Aquinas refers again to the three phases of the appetitive response (i.e. inclination, 
movement, and rest) and situates the irascible passions, in the order of generation, after 
the concupiscible passions of inclination (love/hatred) and movement (concupis-
cence/aversion), but prior to those of rest (pleasure/pain).  
Therefore, whereas in the concupiscible passions we find something relating to all 
three phases of response, in the irascible passions there is “only that which belongs to 
                                                
107 Ibid. 
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movement.”110 More explicitly, once a given object has been (1) cognized as good or evil, 
then (2) loved or hated, and thus (3) the object of either concupiscence or aversion, the 
irascible passions then respond to the arduous characteristic of the intended object: if it is 
an arduous good, then the creature faces some difficulty in coming to possess it; if it is an 
arduous evil, then the creature faces some difficulty in successfully fleeing from the evil. 
If the given object is not arduous in either of these ways, then the irascible passions do 
not arise at all and the appetite proceeds more directly from the concupiscible passions of 
movement to those of rest. However, if an arduous element does come into play, then the 
second side of the causal relationship corresponds to whether the creature is able to suc-
cessfully negotiate and/or overcome the arduous obstacle: if it does, then the irascible 
passion terminates in pleasure and/or joy; it fails to do so, then they terminate in pain 
and/or sorrow.111 
Based upon this general account of the irascible power, Aquinas orders the irasci-
ble passions based upon two variables of contrariety.112 First, there is the principle of con-
trariety that is shared between the irascible and the concupiscible passions: the opposition 
of good and evil terminal objects. In addition, however, the irascible power also adds a 
second variable of contrariety based upon whether the passion prompts the creature to 
move toward or away from—to “approach [accedere]” or “withdraw [recedere]113 from—
the same terminal object. According to Aquinas, this “directionality” of the irascible pas-
sions is based upon a judgment made by the estimative/cogitative power as to whether or 
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not the arduous aspect of the object can be overcome.114 If it judges that it can be over-
come, then that evaluation elicits an irascible passion that prompts the creature to engage 
the arduous object. If, on the other hand, it evaluates it as something that cannot be over-
come, then the resulting irascible passion will direct the creature away from the arduous 
object.  
For the moment, let us consider these two variables of contrariety in regard to the 
first four irascible passions (hope, despair, daring, and fear). I will then extend the analy-
sis to include the unique complexity of anger. The first two irascible passions—hope and 
despair—share in common the cognition of a good, and therefore loved and desired, ter-
minal object that is arduous to obtain. However, according to the second variable of con-
trariety they are opposites. In the face of an arduous good, hope still presses the creature 
toward that good because it seems “possible to obtain”115 despite the difficulties. In con-
trast, despair results from a judgment that the obstacle is impossible to overcome. Ac-
cordingly, it moves the creature to shrink back from the arduous difficulty and thus aban-
don its pursuit of the good that is still nonetheless desired.116 Similarly, fear and daring 
are joined together as resulting from the cognition of an evil, and therefore the object of 
hate and repulsion, that is arduous to avoid. Between the two, daring stands analogous to 
hope according the second variable of contrariety: if the arduous evil can be avoided 
through effort and struggle, then daring prompts the creature to “rise up [surgit]” and 
“face the evil” with boldness and courage.117 In contrast, fear results from the estimation 
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that the evil will be difficult to avoid or overcome,118 thus causing a “contraction in the 
appetite”119 and a parallel “frigidity” of one’s heart and vital spirits.120 As Aquinas’s vivid 
description of the effects of fear suggests, all four of these irascible passions tend to am-
plify the appetitive, motive, and emotive trajectory set by their preexisting concupiscible 
passions. “Thus hope adds to desire a certain effort, and a certain raising of the spirits to 
the realization of the arduous goods. In like manner, fear adds to aversion or detestation a 
certain lowness of spirits, on account of difficulty in shunning the evil.”121 
 The final irascible passion to consider is anger, which is the most complex of the 
all the passions. Anger’s initial complexity stems from the fact that it is caused, not by a 
single passion, but instead by the “concurrence of several passions:”122 the sorrow of a 
present evil, the desire for the good that it hinders, and the hope of eliminating the source 
of sadness by lashing out at it. In addition, anger is the only passion with two motive ob-
jects: the present evil that it seeks to eliminate and the good that it seeks to thereby pos-
sess. Somewhat curiously, Aquinas identifies the double character of anger’s motive ob-
ject as one reason why it has no contrary. Since it is simultaneously moved by a present 
evil and a hoped for good, anger “includes in itself contrariety […] and consequently it 
                                                
118 Ibid., I-II.41.2. 
119 Ibid., I-II.44.1. 
120 Ibid., I-II.44.1.ad1. 
121 Ibid., I-II.25.1. In addition to their pairing according to relative contrariety, Aquinas also orders hope, 
despair, fear, and daring according to the causative relationship that follows from the priority of good over 
evil. Hence, because any given hindrance to a good is by definition an evil, in the order of generation hope 
and fear, respectively, possess a causative relationship to daring and despair. From this perspective, hope 
causes daring because the primary draw toward an arduous good motivates a derivative engagement of 
something that is itself evil. In the same way, fear causes despair because the difficulty of an evil thwarts 
the broader attraction to a good. Cf. Ibid., I-II.45.2. 
122 Ibid., I-II.46.1.  
  
  226 
has no contrary outside itself.”123 In addition to this reason for having no contrary, the 
definition of an irascible passion also precludes a contrary to anger based upon either of 
the possible variables of contrariety. For example, based upon an opposition of terms, the 
contrary to anger would be an irascible passion aimed at a present good. But, as Aquinas 
writes, “once [a] good is obtained” there is “no longer any aspect of arduousness or diffi-
culty” and thus no more irascible passion.124 Likewise, there can be no contrary of anger 
based on approach or withdrawal from the same term since the definition of anger already 
specifies that the evil is already present.125 
Following Aristotle’s lead,126 Aquinas most often discusses anger in the context of 
interpersonal relationships in which the present evil required for anger is furnished 
through an unjust “slight [parvipensio]”127 enacted against an aggrieved party. Based up-
on this presumed context, he usually defines the two objects of anger in terms of (1) the 
person who slighted the angry person and thus is the offensive source of the present evil 
and (2) the vengeance that the person reasons128 will remedy their slight, expunge the evil, 
and therefore generate pleasure: 
Consequently as soon as vengeance is present, pleasure ensues, and so much the 
greater according as the sorrow was greater. Therefore if vengeance be really pre-
sent, perfect pleasure ensues, entirely excluding sorrow, so that the movement of 
anger ceases.129 
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Despite usually confining his remarks to interpersonal slights, and especially those 
wounds that have been inflicted “on purpose [ex industria],”130 Aquinas observes general-
ly that any perceived deprivation of a perfection that a creature desires to realize vis-à-vis 
any particular good can “savor of a slight”131and therefore generate anger. When placed 
within this broader context, anything that “frustrates desire” can become the object of an-
ger’s prompting toward retaliatory attack.132 
III. Intellective Appetite: The Will 
 
Having given an overview of the sense appetite, we are now in a position to outline the 
horizontal ordering of the intellective appetite, viz. the will, before turning in the next 
section to the vertical interrelation that exists between these two appetites. As one would 
expect, the metaphysical differences between the sense appetite and the will parallel 
those between the senses and the intellect. Accordingly, whereas the passions of the sense 
appetite are bound up with a corporeal organ and material transmutations, the will’s acts 
are, like those of the intellect, “absolutely incorporeal and immaterial.”133 Likewise, the 
object of the sense appetite is the relative goodness of a sensible particular, but the object 
of the will is the universal (universale or commune)134 good as understood (intellectum).135 
That which the intellect understands as true can then be presented to the will as an appeti-
tive good.136 This pairing with the intellect also entails that the will is moved by a rational 
power, the universal reason, that can draw upon a much more expansive body of 
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knowledge—namely all that is intelligibly necessary (including moral laws and pre-
cepts)137—in order to make its evaluative judgments than is available to particular reason 
in its simple comparison of the sense appetite’s past intentions.  
As that which seeks the universal good, the will is the appetitive motor through 
which a human being desires and intends its last (or ultimate) end of perfection that 
Aquinas generically identifies, following Augustine, as happiness. This desired end, pre-
cisely in its universal goodness, “entirely satisfies” the will and thus reduces it to a per-
manent act of resting and enjoying that goodness.138 Without a doubt, the most difficult 
aspect of Aquinas’s account of the will is grasping how the will’s object can be the uni-
versal good as understood even though all of its earthly acts are carried out, as Augus-
tine’s notion of ascent eloquently describes, amidst particular goods and penultimate 
truths. This difficulty lies behind many of the debates that have periodically erupted over 
the last two centuries regarding how to relate a human being’s natural potencies with a 
supernatural end.139 This tension arises because, when seen from a theological perspec-
tive, it is obvious that there is only one good that could permanently satisfy the will’s de-
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sire for the universal good: the divine essence itself.140 But, the question logically follows: 
how can we speak of a natural potency for a supernatural end that, by definition, cannot 
be attained apart from grace?141  
Obviously, rehearsing these debates lies beyond the scope of this chapter. My 
goal instead is much more descriptive in attending to Aquinas’s understanding of the nat-
ural capacities of the will, even as I take for granted the necessity of grace’s justifying 
and perfecting work as not only theologically required, but also rather empirically self-
evident. Maintaining the integrity of this descriptive task of Aquinas’s account of the will 
itself, as well as its operative link with the intellect and reason, is essential because it es-
tablishes a crucial part of the conceptual background to be expanded upon constructively 
in the next two chapters. This is especially the case when I turn to discuss the diachronic 
links between the emergence of self-consciousness and the higher operations of the intel-
lect and the will in Chapter 5.  
There are three parts to this descriptive task. In the first subsection, I elucidate 
Aquinas’s foundational contention that the will has a natural inclination for a last end. On 
the basis of this framework, I then turn to reason’s judgment of any given object as good 
or evil in reference to this last end. Lastly, I attend to the similarities and differences be-
tween the affections of the will and the passions of the sense appetite. 
a. The Will’s Natural Inclination to a Last End 
The will, according to Aquinas, has a two-fold act:142 (1) that which it does in itself, 
which is its proper act to will (volo)143 and enjoy (fruitio),144 when possessed, a last end 
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coincident with a creature’s perfect happiness and (2) that which it does through the in-
strumental medium of another power of the soul by commanding it to pursue (or, if evil, 
to flee) proximate goods and ends as means to its last end.145  
The first act, the willing of a last end, Aquinas defines as the simple act of voli-
tion.146 It stands as the final and efficient cause of all other appetitive movements of the 
will. Without the willing of a last end, viz. if one removes this principle of causation, 
“there will be nothing to move the appetite.”147 “For,” as Aquinas exactingly concludes, 
“in all things that have an order to another, if the first be removed, those that are ordained 
to the first, must of necessity be removed as well.”148 Similarly, as their final cause, the 
last end ties together all other volitional acts as an intelligible whole as a genus ties to-
gether a diversity of species. In Aquinas’s words: “[S]ince voluntary actions receive their 
species from the end […] they necessarily receive their genus from the last end, which is 
common to them all: just as natural things are placed in a genus according to a common 
form.”149 
Due to this ordered relationship between the will’s various acts, Aquinas observes  
precise terminological divisions for distinguishing between these acts. When describing 
the will’s proper act in itself, Aquinas speaks of willing (volens) the last end, enjoying 
(fruens) that end when possessed, and intending (intendens) proximate ends in relation to 
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this end.150 When describing the will’s instrumental acts, he speaks of commanding (im-
perans) the other powers, choosing (electiens) the means to the end, and using (utens) the 
means. The most important point to add to this initial typology is that Aquinas strictly 
and consistently identifies free-will (liberum arbitrium) solely with the act of choosing 
the means to an end.151 The will itself has a necessary, definitional relationship to a last 
end,152 despite the fact that it remains free vis-à-vis the means to this end.153  
 Making sense of this claim of Aquinas’s that the will has a definitional relation-
ship to a last end requires attending to several nuanced arguments and comparisons that 
he makes regarding the will’s natural constitution as a power of the soul. The first step is 
to remember that whenever a power of the soul is being defined, one must distinguish 
sharply between the generic aspect of a power’s definition and the specific object(s) in 
which this aspect is actualized and determined. The generic aspect is shared by all mem-
bers of a natural species; its specific determination is accidental to each individual.154 For 
example, the definition of sight is the same for all (viz. a potency to receive visible 
forms), but not all people see the same objects. Likewise, the will generically tends to a 
last end, but not all people tend to the same last end. As to the general aspect of a last 
end, “all agree in desiring the last end: since all desire the fulfillment of their perfec-
tion.”155 Nonetheless, “as to the thing in which this aspect is realized,” not all are “agreed 
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as to their last end: since some desire riches as their consummate good; some, pleasure; 
others, something else.”156  
 Aquinas’s metaphysical logic in defining the will as that which is inclined to a last 
end follows closely with the will’s pairing with the intellect in the intelligent layer of the 
soul. Accordingly, the will’s generic potency is the appetitive corollary, based on the 
metaphysical convertibility of being and goodness outlined above, to the intellect’s uni-
versal apprehensive power. As the intellect is an apprehensive potency for the unitary in-
telligibility of being, so is the will an appetitive potency for the unitary goodness of be-
ing, the good of every good, and thus the end of all other ends. Expressed differently, 
even though the will inevitably “tends to individual things,”157 just as the intellect tries to 
understand individual beings, it “tends to them under the common ratio of goodness [co-
gnoscit universalem rationem boni],”158 just as the intellect understands things according 
to the common ratio of truth. To be sure, Aquinas affirms that there are distinguishable 
“series” within the will’s seeking of the last end, which thereby have penultimate inten-
tions and ends,159 but he nonetheless insists that all of these are defined in reference to the 
last end. For the end of one series is the beginning of another,160 unless of course that end 
is coincident the last end in which the appetite permanently rests.161 
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On more than one occasion, Aquinas extends this parallel between the intelligent 
apprehensive and appetitive powers by comparing the will’s intrinsic inclination toward a 
last end to the inclusion of the first principles within the light of the active intellect: 
[A]s the intellect of necessity adheres to the first principles, the will must of ne-
cessity adhere to the last end, which is happiness: since the end is in practical mat-
ters what the principle is in speculative matters. For what befits a thing naturally 
and immovably must be the root and principle of all else appertaining thereto, 
since the nature of a thing is the first in everything, and every movement arises 
from something immovable.162 
 
As already suggested, the conclusion that follows from this parallel has significant impli-
cations for a theological account of human freedom: even though human beings can mis-
takenly seek their last end in something other than God, indeed this is the essence of mor-
tal sin,163 they cannot turn away from intending a last end that generically ties together all 
of the will’s particular acts and affections. As Aquinas writes in ST I-II.I.6:   
Everything that [a human being] desires [appetit], he necessarily desires for the 
sake of the last end [...] because whatever a [human being] desires, he desires it 
under the aspect of good. And if he desires it, not as his perfect good, which is the 
last end, he must, of necessity, desire it as tending to the perfect good, because the 
beginning of anything is always ordained to its completion; as is clearly the case 
in effects both of nature and art. 
 
Just like the intellect’s natural potency for intelligible truth, the will’s natural potency for 
a last end is tied, not to any of the perverse and often baffling ways that human beings 
actualize this potency, but rather to the indelibility of the Creator’s efficient and final 
causality. As Aquinas provocatively argues, a creature cannot alter this aspect of the will 
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any more than it can change the definition of its eyes as something that apprehends the 
visible or the intellect as that which apprehends the true.164  
 The subtlety of Aquinas’s claim here almost invites any number of misunder-
standings. For example, he is not saying that a person always “thinks about” a last end in 
order to adjudicate her volitional dilemmas and choices. He explicitly denies this.165 Nor 
he is saying that everyone’s will is somehow always, even unconsciously, desiring God. 
He denies this as well,166 despite the fact that God is in fact the only “object” that “entire-
ly satisfies” the human will.167 Rather, what he is saying is far more perceptive in its grasp 
of human nature and wide-ranging in its implications. According to Aquinas, the will in-
herently drives toward a happiness that consists in an intensive appetitive unity defined 
by the genus of a last end, first through the affective union of intention and then through a 
real union of conjunction. In the lived interim, the “middle space [media]” between inten-
tion and conjunction,168 the will seeks to realize this intensive unity by trying to arrange, 
or ordain, all of its acts toward that single last end.169 Even if a human being has indeed 
mistakenly specified a good other than God (e.g. power, wealth, honor, or sensitive 
pleasures) as the source of its perfect happiness, and even if that substituted good could 
never permanently satisfy the will (which is inevitably the case), the will nonetheless still 
impels all of its acts in relation to this last end. The substantive claim is, of course, entire-
ly Augustinian, even if Aquinas expresses it from within a much more metaphysically 
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refined anthropology: whatever the will desires, it desires in reference to and as a useful 
means (uti) toward the last end, which alone is sought after and enjoyed (frui) for itself.  
 Despite the fact that Aquinas clearly affirms that the will’s potency for a last end 
can be sinfully specified toward a created (i.e. non-universal) good, it is noteworthy that 
he spends almost no time analyzing how a person wills a mistaken last end or how anoth-
er might “switch” between the intention of one last end to another. Instead, Aquinas is 
usually content to speak in descriptive, passive or negative terms. Descriptively, he simp-
ly states that some people do in fact desire other things as their consummate and perfect 
good.170 Passively, he speaks, as he does in ST I-II.1.7.ad1, of “turning away” from the 
true last end and “mistakenly seeking” other ends in its place: “Those who sin turn from 
[avertuntur ab] that in which their last end really consists: but they do not turn away from 
the intention of the last end, which intention they mistakenly seek [quaerunt falso] in 
other things.” Negatively, he is particularly adamant in insisting on that which willing a 
last end can never be, namely a matter of free-will and choice: “The last end is in no way 
a matter of choice [nullo modo sub electione].”171 This is due to the fact that the act of 
choosing proximate ends always presupposes a last end according to which they are or-
dained and judged to be desirable.172 
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 In lieu of an explicit explanation from Aquinas on this front, two reasons for this 
relative silence seem likely. First, as an evil act, indeed the paradigmatic evil act, the vo-
litional turning away from one’s last end in the perfect goodness of God, and thereby re-
placing it with some “mutable good,”173 is definitionally dependent on the only genuinely 
universal good that nonetheless still defines the potency of the will. This fact predisposes 
Aquinas to use only descriptive, passive, and negative rhetoric for speaking of these acts 
in themselves. Second, Aquinas considers the true last end of human beings, namely un-
ion with the divine essence, to be something that the human will can only intend through 
the preceding causation of a grace (viz. gratia gratum faciens) that “ordains a human be-
ing immediately to a union with their last end.”174 For only by grace, can the disorder of 
the human will be reordered to the last end in which their happiness truly consists. Again, 
this fact likely inclines Aquinas to consider in much more detail the fact of the human 
will’s natural potency for enjoying our true last end, then he is in trying to explain our 
tragic shuffling between the imposters we set up in its stead. 
 Nonetheless, the essential point for us remains Aquinas’s repeated contention that 
the will’s inclination to order all of its appetitive acts in relation to the last end of perfect 
happiness is coincident with its natural potency and definition. Through this inclination, 
the will impels a human being to seek an intensive appetitive unity preliminarily defined 
in the intention of a last end and permanently forged in the possession of that end. Apart 
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from this generic potency, the will desires nothing; according to its specific determina-
tion, the will desires everything that it contingently desires as a means to that end. For 
everything that a human being desires, she “necessarily desires for the sake of the last 
end.”175 
b. Choosing the Means: Reason and the Will’s Proximate Objects of Desire 
On the basis of its proper act of willing a last end, the will derivatively proceeds to its 
second act: moving all the other powers of the soul, except the vegetative powers because 
they operate apart from reason and apprehension, to their respective acts in the search of 
means to possessing its last end. The will’s capacity to move the other powers instrumen-
tally follows the metaphysical rule briefly cited above: “wherever we have order among a 
number of active powers, that power which regards the universal end moves the powers 
which regard particular ends.”176 Accordingly, as the will is the power whose object is the 
universal end, it is the “agent [that] moves all the powers of the soul to their respective 
acts, except the natural powers of the vegetative part, which are not subject to our will.”177 
Once instigated, this search results in a plethora of apprehended objects that are subject to 
the judgment of reason and free-will’s derivative choices of means to the end. 
  According to Aquinas, any apprehended object, regardless of whether it is sensi-
tively or intelligently apprehended, can become the object of reason’s judgment, free-
will’s choices, and the will’s affections. This is different than the movements of the sensi-
tive appetite, in which the apprehended object must be the sensible good. The ground of 
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this difference is that the free-will is naturally moved by whatever object—be it material, 
imagined, speculative, habitual or practical—that reason ordains to the universal good. 
This universality necessarily entails that the free-will is capable of being moved by a 
much wider range of goods, since—by definition—any object that possesses some degree 
of goodness can generically be “included [comprehensus] in the universal end.”178 Just as 
the intellect is capable of apprehending intelligible forms that includes a potentially infi-
nite number of contingent singulars, so too can the free-will be moved by a potentially 
infinite number of particular goods. 
This diversity of objects can sometimes be obscured by the fact that, in the Prima 
Secundae and Secunda Secundae, Aquinas nearly always envisions external, practical 
objects as his implicit and explicit examples for discussing the interrelatedness of rea-
son’s judgment and free-will’s choices. The nature of these practical objects requires the 
instrumental use of the locomotive powers to either be pursued (e.g. sensitive pleasures), 
performed (e.g. a technical skill or a practical act of virtue),179 or made (e.g. inventions of 
human artifice).180 Nevertheless, Aquinas also occasionally makes it clear that he presup-
poses that certain immanent objects are also subject to reason’s judgment and the will’s 
consent and/or choice. For example, he notes that the are certain immanent goods “with-
out which the end cannot be attained, such as ‘to be’ and ‘to live,’”181 as well as the incli-
nation to self-preservation implied within those goods. For as long as the will’s last end 
includes these goods as necessary means, then the free-will continues to will these as 
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means as well. Similarly, immaterial objects such as intelligible knowledge and the vir-
tues fall under the purview of reason’s judgment as well.182 In fact, Aquinas even explicit-
ly notes that the intellect, which—like all the other powers—is moved by the will as to its 
end,183 can stumble onto a genuine intelligible truth that is then judged as evil, and thus 
hated and rejected, because it “hinders [that person] from gaining the object loved.”184    
 Regardless of the mode of apprehension, however, Aquinas describes five possi-
ble stages of the interrelated response of reason and free-will following an object’s ap-
prehension: counsel, judgment, consent and/or choice, command, and use. These stages 
are “possible” because not every object elicits every stage. For instance, counsel, which 
consists in reason’s comparative inquiry into an object’s suitableness to the last end,185 
only occurs vis-à-vis objects that elicit a degree of “doubt [dubium]”186 regarding their 
relevance to the end. For objects that either have a fixed relation to the end or are of little 
relevance to the end, reason proceeds directly to judgment because there is “no need for 
the inquiry of counsel.”187 
 For objects that do elicit uncertainty, however, the will impels reason to inquire 
into whether an object can be ordained as a means conducive to the will’s intended end.188 
As just suggested, the terminus of this inquiry of counsel is a judgment regarding the ob-
ject as a relative good or evil. As one would expect given that it is the same operative 
power in the soul, reason carries out this inquiry through the same type of process that 
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governs its pursuit of speculative truth: a discursive comparison of all data relevant to 
making a judgment. It draws this data from five basic sources. The first and most im-
portant of these is inherently included in every instigation of counsel: “the end which is 
not the matter of counsel, but is taken for granted as its principle.”189 From this horizon of 
that which is “intended in the future,” reason analytically proceeds through the other rel-
evant data in order to “arrive at that which is to be done at once.”190 In addition to this 
principle of the end, reason also consults the applicable sensory data,191 past experiences 
and memories,192 circumstantial evidence,193 and any relevant general statements drawn 
from the speculative or practical sciences (e.g. the precepts of divine law).194 Based upon 
analyzing these data, reason reaches a decision regarding the relative goodness of the ob-
ject in relation to the end and it declares that evaluation, just as it does in speculative mat-
ters, in the form of a judgment (iudicium). The substance of this judgment renders a par-
ticular good as ordered (or not) to the will’s end. In this way, reason furnishes the will 
with the penultimate version of its proper object: the good as intelligibly ordered and, 
thus, as understood.   
 On the basis of this judgment, reason presents free-will with its object(s) of con-
sent and choice. I consider these two operations of consent and choice together because 
Aquinas describes them as sometimes distinguishable in actuality, while at others only 
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logically.195 What they have in common is that they are both an appetitive response to the 
intelligible species as received from reason’s judgment of an object as good or evil. 
Whereas reason evaluates goods by abstracting, just as it does in the pursuit of specula-
tive knowledge, from the accidental immediacy of an object in order to compare it with 
several sources of data, in consent and choice the will enacts “a certain union” with the 
appetitive object that affectively inclines (or disinclines) the will “to the thing itself.”196  
The potential difference between these two operations, however, is that choice adds an 
additional layer of meaning in a situation when counsel has declared several means as 
conducive to the end. In this circumstance, choice adds a “certain relation to something to 
which something else is preferred,” namely a preference that free-will enacts in choosing 
one suitable good over another.197 When such a collocation of suitable goods is not avail-
able, “then consent and choice do not differ in reality, but only in our way of looking at 
them,” consent as when “we approve of doing that thing” and choice as when “we prefer 
it to those that do not meet with our approval.”198 By definition, however, this additional 
layering of comparison between goods that elicits choice cannot be attributed to any such 
capacity in free-will per se, but rather represents the corresponding appetitive response to 
a higher level judgment between goods that is again furnished by reason.  
Whether the response is categorized as a consent or a choice, Aquinas describes 
the derivative reception of the intelligibility of reason’s judgment as free-will’s inclina-
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tion toward a particular good (or away from an evil) that is formally an act of reason and 
materially an act of the will. As he writes in ST I-II.13.1: 
Now we must observe, as regards the acts of the soul, that an act belonging essen-
tially to some power or habit, receives a form or species from a higher power or 
habit, according as an inferior is ordained by a superior […] Accordingly, that act 
whereby the will tends to something proposed to it as being good, through being 
ordained to the end by the reason, is materially an act of the will, but formally an 
act of the reason. Now in such like matters the substance of the act is as the matter 
in comparison to the order imposed by the higher power. Wherefore choice is 
substantially not an act of the reason but of the will: for choice is accomplished in 
a certain movement of the soul towards the good that is chosen.  
 
When combined with the fact that the will originally moves reason to inquiry in the first 
place, the occurrence of reason’s judgment passing into the will forges a reciprocal loop 
of influence that Aquinas repeatedly draws upon to describe the close relationship be-
tween reasoning and willing:  
When the acts of two powers are ordained to one another, in each of them there is 
something belonging to the other power: consequently each act can be denomi-
nated from either power. Now it is evident that the act of the reason giving direc-
tion as to the means, and the act of the will tending to these means according to 
the reason’s direction, are ordained to one another. Consequently there is to be 
found something of the reason, viz. order, in that act of the will, which is choice: 
and in counsel, which is an act of reason, something of the will—both as matter 
(since counsel is of what man wills to do)—and as motive (because it is from 
willing the end, that man is moved to take counsel in regard to the means).199 
 
By a simple act of volition, the will intends an end according to which it moves all the 
other powers of the soul, including reason; derivatively, by its powers of abstraction and 
comparison, reason moves the will to desire and choose the means ordered to its end. 
 Aquinas extends this formal/material distinction between the will and reason in 
elucidating the relationship between commanding and using. Commanding and using 
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both follow free-will’s choice and jointly represent the actualization of the course of ac-
tion judged to be good by reason and consented to by the will. Even though earlier in the 
Prima Secundae Aquinas also speaks of the will’s capacity as first mover as a kind of 
commanding, in this context he explicitly assigns the act of commanding vis-à-vis the 
means to reason,200 while attributing the actual using of the means to the will’s executive 
power over the other powers.201 His justification for this terminology in this context is 
clear enough and shines through the political and military overtones of Aquinas’s rhetoric 
throughout the Prima Secundae. If the will can be compared to the general that establish-
es the overall goal of an army,202 then reason is the authorized tactician that the general 
employs to formulate specific commands for accomplishing that goal. Once formulated, 
the general then uses both the command and the officers under her power to carry out 
those specific commands. Or as Aquinas puts it: “[I]t is evident that first and principally 
use [uti] belongs to the will as first mover; to the reason, as directing; and to the other 
powers as [instruments] executing the operation.”203 
 Finally, before proceeding to the affections of the will, we should note the im-
portance of the virtue, namely prudence (prudentia), that Aquinas assigns to the rightly 
ordered operation of practical reason—the evidence of which stretches through counsel, 
judgment, consent/choice, command, and use—that yields actions that are genuinely 
morally good. Aquinas divides the virtues into the respective habits of the intelligent ap-
prehensive (i.e. intellectual virtues) and appetitive powers (i.e. moral virtues) that pro-
                                                
200 Ibid., I-II.17.1. 
201 Ibid., I-II.16.1, I-II.16.4, and I-II.17.3. 
202 Ibid., I-II.9.1. 
203 Ibid., I-II.16.1. 
  
  244 
duce human acts that conform to the order of reason204 and, by grace, are ordained to God 
as their last end.205 As the habit that operatively produces right reasoning about things to 
be done,206 prudence is the formal link between the intellectual and moral virtues. For a 
human cannot rightly do anything in the pursuit of her end “unless [her] reason counsel, 
judge and command aright, which is the function of prudence.”207 Thus, just as in general 
the act of reason passes into the act of the will in the form of order, the acts of right rea-
son pass into moral acts of the will in the form of prudential order. Accordingly, pru-
dence “is included in the definition of moral virtue, not as part of its essence, but as 
something belonging by way of participation to all the moral virtues, in so far as they are 
all under the direction of prudence.”208 
c. The Affections of the Will 
Given their metaphysical similarity, it is unsurprising to the find that the will’s affections 
share certain basic structural analogies to the passions of the soul. Like the passions, the 
affections of the will respond to an object as good or evil through the three appetitive 
phases of inclination, movement, and rest. For this reason, Aquinas does not devote a 
separate treatise to the will’s affections, but is instead content to interweave his commen-
tary on them with other discussions explicitly devoted to matters such as the divine will, 
the passions, and a variety of virtues and vices. Their metaphysical overlap with the pas-
sions is reflected in the fact that, once one brings together these references scattered 
throughout the Summa Theologiae, Aquinas names all eleven primary passions of the 
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soul as having homonymous analogues in the will’s affections.209 As with the sensitive 
appetite, the will loves the good, desires it in its absence, rises up in hope, daring, and 
anger against obstacles that are in the way, and enjoys it when possessed, even while de-
rivatively hating, fleeing, shrinking back in despair and fear, and sorrowing over its con-
trary evils.  
Nonetheless, any metaphysical analogy is only useful to the extent that one at-
tends to the differences between the terms under comparison as well as their similarities. 
For our purposes, mentioning three of these differences will sufficiently underline the 
uniqueness of the will’s affections in comparison to the passions of the soul. 
 First, the will’s immateriality entails that there is no accompanying bodily trans-
mutation in its affections as there is in the passions. Instead, the will’s affections are im-
manently concurrent with the “simple movement of the will” itself.210 Aquinas often ac-
cents this relative simplicity of the will’s affections in order to highlight not only their 
comparative uniqueness, but also to further delineate in what way appetitive affections 
can be attributed to the divine and angelic wills as well:211 
Love, concupiscence, and the like can be understood in two ways. Sometimes 
they are taken as passions—arising, that is, with a certain commotion of the soul. 
And thus they are commonly understood, and in this sense they are only in the 
sensitive appetite. They may, however, be taken in another way, as far as they are 
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simple affections without passion or commotion of the soul, and thus they are acts 
of the will. And in this sense, too, they are attributed to the angels and to God.212 
 
Thus, in all of its penultimate affections, the human will’s immaterial simplicity evidenc-
es its created participation in the eternal simplicity of God’s act of willing, as well as its 
teleological determination for a final object of its affection in which the universal good is 
finally and, by definition, simply loved and enjoyed for its own sake. 
 Second, in the will there is no analogous distinction to the division between con-
cupiscible and irascible passions. The metaphysical reason for this is that the universality 
of the will’s object necessarily means that it is only tied to a single appetitive faculty. 
This is because faculties are defined by their formal objects and if a faculty’s object can 
be defined “according to a common idea [rationem communem], there will be no distinc-
tion of faculties according to the diversity of the particular things contained under that 
common idea.”213 Since such universality is foreign to the sense appetite, as it can never 
achieve any order beyond that of a serial aggregate of passions in response to particular 
goods, the formal diversity of its particular objects (e.g. arduous or not) become relevant 
in distinguishing between specific faculties (e.g. concupiscible and irascible) within the 
generic power. However, in the will there is such a common idea—the universal good—
and thus there is no specific distinction to make on the basis of its particular objects. This 
not entail, however, that the notion of an appetitive object being “arduous” is irrelevant to 
the will’s affections. For example, Aquinas explicitly identifies the respective objects of 
the will’s affections of hope and fear as one would expect: the pursuit of an “arduous 
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good”214 and the avoidance of an “arduous evil.”215  It only means that all such specific 
distinctions among the will’s contingent objects are nonetheless generically tied together 
by a common ratio of goodness. 
 Third, Aquinas unequivocally and eloquently argues that the will’s universality 
means that its pleasures are, strictly speaking, “greater” (maiores) than sensible pleas-
ures.216 He defines this superiority according to all three elements required for pleasure: 
“the good which is brought into conjunction, that to which it is conjoined, and the con-
junction itself.”217 As to the conjoined good, the will is capable of enjoying much higher 
and noble goods than any sensible good could ever be. As proof of this, Aquinas cites the 
logic that undergirds the classical spiritual disciplines: people will abstain from sensitive 
goods in order to achieve union with any number of immaterial goods, such as 
knowledge and virtue.218 Second, the intellectual powers’ capacity for assimilating higher 
goods is directly tied to their own metaphysical superiority in comparison to the sensitive 
powers in terms of apprehending and enjoying goods. For instance, in its desire for truth 
the will is inclined to grasping the very principles through which both sensible goods and 
our contingent desire of them can be metaphysically explained. Lastly, and most moving-
ly, there can be a greater pleasure in the will because the mode of intelligible conjunction 
is more intimate, perfect, and enduring. As Aquinas vividly writes regarding the superior-
ity of the intellectual conjunctions that elicits the will’s pleasure:  
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[I]ntellectual conjunction is more intimate, more perfect and more firm. More in-
timate, because the senses stop at the outward accidents of a thing, whereas the in-
tellect penetrates to the essence; for the object of the intellect is “what a thing is.” 
More perfect, because the conjunction of the sensible to the sense implies move-
ment, which is an imperfect act: wherefore sensible pleasures are not perceived all 
at once, but some part of them is passing away, while some other part is looked 
forward to as yet to be realized, as is manifest in pleasures of the table and in sex-
ual pleasures: whereas intelligible things are without movement: hence pleasures 
of this kind are realized all at once. More firm; because the objects of bodily 
pleasure are corruptible, and soon pass away; whereas spiritual goods are incor-
ruptible.219 
 
Expressed another way: the will is intrinsically ordered to the perfection of an eternal 
conjunction that elicits that most intimate and intense pleasure possible for human be-
ings.220 In comparison with this telos, sensitive pleasures, even at their best and most vir-
tuous, are little more than temporary foretastes of an eminent pleasure still to come. 
IV. The Vertical Dynamism Between the Sensitive and Intellective Appetites 
 
With descriptions of the intrinsic ordering of the sensitive and the intellective appetites in 
place, we are now in a position to consider lastly their vertical interrelation, the nature of 
which points toward a distinctly teleological intensive unity found in their operative 
alignment with one another. As I referenced at the opening of the chapter, the overarch-
ing description that Aquinas uses to vertically link these two appetites together is found 
his affirmation that the sense appetite has a natural aptitude to obey universal reason and, 
in so doing, to become “rational by participation.”221 To recall Aquinas’s striking phras-
ing, the sensitive appetite was “born to obey reason,”222 meaning that the sense appetite’s 
telos is to be vertically aligned with the command of right reason as it directs the will in 
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the pursuit of the universal good and the creature’s highest perfection. As Aquinas ex-
plains in ST I-II.24.3:  
For since [a human being’s] good is founded on reason as its root, that good will 
be all the more perfect, according as it extends to more things pertaining [to her]. 
[…] Hence, since the sensitive appetite can obey reason […] it belongs to the per-
fection of moral or human good, that the passions themselves also should be regu-
lated by reason. 
 
Not only does this created trajectory entail that the ordering operations of reason and the 
will include the vertical alignment of the sense appetite, but it also suggests, as we will 
explore in a moment, that the passions have their own horizontal contribution to make in 
the pursuit of and the conjunction with an individual’s last end. 
 In order to describe how this vertical alignment progresses from a natural potency 
to a realized actuality, Aquinas gives sustained attention to the multidimensional influ-
ence that sensitive and intellectual powers mutually have on one another in this dynamic 
process of alignment. His entire account of this interplay is, however, framed by a single 
analogy taken from Aristotle’s Politics that Aquinas draws upon repeatedly for specify-
ing the general kind of ruling power that reason has over the sense appetite.223 This analo-
gy distinguishes two powers of governance that are both present in an individual, one that 
is despotic (and therefore absolute) and another that is political (and therefore admits the 
resistance of free subjects). The example that the analogy gives of despotic rule is that of 
the soul’s power over the body, “because the members of the body cannot in any way re-
sist the sway of the soul.” Instead, “at the soul’s command both hand and foot, and what-
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ever member is naturally moved by voluntary movement, are moved at once.”224 In con-
trast: 
[T]he intellect or reason is said to rule the irascible and concupiscible by a politic 
power: because the sensitive appetite has something of its own, by virtue whereof 
it can resist the commands of reason. For the sensitive appetite is naturally 
moved, not only by the estimative power in other animals, and in man by the 
cogitative power which the universal reason guides, but also by the imagination 
and sense. Whence it is that we experience that the irascible and concupiscible 
powers do resist reason, inasmuch as we sense or imagine something pleasant, 
which reason forbids, or unpleasant, which reason commands.225 
 
Because the sense appetite has its own objects, corporeal organ, physical transmutations, 
and serially reinforced habitual potencies, it is often moved spontaneously to love (or 
hate) certain goods when they are presented to it. This horizontal spontaneity, so to 
speak, cannot—short of God’s grace and providence—simply be commanded away by 
reason instantaneously. For instance, a sense appetite that has been habitually formed to 
love brownies and hate spinach or, more seriously, to love money and hate giving it 
away, will naturally be moved with corresponding passions of love when brownies or a 
money-making opportunity are presented to it. Hence, in these moments the “sensitive 
appetite is aroused suddenly in consequence of an apprehension of the imagination or 
sense” without the command of reason or the consent of the will.226 This degree of hori-
zontal freedom in the sense appetite is intrinsic to it and reason cannot despotically take it 
away. Moreover, if the will unilaterally tries to enforce its desired order, the passions will 
likely break out in rebellion. Here we have the internal principle that explains the fre-
quent, cyclical failure of declarations that attempt to foreswear, by simple volitional fiat, 
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some object of sensitive desire, only to have the corresponding passions inevitably erupt, 
often with new intensity, when that object is presented to it again.  
 Instead of such a directly despotic relationship, Aquinas envisions the intellectual 
powers’ vertical ordering of the passions as something much more akin to an ongoing, 
multi-site round of political negotiation, full of habitual fits and starts and thoroughly ori-
ented toward the long-range (viz. eschatological) end game. This is why Aquinas so often 
speaks of reason’s “moderation” and “regulation” of the passions not as if it thereby re-
presses them, but as a moderator gives much-needed direction to a meeting’s diverse par-
ticipants. Three interlocking fronts of this ongoing appetitive negotiation are particularly 
important for our purposes: (1) the will’s power of consent vis-à-vis the passions, (2) 
universal reason’s therapeutic use of particular reason, and (3) the overflow of virtuous 
acts into the passions. We will consider each of these before closing out the chapter and 
explicitly transitioning to the constructive work of the next two chapters. Before proceed-
ing, however, I will repeat a proviso that has arisen at various points in this chapter, but is 
especially relevant when discussing the passions’ gradual conformation to the order of 
reason: only by grace do the passions become perfectly aligned with reason and the will’s 
virtuous affections for the highest good of God.227 Nonetheless, my concern here is not to 
get distracted by delineating exactly where grace begins and our natural powers end 
(Aquinas would reject this dichotomy anyways), but rather to steadfastly attend to the 
human nature that God graciously reorders228 and the interrelation of two of the natural 
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powers that God either directly moves (e.g. the will) or derivatively heals (e.g. the sensi-
tive appetite) in order to bring about the effects of grace.229  
a. The Will’s Power of Consent 
As briefly referenced above, one of the differences between human beings and non-
intelligent animals is that, under normal circumstances, the sensitive passions cannot 
move any power outside of itself (e.g. the locomotive powers) without the consent of the 
will. As Aquinas writes: 
For in other animals movement follows at once the concupiscible and irascible 
appetites: for instance, the sheep, fearing the wolf, flees at once, because it has no 
superior counteracting appetite. On the contrary, man is not moved at once, ac-
cording to the irascible and concupiscible appetites: but he awaits the command of 
the will, which is the superior appetite. For wherever there is order among a num-
ber of motive powers, the second only moves by virtue of the first: wherefore the 
lower appetite is not sufficient to cause movement, unless the higher appetite con-
sents.230  
 
To his credit, Aquinas does carve out a very narrow space for describing exceptions to 
this operative ordering of the passions to the will’s consent. Despite its narrowness, this 
exception will prove important for us when we turn to explaining several of the patholog-
ical states to which Freud rightly draws our attention. According to Aquinas, this excep-
tion to the will’s power of consent is defined by the instances in which passions such as 
concupiscence, love, or anger are intense enough to “take away the use of reason alto-
gether.”231 Elsewhere, he describes this experience as when someone is “totally absorbed 
by passion [totaliter absorbetur a passione]” and thereby does not “have use of [their] 
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reason.”232 In these circumstances, Aquinas endorses a delicate operative and moral calcu-
lus.233 Generally speaking, Aquinas is willing to say that the passions’ disabling of reason 
renders any resulting action involuntary and thus devoid of moral culpability.234 However, 
if that disablement was preceded and hastened by a voluntary act—e.g. the acts that lead 
to the diminished capacities of drunkenness—the resulting acts are still to be considered 
voluntary and thus subject to moral culpability. Nonetheless, these are the exceptions that 
prove the general rule that, in the vast majority of the circumstances in which human acts 
occur, the sense appetite waits for volitional consent before moving any other powers.  
The fact of this dependence upon consent does not, however, mean that the pas-
sions fail to influence the will. For it is clear, for example, that the immanent prompting 
of sensitive concupiscence “inclines the will to desire the object of concupiscence.”235 
Without this prompting, the will may or may not have been moved by this object at all, 
but once the passion has occurred the will cannot simply ignore the object. Instead, it 
calls upon reason to adjudicate as to whether it should consent to the inclination that re-
sults from the passion’s prompting. If reason exercises prudence in its counsel, judgment, 
and command regarding that passion, then reason moves the will in a manner that is 
commensurate with the contingent actualization and habitual retention of virtue. The con-
tent of such a virtuous judgment can enact any number of responses to the passion. It can 
resist or repel the inclination altogether,236 mitigate its extremes in a virtuous direction 
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(e.g. when immoderate anger can be refocused toward legitimate aims of justice),237 or it 
can concur with the passion’s inclination if the good it proposes is genuinely commensu-
rate with the order of reason.  
One of the surest signs of Aquinas’s commitment to the passions’ teleological in-
clusion in human nature’s perfection is his detailed linking of the passions’ respective 
classifications (viz. concupiscible, irascible, contraries of good/evil and ap-
proach/withdraw) with their ordered perfection in specific virtues. As one would expect, 
he explicates these links between passions and virtues according to commonness of the 
objects implied by the passions. Accordingly, because all the concupiscible passions “fol-
low one another in a certain order, as being directed to the one same thing, viz. the at-
tainment of some good or the avoidance of some evil,”238 they all share a common vir-
tue—temperance (temperantia)—as their perfection according to the order of reason. In 
temperate actions, the will is moved to use or abstain from the sensible pleasures of this 
life to the degree that they are conducive to reaching its last end of perfection.239 Since 
such a common ordering does not exist among the five irascible passions, Aquinas as-
signs a perfecting virtue to each of the contrary pairs and to anger unto itself. Therefore, 
to fear and daring there is the virtue of fortitude (fortitudo) through which the will “firm-
ly and immovably”240 continues to will a good even in the face of a difficult obstacle. To 
hope and despair there is the virtue of magnanimity (magnanimitas) through which the 
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will is inclined toward a good with proper confidence.241 Finally, to anger there is the vir-
tue of meekness (mansuetudo) through which the will aims at removing a present evil 
without overstepping the bounds of justice242 or losing oneself in the vicious fierceness of 
immoderate anger.243 
On the other hand, there is also the distinct possibility that the will enacts its pow-
er of consent by allowing itself to be led astray into a sin, which is derivatively habitually 
reinforced in vices. Aquinas is clear that the sensitive passions cannot ever “move the 
will directly.”244 Instead, the passions can “indirectly” move the will by weakening any 
resolve it might have through the “distraction” of their inordinate intensity such that 
eventually reason simply gives its endorsement of judgment to that which is sensitively 
proposed.245 Here we have the familiar inversion of powers that is characteristic of an 
Augustinian account of sin. As Aquinas writes of the particular distinction of an imagined 
pleasure:  
[F]or […] we observe that those who are in some kind of passion, do not easily 
turn their imagination away from the object of their emotion, the result being that 
the judgment of the reason often follows the passion of the sensitive appetite, and 
consequently the will’s movement follows it also, since it has a natural inclination 
always to follow the judgment of the reason.  
 
In parallel fashion to the virtues described above, Aquinas similarly assigns particular 
generic sins to the different kinds of passions. To the natural objects of the concupiscible 
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passions, there are sins resulting from the “concupiscence of the flesh,” namely the inor-
dinate desire for food, drink, and sex. To the non-natural objects of the concupiscible 
passion, there are the sins resulting from the “concupiscence of the eyes,” through which 
we inordinately desire “money, apparel, and the like.” And: to the arduous objects of the 
irascible passions, there are the sins of pride, through which we inordinately desire diffi-
cult objects solely for the sake of our own excellence.246 
b. Universal Reason’s Therapeutic Use of Particular Reason 
The last two fronts of the appetitive negotiation name the respective ways that reason and 
the will can actually influence and, to a certain extent, reform the shape of the passions in 
themselves. Again, both of these avenues of “therapeutic” influence will prove significant 
for us when we turn to translating the type of therapeutic “cure” that Freudian psychoa-
nalysis touches upon and, in some sense, genuinely discovers for the first time. Universal 
reason’s avenue for initiating such therapeutic influence occurs through its capacity to 
instrumentally use the evaluative power of particular reason within the sensitive layer of 
the soul. As the higher power, universal reason can guide particular reason in an effort to 
reshape its intentions, and derivatively the passions that it thereby elicits, according to the 
order of its higher reason. Aquinas describes the grounds of this possibility in ST I.83.1: 
Wherefore in [a human being] the sensitive appetite is naturally moved by […] 
particular reason. But this same particular reason is naturally guided and moved 
according to the universal reason: wherefore in syllogistic matters particular con-
clusions are drawn from universal propositions. Therefore it is clear that the uni-
versal reason directs the sensitive appetite, which is divided into concupiscible 
and irascible; and this appetite obeys it.  
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For example, universal reason’s access to the intellect’s knowledge of the necessity ex-
pressed in the divine law that forbids adultery might enable it to guide particular reason 
to reevaluate an opposing erotic passion elicited by the attractive presence of another per-
son.247 Despite not often speaking about this possibility in great detail in the Summa, 
Aquinas considers this therapeutic function of universal reason to be self-evident not only 
on the logical basis of its superior place in the soul, but also on the experiential basis that 
makes an appeal like this both possible and plausible: “Anyone can experience this in 
[herself]: for by applying certain universal considerations, anger or fear or the like may 
be modified or excited.”248 
c. The Overflow of Virtuous Acts into the Passions 
Finally, Aquinas reserves the last front of interaction between the appetites for the influ-
ence that the will’s own acts can have upon the passions. Whereas the two fronts de-
scribed above depend most obviously on reason’s moderation of the passions, here we 
have an avenue through which the intellective appetite can cause a movement in the sen-
sitive appetite that aligns and chimes with its own acts. The chief way that the will can 
affect the sense appetite in this manner is simply by being intensely and virtuously moved 
to a good object. Whenever it is so moved, the will’s affections overflow (redundantia) 
as a kind of redundancy, as the word suggests, into the movements of the passions. As 
Aquinas writes, “[W]hen the higher part of the soul is intensely moved to anything, the 
lower part also follows that movement: and thus the passion that results in consequence, 
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in the sensitive appetite, is a sign of the intensity of the will, and so indicates greater 
moral goodness.”249 Aquinas punctuates this claim that ordered passions positively con-
tribute to moral goodness by extending it to the wider claim that a volitional choice of a 
good that has no concomitant movement of ordered passion actually falls short a virtuous 
action. For example, continent actions, in which reason successfully resists inordinate 
passions in order to move the will toward right action, fall short of being virtuous because 
they are not joined by passions that are likewise perfected in being “conformable to rea-
son.”250 Such actions are only made perfect in the virtue of chastity, in which no inordi-
nate passions arise in the first place because the appetites are aligned in their inclina-
tions.251 Accordingly, “the more perfect the virtue, the more it causes passion.”252 
 In addition, this overflow from the will’s rectitude can also contribute over time to 
the reordering of the passions’ beyond its “downward” redundancy in a single volitional 
action. The result of this reordering is a gradual habitual formation of the passions toward 
movements in conformity with reason and virtue. In other words, virtue “produces ordi-
nate passions.”253 Hence, even though the virtues themselves are in the reason and the 
will, Aquinas affirms that the overflow of these virtues make possible the passions’ de-
rivative participation in these habits: 
Because an act, which proceeds from one power according as it is moved by an-
other power, cannot be perfect, unless both powers be well disposed to the act: for 
instance, the act of a craftsman cannot be successful unless both the craftsman and 
his instrument be well disposed to act. Therefore in the matter of the operations of 
the irascible and concupiscible powers, according as they are moved by reason, 
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there must needs be some habit perfecting in respect of acting well, not only the 
reason, but also the irascible and concupiscible powers. And since the good dispo-
sition of the power which moves through being moved, depends on its conformity 
with the power that moves it: therefore the virtue which is in the irascible and 
concupiscible powers is nothing else but a certain habitual conformity of these 
powers to reason.254 
 
As this passage suggests, this ordered formation of the passions enables them to become, 
in a secondary sense, a principle for virtuous acts. For if reason judges a passion to be 
ordinate, then the will can “[choose] to be affected by a passion in order to work more 
promptly with the cooperation of the sensitive appetite.”255 Similarly, if the sense appetite 
is already habitually disposed toward virtuous actions, then “it helps towards the execu-
tion of reason’s command” as one eager and receptive to the order.256  
From Aquinas’s perspective, this overflow from the will to the passions is neither 
random nor accidental. Rather, it is an experiential corollary of the metaphysical axiom 
that the operations of the higher powers of the soul generically and executively perfect 
the operation of the lower powers. Hence, the greater pleasures and joys of the intellectu-
al powers inevitably redound to the sensitive appetite by either diminishing its sorrows257 
or perfecting its pleasures through its participation in them. As one likely anticipates, 
Aquinas considers every temporal experience of this vertical dynamism as a penultimate 
taste of that which will be perfected in the intensive appetitive alignment that will re-
dound to every power of the soul in the ultimate happiness of union with God. For, as 
Aquinas writes, “from the happiness of the soul there will be an overflow to the body, so 
                                                
254 Ibid., I-II.56.4. 
255 Ibid., I-II.24.3. 
256 Ibid., I-II.59.2.ad3. 
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that this too will obtain its perfection.”258 Or, as he adds in a fitting quotation of Augus-
tine, “God gave the soul such a powerful nature that from its exceeding fullness of happi-
ness the vigor of incorruption overflows into the lower nature.”259 
In specifying the exact nature of the teleological form of this intensive unity that 
redounds to an individual intelligently united to God, Aquinas completes his remedial 
transposition of Augustine’s basic insight regarding the wide-ranging character of the dif-
ferent ways in which human beings can deficiently reflect the eminent intensity of God’s 
eternal simplicity. For these similitudes frame our existence from its most primal mo-
ments (i.e. the actuality of souls), to the penultimate occurrence in self-knowledge and 
virtuous appetitive acts, and finally in the ultimate telos of our intended union with God. 
For just as God wills the singular good of God’s goodness by willing into existence the 
multiple goods of creation (exitus), so too are those who are made in God’s image created 
to negotiate the multiplicity of creation’s participated goods by willing the singular end 
of God’s goodness as their own highest good (reditus). Put differently: by loving and en-
joying God forever, the imago Dei is finally and fully intensively fulfilled in us as well. 
For, “[W]e shall be like him because we shall see him as he is.”260   
V. Conclusion: Summarizing and Outlining a Gap 
 
As was done last chapter as well, I conclude here with a retrospective summary and the 
outline of a gap in Aquinas’s account of the appetites that points to the conceptual place 
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into which I will describe the link between a discrete identifying layer of the soul and the 
theorization of egoic self-consciousness as a fourth type of intensive unity. 
Drawing upon last chapter’s description of Aquinas’s understanding of the primal 
unity of soul and reclassification of self-knowledge as a derivative higher-level intensive 
unity, this chapter shows how he successfully distinguishes a third type of intensive unity 
in terms of a vertical alignment of the appetites in relation to goods apprehended by the 
intellect, virtuously ordered by reason, and ardently loved/enjoyed by the will. In the pro-
cess, Aquinas ends up fully solving Augustine’s circular dilemma by successfully order-
ing three types of intensive unity—primal, epistemic, and teleological—each of which 
bears in its own way a deficient similitude to the eternal simplicity of God as the eminent, 
reflective, and amorous unity of all truth. Moreover, the terms of this solution are embed-
ded within a detailed theological anthropology in which he precisely describes a diversity 
of epistemic and appetitive powers that are simultaneously unique in their horizontal 
principles, vertically related in their ends, and metaphysically analogous in their respec-
tive operations.  
 In order to show how Aquinas accomplishes all of this, I proceeded by sequential-
ly outlining the horizontal principles of the appetites and then their vertical interrelation. 
Accordingly, the first part of the chapter summarized Aquinas’s general metaphysics of 
the appetite, in which he defines the appetite as that which seeks the creature’s perfection 
by being moved toward apprehended goods (or away from evils) and rests therein when 
those goods are possessed. Once moved, the appetite’s proper acts emerge as affections 
(e.g. love/hate, desire/aversion, pleasure/pain) that prompt the creature through the three 
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appetitive phases of inclination, movement, and rest. The second and third parts of the 
chapter then expanded upon this general metaphysic by describing Aquinas’s account of 
the respective operations of the sensitive appetite, which is moved by the sensible good 
as judged by particular reason, and the intellective appetite, which is primarily moved to 
the last end of the universal good and secondarily to any good that reason judges to be 
useful as a means to that end. Based upon these descriptions, the fourth part of the chap-
ter then showed how the intensive alignment of the appetites can gradually occur through 
the vertically-ordering capacities of the intellectual powers, specifically the will’s power 
of consent, universal reason’s therapeutic use of particular reason, and the overflow of 
virtuous acts into the passions.  
 Having finished this narration of Aquinas’s multifaceted solution to Augustine’s 
circular dilemma, along with the metaphysical framework and theological anthropology 
in which it is embedded, we are finally in a position to turn to Freud’s analogously circu-
lar dilemma in his narration of how egoic self-consciousness emerges and particularly the 
role of primary identification in that process. In making this transition, however, it will 
again be helpful to name a gap in Aquinas’s account of the appetites that will prove con-
structively significant moving forward. If last chapter I named a gap that endures in 
Aquinas’s anthropology having to do the intensive unity “of the self” that precedes the 
intelligent unions of knower/known, here the analogous gap is related to Aquinas’s un-
derdevelopment of the role that particular self-knowledge can play in reason’s therapeutic 
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and teleological reordering of the passions.261 This underdevelopment is partly due to the 
fact that Aquinas simply does not spend much time developing universal reason’s thera-
peutic role vis-à-vis the passions. However, in the passages when he does speak of it, he 
regularly pays almost no attention to the necessity of an act of self-knowledge, a judg-
ment or insight into oneself, to proceed from reason’s consultation of universal 
knowledge in order to make it applicable to the contingency of one’s own passions.  
For example, in his most sustained discussion—in ST I.81.3—of universal rea-
son’s influence on the passions, which I quoted at length above, Aquinas skips right from 
reason’s consultation of universal knowledge to its (re)direction of particular reason: 
“[P]articular reason is naturally guided and moved according to the universal reason: 
wherefore in syllogistic matters particular conclusions are drawn from universal proposi-
tions. Therefore it is clear that the universal reason directs the sensitive appetite […] and 
this appetite obeys it.” Presumably the type of practical syllogism that Aquinas has in 
mind would run like this: 
 1. The divine law forbids all acts of theft 
 2. This passion inclines my will toward an act of thievery 
 3. This passion should be modified and/or resisted 
 
The second proposition is an act of particular self-knowledge and judgment, an act in 
which the intelligible pattern of one’s own appetitive desire becomes illuminated by the 
backdrop of the universally necessary. The importance of this act of self-knowledge is 
underlined by the fact that without it universal reason’s direction of particular reason 
would never occur. Again without pausing over it, Aquinas confirms this observation 
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own immanent acts, both sensitive and intelligent. 
  
  264 
when trying to make sense of the experiential fact that, as he puts it, “many [people] act 
contrary to the knowledge they have.”262 Why does this occur? Because there is no deduc-
tive judgment about oneself, one’s passion(s), and one’s circumstance that corresponds in 
the intelligible particular to that which is known universally. Aquinas cites the example 
of fornication:  
It may happen, then, that a man has some knowledge in general, e.g. that no forni-
cation is lawful, and yet he does not know in particular that this act, which is for-
nication, must not be done; and this suffices for the will not to follow the univer-
sal knowledge of the reason.263 
 
The point stands vis-à-vis any attempt to discern the shape of one’s passions in the hope 
of redirecting their immediacy to higher ends and unities—whether that end be theologi-
cal or not. Such appetitive (re)direction logically depends on a rational self-judgment that 
moves the will and, derivatively—according to the terms of negotiation described 
above—the passions as well.  
 Another factor in Aquinas’s overall inattention to this function of self-knowledge 
can be found in his general disinclination to place much weight in particular self-
knowledge at all. This is, in large part, the tail the drags behind his displacement of Au-
gustine’s insistence on the centrality of the “self’s” primal knowledge of itself. From an 
Aristotelian perspective, self-knowledge comes in many different flavors,264 none of 
which are important enough to be the kind of anchor to the self that Augustine imagines it 
to be. Still, in addition to the experiential data that push us in the same direction, the pas-
sages in which Aquinas implicitly addresses the importance of particular self-knowledge 
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are suggestive enough to inspire a corresponding creative expansion without, of course, 
seeking to reinstate any kind of primal epistemic unity of the self. Instead, it would be yet 
another transposition of a basic Augustinian insight onto the refined and rich metaphysi-
cal soil of Aquinas’s theological anthropology.  
Perhaps the greatest hurdle in carrying out this expansion, however, is the way 
that the Aristotelian system predisposes Aquinas to leave behind an ambiguity between 
the desire for knowing the intelligible particular (including oneself) versus the desire for 
knowing the intelligible universal. As Pierre Rousselot suggests in his brilliant study, 
L’intellectualisme de saint Thomas, this ambiguity endures in Aquinas because the terms 
of Aristotle’s definitions for apprehension limits knowledge of the particular to the senses 
and knowledge of the universal to the intellect.265 The Aristotelian axiom that “sensation 
is of particulars, while knowledge is of universals”266 always looms large in Aquinas’s 
thought. The result of this ambiguity is a consistent denial that the knowledge of intelli-
gible particulars has any place in the perfection of human intelligence. Rousselot does not 
mince words in his declaration that in this regard Aquinas allowed himself to be “duped 
by the ambiguity of the old formula, ‘scientia est de universali,’” solely on the basis of 
Aristotle’s authority.267 To be sure, Aquinas’s point is that any intelligible knowledge of 
an individual is an act, not of the intellect itself, but of reason’s discursive judgment that 
presupposes some grasp of a repeating pattern that forms the universal basis from which 
such deductive reasoning can take place. Hence knowledge of singulars is not, strictly 
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speaking, a part of the created intellect’s perfection,268 even though it is necessarily part 
of God’s eminent intelligence in which the divine grasp of the universal includes in itself 
exhaustive knowledge of all singulars.269 
Still, Rousselot is right that there is a lingering gap here in Aquinas regarding the 
grasp of the intelligible particular and its potential therapeutic role vis-à-vis the passions. 
Perhaps the most glaring aspect of this gap is Aquinas’s assertion that the created desire 
to know has no trace of interest in knowing something of the immanent qualities of an 
individual (whether of oneself or another): 
The natural desire of the rational creature is to know everything that belongs to 
the perfection of the intellect, namely, the species and the genera of things and 
their types […] But to know other singulars, their thoughts and their deeds does 
not belong to the perfection of the created intellect nor does its natural desire go 
out to these things.270 
 
To his credit, Rousselot significantly critiques this functional gap in Aquinas’s account of 
intelligence even while making it clear that it nothing like a fatal flaw; rather Aquinas’s 
accounts of intelligent knowledge and desire can be extended in order to include eloquent 
descriptions for how particular self-knowledge can become the apprehensive principle for 
a vertical reordering of desire, practical self-representation (e.g. verbal and artistic), and 
the intimate self-sharing between individuals (e.g. therapist/analysand, friends, and/or 
lovers). For in these acts, all of which are of keen interest to the aims of Freudian psy-
choanalysis and its putative “curing” of certain forms of desire—to which we now turn—
intelligence displays the degree to which “it strives to grasp,” as Rousselot rightly con-
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cludes, “as perfectly as it can—in art, in history, in life—the intimate harmony of compo-
site individuals.”271 
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Chapter 4 
The Ego and the Identifying Part of the Soul: 
Translating Freud Via Aquinas’s Solution 
 
The last three chapters have set before us an Augustinian dilemma and a Thomist solu-
tion. As I have repeated often, the dilemma is how to relate different types of intensive 
unity as a way of tying together the open-ended trajectory of human existence: a primal 
unity of the soul, the epistemic unities characteristic of self-knowledge, and a teleological 
unity that is progressively forged as our appetites are vertically aligned toward God as 
our highest good and last end. The Thomist metaphysical solution to this dilemma, which 
I have endorsed with minor qualifications, turns on the formal unity of existence attribut-
able to the soul and the progressive actualization, as well as the vertical perfection of, the 
soul’s paired apprehensive and appetitive potencies. The most significant qualifications 
to this endorsement have come in the form of the two explanatory gaps in Aquinas’ theo-
logical anthropology that emerge along with this solution: (1) the degree to which he does 
not directly address Augustine’s concern as to what intensive unity “of the self” precedes 
the intelligent unions of knower/known, even as he rightly dissociates self-knowledge 
from this particular type of intensive unity; and (2) the lack of weight that he gives to the 
potential therapeutic value of particular self-knowledge in vertically ordering the pas-
sions.  
As I have made clear throughout, my purpose in narrating this dilemma and solu-
tion is to use this sequence from theology’s history in order to address the analogous rid-
dle, which we first narrated in the Introduction through the examples of Kant, Fichte, 
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Hölderlin/Novalis, and Schleiermacher, regarding the origins and theological significance 
of egoic self-consciousness as a specific kind of intensive unity that precedes the epis-
temic unions characteristic of intelligence. Making this constructive bridge will be the 
enterprise begun in this chapter and concluded next chapter. The linchpin for this con-
structive trajectory, the link that makes this leap between intellectual eras possible, is the 
task that stands before us in this chapter: a constructive translation of the psychoanalytic 
account of the pre-reflective origins of the ego (das Ich) and Freud’s associated discovery 
of what he calls “primary identification.” This translation, as I have said before, will be 
made possible by using Augustine’s dilemma and Aquinas’s solution as a lens through 
which to retrieve Freud’s genuine insights regarding human nature from his reductive 
presuppositions and his often glaring lack of rhetorical consistency and/or philosophical 
clarity. Based upon this translation, we will then make the constructive case in Chapter 5 
that egoic self-consciousness contingently arises as an act of primary identification with 
our sensing bodies, the nature of which can be understood as a fourth type of intensive 
unity: one that unconsciously founds the “subject” and thereby precedes the higher opera-
tions of intelligence as a necessary vertical preamble. 
The initial point of overlap between the discourses that are being bridged here 
takes shape in the fact that in Freud’s metapsychology we find another iteration of the 
reflection theory that is analogous to Augustine’s dilemma. This iteration occurs on the 
ground of Freud’s distinctive theorization of the instinctual and libidinal (viz. erotic) ori-
gins of the ego. Where Augustine inconsistently alternates between an always already 
realized epistemic unity of the self and a temporal dawning of this unity in discrete acts 
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of reflective self-knowledge, Freud similarly oscillates between an egoic self-awareness 
that grounds the libidinal desire for a sexual object and an insistence that the ego’s self-
awareness actually emerges out of a prior period of development in which the individual 
and other objects are intensively fused together in what he calls a bond (Bindung) of 
identification. My primary constructive aim is not, however, to prove in detail the cogen-
cy of this parallel. Rather, its purpose is to demonstrate the conceptual clarity that accrues 
to Freud’s original insights when Aquinas’s solution to Augustine’s dilemma is applied in 
the psychoanalytic context. As Aquinas’s transposition of Augustine’s insights onto dif-
ferent metaphysical soil served to deepen their significance, my purpose here is to carry 
out a similar translation of Freud’s anthropological insights into a conceptual framework 
that actually extends the scope of their explanatory precision.  
Overall, there will be three steps to this constructive translation, the first two of 
which will be completed sequentially in this chapter in the two sections that follow. First, 
I will begin by describing the contradictions that appear in Freud’s theory of the ego’s 
origins in light of the oscillation described above between a primal, egoic self-awareness 
and the fusions of primary identification that precede the ego’s formation. In addition to 
this main thread of argument, I will also note an important clue for understanding the na-
ture of primary identification that occurs in the midst of this vacillation. This clue con-
sists in Freud’s inability to discuss the origins of the ego’s self-differentiation without 
relying on rhetoric that implies a native hypnotic capacity and suggestibility operative in 
every individual. Second, I turn to the specific task of applying Aquinas’s theory of the 
soul and its powers to these contradictions in an attempt to explain more satisfactorily the 
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basic anthropological phenomena to which Freudian psychoanalysis rightly draws atten-
tion (e.g. the ego’s fragility and the potential of its pathological “collapse,” identification 
and its crucial relation to infancy, the unconscious and its compulsion to repeat, hypnotic 
states, and dreams/hallucinations).  
As I have frequently signaled, the constructive proposal that emerges from this 
investigation is that Freud stumbles upon a set of operations that can be plausibly de-
scribed as another layer of the soul, complete with its own apprehensive and appetitive 
powers. We will call this the identifying layer of the soul. Setting forth a description of 
the distinctive operations of these powers will form the conceptual foundation that I will 
build upon next chapter in taking the third and final step in this transposition by incorpo-
rating this discussion with the wider question of the origins and theological significance 
of self-consciousness and the vertically dependent operations of intelligence. As we will 
see shortly, the key insight that brings the identifying layer of the soul into focus arrives 
in the formulation of an unconscious apprehensive power of identification in which cer-
tain sensitive acts are perceived—or radically received—in an immediate fusion with the 
individual in a manner that eludes the subject/object division. As I will describe it later 
on, these sensitive acts are perceived qua perceiver, which is an operation most clearly 
glimpsed in the radical receptivity—i.e. the inability to differentiate “me” from “that”—
evident in the object-relations of the womb, early infancy, deep hypnosis, and in the ex-
perience of especially traumatic events.  
Before proceeding, however, two methodological notes are in order. First, alt-
hough Freud will be my main interlocutor throughout the length of this chapter, in each 
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of these sections I will also incorporate several crucial insights from the post-Freudian 
psychoanalytic theorist Julia Kristeva in order to emend Freud’s theory of primary identi-
fication in directions that will prove constructively important both in this chapter and the 
next. The most important of these insights will come from Kristeva’s unrivaled insistence 
that the most archaic and archetypical “pre-objectal”1 relation undoubtedly occurs in 
utero, in the pleasurable pre-reflective stasis in which “the child and the mother do not 
yet constitute ‘two.’”2 For in the womb, more than anywhere else, do we have a fused 
state of existence in which there is “neither subject nor object.”3 For this reason, in my 
constructive extension of Freud, I will theorize that the most archaic identificatory bond 
of all inevitably occurs in relation to what Kristeva calls the “maternal body.”4 The sud-
den rupture of the active stasis of this in utero bond marks both the dawn of post-partum 
life and—precisely because it separates us from a kind of intensive unity we were created 
to desire—the inauguration of pain as well. 
Second, Freud does not systematically differentiate, as I have proposed to do 
since the Introduction, between phenomenal consciousness, made up of the first-order 
perceptual processes characteristic of sensitive acts (both apprehensive and appetitive), 
and self-consciousness as an immanent awareness added to those baseline processes. In-
stead, Freud almost exclusively works with a general notion of consciousness (and its in-
verse, unconsciousness) and tends to reserve references to self-consciousness to instances 
                                                
1 Julia Kristeva, Pouvoirs de l’horreur: essai sur l’abjection (Paris: Seuil, 1980), 17 (ET: Powers of Hor-
ror: An Essay on Abjection, trans. Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 10). 
2 Histoires d’amour (Paris: Denoël, 1983), 45 (ET: Tales of Love, trans. Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Co-
lumbia University Press, 1987), 40).  
3 Pouvoirs de l’horreur, 9 (Powers of Horror, 1). 
4 Cf. Histoires d’amour, 225-47 (Tales of Love, 234-63).   
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when he is citing the work of other theorists5 and/or his inability or unwillingness to en-
gage the philosophical distinction.6 
However, in what follows I assume that there is a meaningful overlap between 
Freud’s discussion of the ego’s self-differentiated consciousness and what I have pro-
posed to discuss under the conceptual banner of self-consciousness. This is primarily be-
cause it is relatively easy to detect in Freud’s writings the functional distinction between 
phenomenal consciousness and self-consciousness. Freud seems to have in mind some-
thing coterminous with phenomenal consciousness when he speaks of certain individual 
processes—e.g. the external senses, pain/pleasure—that have a conscious quality to them. 
As we will see, Freud calls this conscious quality that of having an “internal perception” 
(Wahrnehmung).7 Those that do not have this quality—e.g. the instincts and the ego-
ideal—are inversely considered “unconscious” in their operation, despite the fact that 
they may produce effects of which we are conscious. On the other hand, Freud seems to 
have in mind something coterminous with self-consciousness when he is specifically 
talking about the ego’s self-integrating organization of mental processes as an organized 
whole. As Freud writes in The Ego and the Id (1923), “[I]n each individual there is a co-
herent organization of mental processes; and we call this his ego. It is to this ego that 
consciousness is attached.”8 Again, to recall a point I made in detail in the Introduction, 
the crucial difference between these two types of consciousness is that phenomenal con-
sciousness can be theorized as existing apart from self-consciousness. In a pre-self-
                                                
5 E.g. Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams, SA 2:81, 103, 111/SE 4:58, 82, 90. 
6 E.g. Freud, “On Narcissism: An Introduction,” SA 3:64, n.3/SE 14:98, n. 1. 
7 As we have noted previously, it will be important in all that follows to distinguish carefully between a 
conscious operation and a conscious effect produced by an unconscious operation. 
8 Freud, The Ego and the Id, SA 3:286/SE 19:17.  
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conscious state, it would simply yield a bare flux of sensible data in which neither subject 
or objects are perceived/known with any degree of synthetic unity or differentiation. 
Maintaining this distinction in our reading of Freud will prove rather decisive. This is be-
cause it is in this phenomenal state prior to egoic self-differentiation—generally charac-
teristic of the earliest stages of infancy—that the fusions of primary identification pro-
duce effects within the individual that, as Freud writes in a phrase that will prove deci-
sive, are exceptionally “general and lasting”9 in their subsequent habitual repetitions.   
I. Freud’s Dilemma: The Ego’s Formation, Identification, and the Specter of Hypnosis 
 
In this section, my goal is to trace two interrelated threads in Freud’s metapsychology, 
both of which I referenced above: (1) the dilemma that Freud faces in theorizing the 
emergence of the ego in relation to his foundational commitment to the sexual etiology of 
all psychic development and (2) Freud’s inability to make sense of the ego’s contingent 
formation, and in addition its role in the psychoanalytic “cure,” without relying on rheto-
ric that implies a native hypnotic capacity and suggestibility in human beings. In my 
judgment, it is not a coincidence that the signs of this second thread tend to show up right 
at the places where Freud finds himself most conceptually challenged in theorizing the 
ego’s origins. Most often, as we will see, this rhetoric appears in Freud’s repeated em-
ployment of the concept of “identification” (Identifizeirung) to explain the ego’s for-
mation and his descriptions of the therapeutic centrality of transference (Übertragung) 
within the analytic relation between the patient and the analyst. When traced together, 
these two threads jointly provide the clues from Freud’s metapsychology that I will con-
                                                
9 Ibid., SA 3:298/SE 19:31. 
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structively elaborate upon in the next section in conversation with Aquinas in order to 
translate the seminal insight nascently contained in Freud’s notion of identification.  
 It should be noted at the outset that the repeated appearance of themes related to 
hypnosis and suggestion in Freud’s metapsychology is noteworthy for any number of rea-
sons. As I have said, the most relevant reason for us is that it will point us toward the 
basic structure of identification as a human potency. However, it is also noteworthy with-
in the narrower context of Freud’s own oeuvre. For instance, Freud retrospectively de-
clared in his Introductory Lectures to Psychoanalysis (1916-17) that he founded “psy-
choanalysis proper [die eigentliche Psychoanalyse]” when he “dispensed with the help of 
hypnosis.”10 With this description, Freud sought to distance psychoanalysis itself from his 
earlier collaboration with Josef Breuer (~1886-95) in treating what Breuer and Freud had 
diagnostically termed “hysteria”11 through the dual media of hypnosis and suggestion. In 
light of the importance of this background, I will begin my treatment of the two threads 
above with a brief sub-section on this partnership with Breuer, his reasons for eventually 
parting ways, and the comparative distinctiveness of the methodological presuppositions 
of “psychoanalysis proper.” From this starting point, three sub-sections will follow. The 
bulk of my exposition regarding Freud’s dilemma and the reappearance of themes related 
to hypnosis will come in the following two subsections in which I engage in a close read-
                                                
10 Freud, Introductory Lectures to Psychoanalysis, SA 1:290/SE 16:292.   
11 Generally speaking, the pathological phenomena that Breuer and Freud grouped together in the diagnosis 
of “hysteria” are now categorized under two groups of disorders: dissociative disorders (e.g. dissociative 
amnesia and dissociative identity disorder) and somatic symptom disorders (e.g. conversion disorder and 
somatization disorder). Cf. American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders: DSM-5, 5th ed. (Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Association, 2013), 291-328. 
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ing of the last of Freud’s major metapsychological works, The Ego and the Id (1923).12 
This reading gives special attention to the incommensurability of two theories—what I 
will call the sexual theory and the identification theory—that he offers for the ego’s for-
mation. Lastly, I will turn to describe how the terms of this dilemma, as well as the 
themes of hypnosis and suggestion, show up in an analogous manner in Freud’s theoriza-
tion of the central role that transference plays in the psychoanalytic cure. 
a. Background: The Ego’s Fragile Centrality and the Repudiation of Hypnosis  
Despite the significance that Freud attributed to his break with Breuer, it was in those ear-
ly clinical experiences that he first encountered two characteristics of the ego—its fragili-
ty and its therapeutic centrality—that would continue to frame his metapsychology well 
after his explicit disavowal of hypnosis. The ego’s fragility became evident to him in the 
clinical appearance of psychological pathologies that manifested themselves in a symp-
tomatic lack of the intensive, differentiated unity characteristic of the ego. Instead of 
maintaining the expected continuity of its integration of the differentiated “self,” the egos 
of these patients were repeatedly disrupted by a “splitting” (Spaltung)13 caused by inter-
ferences such as hallucinations or uncontrollable emotional outbursts. Similarly, the ego’s 
therapeutic significance became clear to him in witnessing the curative effects that could 
be brought about through its self-integrating functions. Even in those early days, in a pre-
sumption that remained remarkably consistent throughout his career, Freud identified the 
                                                
12  One of my reasons for focusing on The Ego and the Id is that Freud’s attempts to answer these questions 
left his readers an oeurve that is famous for large-scale revisions and overly broad generalizations. As 
Breuer once recounted in a 1907 letter to a friend, “Freud is a man given to absolute and exclusive formula-
tions […] this is a psychical need which, in my opinion, leads to excessive generalization.” As cited in Paul 
F. Cranefield, “Josef Breuer’s Evaluation of His Contribution to Psycho-Analysis,” International Journal 
of Psychoanalysis 39 (1958): 320. 
13 Cf. Josef Breuer and Sigmund Freud, Studies on Hysteria, GW 1:233-235/SE 2: 166-167, 220-239. 
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forces that can disrupt the ego’s self-organization with the unexpected influence of “un-
conscious [unbewußt]” mental processes that often remain unknown to a person despite 
producing disorderly and pathological effects within their phenomenal consciousness and 
associated behavior.14 
 Examples of this disruptive splitting of the ego can be found throughout the case 
studies that Freud and Breuer co-published in their Studies on Hysteria (1895).15 For in-
stance, it is in that book that Freud describes the particular disruptions that plagued one of 
his first patients, pseudonymously called “Emmy von N.,” in the form of hallucinations 
and phobias: 
This lady, when I first saw her, was lying on a sofa with her head resting on a 
leather cushion…What she told me was perfectly coherent and revealed an unu-
sual degree of education and intelligence. This made it all the more strange when-
ever two or three minutes she suddenly broke off, contorted her face into an ex-
pression of horror and disgust, stretched out her hand towards me, spreading and 
crooking her fingers, and exclaimed, in a changed voice, charged with anxiety: 
“Keep still!—Don’t say anything!—Don’t touch me! She was probably under the 
influence of some recurrent hallucination of a horrifying kind and was keeping the 
interference of this stranger [die Einmengung des Fremden] at bay with this for-
mula.16  
 
In addition to such hallucinations and phobias, the other case histories in the book add 
additional symptoms that were all diagnostically grouped together under the now out-
moded label of “hysteria.” In Breuer’s most well-known client, Anna O., they famously 
                                                
14 See, for instance, the diagnostic role that the unconscious plays in Freud’s case studies of “Miss Lucy R.” 
and “Fräulein Elisabeth von R.” Cf. Ibid., GW 1:163-183, 196-251/SE 2:106-24, 135-81. This is in addition 
to Breuer’s extended theoretical section on “Unconscious Ideas and Ideas Inadmissible to Consciousness.” 
Cf. Ibid., GW 18:281-99/SE 2:222-39. 
15 The cracks of Freud’s break with Breuer and hypnosis are evident even in the layout of Studies on Hyste-
ria. The first chapter of the book, which is the only jointly written part of the book and also clearly endors-
es the method of hypnosis, was originally published in 1893. By the time that the entire book was published 
in 1895, the signs of Freud’s methodological shift had already begun. Accordingly, in the fourth chapter, 
which is Freud’s extended theoretical and practical contribution, he openly doubts the usefulness of hypno-
sis.  
16 Breuer and Freud, Studies on Hysteria, GW 1:100/SE 2:48-49.  
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included psychosomatic symptoms such as a chronic cough and even the temporal paral-
ysis of extremities as well. Other symptoms that Breuer and Freud documented included 
hysterical object conversion (i.e. the perception of one object elicits a reaction as if it 
were another, usually terrifying, object),17 disrupted speech (e.g. clacking and stammer-
ing),18 disturbing dreams,19 and even dissociative states (“absences” as Breuer called 
them)20 in which the “normal” disposition of a person disappeared and another disposition 
appeared for some length of time about which the “normal” ego had no memory or con-
trol.  
Regardless of the particularities of each patient’s symptoms, Freud and Breuer 
concluded that together these cases furnished cumulative evidence that the unconscious 
can become the site of particularly traumatic “memories” (Vorstellungen) that have been 
unconsciously repressed because of their intense pain. In this unconscious state, these 
memories, so they theorized, function as something akin to an infectious disease, “a for-
eign body [Fremdkörper] which long after its entry must continue to be regarded as an 
agent that is still at work.”21 As a foreign intruder, these unconscious memories can trig-
ger involuntary states—which Breuer termed depersonalized “hypnoid states”22— that 
repeat elements of their contents in hallucinations, dreams, object conversions, psycho-
somatic symptoms, and/or excessive and unexplained emotions. These early observations 
would eventually crystallize into two of Freud’s most vivid descriptions of the uncon-
                                                
17 Ibid., GW 18:261-274/SE 2:203-214. 
18 Ibid., GW 1:105-106/SE 2:53-64. 
19 Ibid., GW 1:115-129/SE 2:62-75. 
20 Cf. Ibid., GW 18:223-240/SE 2:23-43. 
21 Ibid., GW 1:85/SE 2:6. 
22 Ibid., GW 18:274-281/SE 2:215-222. 
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scious: its characteristic “compulsion to repeat” (Wiederholungszwang)23 and its parallel 
“timelessness” (Zeitlosigkeit) because it constantly awakens past “impulses as [if they 
are] contemporaneous and real.”24  
Based on their initial theorization, Breuer and Freud developed a “cure” that de-
pended on inducing an analogous hypnotically altered state. The goal of this technique 
was to access the contents of the unconscious and thereby trigger the catharsis of bring-
ing the repressed memories into consciousness in and through the patient’s own self-
narration—the so-called “talking cure [Redekur].”25 Once these memories were “[intro-
duced] into normal consciousness (under light hypnosis) or [removed] through the physi-
cian’s suggestion”26 the pathological repetitions “immediately and permanently disap-
peared” to Freud and Breuer’s “great surprise.”27 Almost paradoxically, the hypnotic dis-
unity of the patient was apparently cured by triggering an analogously depersonalized 
state of hypnosis that opened up the unconscious to recollection and/or the receptivity of 
the doctor’s suggestive intervention. By assimilating the unconscious memories (or hav-
ing them suggestively removed), the ego somehow banishes the foreign intruder, regains 
its operative unity, and acquires a revitalized immanent freedom that had been robbed by 
the involuntary repetitions. As Freud concluded later in “Observations on Transference-
Love” (1915), one of the axiomatic presuppositions of the psychoanalytic cure is that 
“conscious mental activity” is distinguished from unconscious activity by its higher de-
                                                
23 Cf. Freud, “Remembering, Repeating, and Working-Through,” SA 11:210-14/SE 12:150-155. and Freud, 
Beyond the Pleasure Principle, SA 3:228-233/SE 18:18-23. 
24 “The Dynamics of Transference,” SA 11:167/SE 12:108. 
25 Breuer and Freud, Studies on Hysteria, GW 18:229/SE 2:30. 
26 Ibid., GW 1:97/SE 2:17. 
27 Ibid., GW 1:85/SE 2:6. 
  
  280 
gree of “mental freedom.”28 In this sense, the ego’s capacity for therapeutic self-
integration doubles as the site of an individual’s tenuous, and always immanently con-
tested, potency for conscious self-dominion. Even after Freud’s break with Breuer, the 
broad outlines of this “cure” would always remain the same: by becoming aware of the 
unconscious roots of its pathological symptoms the ego is somehow able to begin disarm-
ing these processes of their disruptive power. 
Nonetheless, despite such degrees of continuity Freud did eventually repudiate the 
therapeutic significance of hypnosis. Along the way, he offers at least three types of justi-
fications for this renunciation. There are clinical reasons (e.g. he could not hypnotize all 
of his patients and the curative effects of self-narration did not seem to depend on it),29 
intellectual reasons (e.g. “the mechanism of hypnosis is so puzzling to me that I would 
rather not make use of it as an explanation”),30 and even reasons of a more personal varie-
ty (e.g. “I can remember even then feeling a muffled hostility to this tyranny of sugges-
tion”).31 In regard to this last set of reasons, it must be said that Freud is by no means 
alone. The depersonalization of hypnosis and the radical receptivity of suggestion often 
elicit reactions of disturbance and suspicion from its observers, critics, and counter-
theorists.32 This is despite the fact that, at least according to several sociological studies, 
                                                
28 “Observations on Transference-Love,” SA 11:229/SE 12:170. 
29 Ibid., GW 1:252-312/SE 2:256-305. See n. 15 above. 
30 Ibid., GW 1:271/SE 2: 271. 
31 Freud, Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, SA 9:84/SE 18:89. 
32 This pattern in modern Western thought and science has a long, complicated history that is tied both to 
particularly bad theorizations of hypnotic/suggestive capacities and scientific suspicions of anything the 
mechanism for which eludes visible observation. The deeply ingrained tendency for these variables to con-
verge can be glimpsed in, for instance, the investigation of the French Royal Commission in 1784 that de-
nounced—with good reason—Franz Mesmer’s theories of animal magnetism, despite the linguistic vestige 
(i.e. “mesmerizing” and “mesmérisme”) of his theories that ironically continues to this day. In addition, as 
we are narrating in our own way in this chapter, the counter-theorizing of hypnosis/suggestion runs deeply 
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some form of the hypnotic “trance” can be found in nearly every human culture world-
wide,33 regardless of whether, as Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen notes, a culture tends to “reject 
or marginalize it” (as most Western cultures do) or ends up placing it at the “center of a 
cult” (as many non-Western cultures do).34 In addition, and perhaps even more strangely, 
analogous trance-like states are scientifically observable, especially under conditions of 
extreme stress, among a wide-range of non-human animals.35 
Still, in place of the hypnotic treatment, Freud adopted the method of “free asso-
ciation” as the stated foundation of psychoanalysis “proper.” This method takes it for 
granted that the influence of the unconscious is decipherable on the basis of clues that can 
be observed, at least by the trained eyes and ears of the analyst, from within the dynamics 
                                                                                                                                            
within the genealogy of psychoanalysis itself. In addition to Freud’s own methodological switch away from 
hypnotism, the campaign to discredit the theories of Sandor Ferenczi, to which Freud himself contributed, 
is another incident in this history. The importance of both of these events in relation to the contemporary 
question of the relation between hypnosis and psychoanalysis is documented and explored well in Léon 
Chertok and Isabelle Stengers, A Critique of Psychoanalytic Reason: Hypnosis as a Scientific Problem 
from Lavoisier to Lacan (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992)  
33 Cf. Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen, The Emotional Tie: Psychoanalysis, Mimesis, and Affect (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 1993), 98-120. Borch-Jacobsen relies upon two important cultural anthropology 
studies, “Possession et chamanisme” and “La Folie des dieux et la raison des hommes,” by Luc de Heusch. 
Cf. Luc de Heusch, Pourquoi l’épouser? Et autres essais (Paris: Gallimard, 1971) 
34 Cf. Borch-Jacobsen, The Emotional Tie, 101. The most obvious exception to the Western marginalization 
of the trance is the depersonalized receptivity characteristic of our  cultural addiction to television, film, 
computers, and smart phones.  
35 Much of the unusual phenomena that formerly fell under the description of “animal hypnosis” now goes 
by the name of “tonic immobility,” which is a state of catatonic immobilization characterized, notably for 
our proposal regarding the relationship between waking and object consciousness, by a lack of responsive-
ness to external sensory stimuli. Those who replaced the notion of “animal hypnosis” with “tonic immobili-
ty” largely did so while heavily criticizing any supposed link between human hypnosis and the immobilized 
state witnessed among a large variety of species. An example of this rhetoric can be found in an early study 
that is still cited in the literature today, Gordon G. Gallup, “Animal Hypnosis: Factual Status of a Fictional 
Concept,” Psychological Bulletin 81, no. 11 (1974): 836-53. Interestingly enough, however, the concept of 
tonic immobility, despite being originally coined by some in order differential human and non-human phe-
nomena is now being taken up as way of describing the depersonalized states that often occurs in human 
being during violently traumatic events such as rape. Cf. Murray P. Abrams et al., “Human Tonic 
Immobility: Measurement and Correlates,” Depression and Anxiety 26 (2009): 550-56. I take this develop-
ment to point in the same explanatory direction that I am pursuing in this project through different discipli-
nary and conceptual means.   
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of egoic consciousness itself. Accordingly, because these clues are present within the 
“normal” interactions between the patient and the analyst there is no need to induce an 
altered state in order for psychoanalysis to help the patient. In addition, Freud also ended 
up displacing Breuer’s emphasis on “traumatic” memories as the most basic variable in 
explaining and resolving the unconscious roots of pathological symptoms that repetitively 
disrupt the ego’s unity. Instead, he presumes that the etiology of all pathological psycho-
logical symptoms should “be looked for,” not in traumatic events, but ultimately “in sex-
ual factors.”36  
Nonetheless, the background of Freud’s collaboration and subsequent break with 
Breuer serves two purposes going forward. First, as I suggested above, the double signifi-
cance of the ego—its fragile relation to unconscious disruptions and its therapeutic cen-
trality—would frame his theoretical inquiries into the ego’s formation and function well 
after his break with Breuer. For if the ego’s unity is subject to the continuous influence of 
unconscious factors outside of its control, even to the severe degree of dissociatively sus-
pending the ego’s self-integration entirely, then what is the operative and developmental 
status of these factors? Trying to answer that question forced Freud to repeatedly engage 
in what Paul Ricoeur rightly describes as an “archeology of the subject”37 in which his 
metapsychology is constantly preoccupied with theorizing the problem in which the 
Freudian dilemma about which we are most interested arises: the contingent, archaic ori-
gins of the ego. Second, the (re)appearance of themes related to hypnosis and suggestion 
in his attempt to answer the above question at least raises a doubt as to whether Freud 
                                                
36 Breuer and Freud, Studies on Hysteria, GW 1:255/257. Emphasis in original. See n. 15 above. 
37 Ricoeur, De l’interprétation, 407-443 (Freud and Philosophy, 419-58).  
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was able to separate his continued investigation of the ego’s disruptions by the uncon-
scious from his supposedly clear-cut “dispensing of hypnosis” and his corresponding 
founding of psychoanalysis as a distinct discipline unto itself. In turn, this doubt will 
highlight the explanatory significance of identification that Freud only on occasion seems 
to recognize.  
b. The Ego and the Id I: The Topographical Background and the Need for a Revision 
Shortly after his break with Breuer, Freud attempted to formulate a “map” of the relation-
ship between the ego and the unconscious based upon his clinical observations of the mu-
tual influence that exists between these “parts” of the “psyche.” The result, which Freud 
worked out in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900), was his so-called first “topography” 
of the psyche: the conscious (Cs.), preconscious (Pcs.), and unconscious (Ucs.).38 His 
purpose in writing The Ego and the Id, which he describes early on in the book’s initial 
introductory chapter, is to offer a revision of this topographical map that had been 
prompted by a series of recent clinical observations. However, before stating the nature 
of the theoretical “discovery”39 that emerged out of these observations, Freud first sets out 
to reassure his readers of the larger continuity between his two topographies, despite the 
forthcoming revision.  
The largest point of continuity that he singles out right at the beginning The Ego 
and the Id represents what he calls the “fundamental premise of psychoanalysis.”40 We 
are already familiar with the implications of this premise: that there is a “division of the 
                                                
38 Cf. Freud, The Ego and the Id, SA 3:284-285/SE 19:15.  
39 Ibid., SA 3:287/SE 19:17. 
40 Ibid., SA 3:283/SE 19:13. 
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psychical into what is conscious and what is unconscious [and this premise] alone makes 
it possible for psychoanalysis to understand the pathological processes in mental life.”41 
He proceeds to delineate the boundaries of this division by defining what he means by 
“being conscious.” He does so on the basis of what he calls “perception” 
(Wahrnehmung). “Being conscious [Bewußt sein],” as Freud writes in an important early 
declaration, “is in the first place a descriptive term, resting on perception of the most im-
mediate and certain [unmittelbarste und sicherste] character.”42 As descriptively and per-
ceptually certain, Freud shows no anxiety about the dependability of using the descriptive 
notion of “being conscious” of some process without predetermining the inquiry into the 
origin of the operative distinction in the first place: “the distinction between conscious 
and unconscious is in the last resort a question of perception, which must be answered 
‘yes’ or ‘no,’ and the act of perception [Akt der Wahrnehmung] itself tells us nothing of 
the reason why a thing is or is not perceived.”43  
Nor is Freud shy about offering common examples of conscious phenomena in 
order to establish what the unconscious inverse might be like. In fact, a la Augustine and 
Aquinas, he categorizes these examples according to whether they are derived from “ex-
ternal [äußerer]” or “internal [innerer]” perception.44 He typically limits external percep-
tion to data received from the senses, i.e. sense-perceptions (Sinneswahrnehmungen).45 
As for internal perceptions, Freud lumps them together into what he calls “sensations 
                                                
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid., SA 3:283/SE 19:13-14. 
43 Ibid., SA 3:285/SE 19:15-16. This echoes Lonergan’s insistence that there is a given quality of (phenom-
enal) consciousness that can glimpsed in the reliable distinction between certain processes that are con-
scious (e.g. seeing) and others that are not (e.g. growing your beard). Cf. Lonergan, Insight, 3:344-46. 
44 Freud, The Ego and the Id, SA 3:288-291/SE 19:19-22. 
45 Ibid., SA 3:288/SE 19:19. 
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[Empfindungen] and feelings [Gefühle],”46 the most important of which are the contents 
of thoughts, whether imagistic or verbal,47 and feelings of pleasure (Lust) or the pain of 
its absence (Unlust).48 If any given psychical process can be perceived, then it can be said 
to have a conscious “quality [Qualität]” to it.49 In the absence of this quality, processes—
even if they produce effects of which one is immediately conscious50—can be judged to 
be unconscious in themselves.51 
Accordingly, if Freud does not intend to revise this fundamental premise between 
the operative division between conscious and unconscious processes, what is this new 
discovery that prompts the revision(s) set forth in The Ego and the Id? He had discovered 
a new set of unconscious processes. The distinctions of the first topography include two 
kinds of processes that Freud understands as “unconscious” strictly speaking. First, inter-
estingly enough he assigns a kind of “unconsciousness” to what Aristotle and Aquinas 
would have simply ascribed to the normal habitual retention of memory. Hence, “an idea 
[Vorstellung] that is conscious now is no longer so a moment later, although it can be-
                                                
46 Ibid. 
47 “Das Denken in Bildern” and “das Denken in Worten,” cf. Ibid., SA 3:290/SE 19:21. 
48 Ibid., SA 3:291/SE 19:22. 
49 Ibid., SA 3:283/SE 19:13. 
50 As Freud writes, “We have found […] that very powerful mental process or ideas exist […] which can 
produce all the effects [die alle Folgen] in mental life that ordinary ideas do (including effects that can in 
their turn become conscious as ideas), though they themselves do not become conscious.” Cf. Ibid., SA 
3:284/SE 19:14. 
51 Despite the superficial acuity that might appear on the basis of his stated distinction between inner and 
outer perception, Freud lacks any philosophical resources to systematize these observations regarding the 
potential data sources for the awareness of consciousness and/or the reciprocal relationship between 
them—the precise description of which as we have seen is a cornerstone for Aristotle and Aquinas—that is 
necessarily implied by any talk of memories or their recollection. To his credit, Freud occasionally makes 
observations that gesture towards the phenomena that Aristotelian metaphysics precisely explains via axi-
oms such as “the thing known is in the knower.” For example, he observes that the act of touching an ob-
ject “yields two kinds of sensations, one of which may be equivalent to an internal perception.” (SA 
3:294/SE 19:25. Nonetheless, Freud’s repeated inability to theorize the relation between inner and outer 
perception helps to produce many of the inconsistencies that we will shortly encounter. 
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come so again under certain conditions that are easily brought about.”52 Accordingly, this 
sense of “unconscious coincides with [being] latent and capable of becoming con-
scious.”53 This type of “unconsciousness” Freud typically renames as that which is typical 
of the preconscious.54 The second type of unconsciousness, which he usually references 
as “the unconscious” properly speaking, is identical to the repression of memories that we 
already encountered in Studies on Hysteria. According to Freud, such repression ema-
nates from the liminal boundary of consciousness itself, which functions as a dynamic 
“force” (Kraft) that opposes and resists the ideas [Vorstellungen] associated with these 
memories from emerging into the ego’s consciousness.55 
Now, however, Freud had stumbled upon clinical phenomena that justified “the 
necessity of postulating a third Ucs.”56 The paradigmatic effect of this third set of uncon-
scious processes arise in the form of what Freud calls the immanent “faculties of self-
criticism and conscience.”57 These faculties function as something like the unconscious 
influence of unperceived voices—”You ought to be like this” and “You may not be like 
this”58—that produce the conscious effects of self-reproach, self-criticism, and unex-
pected guilt. In the clinical setting, these processes repeatedly caused a resistance to ana-
lytic treatment because the internal sense of guilt seemed to find “satisfaction in the ill-
ness and thus refuses to give up the punishment of suffering.”59 
                                                
52 Freud, The Ego and the Id, SA 3:283/SE 19:14. 
53 Ibid., SA 3:283/SE 19:14. 
54 Ibid., SA 3:284/SE 19:15. 
55 Ibid., SA 3:284/SE 19:14. 
56 Ibid., SA 3:287/SE 19:18. 
57 Ibid., SA 3:295/SE 19:26. 
58 Ibid., SA 3:301/SE 19:34. Emphases in original. 
59 Ibid., SA 3:316/SE 19:49. 
  
  287 
From Freud’s perspective, the most curious aspect of these unconscious processes 
is that they represent relatively “high” mental activities, which are usually associated 
with the ego in contrast with the “activities of the lower passions [Leidensdkaften]” (e.g. 
feelings, often erotic in origin, of immediate pleasure/pain) typically associated with the 
Ucs. He considers them high not only because of the self-differentiation inherent to them, 
but also because their influence can be seen as producing “effects of the greatest im-
portance” (e.g. cultural and religious moral norms).60 This curiosity leads Freud to the 
unexpected conclusion that this third unconsciousness actually represents a kind of un-
consciousness within the ego itself that nonetheless seems to be at least analogically and 
probably phylogenetically related to the unconsciousness of the repressed:  
We have come upon something in the ego itself which is also unconscious, which 
behaves exactly like the repressed—that is, which produces powerful effects 
without itself being conscious and which requires special work before it can be 
made conscious.61  
 
If such an unconsciousness exists “in the ego itself,”62 then a topography based upon only 
the first two forms of unconsciousness is no longer viable on its own; instead a new to-
pography that specifies some kind of distinction with the ego itself is required to explain 
this phenomenon. The resulting revision articulated in the chapters that follow this initial 
introduction represent what has become known as Freud’s second topography: the ego 
                                                
60 Ibid., SA 3:295/SE 19:26. 
61 Ibid., SA 3:287/SE 19:17. 
62 To Freud’s credit, he demonstrates genuine concern that by introducing a third kind of Ucs. he risks rob-
bing his central concept of its axiomatic significance because it might be seen as signifying too many things 
to describe anything with predictable precision. Nonetheless he presses on in order to make theoretical 
sense of his new discovery. He does so both because he wishes to explain his clinical observations and be-
cause, despite the risks, the explanatory power of psychoanalysis rests squarely on the clue specified by the 
terms of its fundamental premise: “for the property of being conscious or not is in the last resort our one 
beacon-light in the darkness of depth-psychology.” (Ibid., SA 3:287/SE 19:18). 
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(das Ich), the id (das Es), and the ego-ideal (das Ichideal) or super-ego (das Über-Ich).63 
In setting forth this topography, Freud takes up the topic that is of most pressing interest 
to us: a consideration of the ego’s developmental relation to the respective unconscious 
processes characteristic of the id and the ego-ideal’s idiosyncratic faculties of self-
criticism and conscience.  
c. The Ego and the Id II: Freud’s Dilemma and the Emergence of the Ego 
In outlining his revised topography, in the next two chapters Freud sequentially consider  
the ego’s developmental relation to the id64 (Chapter 2) and then to the ego-ideal (Chapter 
3).65 In the process, he not only unexpectedly stumbles back onto the riddles of hypnosis 
and suggestion, but he also finds himself caught in the crux of the decisive circular di-
lemma that I referenced at the outset. For in the process of trying to describe how the 
ego’s self-organization and self-awareness emerges out of a prior developmental state, 
Freud discovers—like Augustine—how difficult it is to speak of the latter without circu-
larly reinstating the former and thus vacillating back and forth between them incoherent-
ly. 
 Due to the fact that these conceptual inconsistencies make this text exceptionally 
difficult to interpret and/or present systematically, I will state the horns of Freud’s di-
lemma at the outset for the sake of clarity. In The Ego and the Id, Freud ends up advocat-
ing for two theories about the ego’s emergence that are, at least as they stand in the terms 
                                                
63 According to Freud’s own usage, the ego-ideal and the super-ego are interchangeable. For the most part, 
unless the surrounding rhetoric makes it awkward, I will opt for “ego-ideal” in what follows because it 
more closely presents the intrinsic connection with the ego. In contrast, the term “super-ego” can implicitly 
suggest that it is a kind of higher form of the ego and therefore something else entirely.  
64 Freud, The Ego and the Id, SA 3:288-295/SE 19:19-27. 
65 Ibid., SA 3:296-306/SE 19:28-39. 
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of his theorization, irreconcilable to one another. The first, which as a shorthand I will 
call the sexual theory, aligns with his basic post-Breuer conviction that all psychological 
development, whether pathological or not, has psycho-sexual origins in the erotic bonds 
(Bindungen) forged by an individual’s sexual libido (viz. erotic object-cathexes (Ob-
jektbesetzung)). The second, which I will call the identification theory, postulates that the 
ego emerges through the mechanism of a series of primary identifications (Identifizei-
rungen) that, and here the inconsistency will already begin to come into focus, supposed-
ly “[take] place earlier than any object-cathexis.”66 
The crux of the irreconcilable inconsistency between these two theories, however, 
ultimately lies not just in the semantics of which is “earlier,” but rather in their opposite 
conceptualizations of the primal subject-object relation. As I will argue below, the sexual 
theory presupposes a basic ego-like awareness of the differentiation between oneself and 
another object qua object. In contrast, the identification theory presupposes an admittedly 
strange identificatory fusion between “oneself” and “others,” out of which the ego’s self-
differentiated awareness genuinely emerges as a derivative development.  
On the basis of these initial summary statements, I will consider each of these two 
theories in more detail before moving on to show how an analogous state of conceptual 
affairs emerges in Freud’s theorization of transference. Even though it is does not hold 
true in every detail, it is broadly the case that the sexual theory emerges most clearly in 
association with Freud’s initial treatment of the ego’s developmental relation to the id in 
Chapter 2 of The Ego and the Id, whereas the identification theory ascends to prominence 
                                                
66 Ibid., SA 3:299/SE 19:31. 
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in the subsequent chapter’s discussion of the ego’s relation to the ego-ideal. In light of 
this loose logical order, we will begin with an overview of the sexual theory after which a 
contrast with the identification theory will follow.   
Freud’s sexual theorization of the ego’s origins begins with his appropriation of  
the Nietzchean use of “das Es”—the id—to describe that which is unconsciously imper-
sonal in human nature.67 This broad concept allows him to assign two kinds of basic im-
pulses to the id: those that arise from the dualistic instincts (the sexual and death drives) 
and those, which we have already discussed, are connected to repressed memories.68 As 
for the instincts, the sexual instinct naturally pursues the life-promoting pleasure of eroti-
cally-driven “uniting [zu vereinigen] and binding [zu binden].”69 In contrast, the death 
instinct tends towards the inverse: a “destruction directed against the external world and 
other organisms.”70 Although we will briefly return to reference how we would resituate 
the death drive into something non-dualistic, for the moment the most important facet of 
the id for us to consider here is its function as the primal seat of erotic libido. This is be-
cause Freud almost exclusively focuses on the libido in articulating the id’s relation to the 
ego’s formation. This relative exclusivity is reflected in extended passages in the chapter 
on the developmental relation between the ego and the id in which he seems to set aside 
the death instinct altogether when discussing the nature of the id. For example, at one 
                                                
67 According to Freud, his most direct source for the Nietzchean concept was George Groddeck. Cf. Ibid., 
SA 3:292/SE 19:23. On the connection between Freud, Groddeck and Nietzsche, see Herman Westerink, A 
Dark Trace: Sigmund Freud on the Sense of Guilt (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2009), 187-94. 
68 Cf. Freud, The Ego and the Id, SA 3:292-293/SE 19:24. 
69 Ibid., SA 3:312/SE 19:45. 
70 Ibid., SA 3:308/SE 19:41. 
  
  291 
point he declares without qualification, “[T]he pleasure principle […] reigns unrestricted-
ly in the id.”71 
 Following the trajectory laid out by some of his earliest psychoanalytic categories 
first developed in his “Project for a Scientific Psychology” (1895), Freud uses the con-
cept of “libido” with explicit energic connotations. Thus, according to Freud, certain ob-
jects become the locus of sexual desire through the desiring individual mentally concen-
trating (viz. binding, cathecting) libido “around/in” them in the sense of a defined con-
densation of energy. Once bound, erotic libido only has two options for achieving the 
pleasure of “releasing,” “spending,” or “discharging” the libidinal energy properly. The 
most obvious option is actually achieving sexual satisfaction with that object-cathexis. 
The other option is the road of sublimation, which runs through the ego as we will see 
shortly, in which sexual libido is successfully redirected—sublimated—toward the pleas-
ure (Lust) of achieving non-sexual ends (e.g. aesthetic, intellectual, cultural).72 Apart from 
these options for release, libido will simply keep accumulating and, if discharge contin-
ues to be frustrated, this accumulation will result in any number of the neurotic states 
(e.g. obsession, anxiety, tension) that Freud associates with the pain (Unlust) of unre-
leased libido.  
However: “At the very beginning [Uranfang],” Freud insists, “all the libido is ac-
cumulated in the id, while the ego is still in [the] process of formation or is still feeble.”73 
On the basis of this assertion, Freud advances his sexual theory that holds that the id is in 
                                                
71 Ibid., SA 3:293/SE 19:25. 
72 Cf. Ibid., SA 3:304/SE 19:35-36. See also, “The Uncanny,” SA 4:241-274/SE 17:219-252 and Civiliza-
tion and Its Discontents, SA 9:191-270/SE 21:57-146. 
73 The Ego and the Id, SA 3:312-313/SE 19:46. 
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fact the immanent, primal ground of the psychical self out of which egoic consciousness 
and the ego-ideal are both derivatively formed. As Freud says clearly, the ego is not an 
entity unto itself, it is only a “a specially modified part [of the id].”74 In other words: in 
the beginning was the id. The modification that follows occurs progressively, as we will 
see in a moment, under the influence of external sense perceptions and derivative inner 
perceptions of pain. Apart from this later development of the ego, however, the id’s libid-
inal impulses operate instinctually and thus without modulation or reasoned direction. 
Freud actually describes this instinctual condition as reflective of the fact that the id “has 
achieved no unified will [einheitlichen Willen].”75 Left to itself, the id unconsciously and 
involuntarily pursues the pleasure principle by “send[ing] part of [its] libido out into erot-
ic object-cathexes”76 without any thought (literally) of how, where, or with whom it 
might actually experience the pleasure of libidinal discharge and sexual satisfaction.                                                                                      
Eventually, though, the impetus that triggers the ego’s development can be found 
in the body’s sensory experience of an external world that does not yield to the id’s erotic 
wishes (Wünsche). This dissonance causes the internal pain that arises from the immanent 
accumulation of libido that has not been discharged.77 According to Freud, the ego 
emerges as a “reaction-formation [Reaktionsbildung]”78 to the experience of this pain. In 
defense against this pain, the ego develops as an immanent condensation of sexual object-
                                                
74 Ibid., SA 3:307/SE 19:40. 
75 Ibid., SA 3:325/SE 19:59.  
76 Ibid., SA 3:313/SE 19:46. 
77 Ibid., SA 3:313-314/SE 19:47. 
78 Freud typically uses this phrase to describe the formation of the ego-ideal in The Ego and the Id. Howev-
er, given both its logic, which Freud uses elsewhere as a general feature of psychic development, and the 
close developmental links and operative functions between the ego and the ego-ideal this formulation 
seems justified. For examples of its general usage, see Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, SA 5:85, 
140-141/SE 7:178, 238-239. 
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libido that has been desexualized and therefore sublimated into narcissistic libido. 
Through this process of sublimation, the ego emerges as a kind of immanent object that 
offers to fulfill the id’s wishes through another (i.e. sublimated) route that runs through 
itself: 
When the ego assumes the features of the object, it is forcing itself, so to speak, 
upon the id as a love-object and is trying to make good the id’s loss by saying: 
‘Look, you can love me too—I am so like the object.’ […] The transformation of 
object-libido into narcissistic libido which thus takes place obviously implies an 
abandonment of sexual aims, a desexualization—a kind of sublimation, there-
fore.79  
 
In short, the immanent, condensed unity of the ego represents a sublimated realization of 
Eros’s main purpose of unifying and binding.80  
 Out of this primary thesis, Freud then proceeds to postulate that this sublimation 
might not only explain the ego’s formation, but also explain its ongoing function of mod-
ulating and sublimating sexual libido to successfully achieve its aims vis-à-vis the exter-
nal world: 
Indeed, the question arises, and deserves careful consideration, whether [the trans-
formation of object-libido into narcissistic libido] is not the universal road to sub-
limation, whether all sublimation does not take place through the mediation of the 
ego, which begins by changing sexual object-libido into narcissistic libido and 
then, perhaps, goes on to give it another aim.81 
 
Expressed in another way, the ego operates at the “frontier” between the id and the exter-
nal world, trying to mediate between the former’s pleasure principle and the latter as the 
reality principle. As Freud writes, “As a frontier-creature [Grenzwesen], the ego tries to 
mediate between the world and the id, to make the id pliable to the world and, by means 
                                                
79 The Ego and the Id, SA 3:297-298/SE 19:30. 
80 Ibid., SA 3:312/SE 19:45. 
81 Ibid., SA 3:298/SE 19:30. 
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of its muscular activity, to make the world fall in with the wishes of the id.”82 Or, as 
Freud adds in a rare nod to traditional formulations: “The ego represents what may be 
called reason [Vernunft] and deliberateness [Besonnenheit], in contrast to the id, which 
contains the passions [Leidenschaften].”83 
 As Freud indicates, if his only task in The Ego and the Id was to specify the rela-
tionship between the ego and the id then the above account might be relatively satisfying 
and indeed even suggest a relatively “simple state of things.” “But,” as Freud continues, 
“there is a further complication:”84 the ego-ideal. In trying to bring the ego-ideal’s origins 
into the mix, Freud himself actually introduces the most complicating variable simply by 
way of how he frames the entire discussion. As I have indicated above, from the earliest 
pages of The Ego and the Id Freud seems to be playing out a hunch that he has that the 
parallel unconsciousness of the super-ego’s ideals and of the id’s unconscious instincts 
and repressions are phylogenetically linked. Somehow, at least according to Freud’s intu-
ition, the unconscious “contents” of the id influence the ego from within the ego itself 
and therefore this unconscious material “confronts the other contents of the ego as an ego 
ideal or super-ego”85 without thereby becoming conscious.86 Here Freud sets before us a 
decidedly more complicated set of problems to solve than those posed by the compara-
tively simple relation between the ego and the id. This is due to the fact that in order to 
make this kind of psychological phenomena intelligible one would likely need to come 
upon a single mechanism that—by its very nature—can be responsible for two mirrored 
                                                
82 Ibid., SA 3:322/SE 19:56. 
83 Ibid., SA 3:294/SE 19:25. 
84 Ibid., SA 3:296/SE 19:28. 
85 Ibid., SA 3:301/SE 19:34. 
86 Cf. Ibid., SA 3:305-306/SE 19:38-39. 
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effects, one “in” the id and another “in” the ego-ideal, that are simultaneously develop-
mentally linked in a common bond of some kind (i.e. mnemic, sexual, or another type).  
 It is at this crucial point in his inquiry that Freud turns to the concept of identifica-
tion (Identifizeirung) as just the sort of mechanism capable of producing these mirrored 
effects. Freud originally had described this concept of identification in his 1917 essay, 
“Mourning and Melancholia.” In that context, he speculated that identification could ex-
plain the difference between the generic process of mourning the loss of a beloved object 
and the comparatively longer-term condition of melancholia.87 Whereas mourning in-
volves a process of grieving a lost object that eventually resolves into a return to a “nor-
mal attitude to life,”88 melancholia exhibits the pathological symptoms of a “profound 
painful dejection, cessation of interest in the outside world, loss of capacity to love, inhi-
bition of all activity, and a lowering of the self-regarding feelings to a degree that finds 
utterance in self-reproaches and self-revilings.”89 Briefly summarized, Freud proposes 
that this difference can be tied to the fact that in melancholia the ego attempts to cope 
with the loss of an erotic object, in a matter that is directly parallel to the above descrip-
tion of the ego’s formation, through forming “an identification of the ego with the aban-
doned object.”90 The result of this attempt is that the absence of the lost object becomes 
introjected into the ego itself as an immanent “substitute for the erotic cathexis.”91 Per-
haps the most crucial part of this theory that is easily missed is that the “object” that is 
                                                
87 There are brief precedents in The Interpretation of Dreams, but they are nothing like the systematic em-
ployment and development found in “Mourning and Melancholia.” Cf. The Interpretation of Dreams, SA 
2:166, 320-321/SE 4:150, 320-323. 
88 “Mourning and Melancholia,” SA 3:197/SE 14:243. 
89 Ibid., SA 3:198/SE 14:244. 
90 Ibid., SA 3:203/SE 14:249. Emphasis in original.  
91 Ibid. 
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introjected is not the beloved object per se, but the object as absent and thus as the loved 
object has been ambivalently joined by feelings of hostility and hate because of the frus-
tration of its absence. Through this identificatory mechanism, what was originally the ex-
ternality of an “object-loss was transformed” into the enduring immanence of “an ego-
loss” that perpetuates the abyssal, withdrawn state of melancholia.92 In the process, the 
full ambivalence of love and hate that had been connected to the object now appears as 
self-ambivalence in the mode of self-reproach and self-criticism that functions to nurse 
the masochistic pleasure provided by this virtual, immanent presence of the lost object. 
Or as Freud writes: “The self-tormenting in melancholia […] , which is without doubt 
enjoyable, signifies […] a satisfaction of trends of sadism and hates which relate to an 
object, and which have been turned round upon the subject’s own self.”93 In the dawn of 
this pathology, as Freud writes eloquently, “the shadow of the object fell upon the ego.”94 
 On the level of an initial evaluation, is it is clear why Freud is attracted to identi-
fication as a route for describing the origins of the differentiation between the ego and the 
ego-ideal. For if identification introduces a certain “grade [Stufe]” and “differentiation” in 
an already formed ego in the process that causes melancholia,95 might it be possible that a 
similar process founded the ego by differentiating it from the id and, derivatively, the 
ego-ideal as well? In addition, identification’s capacity for introjection represents a prom-
ising route for theorizing how certain object-bonds endure “within” the individual and, in 
fact, contribute to the contingent “building-up [herstellen]” of the ego in its actual emer-
                                                
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid., SA 3:205/SE 14:251. 
94 Ibid., SA 3:203/SE 14:249. 
95 The Ego and the Id, SA 3:296/SE 19:28. 
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gence, the fruit of which Freud calls an ego’s idiosyncratic “character [Charakter].”96 It is 
in pursuing this line of thought that Freud coins his well-known declaration that the 
“character of the ego is a precipitate of abandoned object-cathexes and that it contains the 
history of those object-choices.”97 
 Capitalizing on this initial promise, however, proves to be an incredibly convolut-
ed and challenging task for Freud that leads him into the heart of the dilemma we are de-
scribing. The crux of this challenge lies in Freud’s continuous alternation between two 
types of identification—what I will call primary, object-less identification and secondary, 
model-based identification—that jointly represent Freud’s attempt to import the insights 
of melancholic identification into the question of the archaic origins of the ego and the 
ego-ideal.98 Quite often, Freud alternates between these two identifications within a single 
paragraph and, as a result, it is nearly impossible to offer a neat treatment of them sepa-
rately and/or sequentially from one another.  
 For this reason, my strategy at this juncture will be to base my explication of these 
two types of identification on a single, crucial passage from Freud’s most sustained dis-
cussion of identification in The Ego and the Id. I will, of course, reference other material 
for the sake of commentary and explanatory expansion, but no other paragraph illustrates 
the rhetorical inconsistency that results from Freud’s dilemma more than the one that fol-
lows. The immediately preceding context has Freud discussing the character of a devel-
                                                
96 Ibid., SA 3:296/SE 19:28. 
97 Ibid., SA 3:297/SE 19:29. 
98 In addition to the melancholic, primary, and secondary forms of identification, there is also a fourth type 
of identification, social identification, that I leave aside in this context. As Freud describes it, “Social feel-
ings rest on identifications with other people, on the basis of having the same ego ideal.” Cf. Ibid., SA 
3:304/SE 19:37. See as well, Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, SA 9:98-103/SE 18:105-110. 
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oped ego and its capacity for insulating itself from the loss of cathected objects. This ex-
plains the opening transitional clause, after which it is one sustained discussion of the 
role of identification in the earliest part of developmental life outside of the womb: 
But, whatever the character’s later capacity for resisting the influences of aban-
doned object-cathexes may turn out to be, the effects of the first identifications 
made in earliest childhood will be general and lasting. This leads us back to the 
origin of the ego ideal; for behind it there lies hidden an individual’s first and 
most important [erste und bedeutsamste] identification, his identification with the 
father of his own personal prehistory [die mit dem Vater der persönlichen 
Vorzeit]. This is apparently not in the first instance the consequence or outcome of 
an object-cathexis; it is a direct and immediate [unmittelbare] identification and 
takes place earlier than any object-cathexis. But the object-choices belonging to 
the first sexual period and relating to the father and mother seem normally to find 
their starting-point in an identification of this kind, and would thus reinforce the 
primary identification.99 
 
The dissonance of this passage on identification with the sexual theory is immediately 
evident even upon an initial reading. There are clear references to a kind of identification 
that is explicitly earlier than any object-cathexis and even of early sexual objects that 
somehow start from and then reinforce this primary identification. The implications of 
such rhetoric leads us in the direction of a very different primal beginning for a pre-egoic 
individual than one that is always already dominated by the sexual libido.  
 It might be tempting at first to explain away such a passage as an insignificant 
outlier in comparison to the unquestionable primacy of the sexual theory in Freud’s met-
apsychology. However, such an attempt would inevitably founder on sections from 
                                                
99 Freud, The Ego and the Id, SA 3:298-299/SE 19:31. Instead of “starting-point,” Strachey has the ambig-
uous “outcome” for Ausgang here. Such an ambiguity is intrinsic to Ausgang in German since it can signify 
both an ending and the route by which that ending is reached. Freud uses it with both connotations in The 
Ego and the Id (e.g. “starting-point” on SA 3:288/SE 19:19 and “outcome” on SA 3:300/SE 19:32). The 
sense of “starting-point” seems justified here in light of Freud’s rhetoric in the next clause regarding how 
the sexual object-choice “reinforces” the primary identification, thus making the earlier identification the 
Ausgang of the sexual object-choice. 
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Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego (1921) that echo this passage in an even 
more adamant tone. There we encounter Freud unmistakably declaring, “Identification is 
known to psychoanalysis as the earliest expression of an emotional tie with another per-
son.”100 And again later on: “[I]dentification is the earliest and original [ursprünglichste] 
form of emotional tie.”101 Like the above passage from The Ego and the Id, these state-
ments from Group Psychology occur in the context of Freud trying to explain the origins 
and dynamics of the ego-ideal in distinction from the ego alone. When faced with this 
problematic, and specifically when he attempts to address it by means of identification, 
Freud simply does repeatedly lapse into rhetoric that stands in a notable tension with the 
supposed primal primacy of the id’s sexual libido.  
If such passages cannot be ignored, what does Freud intend to accomplish through 
this talk of primary identification and why might he simultaneously resist its implica-
tions? From the immediate context, and especially the framing analogy with melancholic 
identification, it seems clear what he is trying to accomplish. By primary identification 
Freud intends something like a “direct and immediate” introjection of the object into the 
individual, i.e. a radical receptivity to an object to the point that the object is not per-
ceived qua object, but rather qua perceiver. In this precise sense, primary identification is 
“object-less,” for it precedes the subject/object distinction from the side of the developing 
individual. Obviously, objects remain ontologically distinct in reality, but not as they are 
perceived according to primary identification. Freud’s reasons for gesturing towards such 
a receptivity are clear. In order for the identificatory relation to meaningfully form the “I” 
                                                
100 Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, SA 9:98/SE 18:105. 
101 Ibid., SA 9:99/SE 18:107. 
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of the ego—in order for the ego’s self-differentiated character to actually develop as a 
“precipitate” of lost objects—there must be a “time” in which there is no “I” who knows 
itself to be an “I” differentiated from others who are, precisely as objects, perceived as 
“not-I.” Freud signals his awareness of this implication of his line of thought through his 
repeated insistence that the earliest and most influential identifications occur prior to any 
object-cathexes. By giving primary identification such an original preeminence, Freud 
rightfully indicates that in order to explain the self-differentiation intrinsic to the ego—
from the id, from external objects, and from the ideals of the ego-ideal—by way of the 
mechanism of identification that he must try to theorize a stage in human development in 
which the perception of the subject/object distinction is considerably blurred, even to the 
point of its total disappearance, in a perceived fusion between individual and object.  
 In something that seems like an admission that his treatment in The Ego and the 
Id did not go far enough in working out this theorization of identification, Freud’s clear-
est and most concrete examples of this kind of identificatory fusion occur later in his 
oeuvre. For example, in An Outline of Psychoanalysis (1940) Freud writes clearly of the 
identificatory relationship between the infant and a mother’s breast that echoes his pass-
ing comment above about erotic libidinal object-cathexes originating in, and derivatively 
reinforcing, the “objects” of primary identification: 
There is no doubt that, to begin with, the child does not distinguish between the 
breast and its own body; [but] when the breast has to be separated from the body 
and shifted to the ‘outside’ because the child so often finds it absent, it carries 
with it as an ‘object’ a part of the original narcissistic libidinal cathexis.102 
 
                                                
102 An Outline of Psychoanalysis, GW 17:115/SE 23: 188. Emphases in the original.  
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The most noteworthy aspect of this passage is the illuminating way that Freud describes 
the inversion of an original introjection through a process that “shifts,” or even relocates 
(verlegt), that object to the “outside” of the individual. This results in the child being able 
to differentiate itself from the object now perceived qua object. Intriguingly, this pro-
cess—a kind of “abjection,” to mention a term from Kristeva that will elaborate upon in a 
moment—represents the exact inverse of the introjection that had defined identification 
in “Mourning and Melancholia.” A year later, in “Findings, Ideas, Problems” (1941), 
Freud would formulate his most well-known description of the development from identi-
ficatory fusion to self-differentiation in a short note informally categorized with the ta-
gline, “Having’ and ‘being’ in children:” 
Children like expressing an object-relation by an identification: ‘I am the object.’ 
‘Having’ is the later of the two; after the loss of the object it relapses into ‘being.’ 
Example: the breast. ‘The breast is part of me, I am the breast. Only later: ‘I have 
it,’ that is, ‘I am not it.’103 
 
For our constructive purposes, one of the most intriguing aspects of this passage to note 
in passing is the suggestive way that it speculates that this process of “abjection” that 
breaks the identificatory fusion simultaneously ignites the desire to have that which one 
now perceives as “not-I.”  
 As I foregrounded at the outset of the chapter, post-Freudian theorist Julia Kriste-
va picks up this theme in Freud in order to expand it in two directions that will prove im-
portant for us moving forward. First, she pushes back beyond the contingent appearance 
of “the breast” in order to ground the object-less relation that Freud names as primary 
identification. According to Kristeva, the most archaic “pre-objectal” relation always oc-
                                                
103 “Findings, Ideas, Problems,” GW 17:151/SE 23:299. 
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curs “between” mother and child in utero.104 In that relation, the individual who is not yet 
a differentiated egoic subject is located within what Kristeva, drawing upon Plato’s Ti-
maeus,105 characterizes as a “chora”106 that precedes any claim to “identity”—precisely 
because “the child and the mother do not yet constitute ‘two’”107—in which the instinctual 
drives constantly pulsate in an active (i.e. not static) stasis108 with/in the motile rhythms of 
the womb/maternal body.  
Second, she argues that the rupture of this choric fusion that occurs in birth estab-
lishes the archetypical instance of abjection that ties together the effects of biological 
birth and the birth of egoic subjectivity under the banner of a single psychological con-
cept. For in the former birth, there occurs a primal separation, a biologically-necessitated 
abjection of one individual from another, that (echoing Freud’s comment above) is a pre-
condition for both ontological (our own) and epistemic (of others) “objecthood” in the 
first place. As Kristeva writes, “Abjection preserves what existed in the archaism of pre-
objectal relationship, in the immemorial violence with which a body becomes separated 
                                                
104 It is important to note that my constructive appropriation that creatively combines Kristeva’s talk of a 
“pre-objectal” state in utero with Freud’s account of object-less primary identification differs markedly 
from Kristeva’s own employment of primary identification in her own theoretical work. Kristeva herself 
rather exclusively appropriates primary identification in terms that follow what we have called “model-
based” identification, which she can be found assigning both to the maternal body and to the later introduc-
tion of the paternal/Symbolic/linguistic order. Cf. Kristeva, Histoires d’amour, 27-58 (Tales of Love, 21-
56). The closest thing to a distant inspiration for my own combination of Kristeva’s theorization of the ma-
ternal body and Freudian identification can be found in Sara Beardsworth’s explorations of how Kristeva’s 
theory of sublimated maternal love might provide an alternative account of the irreducibly death-driven 
modern subject. Cf. Sara Beardsworth, “From Nature in Love: The Problem of Subjectivity in Adorno and 
Freudian Psychoanalysis,” Continental Philosophy Review 40, no. 4 (2007): 365-87. 
105 Cf. Plato, Timaeus, 48e4, 49a5-6, 52a8, and 52d3. 
106 Julia Kristeva, La révolution du langage poétique; l’avant-garde à la fin du XIXe siècle, Lautréamont et 
Mallarmé (Paris: Seuil, 1974), 22-30 (Partial ET: Revolution in Poetic Language, trans. Margaret Waller 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), 25-30). 
107 Histoires d’amour, 45 (Tales of Love, 40).   
108 Kristeva expresses this juxtaposition between a static stasis and an active state of equilibrium by refer-
ring to ongoing rhythms of “stases.” Cf. Kristeva, La révolution du langage poétique, 23 (Revolution in 
Poetic Language, 25). 
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from another body in order to be.”109 Similarly, the dawning of egoic subjectivity entails a 
kind of abjection that we just glimpsed in Freud as the pre-reflective ground of desire: by 
abjecting that which is “not-I,” we not only enact the circumscription that founds what 
we will later signify as “I,”  but there is simultaneously opened up a “space” in which the 
“not-I” can be desired precisely because it can now be known as an/other object. Howev-
er, the necessary catch to this concept of abjection, which we will have to carefully attend 
to in assimilating this psychoanalytic insight to Aquinas’s account of the appetites, is that 
everything that is abjected simultaneously bears an unconscious mark of hate and pain. 
As Kristeva repeatedly makes clear, we abject “things” precisely because the separation 
of their absence caused us pain and thereby marred the ideal pleasure of active fusion 
with “them.” In translating the Freudian account of primary identification, we will need 
to carefully account for this reactionary tendency to the pain of separation that both Kris-
teva and Freud associate with primary identification. We will return to this necessary im-
plication when we discuss the nature of ambivalence below. 
 For the moment, however, let us return to our reading of Freud himself. Notably, 
despite his later suggestive comments, Freud does not choose either the mother or her 
breast(s) as his chief example for primary identification in The Ego and the Id. In fact, he 
only speaks of the breast as the prototype of erotic object-cathexis.110 Instead, as we saw 
above and to which we will return in a moment, Freud most often speaks, problematically 
as it turns out, of identification in terms of the “father” of one’s personal prehistory. It is 
worth nothing, nonetheless, that Freud does offer one other example of primary identifi-
                                                
109 Pouvoirs de l’horreur, 17 (Powers of Horror, 10). 
110 Cf. Freud, The Ego and the Id, SA 3:299/SE 19:31-32. 
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cation in The Ego and the Id that achieves an analogous level of clarity with his later “I 
am the breast” aphorism. This example comes in his description of the circumstances in 
which the receptive mechanism of identification can break down into a pathological con-
dition of multiplicity. As Freud writes, “If [the ego’s object-identifications] obtain the 
upper hand and become too numerous, unduly powerful and incompatible with one an-
other, a pathological outcome will not be far off.”111 Which pathological outcome? 
Freud’s description of the “disruption of the ego” that can follow is hauntingly evocative: 
“Perhaps the secret of the cases of what is described as ‘multiple personality’ is that the 
different identifications seize hold of consciousness [das Bewußtsein an sich reißen] in 
turn.”112 Even at this point we can observe the strangeness of a mechanism that is simul-
taneously capable of triggering the formation of the ego’s self-integration and the col-
lapse of that fragile intensive unity into the immediacy of unsynthesized—and, in the 
most tragic cases, unsynthesizable—identificatory fragments because there is no egoic 
self to do the synthesizing.  
 Instead of doggedly following this train of thought plotted by primary identifica-
tion, however, Freud more often trades its idiosyncratic immediacy for a secondary iden-
tification in which the subject identifies with the object as a model for its emulation. The 
best way to illustrate this tendency is to unpack the conceptual imprecision reflected in 
Freud’s employment of the so-called “father” of one’s personal prehistory, which he 
acknowledges can be any beloved authority figure regardless of gender,113 as the para-
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digm for identification. On the one hand, it is precisely in connection with this archaic 
“father” that Freud unequivocally declares that identification occurs earlier than “any ob-
ject-cathexis [jede Objektbesetzung].” On the other hand, despite such a declaration it 
quickly becomes clear that Freud most often employs the concept in ways that reinstate 
the authoritative father as an object that the child wishes “to be [sein].”114 Here we have 
an identification in which the father is “taken as a model [Vatervorbild]”115 for the child’s 
emulation.  
Freud then bases his most prominent explanation of the ego-ideal on this very dif-
ferent version of identification. From this standpoint, the ego emerges as the graded dif-
ferentiation between one’s self-awareness (ego) and the unconsciously introjected ideals 
(“You ought to be like this” and “You may not be like this”)116 of one’s archaic identifica-
tions (ego-ideal). Therefore, the ego-ideal’s critical agency represents the internalized 
“representative of our relation to our parents,”117 whose influence was then reaffirmed 
through other “authorit[ies], religious teaching, schooling, and reading.”118 As Freud 
summarizes, “When we were little children we knew these higher natures, we admired 
them and feared them; and later we took them into ourselves.”119 As a result, these origi-
nal identifications repeatedly and enduringly “confron[t] the other contents of the ego as 
an ego ideal.”120 
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There is, to be sure, an uncanny accuracy about Freud’s explanation of the ego-
ideal’s origins that cannot simply be disregarded. Undoubtedly, much of the critical 
agency of one’s conscience represents a kind of reawakening of some of our most pro-
foundly unconscious bonds. Any alteration to Freud’s theorization must, at the very least, 
offer an equally satisfying explanation of this phenomenon. Nonetheless the weakness of 
Freud’s heavy dependence on secondary identification in order to explain the differentia-
tion between the ego and the ego-ideal is that it reinstates an ego-like awareness of the 
self into the very formation of the ego’s self-differentiation. As soon as one speaks of 
identification in terms of the adoption of an emulative “model,” one has already assumed 
a differentiation between self and another that makes such emulation possible—”I am not 
that (not-I), but I want to be that”—in the first place. Once this shift has taken place, the 
claim that identification takes place “earlier than any object-cathexis” is rendered inco-
herent. Talk of an idealized model always presupposes some kind of object-cathexis 
made possible by an ego’s self-differentiated awareness. Just as Augustine always snaps 
back to positing a primal epistemic unity of the self despite the opposite direction that his 
own rhetoric suggests, so does Freud also lapse back in the ego’s primal self-awareness 
despite the suggestive nature of his rhetoric concerning primary identification. 
To continue the comparison: Just as Augustine’s dilemma arose because of limita-
tions in his metaphysics and epistemology that guided his convictions regarding the way 
the analogy between God and humans beings had to be drawn, so also can the most obvi-
ous explanation for Freud’s dilemma be found in his most deeply held intellectual and 
clinical conviction: the primacy of sexual etiology for all psychic phenomena. From this 
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perspective, the sexual theory and secondary identification, despite the fact the latter con-
cept is desexualized in its rhetoric, stand in parallel relation to one another because they 
both presuppose a basic egoic awareness of the subject/object distinction that makes the 
elemental form of their desires possible (i.e. I do not have/I want; I am not/I want to be). 
In a passage near the end of The Ego and the Id that again contradicts his earlier descrip-
tion of identification as prior to any object-cathexis, Freud underlines this parallel when 
he explicitly describes identification (in the sense of a model) as a sublimation of sexual 
libido: “Every such identification is in the nature of a desexualization or even of a subli-
mation.”121 In addition to this sublimation thesis, Freud’s deep commitment to the central-
ity of the Oedipus complex also repeatedly aids in this overarching tendency to assimilate 
the identification theory back into the sexual theory. It serves him in this end because the 
triangular terms of the Oedipus complex require a primal sexual attraction to one (or 
both) of the parents that then elicits an identificatory relation (of the model type) to the 
opposite parent (e.g. “I erotically want mom/dad has mom/I want to be (like) dad”). In 
both cases, the parallel between secondary identification and the sexual libido furnishes 
Freud with the conceptual opening for reinstating the primacy of the sexual theory.  
There is, however, another possible variable in play for explaining why Freud 
seems to habitually work against the implications of his own rhetoric regarding primary 
identification. This factor is much more subtle, if not necessarily less decisive. Is it possi-
ble that primary identification too closely resembles the depersonalization of hypnotism 
that Freud had attempted to reject decisively in founding psychoanalysis? If primary 
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identification entails a radical receptivity such that the “object” is perceived qua perceiv-
er, then there emerges at this point the outline of the aforementioned resemblance to hyp-
nosis that is striking enough to invite further inquiry. For in deep hypnotism there occurs 
an immediate translation of the hypnotist’s second-person suggestions into first-person—
is it too much to say?—identifications. As Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen writes: 
The other, in hypnosis, does not appear as other, and if the subject does recognize 
himself in the other it is rather by totally identifying with him […] To grasp this, 
we have only to think of hypnosis by verbal suggestion, as Freud [himself] de-
scribed it, for example in “Psychical Treatment” [1905]. The hypnotist says, “You 
are falling asleep,” and voilà, I fall asleep. He says, “You are smelling a flower,” 
and I smell the fragrance. He says, “You see a snake,” and I see the reptile, I am 
afraid, and I cry out. It would be totally false to claim that an I is submitting or re-
sponding to another here. In reality, “I” am spoken by the other, I come into the 
place of the other—who, by the same token, is no longer an other but rather “my-
self” in my undecidable identity of somnambulistic ego.122 
 
Such a description of hypnotism conspicuously chimes with Freud’s own descriptions 
and examples of primary identification’s operations in the absence of an ego whether pri-
or to its formation (i.e. I am the breast) or its collapse (i.e. I am another personality). It is 
also reminiscent of Freud’s early encounters with the ego’s fragility and capacity for un-
expectedly “disappearing” even though the individual remains awake (i.e. not sleeping). 
Is it possible that Freud’s alternations on identification ran along the same habitual track 
as his admitted “hostility” to hypnosis, despite the fact that his clinical observations al-
ways prompted these themes to appear again in his writings? Answering that question 
affirmatively seems more likely when we glimpse how hypnosis and suggestion also re-
turned—as we will see in a moment—in the crucial role played by transference in the 
psychoanalytic cure. In the end, however, definitively answering the genealogical ques-
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tion vis-à-vis Freud is not our primary concern in this chapter. Nonetheless: the dynamics 
that justify the question are entirely relevant for gesturing towards the direction of our 
main task of seeing how the fertile inconsistencies of Freud’s theories might be reappro-
priated—via Aquinas—for a reconfigured theorization of the emergence of egoic self-
consciousness from within the fertile plurality of an individual’s primary identifications.   
d. Transference, the Talking Cure, and the Return of Hypnotic Suggestion 
As I mentioned at the outset of this section, Freud’s break with Breuer and cathartic hyp-
notism did not end up triggering a wholesale reconstruction of his understanding of the 
talking cure and its therapeutic relation to psychic pathology. Even in “psychoanalysis 
proper,” the cure continued to depend on the intentional repetition of some aspect of the 
unconscious within a context that allows it to be assimilated into egoic consciousness, 
thus breaking the involuntary repetitions of the symptoms through the dual media of the 
patient’s self-narration and the analyst’s didactic interventions. As Freud asks and an-
swers in The Ego and the Id, “How does [an unconscious] thing become conscious? […] 
Through becoming connected with the word-presentations [Wortvortsellungen] corre-
sponding to it.”123 Through this process of facilitating the assimilation of the unconscious 
into the ego’s self-integration, psychoanalysis—in one of Freud’s most sweeping declara-
tions—enables “the ego to achieve a progressive conquest of the id.”124 
Nonetheless, at first glance the claim that the problems raised by Freud’s dilemma 
regarding the ego’s formation are echoed within the psychoanalytic technique itself 
seems unlikely since it is on this conceptual ground more than any other that Freud 
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claimed to be differentiating himself most decisively from Breuer’s method of hypnosis. 
From this perspective, the key break between Breuer’s technique and Freud’s subsequent 
method of “free association” is bound up with their different conceptions of what kind of 
repetition of unconscious material is required to break the cycle of pathological symp-
toms. In Breuer’s method, the goal of hypnosis was to access and trigger a repetition of 
the traumatic event in its “status nascendi,”125 literally to reenact psychically and affec-
tively the event as accurately as possible. In theory, this “return” to the event allowed it to 
be cathartically “discharged” in the way that it failed to be in the wake of the event’s 
original occurrence.  
In contrast, as I referenced above, Freud’s method of free association takes it for 
granted that repetitions of the unconscious are decipherable within the dynamics of egoic 
consciousness itself and thus no altered state of hypnosis is necessary. The possible range 
of these clues is incredibly diverse. They can be the pathological symptoms themselves 
(e.g. hallucinations, hysterical triggers, or psychosomatic indications such as a tick or a 
cough), the affective character of the patient’s speech, or (most centrally to Freud) the 
apparently random connections that arise in a patient’s description of whatever comes 
into their mind. The patient, of course, remains wholly ignorant of this influence (and the 
clues) without the intervention of the analyst. However, a good analyst should be able to 
discern the pathological repetitions of the unconscious as the patient follows psychoanal-
ysis’s fundamental rule [Grundregel] of free association: “that whatever comes into one’s 
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head must be reported without criticizing it.”126 On this methodological basis, Freud com-
pares the work of those following his technique to that carried out by a kind of psycho-
logical smelter: “from the raw materials of the patient’s associations,” the analyst “[ex-
tracts] the pure metal of valuable unconscious thoughts” and is able to direct the patient 
accordingly.127 
 Of all the clues that he could cite as a sign of the unconscious’s influence, none 
became more decisive for Freud and psychoanalysis than the unexpected phenomenon of 
transference. Succinctly defined, transferences (Übertragungen) occur when some past 
psychic bond—whether a parental relation, an erotic-interest, or a traumatic event—is 
revived within the relation between the patient and the analyst. As Freud writes in Frag-
ment of an Analysis of a Case of Hysteria (1905): 
What are transferences? They are new editions or facsimiles of the impulses and 
phantasies which are aroused and made conscious during the progress of the anal-
ysis; but they have this peculiarity, which is characteristic for their species, that 
they replace some earlier person by the person of the physician. To put it another 
way: a whole series of psychological experiences are revived, not as belonging to 
the past, but as applying to the person of the physician at the present moment.128 
 
Though at first bewildering, Freud’s clinical observations chime with the wider experi-
ence that our most formational relational bonds, especially our earliest familial attach-
ments beginning in infancy, have an outsized influence upon our later habits, desirous 
tastes, and relational predilections. It is as if our most pivotal relational bonds are so 
formative that they create in us “prototypes [Vorbilder],”129 which Freud also calls “infan-
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tile imagos [infantile Imagines]”130 (e.g. a father-imago, a mother-imago, a the brother-
imago),131 that can be aroused when someone or something triggers an unconscious reviv-
al of those prototypes. Based upon these ingrained prototypes, we then “approach every 
new person whom [we meet]” with these imagos serving as “libidinal anticipatory ideas 
[libidinösen Erwartungsvorstellungen]” that await being revived all over again.132 This is 
the basis of Freud’s declaration that the “essential character of every state of being in 
love [Verliebheit]” consists in its being a “new [edition] of old traits” and a repetition of 
“infantile reactions.”133 
 The resulting transferential repetitions, as Freud continues within the specific 
clinical example, can either be a nearly identical reproduction with the exception of sub-
stituting the analyst for the original bond or they can blend or attach the preceding model 
with “some real peculiarity in the physician’s person or circumstances.”134 The former 
pattern Freud calls an “unchanged reprint” (unveränderte Neuauflage) of the same psy-
chic “model” (Vorbild)135 whereas the latter occurrence constitutes a genuinely “revised 
edition” (Neubearbeitung )136 of the original. In addition to these variations, the underly-
ing model for a transferential relation can entail both affectionate (viz. positive transfer-
ence) and/or hostile (viz. negative transference) feelings toward the analyst.137 This being 
said, it does seem that Freud most often encountered clinical transferences that were ap-
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parently directly amorous and erotic. Thus, he writes often on how to professionally and 
therapeutically manage a patient who openly declares that “she has fallen in love, as any 
other mortal woman might, with the doctor who is analysing her.”138  
 From Freud’s perspective, the most obvious explanation for the occurrence of 
transference is that it is simply another of the ego’s defensive strategies to keep the truth 
of unconsciously repressed material from emerging into consciousness. The clinical evi-
dence for this explanation can easily be found, and as Freud observes in detail, in the fact 
that patients who are caught in a transference inevitably grow more resistant to analysis 
and therefore to the resolution of their symptoms.139 This resistance emerges because the 
therapeutic relation gradually becomes displaced in the patient’s mind as they become 
increasingly convinced that the transferential relation is actually the defining—the “re-
al”—relation with the analyst.  
Even though he would always maintain that there is a definite defensive element 
in transference, two realizations eventually caused Freud to see transference as a neces-
sary cornerstone to analytic treatment and therefore “one of the foundations [Grundla-
gen] of the psychoanalytic theory.”140 First, based upon his repeated clinical experiences 
he realized that there are certain elements intrinsic to the analytic relation, specifically its 
promotion of dependent vulnerability, trust, authority, and self-disclosure, that make it 
inevitable that it will become a site of transference for the patient (also perhaps the ana-
lyst as well). As Freud writes, transference will occur “without fail.”141 Accordingly, the 
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analyst must always keep in mind that such transferential feelings have been “provoked 
by the analytic situation”142 and thus, in this precise sense, are “unreal.”143 Second, it 
gradually dawned on Freud that transferences actually mark an unexpectedly “live” ap-
pearance—he is even willing to compare it the “summoning of a spirit”144—of the uncon-
scious’s compulsion to repeat that has fortuitously fertile implications for the analytic re-
lation and its therapeutic aims. Far from being an obstacle to a patient’s treatment, it turns 
out for Freud that transference holds the key for “curbing the patient’s compulsion to re-
peat.”145 “For,” as Freud continues in the paranormal motif, “when all is said and done, it 
is impossible to destroy anyone in absentia or in effigie.”146 
What is the nature of this therapeutic window that transference opens for psycho-
analysis? There are two sides to answering this question that have to be addressed: the 
analyst-side and the patient-side. From the perspective of the analyst, transference serves 
the dual purpose of discovery and intervention. As discovery, by provoking the transfer-
ential repetition to proceed, the analyst learns more about the patient’s unconscious than 
they could likely narrate on their own. To borrow Wittgenstein’s famous juxtaposition, 
even though the subject’s unconscious has yet to be said (i.e. translated into words), in 
transference it shows itself to the analyst.147 As Freud writes in “Remembering, Repeat-
ing, and Working-Through” (1914): 
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We render the compulsion [to repeat] harmless, and indeed useful, by giving it the 
right to assert itself in a definite field. We admit it into the transference as a play-
ground in which it is allowed to expand in almost complete freedom and in which 
it is expected to display [vorzuführen] to us everything in the way of pathogenic 
instincts that is hidden in the patient’s mind.148 
 
Shortly thereafter, Freud makes it clear that this enacted display coincides with an open-
ing for the analyst’s therapeutic intervention:   
The transference thus creates an intermediate region between illness and real life 
through which the transition from the one to the other is made. The new condition 
has taken all the features of the illness; but it represents an artificial illness which 
is at every point accessible to our intervention.149  
 
By providing “especially favorable conditions”150 for transference to arise, psychoanalysis 
promotes a controlled space in which, almost paradoxically, a patient’s unconsciousness 
reveals its influential compulsions even as it simultaneously opens itself up to therapeutic 
counter-influence.  
 In response to this therapeutic opening provided by transference, the intervention 
formally begins with the analyst breaking off or “dissolving” (Auflösung) the transferen-
tial relation by explaining its unconsciously repetitive roots to the patient. Through the 
analyst’s explanation, the transference is rendered perceptible to the patient’s conscious-
ness: 
The transference is made conscious to the patient by the analyst, and it is resolved 
by convincing him that in his transference attitude he is re-experiencing [wie-
dererleben] emotional relations which had their origin in his earliest object at-
tachments during the repressed period of his childhood.151 
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Once “acquainted” with the unconscious roots of their pathology and transference,152 at 
least as Freud tells it, the patient’s resistance to the therapeutic effects of consciously 
“remembering” and narrating instead of repeating quickly ensue. As Freud summarizes, 
“From the repetitive reactions which are exhibited in the transference we are led along 
the familiar paths to the awakening of the memories, which appear without difficulty, as 
it were, after the resistance has been overcome.”153 
 Despite the eloquent and even convincing nature of the analyst’s role of discovery 
and intervention, it is precisely here that Freud finds himself eerily close to realigning the 
psychoanalytic cure with Breuer’s hypnosis. For the patient who is caught in the involun-
tary repetitions of transference, and yet is simultaneously unusually open to the counter-
influence of the analyst, bears a striking resemblance to the hypnotized subject who is 
receptive to suggestion. Strangely enough, not even Freud himself could deny the analo-
gy between the transferential intervention and hypnotic suggestion. On several occasions 
he seems to admit the point. As he writes in “Dynamics of Transference,” “[We] readily 
admit that the results of psychoanalysis rest upon suggestion.”154 Or even more unset-
tlingly in his Introductory Lectures, “[It dawns on us] that in our technique we have 
abandoned hypnosis only to rediscover suggestion in the shape of transference.”155  
 Faced with this rediscovery of hypnosis, Freud tries to save psychoanalysis from 
being assimilated to hypnotherapy by emphasizing that psychoanalysis provokes trans-
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ference solely in order to break it off, to dissolve it by making the patient aware of it. As 
he continues in his Introductory Lectures: 
It is this last characteristic which is the fundamental distinction between analytic 
and purely suggestive therapy and which frees the results of analysis from the 
suspicion of being successes due to suggestion. In every other kind of suggestive 
treatment the transference is carefully persevered and left untouched; in analysis it 
is itself subjected to treatment and is dissected in all the shapes in which it ap-
pears. At the end of an analytic treatment the transference itself must be cleaned 
away.156 
 
But to simply insist that the transference is permanently “dissolved” in its conscious as-
similation is in the end to simply beg the questions regarding the native suggestibility of 
human beings, and its relation to the ego’s formation and function, that transference rais-
es once again. On what basis can one assume that suggestibility is ever terminated? 
Might the ego itself emerge simply as an epiphenomenal byproduct of this more primal 
state of suggestibility, the mirage of the self-aware first-person who is actually “spoken 
into being” by the word(s) of hypnotic powers?  Or as Borch-Jacobsen pushes the point: 
“In the end, is psychoanalysis” really just one “long-drawn-out suggestion?”157  
 If Freud offers any rejoinder to such an accusation, it only arrives—and indeed 
only in an inchoate state—when he shifts from evaluating the therapeutic window opened 
by transference from the perspective of the analyst to that of the patient. In these scattered 
comments, Freud focuses less on the suggestive role of the analyst and even the corre-
sponding, mostly passive, “remembering” that it prompts in the patient. Instead, he 
speaks about the open-ended state of immanent struggle that analysis triggers in the pa-
tient. As he writes near the end of “Remembering, Repeating, and Working-Through,” 
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merely naming the transferential resistance can never “result in its immediate cessation.” 
Instead: 
One must allow the patient time to become more conversant with this resistance 
with which he has now become acquainted, to work through it [ihn 
durchzuarbeiten], to overcome it, by continuing, in defiance of it, the analytic 
work according to the fundamental rule of analysis. Only when the resistance is at 
its height can the analyst, working in common [gemeinsamer Arbeit] with his pa-
tient, discover the repressed instinctual impulses which are feeding the resistance; 
and it is this kind of experience which convinces the patient of the existence and 
power of such impulses.158 
 
In this portrayal of the psychoanalytic cure, we discover the patient as thrown into a 
mixed state of internal conflict. On the one hand, she is still perceiving the immanent im-
pulses that emanate from the transference. But, on the other hand, she is also bidden to 
contribute—in gemeinsamer Arbeit with the analyst—something herself: an effort to 
overcome these impulses, to defy them, and thereby work through them.  
What immanent power could be responsible for this “overcoming”? In one sense, 
one could simply reference the ego’s consciousness itself, since the “making conscious” 
of unconscious impulses has always been an essential part of the psychoanalytic cure. 
Even so, and as the above passage attests, Freud seems cognizant of the therapeutic limi-
tations of merely making something transparently conscious. This awareness is also evi-
dent in a small number of passages in which Freud, working against his own reductive 
tendencies, attributes this power to overcome, to resist the transferential resistance, not 
with consciousness itself per se, but with the still higher powers of the intellectual pro-
cesses. As he writes near the end of “The Dynamics of Transference:”  
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The doctor tries to compel him to fit these emotional impulses [that arise from 
transference] into the nexus of the treatment and of his life-history, to submit 
them to intellectual consideration and to understand them in the light of their psy-
chical value. This struggle between the doctor and the patient, between intellect 
and instinctual life, between understanding and seeking to act, is played out al-
most exclusively in the phenomena of transference. It is on that field that the vic-
tory must be won the victory whose expression is the permanent cure of the neu-
rosis.159  
 
To be sure, there is no justification at all for simply taking an evocative reference to intel-
lect in Freud and using it as a straightforward rhetorical portal in which to import all of 
the considerable conceptual freight that comes with Aquinas’s intellectus. Freud’s system 
of thought has an integrity unto itself, even if there are serious reasons to doubt its ex-
planatory consistency. Instead, the overarching justification of the Thomist translation to 
follow ultimately rests in explaining the preponderance of anthropological data with 
which Freud was concerned in a more satisfying and coherent way than he was able to 
accomplish on his own terms. Nonetheless, the question of what human power might be 
capable of having a therapeutic effect upon desiderative impulses that have a kind of in-
voluntary freedom of their own is certainly suggestive of the relation that we will end up 
theorizing as existing in the human soul between identification, transference, and the 
higher powers of intelligence.   
II. The Identifying Part of the Soul: An Initial Step in Applying Aquinas’s Solution 
 
Having outlined the inconsistencies that emerge from Freud’s dilemma in tracing the 
ego’s developmental origins and its ongoing fragility/therapeutic significance, we can 
proceed now to the constructive task of translating Freud’s account in conversation with 
Aquinas’s solution to Augustine’s dilemma and the theological anthropology that issues 
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from it. As I made clear in the opening of the chapter, what follows here is an initial step 
in the effort to translate Freud’s insights into a Thomist framework that will furnish the 
conceptual materials necessary for completing this constructive proposal in Chapter 5 in 
conversation with the broader questions regarding the origins and theological significance 
of self-consciousness and its relation to the three other types of intensive unity (i.e. the 
soul, self-knowledge, and appetitive). Having gained a familiarity with Freud’s dilemma 
and terminology, I can elaborate a bit more on this division of labor between the chapters.  
The remaining work in this chapter is split into two subsections. In the first, my 
goal is to develop a way of thinking and talking about identification as a kind of appre-
hensive power that is paired with a correlative appetitive power analogous to the sensitive 
and intellective appetites. Together these form what I have called the identifying layer of 
the soul. From the outset I have indicated the path along which this description will pro-
ceed: it begins with the suggestive clue of what Freud speaks of as primary identification 
and seeks not only to undo Freud’s conceptual evasion of its implications, but also to re-
render it in terms that are broadly commensurate with Aquinas’s metaphysics and theo-
logical anthropology. By reformulating primary identification in this manner we will be 
able to separate out its distinct capacities from that of the sexual appetite—as Freud con-
sistently fails to do—even as we will manage to incorporate several of the important de-
velopmental insights from the sexual theory without falling into its attendant circular pit-
falls that we witnessed above. As will become clear both in this chapter and the next, the 
most decisive of these insights to retain from the sexual theory have to do with the infan-
tile origins of ambivalence in alternations between love/hate in response to the pres-
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ence/absence of beloved “objects” and the resulting crisis of pain that ultimately hastens 
the “defensive” formation of the ego’s self-integration. In addition to outlining what I 
mean by the identifying apprehensive and appetitive powers, in this subsection I will also 
describe how these powers vertically “fit into” the Aristotelian/Thomist tripartite soul and 
draw some initial clarifying gains that accrue to the varieties of consciousness and appe-
tite based upon this account. Following the main arguments of this subsection, I will re-
turn to consider briefly how we might re-theorize the relationship between primary iden-
tification and sexuality on the other side of clearly decoupling the two capacities.  
Based upon these initial descriptions, I will then proceed in Chapter 5 to put this 
account to work, so to speak, in offering a proposal regarding the developmental origins 
of self-consciousness as a fourth type of intensive unity and the multi-dimensional verti-
cal relation that can then be described between identification and intelligence. This last 
step of transposition will incorporate attention to (1) the developmental process that 
Freud explores under the rubric of the ego’s constitution as a “precipitate” of lost “object-
cathexes,” (2) post-egoic phenomena such as trauma, hypnosis, transference, and the in-
fluence of the ego-ideal, that each can be theorized as either a regression to or a deriva-
tive effect of primary identification and (3) the self-organizing, therapeutic powers that 
he variously assigns to the ego, self-narration, and the intellect. In light of explicitly de-
ferring discussion of both the ego’s formation and the post-egoic phenomena cited above, 
I want to be clear at the outset in order to avoid some of the conceptual confusion that 
mars the brilliance of The Ego and the Id: unless otherwise indicated, all references to 
identification in the following subsections should be taken as referring to the archaic op-
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erations of primary identification, i.e. in a pre-reflective state prior to the emergence of 
self-consciousness or, as Freud has it, prior to any “object-cathexis” that presupposes the 
ego’s consciousness.  
In choosing to focus here on primary identification I am conscious that I am risk-
ing putting synthesis ahead of analysis. What I mean by this is that the postulation of 
primary identification depends upon the analysis of post-egoic phenomena such as those 
that drew the interest of Freud in the first place (e.g. hypnotic states, hallucinations, trans-
ference, and the fragile self-organization of the “ego”). Based upon observing this data, 
Freud’s “analysis” led him down the path of his “archeology of the subject,” which runs 
parallel to the Aristotelian search for causes, at the end of which he theorized the interact-
ing mechanisms of primary identification, the instinctual urges of the id, and the modify-
ing influence of sense-perceptions as explanations for the “later” phenomena. The results 
of such an analytic search can then be presented in the characteristic systematic ordering 
of a subject matter according to its basic causes and principles (e.g. a metapsychology, a 
metaphysics, a summa or system of theology).160 By beginning with primary identifica-
tion, I am in a way reversing this order.  
My reasons for doing so are in part rhetorical and in part strategic. Rhetorically, 
we have just followed Freud all the way down his analytic trail to arrive at his suggestive, 
but ultimately systematically unsatisfying, conclusions, especially regarding primary 
identification. For the sake of brevity, it seems wise to not repeat a description of all the 
relevant data, but instead to build our systematic presentation from here by retracing our 
                                                
160 Lonergan concisely lays out the relation between analysis and synthesis in The Triune God: Systematics, 
12:61.  
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path through Freud by building a cumulative case for why this modified account of pri-
mary identification explains both the formation of what Freud calls the ego and the origi-
nal post-egoic data more satisfactorily. Strategically, the power that Freud hits upon in 
identification almost inevitably, as his own rhetoric of the paranormal reflects, evokes 
bewilderment and calls for dismissal. On an intellectual level, as Freud’s and Augustine’s 
dilemmas illustrate, we struggle to port our post-self-conscious language and concepts 
into a framework agile enough to capture imaginatively and precisely any pre-reflective 
stage of being. On a more personal level, the specter of anything involuntary and imper-
sonal that precedes our self-awareness, endures “in” us without our knowledge, and that 
can potentially disrupt the self-unifying “I”-ness of our self-consciousness almost inevi-
tably engenders a stout defensiveness in the name of our illusions of total self-dominion. 
Accordingly, my strategic intent below is to try to capitalize on the initial presentation of 
Freud’s uneven conclusions by developing a framework to talk about identification that 
disarms some of these elements of resistance by beginning to normalize identification by 
placing it within a metaphysical setting broad and deep enough to support it. And even 
more than that: by speaking of identification as a power of the soul we open up the possi-
bility—which I will begin developing next chapter—that not only is there nothing intrin-
sically ab- or paranormal about identification, despite its capacities for pathology (like all 
human powers), but it is a potency created by God as good and teleologically ordered to 
the vertical flourishing and perfection of human beings. I have no doubt that for some 
readers that this means that the end of this chapter will seem anticlimactic because what 
follows is more descriptive than it is dramatically exhaustive. It is closer to a thought-
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experiment than it is to an airtight presentation. Its main purpose, however, is preparato-
ry. Its real test will come next chapter as we will put this theorization of identification to 
work in finally addressing the riddle regarding the developmental nexus between the im-
mediacy of a pre-reflective stage of life and the multilayered richness of self-
consciousness and intelligence that blossoms out of it.   
 One final prefatory note is in order. I am acutely aware of the number of meta-
physical and theological challenges that arise in trying to speak of another “part of the 
soul” in addition to the vegetative, sensitive, and intelligent layers that Aristotle and 
Aquinas elucidate so convincingly.161 My overall strategy in this particular work vis-à-vis 
these challenges is to make a persuasive enough prima facie case for the identifying pow-
ers, based upon the venerable Aristotelian axiom that powers are known by their opera-
tions and objects, that the challenges become worth addressing in detail as we go along 
here and in subsequent projects as well. Nonetheless, in the wake of the last three chap-
ters, at least four questions can be flagged immediately and some comment should be 
made as to when and to what degree I intend to take these up explicitly: 
1. What is the relationship of the identifying layer of the soul to other living 
creatures?  
2. To what degree are the identifying powers material and/or immaterial? 
3. Is there any analogous relationship between these powers and God?  
4. How are these powers related to the ascent of desire into intelligent union 
with God?  
 
Apart from a couple of scattered comments and footnotes, I am going to mostly leave the 
first question aside in this project for the sake of brevity and also due to my lack of spe-
                                                
161 This is in addition to the inherent challenges that come from importing such an ancient concept like the 
soul into a project that seeks to converse with two modern discourses such as psychoanalysis and the ori-
gins of self-consciousness. See my comments in the Introduction regarding these challenges and my ap-
proaches to them. Cf. pp. 29-51. 
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cialty knowledge regarding non-human animal behavior, biology and development.162 
Likewise, the second question I am also going to have to delay until a full discussion can 
be organized in another context. The contemporary discussion around materiality and its 
relationship to the kind of immaterial phenomena that Aristotle/Aquinas affirm is simply 
too vast—and ever expanding—to try to squeeze into the main path of our trajectory be-
fore even getting my constructive account of identification off the ground, so to speak.163 
                                                
162 My suspicion, however, is that there are good reasons to think that there are identifying powers in non-
human animals, especially because of the verified existence of hypnotic/trance-like behavior among them. 
Cf. n. 35 for citations related to this behavior. 
163 To elaborate on this bracketed point just briefly: the specific task of describing how identification fits 
into the Aristotelian/Thomist immaterial/material scheme would only be possible as a sub-task of the much 
larger enterprise of translating the Aristotelian/Thomist theory of forms in conversation with insights that 
stretch across the disciplinary variations of natural science (e.g. evolutionary/developmental biology, ther-
modynamics, neuroscience). This much larger task, and here I freely admit that I am drawing upon direc-
tions of research suggested to me by Paul J. DeHart (both in his work (cf. Paul J. DeHart, Aquinas and 
Radical Orthodoxy: A Critical Inquiry (New York: Routledge, 2012), 194-200, 24-25, n. 9) and in our per-
sonal conversations), is constituted by at least two pressing questions:  
(1) In light of modern science’s analysis of the complexity and necessity of the material bases of 
higher human operations such as understanding and willing, what exactly do we mean by these 
operations being in some way enduringly “immaterial”? The point is important not only because 
the intellectual justifications first articulated by Aristotle’s regarding the immateriality of the intel-
lect remain entirely compelling, but also because the literal attribution of intelligence to God de-
pends on its operations being immaterial (cf. ST I.14.1). In terms of the most promising thought in 
answering this question, I know of no better resources than the exacting thought of James F. Ross. 
Cf. “Immaterial Aspects of Thought,” 136-50; “Adapting Aquinas,” 41-58; and Thought and 
World.  
(2) How might the Aristotelian/Thomist layers of the soul be reclassified in terms of their hierarchical 
similarities and differences in relation to the immateriality of intelligence? Vis-à-vis their similari-
ties, there is promise in thinking through the various systems that underlie the capacities grouped 
together by Aristotle/Aquinas in terms of energy differentials and an increasing complexity of 
processes that are dependent on the fertility of lower-level processes, but are equally irreducible to 
those lower-processes. See, e.g., Nancey Murphy and William R. Stoeger, eds., Evolution and 
Emergence: Systems, Organisms, Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Edward Pols, 
Mind Regained (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998); and Alicia Juarrero, Dynamics in 
Acction: Intentional Behavior as a Complex System (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999). Vis-à-vis 
their differences, the modern notion of “downward causality,” which aims at describing the way in 
which higher-processes can effect changes in lower-level processes, bears a striking resemblance 
to the executive role that Aristotle/Aquinas attribute to intelligence. See, e.g., Charles T. 
Campbell, “Downward Causation,” in Studies in the Philosophy of Biology: Reduction and 
Related Problems, ed. Francisco José Ayala and Theodosius Dobzhansky (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1974), 179-86 and Nancey Murphy, George F. R. Ellis, and Timothy O’Connor, 
eds., Downward Causation and the Neurobiology of Free Will (Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer, 
2009). Both of these aspects obviously converge quite promisingly with Lonergan’s notion of ver-
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I am, however, happy to say the last two questions will be addressed rather substantively 
toward the latter half of next chapter. For now, however, we can proceed with the first 
step of the aforementioned prima facie case for existence and distinctive operations of the 
identifying powers. 
a. The Identifying Powers of the Soul: Identification and Its Appetitive Affections 
In transitioning back to Aquinas’s metaphysical framework, we are instantly faced with a 
conundrum: given the Aristotelian axiom that the soul’s powers and acts are ordered ac-
cording to their generic objects, what could it mean to speak of a generic “object” of a 
power of identification? If, as I have argued above and now reaffirm, primary identifica-
tion has its definition in the radical receptivity of perceiving sensations qua perceiver—as 
the completion of an intensive self-unity—then we already find ourselves in a conceptual 
territory that is in a way quite different than Aquinas’s account of sensitive and intellec-
tual apprehension. For both of these acts presuppose that they terminally yield knowledge 
qua object, viz. the (sensible or intelligible) form of the known object in the knower. To 
be sure, describing identification metaphysically will stretch Aquinas’s concepts beyond 
his own use of them. My intent, however, is to stretch them, not to break them, and in the 
process honor them by trying to expand the reach of their explanatory analysis of reality, 
of being and beings, according to its causes. 
 We can begin this stretching by making two observations that together open an 
initial space for considering identification as an apprehensive faculty. First, it does not 
take much straining of the imagination to see that primary identification has a family re-
                                                                                                                                            
tical finality (and its antecedents in Aristotle and Aquinas). Cf. Lonergan, “Finality, Love, and 
Marriage,” 19-23.  
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semblance to other acts of apprehension. If apprehensive faculties entail having “within 
itself something which is outside it,”164 then identification’s receptivity can be seen as an 
especially immediate, intimate, and lasting kind of interiorization of sensations into the 
individual. Second, Freud himself presupposes in his own way that identification depends 
on data received from sense-perceptions. This suggests that identification has an analo-
gous relationship to intellectual apprehension: sensitive data is a necessary preamble to 
both of their distinctive operations. Or, to put it differently, the identifying layer of the 
soul is vertically higher than the sensitive layer, even though, as I will argue at length 
next chapter, it remains operatively lower than the intellectual layer. 
But exactly how might we describe the relationship between the sensitive powers 
and the identifying powers? We already know that specifying the positive relationship 
between sensitivity and intelligence brought about one of Aristotle’s decisive contribu-
tions to Aquinas’s transposition of Augustine’s theory of (self-)knowledge: the active in-
tellect illuminates the repeating patterns of the intelligible species as they are presented in 
the sensitive phantasms, which then moves the passive intellect to its proper acts under-
standing and judging. Where could we look for an analogous link between sensitivity and 
the powers of identification? If we can answer that question successfully, then we might 
be able to articulate something analogous to a sensible or intelligible form as that which 
moves the identifying faculty to its act of radical receptivity. 
Based upon Freud’s insights, the most likely candidate for such a link would ap-
pear to be sensitive forms that elicit—usually repeatedly—passions of pleasure and/or 
                                                
164 Aquinas, ST I.59.2. 
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pain.165 Furthermore, if, as my proposal presupposes, identification precedes self-
consciousness and the operations of intelligence, then the only type of sensible forms that 
could furnish this link are those that, as Aquinas precisely describes and we outlined last 
chapter, are pleasurable (or painful) to the senses themselves and thus require no degree 
of rational judgment for discerning their goodness. However, the analytical task of refin-
ing this initial clue as to how and under what conditions the identifying faculty is moved 
to its act requires careful attention to several different features of identification that we 
have already touched upon above. For instance, identification does not follow just any 
given pleasurable or painful sensation. If it did, not only would it be much more difficult 
to articulate the differences between sensitivity and identification, but identification’s ac-
tive term would quickly lose its characteristic of completing and perpetuating an inten-
sive wholeness because identificatory acts would end up being as numerous and diverse 
as the pleasurable/painful sensations themselves.   
Instead, identification seems to be a power that is moved to its act through the 
confluence of several causes. There is a certain analogy to be made here with an eye that 
requires certain elements to be in place in order to see (e.g. to be open, to have a light 
source, to not be organically impaired).166 If we look to Freud and Kristeva for insight, 
there are two causes that suggest themselves as particularly decisive in “opening” the 
identifying faculty to its receptive act: (1) a spontaneous arrangement (concomitant or 
sequentially ordered) of intense and/or repeatedly pleasurable or painful sensations and 
                                                
165 Even though most of the examples cited below will reference sensible forms that elicit pleasurable pas-
sions, in order to account later on for phenomena such as melancholia and trauma it will be necessary for us 
to maintain throughout that identification can be moved by painful sensations as well. 
166 However, as we will see further on, the relative exposure of the identifying faculty is neither as binary 
nor as tied to the will’s direct agency as is the movement of an eyelid. 
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(2) the recent disruption of an active state of identificatory fusion. Expressed very broad-
ly, the first variable furnishes the “formal content” that moves the identifying faculty to 
act. It also expresses, as we will see in a moment, a central aspect of identification’s ver-
tical relation to sensitivity. Similarly, the second variable explains the ostensible contin-
gency of the identifying faculty’s being “open” to new acts of primary identification that 
disproportionately occurs during the pre-egoic period of infancy. 
Explicating these causes sequentially is a challenge in light of the fact that, with 
the sole (and illuminating) example of the identificatory state of the womb, they always 
occur in close interrelation to each other. To describe the formal content of a new act of 
identification is necessarily to describe the circumstances surrounding the disruption of 
another identificatory fusion. This necessary conjunction reflects what we will describe 
below as the idiosyncratically elastic formality and ideality of identificatory acts and their 
derivative habitual bonds: their natural inclination to remain in an active state of identifi-
cation amidst a wide, but nonetheless finite, scope of what might be called “accidental” 
sensible variations perceived from within that ongoing fusion. However, as I will argue  
below, when such acts are finally disrupted through a decisive alteration in the sensory 
conditions associated with the identificatory state (e.g. the absence of the breast or the 
violent expulsion from the womb), the resulting disruption leaves the identificatory facul-
ty receptively “open” to a new act of primary identification. As we will see, this natural 
inclination of identification toward the formal ideality of a perpetual fusion lies at the 
heart of so many characteristics that Freud associates with the unconscious in general—
e.g. its so-called timelessness, involuntary compulsiveness, and relation to a rapid alter-
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nation between love/hate—but fails to systematize under one single conceptual explana-
tion as we are attempting to do here in terms of identification. 
Nonetheless, the necessities of rhetoric force us to start with the first of these two 
causes and, in the wake of this initial analysis of the basic “formal” nature of identifica-
tion’s movement and the vertical relation to sensitivity that it reveals, we will subsequent-
ly integrate the significance of the second cause in order to show how they jointly func-
tion to specify further the nature of the identifying apprehensive act, identification’s 
equivalent of a generic object, and the principles that govern its corresponding appetitive 
movements.  
1. The Form(s) of Identification and its Verticality Vis-à-vis Sensitivity 
 
In order to prepare for analogously applying its metaphysical principles to identification’s 
relation to sensitivity, let us recall the three primary dimensions that can define one layer 
of the soul’s verticality in relation to another, as illustrated by Aquinas’s understanding of 
the relation between sensitivity and intelligence: (1) the lower powers can furnish an op-
erative preamble to the higher powers (e.g. the human intellect’s dependence on phan-
tasms); (2) the higher powers can accomplish comparatively more perfect ends as defined 
by the interrelated metaphysical principles of unity and explanatory scope (e.g. the com-
parative perfection of grasping substantial forms vs. sensible forms); and (3) the higher 
powers can exercise a vertical influence on the lower powers through executive dominion 
(e.g. the will’s power of consent), therapeutic mitigation (e.g. the will’s use of the partic-
ular reason to ameliorate sensitive passion), and/or the downward “overflow” of appeti-
tive movements (e.g. the will’s affections “redounding” to the sensitive passions).  
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I have already affirmed the first type of verticality as characterizing identifica-
tion’s relation to sensitivity: identification is somehow related to the preamble of sensa-
tions associated with intense and/or repeated pleasures or pains. My argument as to how 
identification is thereby moved—and how the term of that act is habitually retained and 
reactualized—will gradually draw upon the other two dimensions of verticality in order 
to fill out a more complete picture of identification’s operative relation to sensitivity. 
Next chapter, in addition to describing self-consciousness as related to a specific kind of 
identifying act, we will also turn to complete the analogous task vis-à-vis the parallel ver-
tical relation between identification and intelligence. 
In his own way, Freud furnishes an intriguing conceptual possibility for conceiv-
ing of the “form” that moves the identifying faculty as something that is metaphysically 
“between” a sensible form and an intelligible form in terms of its unity and explanatory 
scope. As we saw above, this conceptual possibility variously goes by the name of an in-
fantile “prototype” (Vorbild) or “imago” that later functions—in a post-egoic setting—as 
an “anticipatory” idea or bond waiting to be transferentially revived again. However, the 
promise of this concept as an explanatory principle for primary identification remains ob-
scured most obviously by Freud’s repeated employment of it as a support for both the 
sexual theory and secondary, model-based identification. When employed in this direc-
tion, the concept inevitably leads to describing a capacity through which this proto-
type/imago is originally received qua object and thus already presupposes a self-
conscious subject who primally desires that which she knows herself not to have (sexual-
theory) or be like (secondary identification). Nonetheless, as Freud’s own examples of 
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the breast as an “object” of primary identification illustrate, there is no reason why this 
concept cannot be adapted for describing the manner in which the pleasurable/painful 
presence of certain “objects” becomes interiorized in the act of primary identification as a 
“prototype” or “imago” of that which pre-reflectively completes “me.” Only later, to re-
call an insight we bookmarked above, once that “object” is somehow “abjected” or “relo-
cated”—in a manner we will upon elaborate on later—outside the bounds of “me” does 
the habitual remnant of that act become a “prototype” for desiring that which an individ-
ual now perceives as “not-me.” In this way, to recall Freud’s important phrase from The 
Ego and the Id, the intensive fusions of primary identification can be affirmed as the 
“starting-point” for later, post-egoic desires for objects qua objects.  
 There is also another important way that Freud is responsible for obscuring the 
promise of this concept for describing the nature of identification precisely. In light of 
our insistence that identification is responsible for a perceived fusion that eludes an 
awareness of the subject/object division, naming—to continue with Freud’s example for 
the moment—”the breast” as a specific object for a given act of identification is exactly 
the kind of claim that needs to be highly qualified in order to successfully escape the cir-
cular pitfalls of the reflection theory. As I signaled above, this is why I repeatedly have 
been using qualifying quotation marks around any reference to an identificatory “object.” 
An initial level of clarification can come from making explicit exactly what com-
bined effects can be attributed to the operations of the inner and outer senses on their own 
apart from the participative, intelligent effects attributable to reason, the intellect, and the 
will—all of which, as we have insisted throughout, presuppose an awareness of the sub-
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ject/object division and thus self-consciousness as well. If we look to Aquinas’s account 
of the senses here for help, we find that he affirms that, following the initial acts of the 
external senses, the combined effects of the estimative and memorative powers are suffi-
cient, even in non-rational animals, to perceive, recollect, and associate the particularities 
of repeated sense-perceptions as the “term or principle of some action or passion”167 that 
has occurred in the past in the individual following the apprehension of those sense-
perceptions. This type of sensitive association is notably different from what the intellect 
later makes possible when the estimative/cogitative faculty168 is able to apprehend that 
certain sets of sensitive data are individual instances of intelligible genera: “a man as this 
man, this tree as this tree,”169 and, to extend Aquinas’s list via Lonergan, “a thing as this 
thing.” Instead, on their own, the senses merely associate their own present and mnemi-
cally stored perceptions with an individual’s “own actions or passions.”170 Hence, “a 
sheep knows this particular lamb, not as this lamb, but simply as something to be suck-
led; and it knows this grass just in so far as this grass is its food.”171 Outside of this self-
referential—narcissistic?— type of “relation to its own actions or passions it does appre-
hend at all.”172 Even though the senses can mnemically associate certain sense-
perceptions with particular actions or passions, apart from the intellect they cannot asso-
ciate these actions or passions with an object qua object or a thing qua thing.   
                                                
167 Aquinas, In De Anima II, lect. 13, n. 398.  
168 Cf. pp. 211-13 above on the relation between estimative/cogitative faculty in non-intelligent and intelli-
gent creatures.  
169 Aquinas, In De Anima II, lect. 13, n. 398. 
170 Ibid. 
171 Ibid. 
172 Ibid. 
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The significance of this account for our purposes can be summarized as follows: 
if we are to steer clear of the reflection theory’s implicit reinsertion of the unities charac-
teristic of self-consciousness and intelligence, then we must be very intentional about not 
creating too strict an identity between the sensations that identification converts qua per-
ceiver and any particular object that we in fact know (now) to be an intelligible whole per 
se. “The breast” can never be an identificatory “object” qua breast; rather, its inclusion in 
an identificatory act must be due to its sensible association with a corresponding pleasur-
able/painful “action or passion.” If one takes the quintessential infantile pleasurable activ-
ity associated with the breast—breast feeding (or suckling in an interesting overlap with 
Aquinas)—as a chief example of an identificatory fusion, then one is left with the distinct 
impression that the kind of “form” that moves identification to act and is thereby received 
as a pre-reflective extension of the individual is constituted not by any single sensation 
(or object thereof), but by the contingent totality of sensations associated with the instiga-
tion and/or ongoing perpetuation of those passions of pleasure (or pain).  
In other words, to single out “the breast” as the identificatory “object” that moves 
the identifying faculty to act is instead to engage in synecdochical rhetoric that is reflec-
tive of the structure of primary identification itself. For example, if we follow Freud’s 
own logic that explains the later synecdochical associations characteristic of transference 
and free association, the identificatory fusion of infant/mother in breastfeeding has its 
origins in a collocation of apprehensive and appetitive sensations: the shape of the breast, 
the contours of the motherly/feminine face, the tactile and gustatory qualities of flesh, the 
sound of a calming voice, the taste of milk, and the derivative appetitive pleasures associ-
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ated with each of these apprehensions. A similar list could be made for the identificato-
ry—or, as Kristeva has it, “pre-objectal”—state of the womb: its tactile warmth/fluidity 
and the auditory rhythms of the mother’s heartbeat and voice. When laid out in this man-
ner, the metaphysical perfection of the identificatory act can be named as the collocating 
conversion of all those disparate sensations into the perception of a singular intensive 
wholeness—“me”—that Freud synecdochically expresses in his aphorism as “‘I’ am the 
breast.”  
In this regard, Freud’s alternative concept of an infantile “prototype” or an “ima-
go” is a much more precise—i.e. non-synecdochical—way of expressing that which is 
received and habitually retained in identification. These terms accurately capture the deli-
cate balance between the apprehensive/perceptual unity—an intensive whole—intrinsic 
to the act of identification and the diversity of “textural” qualities, reflective of the origi-
nal spontaneous arrangement of apprehensive and appetitive sensations, that are thereby 
gathered together into the converted singularity of the prototype/imago of an intensive 
wholeness.  
In terms of articulating a kind of “generic object” for identification, the striking 
thing about expressing the Freudian notion of an infantile prototype/image in this manner 
is that it begins to look rather remarkably like a distinct kind of “identificatory form” that 
simultaneously chimes with the metaphysical notion of verticality and the distinct princi-
ples of identification we have been developing. In terms of verticality, this type of identi-
ficatory form represents a supervening unity of sensible data that mimics—on a lower 
level—the verticality of intelligible forms vis-à-vis sensible forms. The key difference, of 
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course, is that in identification there is no analogue to the active intellect responsible for 
illuminating something “in” the sensible data; instead there is only the radical reception 
to the contingent arrangement of that data. Similarly, the habitual retention and derivative 
reawakening of this arrangement—either pre-egoically or post-egoically in transfer-
ence—gives identification an explanatory scope that fits the general notion of a meta-
physical form: a “pattern” that is “repeated”  across several contingent instances.  
In terms of the principles of identification we have been developing, the decisive 
characteristic of this formal unity is that it does not yield any further knowledge at all qua 
object. Or, to make an allusion to Fichte that we will return to next chapter, “nothing 
more can be said”173 about this arrangement of sensible data other than it has been radical-
ly received as constitutive of “me.” Instead, the formal referent for this apprehensive uni-
ty is found solely vis-à-vis the identifying individual: it “defines” them and their inten-
sive wholeness alone. Expressed another way, in stark contrast to the senses and the intel-
lect, which cannot be mistaken174 in their apprehension of sensible/intelligible forms, the 
categories of right/wrong and true/false do not apply to identification’s acts in themselves 
at all. This is despite the fact that the nature of identification’s acts in any given individu-
al are derivatively open to rational “analysis” and intelligent understanding: this is the 
necessary presupposition of this very discourse, psychoanalysis as a whole, and, as we 
will examine next chapter, any plausible explanation of the Freudian talking-cure. In it-
self, however, the active identificatory reception of its form(s) only involves the contin-
gent and unconscious, but nonetheless real, formation of the identifying individual. 
                                                
173 Fichte, GWL, I:279 (SK, 246). 
174 Barring organic impairment and/or another extraordinary condition. 
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The account of identification’s act that results from this description of its equiva-
lent of a generic form is one that helpfully illuminates its term as an unconscious and im-
manent perception of that sensible totality as coterminous with “oneself.” It is uncon-
scious because the entire term of its act excludes the differentiatedness of an “I” who 
could be “aware” of that act qua particular act or object. One cannot “see” that with 
which one is identifying or oneself doing the identifying at the very same moment in 
which the act of identification is occurring.175 There is no self-differentiated “gap” within 
the identifying operation that could make such a “seeing” possible; instead, the intensive, 
pre-reflective wholeness of that which we later signify by “I” or “me” is unconsciously 
constituted by the identifying act itself: “‘I’ am the breast.” This observation will under-
gird much of the work to be done next chapter in arguing for an operative link between 
self-consciousness and identification.  
Similarly, the immanence of identification’s term can be construed as analogous 
to the immanent and dematerialized (i.e. mental) terms of sensitive and intelligent appre-
hension. This observation is of some importance because there is a potential misunder-
standing that looms here through which identification is robbed of its distinctive imma-
nent term: an unconsciously perceived fusion with the identificatory form. Analogous 
misunderstandings have, of course, plagued both sensitive and intelligent apprehension 
when their immanent mental terms (i.e. phantasms and inner words) are forgotten, dis-
paraged, and/or merged with their external referents (i.e. sensible objects and spoken 
words). A similar fate can easily beset identification if it is simply compared to an unspe-
                                                
175 This is a rough paraphrase of a similar formulation made by Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen with the concepts 
of mimesis and playacting. Cf. The Freudian Subject (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988), 39. 
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cific and unnuanced mimesis or mirroring in which no attention is given to what imma-
nent power within an individual makes such receptive fusions possible in the first place. 
The human psyche might at times be like a mirror, but, unlike a mirror that simply 
bounces back preexisting light rays, in identification—and its derivative instances like 
hypnotism, trauma, and transference—there is a genuine immanent conversion of data 
that occurs in identification.176 It is this immanent conversion that is the essence of identi-
fication’s operation. One way to guard against forgetting the distinctiveness of this im-
manent operation is to remember that all acts of apprehension accomplish a similar con-
version that ties together their principles and terms into a single, unified act. Sensitive 
apprehension converts sensible forms into phantasms. Intellectual apprehension converts 
intelligible species into inner words. Identifying apprehension converts a collated sensi-
tive “that” into the perception of a pre-reflectively whole “me.” 
Finally, before turning to how disruptions to an act of primary identification open 
up the identifying faculty to new bonds of identification, I can conclude this subsection 
with a few comments regarding how affirming the synecdochical structure of the identifi-
catory form also explains several other idiosyncratic aspects of identification’s operation 
while in act that are then reflected in the conditions whereby its habitual bonds can be 
unconsciously reactualized (or, in the psychoanalytic nomenclature, “reawakened”). For 
his part, Freud focuses almost entirely on the nature of the structure of an identificatory 
bond’s habitual reawakening, whereas what is necessary for a fully compelling account is 
                                                
176 The implicit target of this clarification is, of course, Jacque Lacan. The locus classicus is Jacques Lacan, 
“Le stade du miroir comme formateur de la fonction du Je telle qu’elle nous est révélée dans l’expérience 
psychanalytique,” in Écrits (Paris: Seuil, 1966), 93-100 (ET: “The Mirror Stage as Formative of the I Func-
tion as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience,” in Écrits: The First Complete Edition in English, ed. 
Bruce Fink (New York: W.W. Norton, 2006), 75-81). 
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an explanation of how the nature of the original act is connected with the structure of the 
habitual bond and the conditions for its reactualization.  
While in act, identification shows a remarkable double capacity for what I will 
call diachronic elasticity and condensive assimilation. By diachronic elasticity, and here 
we begin to articulate the nature of the identifying appetite and another dimension of 
identification’s verticality vis-à-vis sensitivity, I mean that a given act of primary identi-
fication is capable of remaining in act amidst a certain degree of “accidental” variation in 
its underlying sensible conditions. This is a necessary implication for affirming that the 
same identificatory bond, usually parental in its associations, can remain in act (or be re-
actualized) amidst sensible conditions that are by definition never exactly identical, viz. 
sensitive memory is to able to associate the sight/sound/feel of a parental face/voice/body 
regardless of the surrounding “accidental” variations (e.g. what they are wearing, where 
they are, or what background noise is present). Furthermore, this elasticity helps to ex-
plain why certain analogous variations prove to be tolerable from within a single identifi-
catory act or state. For example, an infant who is done feeding is able to endure the with-
drawal of the breast without an immediate appetitive response of pain that signals that 
one has become separated from the conditions of one’s own intensive wholeness. Instead, 
there seems to be an identificatory appetitive response of pleasure that redounds and re-
doubles the discrete pleasures of the sensitive appetite throughout the span of an identifi-
catory act that carries the active, though unconscious, connotation of “‘I’ am whole, ‘I’ 
am whole, ‘I’ am whole”—or, cast into one of its derivative analogues, “I’m ok, I’m ok, 
I’m ok.”  
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Condensive assimilation then names the parallel phenomenon through which any 
of the sensations experienced within that active state of identification can then become 
habitually assimilated into the formal content of that same identificatory bond. In this 
way, for example, the sight of the breast and the euphoric state after feeding signified by 
“flushed cheeks and a blissful smile”177 can become habitually associated with a single 
act/bond of identification. Importantly, one of the diachronic effects of this ongoing as-
similation is that, given the habitual reinforcement provided by the repetitive presence of 
a given parental figure, the formal content of a single identificatory bond can, and often 
does, in fact “condense” around a set of sensitive experiences easily associated with a 
single person, despite not yet knowing that person qua thing. The result of this assimila-
tive process is an identificatory bond that closely corresponds with what Freud classified 
above as a “mother-imago” and/or a “father-imago.” 
As for defining the finite boundary as to what sensible variations can or cannot be 
assimilated elastically, there is no way to predict ahead of time what exact degree or qual-
ity of fluctuation will cause a disruption to the active stasis of an identificatory act. The 
practice of caring for an infant, however, confirms this delicate balance between main-
taining the elastic conditions for an infant’s identificatory pleasure and unexpectedly 
reaching its finite boundary. The (frequently exasperated) parental response to reaching 
this boundary sounds out in the endless variations of “what happened?!” uttered by the 
caretakers of infants. The response within the infant, however, to this boundary being 
reached is, as we will discuss in a moment, the onset of an immediate pain that emanates 
                                                
177 Freud, Three Essays, SA 5:89/SE 7:182. 
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from a disjunction—or an absence—appearing in “themselves:” “I’ am not whole.” One 
of the most reliable signs of this identificatory pleasure/pain can be found in the repetitive 
movements and/or physiological effects that each appetitive response tends to cause in 
the identifying individual. Such effects are exactly what you would expect if the identify-
ing powers have a degree of vertical influence over the lower parts of the soul. When it 
elicits a diachronically continuous pleasure, identification often causes repetitive move-
ments such as sucking, gazing, and stroking that signal an infant’s receptiveness to the 
identificatory form and the intensive wholeness that it completes. Analogous physiologi-
cal effects include the regulation of an infant’s breathing, temperature, and heart rate.178 
If, and when, a pleasurable identificatory act is disrupted, not only will the active stasis of 
these effects cease, but they will quickly be replaced by equivalent manifestations of the 
resulting identificatory pain: tears, screams/squeals, and physiological signs of elevated 
stress. As Kristeva frequently points out in an observation that we will return to regularly, 
one of the primal occurrences of a disruption outside the elastic bounds of an identificato-
ry bond occurs in birth itself. Hence: the inevitable outbreak of tears that will continue 
until an infant is reunited with its mother’s body.  
The habitual corollary to identification’s diachronic elasticity and condensive as-
similation is that the occurrence of any single sensation similar to one that has been elas-
tically assimilated can synecdochically reactualize/reawaken the diachronic totality of 
                                                
178 Interesting enough, this phenomenon has been observed in skin-to-skin contact with fathers as well as 
with mothers. A few representative studies: Jan Winberg, “Mother and Newborn Baby: Mutual Regulation 
of Physiology and Behavior—A Selective Review,” Developmental Psychobiology 47, no. 3 (2005): 217-
29; J. Bauer et al., “Metabolic Rate and Energy Balance in Very Low Birth Weight Infants During 
Kangaroo Holding by Their Mothers and Fathers,” Journal of Pediatrics 129, no. 4 (1996): 608-11; and 
Kerstin Erlandsson et al., “Skin-to-skin Care with the Father after Cesarean Birth and Its Effect on 
Newborn Crying and Prefeeding Behavior,” Birth 34, no. 2 (2007): 105-14. 
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that bond such that one’s wholeness is once again defined by that formal arrangement of 
assimilated sensations. Here we have our translated version of the timelessness that 
Freud’s assigns to the unconscious in general in its “compulsion to repeat” and especially 
to the later, post-egoic instances of transference in which the ideal fullness of a bond 
forged in the “prehistory” of one’s past is reawakened on the basis of contemporaneous 
sensations. In infancy, this reawakening seemingly occurs, for instance, every time infan-
tile slumbering is interrupted by the return of hunger pangs that inevitably recalls the—
now lost—pleasurable fullness of identificatory union.  
To be sure, some of the sensations that may end up reactualizing an identificatory 
bond, especially in the post-egoic occurrences of transference, will inevitably appear to 
be much more random than the connection between hunger pangs and a mother-imago. 
This apparent randomness has, of course, attracted the scholarly attention of many post-
Freudian theorists. Such attention has produced voluminous commentaries on Freud’s 
own endorsements on the “symbolic” and “condensive” nature of the unconscious’s 
“timeless” mnemic structure. The most influential of these commentaries is undoubtedly 
Jacque Lacan’s grammatical extensions (e.g. metaphor and metonymy) of this Freudian 
theme, which we have appropriated to a certain extent in our own employment of synec-
doche to describe the identificatory form and its habitual retention. One of the effects of 
this post-Freudian stream of theory has been an enhancement of the mystical/inexplicable 
connotations surrounding the unconscious and its timeless “compulsion to repeat” that 
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Freud himself began with the paranormal rhetoric that we witnessed above.179 In the end, 
however, such mystification of the compulsion to repeat is, at least in my judgment, 
completely unnecessary. 
Instead, a sufficient metaphysical account of the apparent randomness of identifi-
catory reawakening/reactualization can be found by insisting that a distinct identificatory 
memorative power retains and then repeats its forms mimics on a higher level the way 
that Aquinas speaks of sensitive memory apart from rationality. As he argues in ST 
I.78.4, sensitive memory, apart from the higher operations of rationality, only enables the 
“sudden recollection of the past [subita recordatione praeteritum].” Only the vertical op-
eration of reason, as Aquinas continues, makes possible that which we often confuse with 
sensitive memory itself: a “syllogistically” ordered search that yields an intentional “rem-
iniscence” of certain memories. On the basis of this insight, there opens the possibility of 
considering identification’s correlative memorative power as akin to non-rational sensi-
tive memory in that it is only subject to the involuntary “sudden recollection of the past.” 
However, this overall similarity immediately suggests two aspects of difference between 
                                                
179 E.g. The worst offenders of this type of enhancement are almost certainly Cathy Caruth and Bessel van 
der Kolk. Caruth and van der Kolk have jointly perpetuated a Freudian-inspired, but certainly not Freudian,  
theorization of trauma that magnifies both the mystical and inexplicable aspects of Freud’s rhetoric sur-
rounding the compulsion to repeat. For example, vis-à-vis the mystical aspect, Caruth speaks of how a 
traumatic event “repeated[ly takes] possession of the one who experiences it” and can even function like a 
“contagion” that is subject to “transmission” between persons (Cathy Caruth, ed. Trauma: Explorations in 
Memory (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), 4, 10-16). Similarly, vis-à-vis the inexplicable 
aspect, van der Kolk claims that trauma is a literal “engraving” upon the mind that completely eludes any at 
representation or symbolization even as it “continually returns, in its exactness, at a later time” (cf. Ibid., 
153.). The risk of such extraordinary claims is that if they are made in a context devoid of a detailed an-
thropology through which to actually make sense of such rhetoric is that, even as they promote admirable 
political and ethical agendas, they may also end up, as I take actually to be the case with Caruth and van der 
Kolk, perpetuating total conceptual confusion surrounding what trauma is and how it is connected to some 
natural human capacity for repeating decisively pivotal events in our lives. For a detailed analysis and ex-
acting critique of Caruth and van der Kolk along these lines, see Ruth Leys, Trauma: A Genealogy 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 229-97.  
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sensitive and identifying memory that are primarily due to identification’s intrinsic un-
consciousness and the diachronic character of its forms. First—and here we distinguish 
our account from Freud’s notion of “remembering” in a manner that we will return to 
next chapter—the unconscious fusions embedded in identification’s “memories” can nev-
er become subject to reason’s direct inquiry and reminiscence. To “remember” in this 
direct way requires the concomitance of the subject/object distinction within the memory 
itself as the precondition for reason’s self-differentiated recollection of that—to suppose 
otherwise would be a mnemic version of the reflection theory. Even the theoretical re-
membrance of a sensitive “scene”—whether involuntarily or intentionally (i.e. rational-
ly)—associated with an act of identification would not vitiate the validity of this point. 
For such a remembered “scene” would only be a memory of the original sensations asso-
ciated with that identifying act, viz. it would be an operation of sensitive memory. Ra-
tionally recalling the act of identification in itself, however, always remains impossible. 
Hence, secondly, the “timeless,” involuntary, and unconscious reawakening of the totality 
of the identificatory form in the present simply is the specific mode of identification’s 
“memory.” It is the “sudden recollection of the past” that fits the natural principles of 
identification’s peculiar, but nevertheless not inexplicable, mode of apprehension.  
2. The Disruptive Opening of Identification and the Binary Ideality of Its Appetite 
 
Having outlined an analogous equivalent to the moving “object” of identification, we can 
now turn to describe the second primary cause for this act: the recent disruption of an ac-
tive state of identificatory fusion. Both Freud and Kristeva presuppose, each in their own 
terminological way, that pre-objectal states have an intrinsic ideality to them. As I use the 
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term in our modified Thomist framework, I mean “ideality” to mean a natural inclination 
to maintain the active stasis of an identificatory fusion that inevitably comes into (pain-
ful) conflict with the vacillating conditions of external reality. As we detailed above, 
Freud’s version of this ideality stems from the sexual theory’s view of the id’s erotic un-
conscious instincts being compulsively, involuntarily, and irrationally “sen[t] […] out 
into erotic object-cathexes,”180 with the result that its wishes are inevitably left painfully 
unsatisfied. Similarly, Kristeva describes the primal, motile “stases” that characterize the 
womb and that are “violently” disrupted in the advent that marks the infant’s arrival ex 
utero: the biologically-forced separation through which our road to being an individual 
body and, later, an egoic subject is originally founded and given its trajectory through the 
crucible of pain(s).  
 For our overall purposes, the most relevant aspect of this ideality that inevitably 
causes pain is the derivative “defensive” coping that it prompts. This coping, so they both 
theorize, eventually leads to the formation of the ego’s self-integration as that which 
brings a sustainable, albeit still fragile, degree of stability to the individual. Even though 
next chapter we will draw upon this broad psychoanalytic theme in order to offer our own 
translated account of how the ego arises through the specific act of primary identification 
with our sensing bodies, at the moment my initial goal here is to show how it can explain 
how disruptions to the active stasis of an identificatory act can render that same faculty 
“open” to forging new bonds of identification and how this openness is related to some 
distinctive features of the identifying appetite. 
                                                
180 Freud, The Ego and the Id, SA 3:313/SE 19:46. 
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 Recall that Freud originally formulated identification as a way to explain the 
deep-seated sadness of melancholia. According to this melancholic version of identifica-
tion, identification is an post-egoic capacity that reacts to the painful loss of an erotically-
cathected object (i.e. a loved object). It does so by identifying with the abandoned object 
with the result that that object’s absence—and the attendant pain and hate of its ab-
sence—is introjected into the ego as a masochistic/ambivalent substitute for the originally 
beloved object. There are, of course, a number of facets of this theorization of identifica-
tion that we have already had to jettison in our critique of the sexual theory and translated 
account of primary identification. Most importantly, we have consistently denied the 
primal awareness of an object qua object (or self qua self) and identification as a reactive 
capacity to the erotic object-cathexes.  
 Nonetheless, once these elements have been conceptually strained away, this orig-
inal context opens up an illuminating framework for describing a similar dynamic in our 
transposed account of identification. For instance, we can imagine an infantile scenario in 
which an already forged identificatory bond is reawakened/reactualization through any 
synecdochically related sensation: e.g. a hunger pang, a face (which may or may not be a 
parent’s), a spontaneous memory, or a physical discomfort. The result of such a reactual-
ization would be a contemporaneous (i.e. timeless) equation of “my” wholeness with the 
collated totality of sensations through which that bond was originally forged. If such a 
reawakening is quickly met with an accompanying and/or sequential array of sensations, 
apprehensive (e.g. the appearance of the breast) and appetitive (e.g. the discrete sensitive 
pleasures), sufficiently mnemically associated with that identificatory bond, the result 
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will be corresponding identificatory pleasure—”’I’ am whole”—that will overflow to 
sensitivity.  
 However, what happens if such an array of sensations do not follow? We already 
foreshadowed the answer above. For such an individual, there appears a pain-filled ab-
sence in “themselves,” a “lack” (manque) as a Lacanian like Kristeva would speak of it,181 
such that the conditions for the individual’s intensive wholeness are not met: “I’ am not 
whole.” Here we have a transposed version of Freud’s account of the hate/pain of losing 
an erotic object-cathexis shorn of both its erotic connotations and object-awareness. This 
identificatory “absence” could be signaled by any number of variables, such as the disso-
nance between the sensitive memories and whatever apprehensive sensations happen to 
be present at the time. What seems almost certain, however, is that the most decisive con-
trast for infants is the pain of hunger/thirst/physical discomfort that continues unabated 
without all the pleasures that the fullness of the identificatory bond originally furnished. 
No one has expanded upon this basic Freudian train of thought regarding what she called 
“the emotional situation of the baby” more effectively than did Melanie Klein. As she 
seminally wrote in her, “Love, Guilt, and Reparation” (1937): 
In the very beginning [the baby] loves his mother at the time that she is satisfying 
his needs for nourishment, alleviating his feelings of hunger, and giving him the 
sensual pleasure which he experiences when his mouth is stimulated by sucking at 
her breast […] But when the baby is hungry and his desires are not gratified, or 
when he is feeling bodily pain or discomfort, then the whole situation suddenly al-
ters. Hatred and aggressive feelings are aroused and he becomes dominated by the 
impulses to destroy the very person who is the object of all his desires and who in 
his mind is linked up with everything he experienced—good and bad alike.182 
                                                
181 E.g. Kristeva, La révolution du langage poétique, 86-100 (Revolution in Poetic Language, 90-105). 
182 Melanie Klein, “Love, Guilt and Reparation,” in Love, Guilt and Reparation: and Other Works, 1921-
1945 (New York: The Free Press, 1975), 306-07.  
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Despite the acuity of this passage, we must immediately add an emendation that trans-
lates its insights into our framework of identification: on the level of identification, this 
alternation between love/pleasure and hate/pain cannot originally (i.e. pre-egoically) be 
directed at one’s mother qua mother or the breast qua breast. Instead, they must register 
as a deficit within the individual’s own intensive wholeness.  
In other words, what we have here are genuine instances of pre-reflective and pre-
self-conscious appetitive movements of love/pleasure and hate/pain. As we will discuss 
next chapter, the “self-referential” character of these identifying appetitive responses lays 
the archaic habitual foundations for their later, post-egoic expressions in narcissism (I 
love myself) and the self-revilings of the ego-ideal (I hate myself/I should be more like 
that). More importantly, however, here we have the transposed, unified root that hides 
behind Freud’s vacillating theorization of a primary identification that precedes object 
awareness and a melancholic identification that reacts to the sensitive absence of a be-
loved object. Any object associated with a bond of primary identification is always al-
ready interior meo before the identificatory pain of its absence. In insisting on this point, 
we also have a perhaps unexpected convergence with one of Aquinas’s most central ap-
petitive axioms, the character of which also points to how we would constructively re-
situate Freud’s instinctual “death drive.” As Aquinas was fond of writing, “nothing is 
hated, save through being contrary to a suitable thing which is loved [and] hence it is that 
every hatred is caused by love.”183 The hated contrary of an identificatory fusion is noth-
ing other than the pain of its absence, the deprivation of which is signified by a host of 
                                                
183 Aquinas, ST I.29.2. 
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sensations contrary to the pleasurable fullness in which the bond was originally formed. 
Put differently: the “death drive” has no dualistic impulses “of its own;” its rage to de-
stroy is always the appetitive inverse of love.  
This modification of Freud’s original link between identification and melancholia 
leads to two final pieces of the puzzle of transposition that we are trying to fit together 
before turning back briefly to consider identification’s relationship to sexuality. First, the 
rapid oscillation between love and hate that both Freud and Klein associate with the ide-
ality of pre-objectal states such as identification opens up the possibility that the identifi-
catory appetitive response simply does consist in an alternation between immediately 
conjoined affections of inclination (love/hate) and rest (pleasure/pain).184 Once actualized, 
whether originally or habitually, identificatory bonds immediately trigger appetitive 
movements of inclination and rest that correspond with the presence or absence of sensa-
tion sufficient similar enough to elastically “reconstitute” the ideality of original bond. If 
these sensible conditions are satisfied, then they immediately elicit identificatory 
love/pleasure that redounds to sensitivity; if not, the elicited appetitive response is 
hate/pain at the absence of that fullness. In other words, primary identification does not 
progress through either of the two elements of “delay” characteristic of many movements 
of the sensitive and intellective faculties: (1) there is no delay of evaluative judgment re-
garding the “goodness” of the bond; that “goodness” is already presupposed in the identi-
ficatory bond itself; and (2) there is no delay corresponding to the affections of move-
ment (e.g. desire/aversion), all of which presuppose the self-differentiation of egoic self-
                                                
184 Obviously these remain logical distinguishable. 
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consciousness (i.e. I am not that/I want that/I must flee that). Expressed in Aquinas’s lan-
guage: primary identification evokes no appetitive “moment” in which an affective union 
is experientially differentiated from real union. In identification there is only real union, 
whether that is with the pleasurable presence of identificatory fullness itself or the painful 
presence of its absence. As we discussed at length last chapter, in the former state there is 
active perfection of the appetitive in pleasure; in the latter state, the presence of painfully 
being separated from the conditions of goodness expresses the individual’s continuing 
“craving for unity” with that which it has lost. 185  
Second, through a final act of translating Freud, we can lastly redescribe the par-
allel defensive dynamics of the ego’s melancholic coping with lost objects and the id’s 
sublimatory formation of the ego out of the pain of its wishes being unfilled as jointly 
indicative of the identifying faculty being “opened” to new bonds whenever an identifica-
tory act encounters sensitive conditions contrary to its original ideality. For as long as the 
active and ideal stasis of an identificatory act is sustained, all that it “sees” is that identi-
ficatory form as characteristic of the intensive wholeness that it enduringly converts and 
defines. Once that active stasis is disrupted by a decisive shift in the sensitive conditions 
outside of the elastic bonds of its form/bond, the identifying faculty “copes” with the re-
sulting hate/pain by being open to a new identificatory bond. This helps to explain why 
infants, i.e. those who are encountering the rapidity of reality’s vacillations for the first 
time and thus rapidly move through states of identificatory wholeness and deprivation, 
are so often characterized by identificatory openness. In the infant’s absent eyes and vul-
                                                
185 Aquinas, ST I-II.36.3. 
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nerable body we catch some of the most universal glimpses into the quintessential radical 
receptivity and abyssal vacancy that characterizes identification’s openness to new identi-
ficatory bonds.186  
Furthermore, this defensive openness helps to set out the preliminary terms for 
our translated version of the infantile crisis of pain that, as we will discuss in more detail 
in Chapter 5, leads to the eventual advent of the ego’s self-integration and self-
consciousness. Given the vacillating conditions of external reality, it seems inevitable 
that every identificatory bond forged in infancy will eventually become ambivalently as-
sociated—elastically tinged, if you will—with sensitive deprivations and identificatory 
affections of hate/pain that permanently undermine the ideality of the original identifica-
tory bond in a process that closely echoes that which Klein narrates in the passage above. 
Hence, for instance, sequential reactualizations of a mother-imago will begin to elicit 
identificatory appetitive responses that progressively fit the classic definition of ambiva-
lence: the simultaneous occurrence of love/hate. Love because of the recollection of the 
original—in this case, pleasurable—ideality of the identificatory bond; hate because of 
the simultaneous recollection of the pain that was caused in its disruptive “absence.” On 
the level of our most infantile identificatory bonds, Lacan was entirely right: “there is no 
love without hate.”187  
                                                
186 My use of “vacancy” in this conceptual context is derived from Julia Kristeva and Ruth Leys. Cf. 
Kristeva, Histoires d’amour, 130 (Tales of Love, 134-135) and Leys, Trauma: A Genealogy, 32. 
187 Jacques Lacan, “Dieu et la joussance de femme–Une lettre d’âmour,” in Le Séminaire, Livre XX, Encore 
(1972-1973), ed. Jacques-Alain Miller (Paris: Seuil, 1975), 82 (ET: “God and the Jouissance of Woman–A 
Love Letter,” in Feminine Sexuality: Jacques Lacan and the école freudienne, eds. Juliet Mitchell and 
Jacqueline Rose (New York: W.W. Norton, 1982), 160). 
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It is this inevitably accelerating conflict between identification’s ideality, the bi-
nariness of its affections, and reality’s endless vacillations that eventually causes the cri-
sis of pain that forces an individual to develop different ways to make sense of the fluctu-
ations encountered in the sensible “that.” Once a certain apex of this crisis of pain has 
been reached, there seem to be three routes of adaptation that open up before an individu-
al. The first two—fantasy and melancholia/masochism—dominated Freud’s attention. In 
fantasy, identification vertically and compulsively annexes the interior senses in order to 
simulate the presence of the original ideality of identificatory bond in the form of fanta-
sies, dreams, and/or hallucinations. The metaphysical logic of this adaptation follows 
Aquinas’s observation that the intelligent powers cannot vertically rule the exterior sens-
es because they “require exterior sensible things for action.”188 However, the interior 
senses “do not require exterior things,” and thus reason can “incite […] and form the 
phantasms of the imagination”189 for the its own purposes. Likewise, the identificatory 
powers have a degree of vertical dominion over the interior senses, which is most obvi-
ous during, but by no means exclusive to, the slumbering of waking consciousness and 
intelligence in sleep. The result of this dominion is that sometimes an individual adapts to 
the pain of an identificatory bonds absence by conjuring up the illusion and pleasure of 
its real presence in a dream (or fantasy or hallucination), even though the associated sen-
sible references remain “absolutely speaking, […] absent.”190 
                                                
188 Aquinas, ST I.81.3.ad3. 
189 Ibid. 
190 Ibid., I-II.32.3. 
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In the second path of adaption, if no other bond presents itself as a coping mecha-
nism for the pain of identificatory deprivation, then the derivative openness of the identi-
fying faculty can result in a melancholic/masochistic act of identification with the con-
comitant sensitive conditions (i.e. sensitive pain, memories, any other spontaneous sensa-
tions that might be present) constitutive of the very absence that opened the identifying 
faculty in the first place. Even though the origins of such a resulting bond presuppose the 
existence, actualization, and formal content of the original identification (i.e. it is a maso-
chistic substitute for the original bond), it functions as its own identificatory bond com-
plete with its own synecdochical structure: “‘I’ am this pain.” The resulting mix of formal 
dependence and operative independence of such a melancholic/masochistic bond is per-
fectly captured by Freud’s terminology: it is a “shadow” of the original identificatory 
bond and functions in many ways as its unconscious substitute. Accordingly, when a 
melancholic/masochistic bond is reawakened and sustained in its act (either pre-egoically 
or post-egoically), it is quintessentially recognizable through the mixture of sensitive 
hate/pain/sadness and masochistic pleasure that redounds to it from the identifying appe-
tite: “‘I’ am (pleasurably) completed by this pain.” 
In spite of the ongoing allure of fantasy and the deep-rooted character of melan-
cholic identifications, there remains a third, and more promising, route of adaptation that 
opens up before the individual. This route, which Freud notes only infrequently, is the 
way, as we will expand upon next chapter, that eventually leads to the vertical perfections 
of intelligence. By proceeding down this developmental road, an individual gains the ca-
pacity to gradually “pull out” of identification’s external fusions in order to respond to 
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the sensible “that” by asking a question that is as familiar to philosophers and theologians 
as it is to parents: “What is that? (That is, if it is not ‘me’).” Or as Aquinas has it: quod 
quid est? In order to ask that question, however, an individual must first forge what we 
will come to see next chapter as the most important bond of identification of all: one that 
is forged with our own sensing bodies. This bond, when it is in act, yields self-
consciousness as its immanent term; it defines “me” in terms of a pre-reflective intensive 
whole in/around our bodies. As such, as I will argue next chapter, this act of identifica-
tion not only forms the operative baseline for all subsequent acts of intelligence, but it 
also opens up the external “space” in which all that is “not-me” can, finally, be desired 
qua object.  
b. A Brief Reconsideration of the Preeminence of Freud’s “Sexual Factors” 
What then do we say about the instinct of Eros? Although an exhaustive response will 
have to be delayed for another project, a few comments are in order before turning to 
complete our constructive proposal. One of my chief arguments in this chapter is that 
Freud’s emphasis on the centrality of the erotic libido in psychic development yields a 
theory of the ego’s formation in early childhood that is theoretically unsatisfying in ac-
counting for the phenomena to which it rightly draws attention. Nevertheless, one of 
Freud’s most oft-cited reasons for re-theorizing the developmental importance of the sex-
ual libido was to combat contemporary theorists who claimed that the sexual instinct is 
entirely “absent in childhood” and only “set[s] in at the time of puberty in connection 
with the process of coming to maturity.”191 Even though the resulting libido theory is in-
                                                
191 Freud, Three Essays, SA 5:47/SE 7:135. 
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sufficient to explain the emergence of the ego’s object consciousness, a deeper emphasis 
on primary identification as a non-sexual operation should not necessarily lead to a paral-
lel rejection of the entirety of Freud’s insistence on the presence and continuing influence 
of something that could broadly be called “infantile sexuality.”  
 What would have to be excluded, however, is Freud’s repeated penchant for rein-
serting a post-egoic self/object awareness in a manner that undermines the theorization of 
primary identification. If, as Aquinas endorses as an Aristotelian, the sexual appetite is 
created as a part of the sensitive layer of the soul, then there is no reason to automatically 
doubt Freud’s claims that the “germs [Keime] of sexual impulses are already present in 
the new-born child.”192 What would a pre-egoic form of these germinal impulses be like? 
They would follow the pattern we have already established to describe the pre-egoic op-
eration of the senses. Pre-egoic sexual impulses would then consist in the enhanced tac-
tile pleasure of certain sources of intense sensory stimulus. Even though he does not suc-
cessfully link such emphases up with his metapsychological reflections on the sensory 
origins of the id’s modification in a manner that could have produced a more orderly ac-
count of sexuality’s developmental relationship to the ego’s formation, such a sensory-
limited account of infant sexuality finds deep resonances with Freud’s extended com-
ments in Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality (1905) on the infantile pleasures de-
rived from oral, anal, and genital “erotogenic zones” (erogene Zonen).193 
 If, as we have postulated above, one variable for “opening” identification’s opera-
tive capacity for receptivity is the repeated presence of sensory pleasure, then there is 
                                                
192 Ibid., SA 5:84/SE 7: 176. 
193 Cf. Ibid., SA 5:76-78, 81-111, 113-117/SE 7:167-169, 173-206, and 208-212. 
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every reason to suspect that from an early age that there is often substantial apprehensive 
and appetitive overlap between sexually-tinged sensory acts and acts of primary identifi-
cation. This is despite the need to continually logically distinguish between their respec-
tive—and developmentally-sensitive—operations in a way that Freud consistently fails to 
do. Such archaic overlaps would explain why so many arousals of identificatory bonds 
later in life (i.e. transferences) have erotic overtones to them. In fact, as Freud suggests in 
his own way, there are good reasons to think that many, if not most, experiences of “be-
ing in love” (Verliebheit) represent the contemporary convergence of the sensitive and 
identificatory appetites. The former appetite furnishes an attraction to certain sensible 
qualities of another individual and a yearning for the sensitive pleasures of being physi-
cally united to them; the latter appetite furnishes the unconscious redoubling of those de-
sires by fueling fantasies of repeating (and completing) infantile experiences of identifi-
catory wholeness. These overlaps would also go a long way to explain why many sexual 
acts incorporate repetitive movements (e.g. sucking, stroking, and oral or masochistic 
stimulation) that can be as pleasurable as they can be regressively compulsive and addic-
tive when they become mere substitutes, fantasmatically and unconsciously, for identifi-
catory objects that have long since disappeared into the ever-presence of their melanchol-
ic absence. If there seems be an implied theology (and vertical teleology) for sex emerg-
ing here, that sense is not accidental. We will briefly pick up this implication next chapter 
when we reconsider the perfections of intelligence vis-à-vis identification.194   
                                                
194 An initial foray into the teleology can be made here in suggesting that it is quite rare for sexual acts 
(and/or “being in love”) to be completely devoid of identificatory enhancement and intensification. Sex is 
almost never an encounter between, as David Foster Wallace writes, “just bodies.” Wallace’s satirical and 
deconstructive essay on the pornography industry is an incisive non-theological commentary on the multi-
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 Even with such promising leads for a rapprochement between sexuality and iden-
tification, however, we must always resist the temptation to collapse identification into 
sexuality as Freud repeatedly does. One reason for this resistance is to insist on the logic 
reflected in the last few paragraphs: identification cannot be reduced to sexuality; instead, 
identification vertically intensifies certain movements of the sexual appetite. Another rea-
son to resist this false reduction is to remind ourselves that there remain explanations for 
non-sexual, post-egoic phenomena (e.g. self-consciousness, trauma, the ego-ideal, hypno-
tism, transference) that await us next chapter in connection with continuing to elaborate 
upon the identifying powers. The veracity of such explanations depend on there being 
identificatory bonds that are intrinsically non-sexual and do not necessarily converge 
with the sexual appetite at all.  
For the moment, then, we might conclude by observing that, despite its wide-
spread modern influence and reputation for novelty, Freud’s reductive gesture is only the 
latest repristination of a impulse that has long-endured in Western thought to place all 
occurrent unities between different objects under an erotically-charged genus of union. 
Ironically, this point was not lost on Freud. As he writes in the preface to the fourth edi-
tion of his Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, “[A]nyone who looks down with 
contempt upon psychoanalysis from a superior vantage-point should remember how 
closely the enlarged sexuality of psychoanalysis coincides with the Eros of the divine 
                                                                                                                                            
layeredness of sex and the reality that reducing sex to its material/physical base seems to not only debase 
and depersonalize the activity and its participants, but also seems to take a lot of hard work to actually (and 
tragically) accomplish. Augustine and Aquinas would simply have seen this phenomenon in its actuality to 
be the result of the inverted nature of sin. Similarly, they would have seen its relative difficulty to accom-
plish to be a sign of the Creator’s indelibility as inscribed in the verticality of our powers. Cf. David Foster 
Wallace, “Big Red Son,” in Consider the Lobster and Other Essays (New York: Little, Brown and 
Company, 2006), 3-50. The citation above is on p. 17, n. 14. 
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Plato.”195 There is, of course, another possibility: that sexual union is a species, and a rela-
tively low one at that despite its created goodness, of a genus that culminates in the unri-
valed intimacy and pleasure of intelligible union. That, at least, is the option that we have 
been and will continue to pursue steadfastly in this project.     
III. Conclusion: Summarizing and Looking Ahead 
 
My goal in this chapter has been to carry out the first two steps of a three-part transposi-
tion of the psychoanalytic account of the pre-reflective origins of the ego’s self-
differentiated integration through the lens of Augustine’s dilemma and Aquinas’s meta-
physical and theological solution. The first of these steps began by tracing the inconsist-
encies that arise in Freud’s attempt to describe the ego’s archaic formation and, by exten-
sion, its therapeutic, self-organizing role vis-à-vis the disruption of unconscious process-
es. The main cause of this inconsistency stems from his vacillation between one explana-
tion (i.e. the sexual theory) that presupposes an egoic awareness of the self/object distinc-
tion and another (i.e. the identification theory) that presumes that the ego emerges out of 
a prior developmental state in which individual and sensible objects are fused together in 
a pre-reflective bond of primary identification. In the process of detailing this vacillation, 
we also saw that Freud repeatedly backs away from the implications of his fertile theori-
zation of primary identification by collapsing it back into the sexual theory and thus rein-
stating, a la Augustine in De Trinitate, an always already egoic awareness to the “prehis-
tory” of the individual.  
                                                
195 Freud, Three Essays, SA 5:46/SE 7:134. 
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Based upon these observations, our next step was the just completed rehabilitation 
of Freud’s notion of primary identification by extending the metaphysical terms of Aqui-
nas’s solution to Augustine’s dilemma. The fruit of this attempt was the description of a 
distinct identifying layer of the soul. This layer of the soul is characterized by an appre-
hensive power of identification, the operation of which converts an “identificatory form” 
into the perception of a pre-reflective wholeness, and an appetitive power that generates 
affections of inclination and rest corresponding to the presence/absence of sensations as-
sociated with that form. I then showed how this theoretical framework helpfully explains 
several qualities of the Freudian unconscious—e.g. its timeless compulsion and the dis-
ruptive triggering of dreams, fantasies, and hallucinations—in a manner that simultane-
ously chimes with its vertical placement in the soul “in between” the sensitive and intel-
lective layers of the soul. 
From here, what lies before us in Chapter 5 is the third step of transposition, 
which will occur by incorporating this discussion into the modern question of the origins 
and theological significance of self-consciousness as it is bound up with the broader Au-
gustinian and Thomist themes surrounding the varieties of intensive unity within an indi-
vidual (e.g. primal, epistemic, and teleological) and our appetitive reditus back to God. 
As I suggested above, the cornerstone of this extension next chapter will occur in arguing 
that egoic self-consciousness arises as the immanent term of an act of primary identifica-
tion that forms the operative baseline for the higher acts of intelligence by unconsciously 
and pre-reflectively “apprehending” a circumscribed, embodied whole—”me”—outside 
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of which lies that which I can genuine intelligibly know precisely as that which is “not-
me.”  
As we will see, and as the terminology already suggests, there will be much reso-
nance between this theorization of self-consciousness and that of the “unconscious” ap-
proach that I associated with Hölderlin and Novalis in the Introduction. However, the ul-
timate nexus of integration to this line of inquiry will actually occur in seeing how the 
overall Thomistic anthropological framework that has been developed also allows us to 
constructively link this unconscious approach not only with a refined account of desire 
that finally clarifies the relationship between self-consciousness and the “drive to stride 
forth toward the infinite,”196 but also with a Thomistic/Augustinian version of Schleier-
macher’s theological approach as well. For by describing the unconscious reception of 
“ourselves” in identification from within this metaphysical framework, we will find the 
necessary ground for forging a conceptual convergence between the two approaches: for 
identification is the intermediary—a causal medium within the overall intermediary of 
the soul as that which causes creaturely existence—through which the Creator creatively 
causes the finite wholeness that defines an egoic subject to be radically received and 
therefore always already “born” in absolute dependence as well. 
                                                
196 Cf. Hölderlin, “Die metrische Fassung des Hyperion,” III:195, lines 46-51. 
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Chapter 5 
Identification, Self-Consciousness, 
and the Vertical Perfections of Intelligence 
 
This project began in the Introduction with an initial sketch of the riddle of egoic self-
consciousness and two conjectures that I initially theorized might help to reframe that 
riddle. Broadly speaking, that riddle is centered on explaining how each of us first came 
to perceive that “I” am not “that” without presupposing that an individual is always al-
ready aware of the distinction between the egological self and an objectified object. Put 
differently, the goal throughout has been to establish a new framework through which to 
formulate an explanation of self-consciousness without making explicit or implicit use of 
the concept of intelligent reflection (or any variant thereof) that thereby reinserts the ego-
ic self—as the  “subject” (the one who reflects) and/or the “object” (that which is reflec-
tively found) of that reflective act—into what was supposed to be an explanation for its 
emergence in the first place. 
 I then situated these two conjectures against the backdrop of the illuminating, but 
nonetheless problematic, genealogy that has seminally shaped the modern discourse on 
self-consciousness. I represented this genealogy by identifying four common and histori-
cally-linked approaches to explaining self-consciousness from several of the major philo-
sophical figures from within it: the presuppositional approach (Kant), the exceptional ap-
proach (Fichte), the unconscious approach (Hölderlin/Novalis), and the theological ap-
proach (Schleiermacher). Despite the seminality of these figures and approaches, I ex-
pressed concern regarding that genealogy’s ability to furnish concepts that are precise 
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enough to clarify several conceptual fronts closely associated with the riddle of self-
consciousness: (1) the dynamic interrelation between different human capacities (e.g. 
self-knowledge, knowledge of external objects, sense-perception, and desire (2) the care-
ful delineation of different types of intensive and extroverted unities characteristic of hu-
man existence; and (3) the causal and teleological relation between the supposed infinity 
of the self’s “striving” to be itself and the concrete reality of the objects qua objects that 
it inevitably encounters in and through that striving.  
 In response to these deficiencies, the purpose of pursuing my two conjectures has 
been to expand the conceptual and phenomenological territory upon which this project’s 
discourse regarding self-consciousness could be progressively unfolded with a higher de-
gree of explanatory precision. First, based upon Dieter Henrich’s observation that the 
tendency to root self-consciousness in reflection (i.e. the “reflection theory”) is likely not 
an historical accident limited to the above genealogy, but rather is somehow rooted in the 
“structure of consciousness itself,”1 I conjectured that a constructive extension of a fortui-
tous intellectual sequence between Augustine and Aquinas could plausibly furnish the 
metaphysical, anthropological, and theological resources precise enough to clarify the 
conceptual fronts described above. In Chapter 1, I began narrating this sequence by argu-
ing that Augustine’s overarching theological framework in De Trinitate promisingly sug-
gests that human existence is tied together by three types of intensive unity—the primal 
unity of the soul, the epistemic unity of self-knowledge, and the teleological unity of de-
sire/love—that are deficiently similar to God’s eminently simple unity in different ways. 
                                                
1 Henrich, “Selbstbewußtsein,” 274 (“Self-Consciousness,” 19). 
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Unfortunately, Augustine’s metaphysics and epistemology force him into the dilemma of 
a version of the reflection theory that results in his circular conflation of these three varie-
ties of unity into the single form of a reflective self-knowledge always already given in 
the soul as the preceding ground of all knowledge of external objects. In Chapters 2 and 
3, I completed this narration by describing Aquinas’s multi-faceted solution to this Au-
gustinian dilemma. He formulates this solution in and through a creative synthesis that he 
forges between several of Augustine’s most seminal insights (e.g. the varieties of inten-
sive unity, the exitus-reditus scheme, and the centrality of intelligence as the site of ima-
go Dei) and the precision of Aristotle’s metaphysical framework (e.g. causation, poten-
cy/act, the soul, the intellect). The fruit of this synthesis arrived in a Thomist theological 
anthropology that finally capitalizes upon Augustine’s initial insight by naming the soul 
as the cause of an individual’s most primal intensive unity (viz. its existence), reclassify-
ing self-knowledge as only derivatively possible on the basis of the senses’ and the intel-
lect’s native extroversion, and redescribing the teleological unity of desire/love as the in-
tensive alignment of the appetites that occurs through the vertical influence of intelli-
gence and its ultimate (re)union with God. 
The second conjecture sought to augment this overall metaphysical and theologi-
cal framework by incorporating Freud’s promising insight regarding the crucial role that 
primary identification plays in the emergence egoic self-consciousness from a preceding 
pre-reflective state in infancy and our potential regression to such a state if that self-
consciousness is pathologically disrupted. The fruit of this conjecture arrived in the just 
completed translation of primary identification, and concomitant untangling of Freud’s 
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own libidinal version of the reflection theory, into terms broadly commensurate with 
Aquinas’s metaphysics and theological anthropology. In the latter part of Chapter 4, I set 
forth those translated terms as a distinct identifying layer of the soul, complete—a la 
Aquinas’s sensitive and intelligent layers—with an apprehensive and appetitive power. 
The apprehensive power of identification converts an “identificatory form” rooted in in-
tense and/or repetitive sensations of pleasure or pain into the unconscious perception of a 
pre-reflective wholeness. Derivatively, its correlative appetitive power generates con-
joined affections of inclination (love/hate) and rest (pleasure/pain) corresponding to the 
presence/absence of sensations associated with that form. 
It is here in this final chapter that I will bring all these threads of argument togeth-
er in order to formulate a constructive proposal regarding (a) the nature, origin, and theo-
logical significance of self-consciousness that successfully eludes the circular pitfalls of 
the reflection theory (b) the operative/teleological association between self-
consciousness, the human desire for the infinite, and the vertical perfections of intelli-
gence that situates egoic self-consciousness as a fourth type of intensive unity in addition 
to the soul, self-knowledge, and the vertical alignment of the appetites.  
In order to accomplish these goals, the itinerary ahead will move through three 
main sections. First, I will expand the transposed account of identification in order to re-
narrate the infantile “crisis of pain” that eventually leads to a decisive act of primary 
identification, which we will call the “egoic act,” which eventually condenses around 
one’s own sensing (i.e. phenomenal conscious) body and thereby establishes a sustaina-
ble, albeit enduringly fragile and contested, degree of stability within the individual. The 
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term of this egoic act of identification, the unconscious conversion of this “identificatory 
form” (i.e. the sensing body) into a pre-reflective whole (i.e. “me”), is what we will argue 
ultimately constitutes and perpetuates self-consciousness. In this section, I will also dis-
cuss how this account of the egoic act not only successfully eludes the reflection theory, 
but simultaneously points to its function as a necessary condition—vertically analogous 
to the role of phantasms—for the higher perfections of the intellect and the will. As such, 
the egoic act fills the explanatory “gap” left behind by Aquinas’s repositioning of self-
knowledge and thus can be affirmed as a fourth type of intensive unity. Second, I will 
explain how the vertical dynamism between identification and intelligence can be de-
scribed in such a way as to account for the phenomena (e.g. transference and the ego-
ideal) that can broadly be grouped together under the banner of secondary or post-egoic 
identification. Finally, in the last section I turn to address a number of interrelated issues 
all of which have to do with specifying the vertical perfections/influence of intelligence 
vis-à-vis the identifying powers. For example, in this section I will (1) describe intelli-
gence’s limited, but nonetheless genuine, political and therapeutic dominion over the 
identifying layer of the soul as illustrated by the Freudian talking-cure; (2) situate, in a 
manner that will reflect several aspects of Schleiermacher’s theological approach to self-
consciousness, the theological significance of egoic self-consciousness in relation to the 
three other types of intensive unity as enumerated by Augustine and Aquinas, and (3) an-
swer the lingering question of whether the identifying powers might in any way be posi-
tively affirmed as deficiently related to the eminent simplicity of the triune God.  
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I. Self-Consciousness as the Egoic Act of Primary Identification with the Sensing Body 
 
As I just referenced, the aim of this initial section is to propose a way of answering the 
riddle of egoic self-consciousness by drawing upon our translated account of identifica-
tion developed in Chapter 4. To recall our discussion in the Introduction, this riddle is 
constituted by two closely interrelated questions. First, there is the question of definition: 
what are the terms of the immanent relation—the relata—that constitutes self-
consciousness? Based upon our initial discussion, we preliminary concluded that one of 
these relata is relatively clear: the sensitive data of phenomenal consciousness. However, 
what has remained unclear is whether self-consciousness is the other member of this rela-
tion per se (and, if so, what is self-consciousness “on its own”?) or whether something 
else (e.g. self-knowledge, feeling (Gefühl), or self-acquaintance) combines with phenom-
enal consciousness to “produce” self-consciousness. The second question—that of origin 
or causation—is closely bound up with the first: how can we describe the cause/origin of 
self-consciousness without reducing it to the type of object qua object that we can intelli-
gently reflect upon?  
 For the sake of clarity, I want to state at the outset my provisional answers to the-
se questions in a thetic manner that we can then elaborate upon in the three descriptive 
subsections that follow. In reference to the question of definition, my contention is that 
egoic self-consciousness is “produced” as the immanent term of an act of primary identi-
fication—the egoic act—with an identificatory form that progressively and habitually 
condenses around the sensing body. As for the question of origin/causation, our account 
of identification suggests two interrelated causes: (1) that which disruptively opens the 
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identifying faculty to a new bond, namely the infantile crisis of pain and (2) the “formal” 
cause itself as the identificatory form that condenses around the sensing body, viz. that 
which we thereby unconsciously perceive as “me.” 
 The first two subsections that follow will be given over to describing each of the-
se two causes: our renarrated version of the Freudian and Kristevian infantile crisis of 
pain and then the sensitive and developmental variables that are likely collated in the 
identificatory form that moves the identifying faculty to the singularity of the egoic act. 
In each of these subsections we will also note thematic and conceptual parallels with the 
genealogy noted above as we come across them in order to show how our own account 
intersects with the problematic(s) variously described by the representative figures we 
have chosen to highlight. In the third subsection, we will then explain how this account of 
self-consciousness simultaneously eludes the reflection theory and points to the egoic act 
as a requirement for the subsequent operations of the intelligent layer of the soul. We will 
treat these two facets of the egoic act together because, as Novalis foreshadowed in his 
own way, they are deeply intertwined: the inward gaze of intelligent reflection cannot 
establish that which is its own preceding condition—”What reflection finds, seems to be 
there already.”2 
a. Opening the Identifying Faculty: Renarrating the Infantile Crisis of Pain 
Let us began by recalling that Freud’s version of the infantile crisis of pain that leads to 
the emergence of the ego begins with his assertion, “At the very beginning, all the libido 
is accumulated in the id, while the ego is still in [the] process of formation or is still fee-
                                                
2 Novalis, Fichte-Studien, II:112, no. 14 (FS, 12).  
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ble.”3 Out of this primal state, so Freud theorizes, the id then involuntarily “sends part of 
[its] libido out into erotic object-cathexes”4 that inevitably do not yield to its erotic wish-
es. The pain of these frustrated wishes then ultimately brings about the formation of the 
ego as that which sublimatorily assuages the pain by becoming a substitute, immanent 
“object” that is “always there” in a manner impossible for any external object/erotic-
cathexis. Where there was once the desire for immediate sexual satisfaction (and its at-
tendant painful frustration), the ego ultimately condenses as a replacement that is—apart 
from its pathological “absence”—in fact immediately “present” for sublimatory release.  
 As we similarly observed last chapter in our commentary on the potential rele-
vance of Freud’s description of melancholia once it is strained of its erotic elements and 
its implicit reliance on a libidinal version of the reflection theory, our own renarrated ac-
count of this crisis of pain takes up and reappropriates many of these basic elements. 
Next to our obvious point of divergence in replacing the libido with our translated ac-
count of identification, the most significant variance for our account of the crisis of pain 
is drawn from one of Kristeva’s feminist emendations of Freud. On the basis of this 
emendation, we can offer our translated version of Freud’s quotation above: At the very 
beginning, there was the inevitable primary identification with the maternal body. Out of 
the “archaism of [this] pre-objectal relationship,”5 early infancy takes shape through a 
series of sensitive experiences that reawaken this bond and/or progressively forge other 
identificatory bonds that generally—albeit not necessarily—gradually condense around 
                                                
3 Freud, The Ego and the Id, SA 3:312-313/SE 19:46. 
4 Ibid., SA 3:313/SE 19:46. 
5 Kristeva, Pouvoirs de l’horreur, 17 (Powers of Horror, 10).  
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parental identificatory forms/bonds. The more habitually reinforced and condensively 
expansive such bonds become, the more “general and lasting” their effects will prove to 
be.  
 The problem, of course, is that in the “long-term” none of these external bonds 
can permanently satisfy the ideality intrinsic to identification that was first pleasurably 
tasted in relation to the maternal body. This is because reality’s vacillating conditions will 
necessarily entail that all such primal bonds will become condensively habituated with 
the full ambivalence of love/hate and pleasure/pain through the momentary or extended 
absence of sensations associated with an actualized identificatory bond. These dissonant 
experiences thereby introduce a hated and painful deprivation, a lack, into that which we 
identify with our “own” wholeness. Even any masochistic substitutes that have been 
forged will likely develop similar ambivalence because the returning presence of what 
were likely originally sensitive pleasures (e.g. the return of the breast) will then ambiva-
lently rob the infant of the pleasurable pain of its absence. Put differently, for every 
“bright and fragile amatory idealization”6 found in infancy, there always opens up, as 
Kristeva has it, the “somber lining”7 of losing that “other” who in identification I take as 
“myself.” Nowhere, as Kristeva repeatedly points out, are the later effects of this inevita-
ble ambivalence more evident than in our unconsciously perpetuated and culturally rein-
forced hatred of the maternal body; the ideality of our first identificatory love inevitably 
                                                
6 Julia Kristeva, Soleil noir: Dépression et mélancolie (Paris: Gallimard, 1987), 15 (ET: Black Sun: De-
pression and Melancholia, trans. Leon S. Roudiez (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 5). 
7 Ibid.  
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becomes “contaminated” with “maternal aversion” that is the appetitive inverse for a 
whole “gamut of forgotten bodily relationships with [our] mothers.”8 
 The crisis that eventually develops out of this conflict between identification’s 
ideality and reality’s oscillations is that there occurs a law of decreasing returns that inev-
itably accompanies infantile identificatory bonds: where identification is inclined toward 
the active stasis of an identificatory fusion, it repeatedly encounters a sensible environ-
ment through its phenomenal consciousness in which original idealities are marred by the 
occurrence of identificatory hate/pain that opens it up again to new identificatory bonds. 
Every beloved/pleasurable identificatory form eventually becomes ambivalently tainted 
with hate/pain through the “remembrance” of its condensively-assimilated deprivations. 
Expressed in Kristeva’s terminology, the infant who was once surrounded by the choric 
fullness of the womb, now distressingly encounters sensitive “surroundings” that repeat-
edly elicit appetitive responses with the disruptive connotations of “‘I’ am not whole” 
that thereby opens up the identify faculty again. Maternal, choric fullness inescapably 
gives way to a world of identificatory lack.  
In the onset and acceleration of this cycle of ambivalence, perhaps we could even 
appropriate Fichte’s seminal language productively: where there was once an “original 
force”9 to define the “self” externally in identification, in the intensification of the crisis 
of pain the individual encounters a “limitation” (Begrenzung) and “check” (Anstoss) that 
causes the locus for identification’s intrinsic ideality to “rever[t] back”10 to the sensing 
                                                
8 Histoires d’amour, 243 (Tales of Love, 257).  
9 Fichte, GWL, I:294 (SK, 259). 
10 Ibid. 
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body. This reversion eventually leads to the egoic act that circumscribes the individual as 
a finite, embodied self. “Nothing more can be said” about this limitation (at this junc-
ture), but without encountering it the egoic act “would never have existed either.”11 Iden-
tificatory ambivalence, in its own way, paves the road toward self-consciousness. To cite 
Kristeva once last time, these “inaugural loss[es] [end up laying] the foundations of [the 
subject’s] own being.”12 For by losing the ideality of our most primal identificatory 
bonds, our identifying faculty is thereby opened to receiving the identificatory form that 
condenses around our sensing bodies: that which is indeed, by definition, “always there.”   
b. The Sensing Body as the Identificatory Form of Egoic Self-Consciousness 
In turning to consider how the sensing body comes into focus as an identificatory form, 
and in doing so ameliorates the infantile crisis of pain, we should immediately make two 
clarifying comments at the outset. First, we will need to avoid any trace of the idea that 
there is one decisive developmental moment in which the egoic act commences and after 
which it continues unabated. Such a fallacy would cut at the heart of our insistence that 
egoic self-consciousness is a fragile integrative phenomenon that is always subject to col-
lapse and/or disruption. Instead, I take it for granted that the “identificatory situation of 
the baby,” to adapt Klein’s terminology, is characterized by an ongoing fluctuation—
even conflict—between primal identificatory bonds that eventually and progressively sta-
bilizes in the expected continuity, elasticity, and diachronically active character of the 
egoic act. At one point, the infant might be identifying with the sensing body—broadly 
speaking—only to have that fullness interrupted by the reintroduction, for instance, of the 
                                                
11 Ibid., I:279 (SK, 246). 
12 Kristeva, Pouvoirs de l’horreur, 12 (Powers of Horror, 5). 
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identificatory bond that condensively includes the breast and/or another parental imago. 
Eventually, however, the egoic act usually becomes so habitually and condensively rein-
forced that such interruptions become less frequent, even though early on—”when the 
ego is still in [the] process of formation or is still feeble”13—such interruptions surely oc-
cur with a higher degree of ease and frequency. Noting such disruptive conflicts between 
identificatory bonds will prove important when we discuss secondary, post-egoic identi-
fication in the next section as well.  
 Second, recall that the definition we worked out for an identificatory form last 
chapter presupposes that a diversity/plurality of sensations become collated (elastically 
and condensively) into a single identificatory bond. The importance of this diversi-
ty/plurality for purposes is multifaceted. Most crucially, it functions as a bulwark against 
the constant temptation to tie egoic self-consciousness to any single sensitive variable 
(e.g. the sight of one’s body) in a manner that too rigidly specifies the developmental 
route to self-consciousness for each individual. Instead, the concept of an identificatory 
form is flexible enough that the specific series of intense/repetitive sensations that even-
tually leads to the dawning and condensation of the egoic act is likely contingently differ-
ent for each individual, despite the fact that each of them eventually condenses 
“in/around” one’s “own” sensing body because of the interdependent associations easily 
forged between different parts of and sensations associated with the body. In this sense, 
the ontological order of creation tends to predispose and reinforce identificatory forms to 
condense in/around things that (in truth, though still unknown) have a single intelligible 
                                                
13 Freud, The Ego and the Id, SA 3:312-13/SE 19:46. 
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form: just as parental imagos tend to form because of the diachronic series of pleas-
ures/pain contingently associated with them, so too we must affirm that a similar conden-
sive process is in play in relation to the sensing body. This is just another way of express-
ing a claim with which we are now familiar from a number of rhetorical directions: self-
consciousness does not emerge from finding any object qua object, it emerges through 
the progressive collocation of a number of different sensations that end up contingently 
condensed into the elastic singularity of an identificatory bond. Again, the point will 
prove decisive when considering how the egoic act can be disrupted. Such disruption 
cannot occur through the mere absence of any single sensitive factor bound up with its 
form, but rather through what we described last chapter as a decisive and likely multifac-
eted alteration in those supporting sensitive conditions.   
 Given these two observations, I will begin by drawing upon some insights from 
psychoanalysis (Freud/Kristeva/Klein) that help to explain generally how an initial identi-
ficatory bond is likely forged with some aspect/part of the body through pleasurable acts 
that help an infant cope with the painful absence of sensations related to another identifi-
catory bond. From there we will draw upon several aspects of the operative relation be-
tween the external senses and the inner senses that we developed in Chapter 3 in order to 
lay out the different sensory factors that progressively, developmentally, and mnemically 
condense into what we will affirm as a sense-cognitive “feeling” of the finite bounds of 
one’s body. The identificatory conversion of this collated form in the egoic act then 
yields the pre-reflective wholeness characteristic of self-consciousness—”me.” Lastly, in 
light of our insistence that all identificatory acts can be disrupted if their underlying sen-
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sitive conditions undergo an alteration outside the bounds of that act’s diachronic elastici-
ty, we will finally consider several examples of such disruptions taken from psychoanaly-
sis (e.g. trauma) and cognitive neuroscience (e.g. organic impairment). 
 If, as we theorized above in renarrating the infantile crisis of pain, the ideality of 
every primal identificatory bond with external (though unknown as so) referents inevita-
bly becomes habitually tainted with ambivalence, then the body steadily ascends as a po-
tential identificatory locus that satisfies identification’s ideality. Though Freud does not 
draw this exact connection, he does repeatedly draw attention to the significance of auto-
referential pleasures as decisively important for how an infant copes with the absence of 
the breast/mom/parent. Freud’s main example is the substitution of the breast with the 
rhythmic sucking of their thumb.14 However, to this basic example we can add the analo-
gous pleasures, any one of which could deepen into an initial body-centric identificatory 
bond, that can be glimpsed when infants stroke their belly/foot/genitals, grasp their legs 
in order to rock back and forth, or (masochistically) bang their heads against something: 
“‘I’ am this bodily pleasure/activity/body part.” To these primal, repetitive, and mnemi-
cally-reinforced sensitive encounters with one’s body as something to be “something to 
be sucked/stroked/grasped”—to allude back to Aquinas’s phrase last chapter—we can 
also add the elementary apprehensions (e.g. usually visual and tactile) of one’s body parts 
as somehow repeatedly (and sometimes surprisingly!) “present” right “nearby” as some 
of the sensitive variables available for condensive assimilation into any of the initial iden-
tificatory bonds cited above. 
                                                
14 Three Essays, SA 5:88-89/SE 7:181-82. 
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  As just referenced, the identificatory importance of such primal sensitive encoun-
ters with one’s body can only be glimpsed against the causal background of the infantile 
crisis of pain. For in encountering one’s own body—and forging an autoreferential bond 
with some part of it—the identifying faculty finally finds an entry point that can be con-
densively expanded to include the collated sensations for something that is comparatively 
“always there.” This enfleshed “border” (limites) or “territory,”15 as Kristeva describes it, 
thus becomes the locus of an identificatory bond whose positive, formal content will 
eventually, ipso facto, “abject” that which elastically lies “outside” that bond as “not-
me.” If life as a biological whole begins through our abjection in the birth canal, our ego-
ic birth begins through an analogous act of de facto abjection. As Kristeva writes in a 
passage that echoes Fichte, that which is thereby abjected is not “a definable object” per 
se, but in fact “only [has] one quality of [an] object—that of being opposed to I 
[s’opposer à je]”16 or in our translated language: of being opposed to identification’s ide-
ality through which we are naturally and unconsciously inclined toward the active fusion 
of a non-ambivalent whole. Nonetheless, as we will explore shortly when we turn to con-
sider secondary identificatory, the effects of our other infantile bonds of identification 
always endure even on the other side of this discovery that ends up producing the egoic 
act. They remain “in us,” to formulate our own convergence between Freud and Kristeva, 
as the habitual “history” of our “abandoned” identificatory “objects,” the remnant of our 
archaic and amorous “alter egos,”17 waiting to be transferentially revived once more. 
                                                
15 Kristeva, Pouvoirs de l’horreur, 11-13 (Powers of Horror, 3-6). 
16 Ibid., 9 (Powers of Horror, 1).   
17 Cf. Ibid., 16-18 (Powers of Horror, 9-10).  
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 As to how such a primal autoreferential bond condensively expands to include the 
fullness of the sensing body, obviously any initial sensible forms associated with such a 
bond will remain crucial elements in the perpetuation of act of identification, especially 
since such forms are subject to accelerating mnemic reinforcement as an infant develops. 
Usually these forms are visual (e.g. seeing body parts) or tactile (e.g. feeling the skin’s 
surface and temperature). However, the contributions of the external senses in this regard 
might be reasonably extended (both rhetorically and condensively) to include certain pat-
terns of sense-perceptions that make us aware of internal bodily states of either appetitive 
(e.g. the bodily changes associated with sensitive passions)18 or vegetative origin (e.g. 
hearing one’s heart beat or breathing).19 All of these sensitive forms likely provide some-
thing of an initial, primal topography for the elastic bounds for an autoreferential identifi-
catory bond that ends up defining the pre-reflective wholeness characteristic of self-
consciousness. In more ways than one, they are the archaic perceptual media through 
which we become comfortable with/in our own skin. 
 Nonetheless, the fullness of the egoic act requires the collation of sensations relat-
ed much more directly to the body’s coordinated physicality than the external senses are 
capable of providing. In this regard, the progressive condensive inclusion of data received 
from the internal senses—particularly the ordered relation between proprioception, 
equilibrioception, and the common sense—would seem to be especially decisive in the 
                                                
18 Obviously Aquinas’s metaphysics has prepared us for this, but for confirmatory contemporary research, 
see, for instance, Anil K. Seth, “Interoceptive Inference, Emotion, and the Embodied Self,” Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences 17, no. 11 (2013): 565-73. 
19 Again, see, for instance, Manos Tsakiris, Ana Tajadura-Jiménez, and Marcello Costantini, “Just a 
Heartbeat Away from One’s Body: Interoceptive Sensitivity Predicts Malleability of Body-
Representations,” Proceedings of the Royal Society, Series B 278 (2011): 2470-76.  
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developmental solidifying of egoic self-consciousness. As we discussed in Chapter 3, 
proprioceptors (e.g. muscle spindles and Golgi tendon organs in the arms, legs, and neck) 
and the equilibrioceptors (e.g. the semicircular canals and the otolith organs in the inner 
ear) are differentiated from external senses because their acts yield sensations indicative, 
not of sensible qualities of external objects, but rather of one’s own embodied position 
within the world. Proprioceptors do this by collectively sensing the relative position and 
state (i.e. stretched or relaxed) of different muscles; equilibrioceptors analogously sense 
the body’s rotational movements (i.e. the head moving) and linear acceleration (i.e. going 
up or down, forward or backward).  
 In addition to the different reference for their sensations, it is also crucial for our 
purposes here that proprioception and equilibrioception are dependent upon post-partum 
physiological maturation (i.e. vegetative) and habitual formation for their development in 
manner that again sets them apart from the external senses.20 In the onset of a pattern of 
experience that accompanies the formation of any kinesthetic ability later in life, early 
infancy is marked by the gradual habitual and physiological strengthening of our muscu-
lar apparatus—including our proprioceptors—that make certain activities easier through 
repetition. Of all such infantile milestones that might be related to the emergence of egoic 
self-consciousness, none is likely as decisive as the capacity to lift and hold our heads 
vertically that usually progressively occurs during the first sixth months of life. For in the 
wake of lifting our heads, the equilibrioceptors in the vestibular system derivatively de-
velop the habitual capacity to regulate the head’s positional stability, the most important 
                                                
20 Cf. Aquinas, ST I.78.4. 
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extension of which is the vestibular-ocular reflex whereby the visual data received 
through the eyes are coordinated with the head’s movement. This learned coordination 
between different sensitive powers, external and internal, yields the familiar experience 
of a visual field that remains stable even when the head moves (i.e. our eyes “automati-
cally” move left when our head turns to the right).21  
 Once established, this stability of field and vertical-orientation would seem to 
yield a collation of autoreferential sensations, to be condensively added to the enfleshed 
boundary established by external apprehensions, that form a crucial dimension in a sensi-
tively integrated “feeling” of one’s body. For in this multisensory stabilization of the 
head, we establish one of the key elements of what cognitive scientist Olaf Blanke and 
philosopher Thomas Metzinger, in something of a convergence with our own theoriza-
tion, have called the “weak first-person perspective”22 intrinsic to self-consciousness. In 
coining this concept, they are explicitly contrasting it with so-called “strong first-person 
perspectives” that presuppose higher, non-sensitive (i.e. intelligent) types of self-
knowing. Instead, all we have in a weak first-person perspective is the gradual establish-
ment of a consistent “geometrical […] point of projection” that functions as the “origin” 
for an individual’s “sensory and mental processing.”23 In relation to this vertical orienta-
tion established by the head, we not only gain a consistent orientation for sensing our 
                                                
21 On the learned nature of this “reflex,” cf. Goldberg et al., The Vestibular System, 409-26.  
22 Cf. Olaf Blanke and Thomas Metzinger, “Full-body Illusions and Minimal Phenomenal Selfhood,” 
Trends in Cognitive Sciences 13, no. 1 (2008): 7-8. Blanke and Metzinger explicitly contrast this weak 
first-person perspective with what they call a “strong first-person perspective,” which they define as a “sys-
tem [that] represents itself” as a unified self that carries out various acts (e.g. the act of knowing). Cf. Ibid., 
8. 
23 Ibid. 
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bodies, but in relation to this “point” we also quite literally—via our proprioceptive and 
equilibrioceptive senses—learn to feel and maintain the balance of our bodies. 
 When ported into the terms of our modified Aristotelian-Thomist framework, 
such examples of multisensory integration lay the foundations for reemphasizing the de-
cisive importance of the common sense as that which ultimately unconsciously structures 
all external, proprioceptive, and equilibrioceptive sensations into a contemporaneous flux 
of phenomenal and phantasmatic consciousness. As we discussed in Chapter 3, without 
this common sensitive act, all the discrete sensations would remain uncoordinated, atom-
istic qualia (to borrow a term from contemporary philosophy), “as though [these distinct 
sensations],” to recall Aquinas’s striking conclusion, “were sensed by [different people]; 
I this and you that [ego sentio hoc, et ille illud].”24 Instead, the common sense, as the 
“principle and term of all sensibility,”25 integrates all these sensations temporally—they 
are apprehended in “undivided moment”26—and yet in a manner that is topographically 
distributed appropriately “in” and “around” the localizable parts of an individual’s body. 
In this manner, the common sense is responsible for yielding a phenomenal conscious-
ness volumetrically conterminous with the enfleshed boundary of one’s body glimpsed 
by the external senses and the embodied physicality sensed/regulated by proprioception 
and equilibrioception. 
 Despite all these elements of coordination that should be attributed to a sensitive 
feeling of the finite bounds of the body, what none of these acts can do on their own is 
                                                
24 Aquinas, In De Anima III, lect. 3, n. 603. 
25 Ibid., lect. 3, n. 609. 
26 Ibid., lect. 3, n. 605. 
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collate all of these different elements into the pre-reflective wholeness of egoic self-
consciousness. Even if they collectively furnish all the relevant data regarding the body’s 
finite bounds (which they do), no sensitive power is capable of imputing the quintessen-
tial characteristic of egoic self-consciousness: integrated “mineness.” That, as we have 
argued at length, is the metaphysical province of identification. By gradually condensing 
these sensitive elements into a single identificatory form, what began as an autoreferen-
tial identificatory bond borne amidst a crisis of pain progressively expands in scope to 
include all these sensitive elements (and others as well) associated with, and continuously 
mnemically reinforced by, the enduring presence of one’s sensing body. When in act vis-
à-vis this condensed form, the identifying faculty actively produces the pre-reflective 
terminal effect that defines egoic self-consciousness—”’I’ am this sensing body”27—and 
thereby unconsciously and ipso facto divides phenomenal consciousness according to the 
archaic division of “me” and “not-me.” 
 Having formulated this crucial definition, we must immediately attend to two po-
tential misunderstandings and/or criticisms. First, one criticism to which our account 
would seem to be particularly vulnerable can be articulated in the form of this question: 
how can an act that we have insisted throughout is “unconscious” yield a variety of “con-
sciousness,” i.e. self-consciousness? Answering this question begins with adequately dis-
                                                
27 In the course of formulating this definition on the basis of the conceptual trajectory that I had already set 
for myself vis-à-vis my primary conversation partners (e.g. Fichte, Schleiermacher, Augustine, Aristotle, 
Aquinas, Lonergan, Freud, and Kristeva), I became aware through adjacent research of the close proximity 
of this declaration and Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s in Phenomenology of Perception (1945), “I am not in 
front my body, I am in my body, or rather I am my body [je suis mon corps].” The origination of this over-
lap is merely incidental, though obviously connected to analyzing the same embodied conditions of con-
sciousness. I simply note this overlap in passing for the sake of explanation and, perhaps, future explora-
tion. Cf. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phénoménologie de la perception (Paris: Gallimard, 2005), 186 (ET: 
Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Donald A. Landes (London/New York: Routledge, 2012), 151).  
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tinguishing, as we showed Freud doing last chapter, different types of act-based phenom-
ena that qualify as “unconscious” in different ways. Vegetative acts are “unconscious” 
simply because they are devoid of any kind of apprehensive conversion; their terminal 
effects are merely physiological and intrinsically outside of the flow of phenomenal con-
sciousness. Sensitive acts, on the other hand, exhibit different levels of unconscious-
ness/consciousness. The external senses, for example, always produce a diversity of acts 
of which one is necessarily phenomenally conscious: one cannot see and not be aware 
that seeing is occurring. Similarly, as Freud argues repeatedly in his own way, appetitive 
affections intrinsically carry with them the quality of being phenomenally conscious.28 
Again, one cannot love or be in pain without that data entering into phenomenal con-
sciousness. On the other hand, the act of the common sense is itself unconscious, despite 
the fact that we are phenomenally consciousness of its effects (i.e. the temporal and topo-
graphical simultaneity of sensitive data), which then become the basis on which we can 
rationally affirm the existence of its act. Nonetheless, we are not enduringly phenomenal-
ly conscious that we are “common-sensing,” nor—interestingly enough—is it subject to 
volitional control.  
 When placed within this loose typology, the egoic act can be affirmed as “uncon-
scious” in two senses. First, it is unconscious in a manner that is directly, albeit vertically, 
analogous to that of the common sense. The egoic act yields a kind of pre-reflective fu-
sion with the sensing body “as mine” such that all the sensible data in the immanent flow 
of our phenomenal consciousness is “accompanied” by a diachronic wholeness elastically 
                                                
28 Cf. Freud, The Ego and the Id, SA 3:291-292/SE 19:22-23. 
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coterminous with the finite bounds of that body. This pre-reflective wholeness can be ra-
tionally and reflectively affirmed on the basis of its effects (i.e. a collated “feeling” of 
self-differentiated wholeness that accompanies all the embodied sensations collated into 
the egoic), but as we will discuss shortly, that reflection has its limits and certainly cannot 
be named as the cause of the preexistent wholeness. Second, the first element of reflec-
tion’s limit can already be glimpsed in the other aspect of “unconsciousness” associated 
with the egoic act. As we discussed last chapter, there is a type of unconsciousness pecu-
liar to identification caused by the nature of identification itself: the pre-reflective fusion 
that identification actively forges entails that “I” cannot be conscious of identifying with 
my body in the same that I am aware that “my” eye sees; rather in identification “‘I’ 
simply am my sensing body.” Instead, the intrinsic multiplicity of the sensations relating 
to the topography of “my” body continues, even as they are condensed—and thereby ac-
companied by—the singularity of the egoic act. Here we have the unconscious mecha-
nism of synthetic, non-reflective “recognition” that Hölderlin pointed out as necessary for 
self-consciousness in “Urteil and Sein,” but could not name or extrapolate. By collating 
these sensations into the singularity of an identificatory form, the egoic act “recognizes 
the identity” of the sensing body “in spite of the distinction” between phenomenal con-
sciousness and the identifying faculty.29 In this regard, the variety of consciousness that 
self-consciousness is yields an absolutely whole “mineness” that is impervious to some-
thing “else” being consciously “aware” of that act in itself because the pre-reflectively 
synthesized and elastically bounded egoic self simply is always already structured by that 
                                                
29 Hölderlin, “Urteil und Sein,” IV:227. 
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identificatory act being in act. Or, to allude to Novalis once more, self-consciousness as 
the converted, pre-reflective “feeling” of the sensing body, “cannot feel itself.”30 Rather, 
for as long it is in in act, egoic self-consciousness is simply, to cite Lonergan, a pre-
reflectively and involuntarily-forged “[given] unity of consciousness.”31   
 The second potential misunderstanding that immediately looms at this juncture is 
to suppose that the egoic act thereby “finds” some kind of fixed scope of the body that 
could be supposed as the foundation for an inviolable and static Self/Subject. To be sure, 
there is a certain defensiveness involved in both the origins and ongoing perpetuation of 
the egoic act, but—as with all identificatory acts—this one is also continually character-
ized as diachronically elastic, condensively assimilatory, and circumstantially disruptable 
active state of pre-reflective fusion. The full freight of the Aristotelian/Thomist notion of 
act is essential to maintain here. Just as sensitive or intellective acts of apprehension do 
not cease just because they are united to their respective form (in fact just the opposite!), 
so does the identifying act that produces self-consciousness as its term remain in act un-
less it is disrupted by the slumbering of the sensing body in sleep, the interference of an-
other identificatory form, or a decisive alteration in its underlying sensitive or physiolog-
ical conditions.  
 Of all these characteristics that define the egoic act, the interrelated qualities of 
diachronic elasticity and condensive assimilation are jointly explanatorily responsible for 
one of the most classic aspects of self-consciousness that we noted in the Introduction: 
the “quality” of integrated mineness that is immediately added to certain first-order data 
                                                
30 Novalis, Fichte-Studien, II:114, no. 15 (FS, 13) 
31 Lonergan, Insight, 350.  
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in phenomenological consciousness. To recall Schleiermacher’s seminal phrase, this 
quality of self-consciousness thereby “appears as an accompaniment of the state itself.”32 
From within our theorization of self-consciousness, such an accompaniment signals the 
condensive and elastic collation of a given sensation into the diachronic unity of the egoic 
act. This intrinsic quality of identification’s vertical relation to sensitivity yields the pecu-
liar singularity of an act—classically characteristic of self-consciousness—that “re-
mains,” to appropriate and emend another of Schleiermacher’s phrases, “self-identical as 
an act while all other sensitive states are changing.”33 
 Perhaps surprisingly, two experiments—the “rubber hand illusion” and the “full-
body illusion”—carried out under the disciplinary banner of cognitive neuroscience have 
illustrated this dynamic of active integration that results in an elastic “boundary” around 
embodied “ourselves.” Since the methodologies of each of these experiments require the 
verticality of intelligent actions such as verbal self-reporting of mental phenomena, our 
use of them as this juncture should be somewhat qualified. Nevertheless they are still 
quite useful for illustrating the way that our identifying faculty non-volitionally collates 
some sensations (and not others) into our unconscious apprehension of an embodied, in-
tegrated “me.”  
                                                
32 Schleiermacher, CG, 13.1:§3.2, p. 23 (CF, 6). 
33 Schleiermacher’s original passage runs as follows: “As a consciousness of absolute dependence it is quite 
simple, and remains self-identical while all other states are changing. Therefore, in itself it cannot possibly 
be at one moment thus and at another moment otherwise, nor can it by intermission be present at one mo-
ment and absent at another. Either it is not there at all, or, so long as it is there, it is continuously there and 
always self-identical.” Ibid., 13.1:§5.2, p. 37 (CF, 21). Obviously, in light of our foray into Freud’s insist-
ence regarding the ego’s continual fragility, we could only endorse the latter half of this passage with heavy 
qualification.  
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 Both experiments accomplish this illustration by manipulating the coordinated 
multisensory basis upon which our embodied self-consciousness depends such that our 
identifying faculty incorporates, to one degree or another, non-bodily sensations into the 
form that participants identify with as “me.” In the rubber hand experiment (RHI), partic-
ipants have their real hand hidden behind their back and then are visually directed to a 
fake rubber hand situated on a table in a manner properly aligned with the rest of their 
body. When their real hand and the rubber hand are stroked with a paintbrush at the exact 
same time (i.e. synchronously), participants regularly and repeatedly reported that the 
rubber hand “feels like my own.”34 Intriguingly, however, the bounds of this illusion are 
demonstrably narrow and always reminiscent of the body’s actual, finite bounds and/or 
sensitive operations. For instance, if the stroking is done asynchronously,35 or if the visual 
object does not look like a hand,36 or if the rubber hand is placed too far away,37 the illu-
sion completely disappears and participants phenomenologically “[re]localize their real 
stroked hand.”38 Similarly, the full-body illusion grew out of the methodology introduced 
by the RHI, even as it introduced a more “global” element to this experimental manipula-
tion. By attaching a head-mounted, virtual reality display on the participant that relayed a 
                                                
34 Estelle Palluel, Jane Elizabeth Aspell, and Olaf Blanke, “Leg Muscle Vibration Modulates Bodily Self-
Consciousness: Integration of Proprioceptive, Visual, and Tactile Signals,” Journal of Neurophysiology 
105, no. 5 (2011): 2239. See also, Donna M. Lloyd, “Spatial Limits on Referred Touch to an Alien Limb 
May Reflect Boundaries of Visu-Tactile Peripersonal Space Surrounding the Hand,” Brain and Cognition 
64 (2007): 104-09. 
35 Cf. Matthew Botvinick and Jonathan Cohen, “Rubber Hands ‘Feel’ Touch that Eyes See,” Nature 391 
(1998): 756. 
36 Cf. Manos Tsakiris and Patrick Haggard, “The Rubber Hand Illusion Revisited: Visuotactile Integration 
and Self-Attribution,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception & Performance 31, no. 1 
(2005): 80-91. 
37 Cf. Lloyd, “Spatial Limits on Referred Touch to an Alien Limb May Reflect Boundaries of Visu-Tactile 
Peripersonal Space Surrounding the Hand,” 104-09. 
38 Palluel, Aspell, and Blanke, “Leg Muscle Vibration Modulates Bodily Self-Consciousness,” 2239. 
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video filmed synchronously from behind their own body, they similarly “self-identified,” 
to cite the experimenters’ own language, with the projected body when their own back 
was stroked.39 Again, when such stroking was either asynchronous or applied to a non-
bodily object, the illusory identification disappeared.40 
 One of the implications of these experiments is that by inducing variations in the 
underlying sensitive data within a certain scope, the bounds of the identificatory form 
that yields egoic self-consciousness can be elastically expanded, to appropriate Blanke’s 
and Metzinger’s conclusion, “in a predictable fashion.”41 In this regard, these sensitive 
manipulations of self-consciousness actually prove the point: the sensing body is the lo-
cus of an ongoing identificatory act that terminally yields the integrated unity of self-
consciousness. Something directly analogous—and similarly confirmatory—occurs in 
organic (i.e. neurological) impairments that can result in similar variations in the elastic 
bounds of self-consciousness. For instance, certain types of brain damage (i.e. lesions) 
can result in a pathological condition known as somatophrenia in which a person either 
misattributes one’s “own” hand or leg to a familiar person such as a friend, a doctor, or a 
nurse42 or identifies another person’s limb as their own.43 Or, to make a parallel with the 
full body illusion, other neurological lesions can cause visual hallucinations of one’s en-
tire body (i.e. an “autoscopy”). Again, however, each of these organic pathologies would 
                                                
39 Cf. Bigna Lenggenhager et al., “Video Ergo Sum: Manipulating Bodily Self-Consciousness,” Science 
317 (2007): 1096-99.  
40 Blanke and Metzinger, “Full-body Illusions and Minimal Phenomenal Selfhood,” 12. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid., 9. 
43 Josef Gerstmann, “Problem of Imperception of Disease and of Impaired Body Territories with Organic 
Lesions: Relation to Body Schema and Its Disorders,” Archives of Nerology and Psychiatry 48 (1942): 
890-913. 
  
  387 
seem to only be disruptive in the sense that they “disrupt” the “normal” boundaries of the 
egoic act, despite the fact that its basic integrity, rooted in the identificatory form of one’s 
actual sensing body, remains intact.  
 There are, however, at least two lesional disorders—heautoscopy and out-of-body 
experiences—whose symptoms elastically stretch the collated scope of the egoic act to an 
extent that begins to approach what psychoanalysis would call a “break” or “absence” of 
embodied self-consciousness reminiscent of a schizophrenic multiplication of egos.44 
Whereas in “regular” autoscopic experiences an individual reports that their “self-
location” remains centered in this body (not “in” that which is hallucinated), in a heato-
scopic experience individuals report a “rapid alternation” between two “centers” of phe-
nomenal/visuo-spatial consciousness: one located in their actual body and another located 
in the hallucination of that body.45 Similarly, in an out-of-body hallucination an individu-
al identifies with a disembodied perspective “from which” their actual body can be 
“seen.”46 
 In spite of the illuminating nature of these organic impairments, each one of 
them—and this is how they indirectly support our overall description of the egoic act—
still express some recognizable link to an original identificatory form centered on one’s  
“own” sensing body: autoscopic and out-of-body phenomena always involve some kind 
                                                
44 Although not the same as schizophrenia, both heautoscopy and out-of-body experiences are common 
symptoms of schizophrenia. Cf. Susan Blackmore, “Out-of-Body Experiences in Schizophrenia,” Journal 
of Nervous and Mental Diseases 174 (1986): 615-19. 
45 Cf. Olaf Blanke et al., “Out-of-Body Experiences and Autoscopy of Neurological Origin,” Brain 127 
(2004): 243-58. 
46 Cf. Blanke and Metzinger, “Full-body Illusions and Minimal Phenomenal Selfhood,” 10 and Olaf Blanke 
and Shahar Arzy, “The Out-of-Body Experience: Disturbed Self-Processing at the Temporo-Parietal 
Junction,” The Neuroscientist 11, no. 1 (2005): 16-24. 
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of hallucinatory/representative connection to one’s “own” body.47 In this regard, and here 
we return to one of the central contributions that we have attributed to Freud throughout, 
the pathological data of psychoanalysis is much more indicative of situations in which the 
egoic act can genuinely be interrupted by the intrusion of another identificatory form to-
tally devoid of such obvious representative links with one’s sensing body.  
 There are other links that we could make to psychoanalytic pathologies (e.g. 
schizophrenia), but for the sake of brevity we will limit ourselves to that which is not on-
ly likely to be the clearest example of such a disruptive intrusion, but also happens to be 
the original phenomenon that attracted the attention of Breuer and Freud: trauma. For in 
the most extreme cases of traumatically violent experiences—e.g. sexual assault, abuse 
(child or partner), and torture—there often occurs what has been described both theoreti-
cally and clinically as a state of “dissociation” variously marked by “frozen” immobility, 
detachment, impaired consciousness and trance-like surrender. Such a state, as several 
theorists have commented, signals a kind of “collapse of the self”48 and has been linked 
with the severest symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in which that event 
is “repeated” (e.g. flashbacks and nightmares).49 Even though this phenomenon and its 
tragic effects have been well-documented, the question of what immanent “mechanism,” 
                                                
47 Cf. Olaf Blanke, Shahar Arzy, and Theodor Landis, “Illusory Reduplications of the Human Body and 
Self,” in Handbook of Clinical Neurology. Volume 88, ed. M. Aminoff, F. Boller, and D. Swaab 
(Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2008), 429-58 and Peter Brugger, Marianne Regard, and Theodor Landis, “Illusory 
Reduplication of One’s Own Body: Phenomenology and Classification of Autoscopic Phenomena,” 
Cognitive Neuropsychiatry 2, no. 1 (1997): 19-38. 
48 E.g. Ghislaine Boulanger, “Wounded by Reality: The Collapse of the Self in Adult Onset Trauma,” 
Contemporary Psychoanalysis 38 (2002): 45-76. 
49 Cf. V. Rocha-Rego et al., “Is Tonic Immobility the Core Sign among Conventional Peritraumatic Signs 
and Symptoms Listed for PTSD?,” Journal of Affective Disorders 115, no. 1-2 (2009): 269-73. 
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as Freud once put it and has been repeated by others more recently,50 is responsible for 
how the traumatic event becomes so deeply “interiorized” into its victims remains largely 
unresolved and heavily debated. 
 When viewed from within our metaphysical framework, the intriguing possibility 
opens up that what occurs in these most traumatic events is that the collective intensity of 
sensations (apprehensive and appetitive) elicited by them are sufficient to overwhelm the 
egoic act, viz. they lie outside the elastic bounds of the identificatory form on which self-
consciousness is dependent. The result? A forced identification with the traumatic event 
that manifests itself in the same radical receptivity that we have repeatedly associated 
with identification: “‘I’ am this trauma.” Once the violence ends, at some point the sensi-
tive conditions are sufficient enough to support a “return” of the egoic act—with the trag-
ic caveat being that the identificatory bond associated the traumatic event remains uncon-
sciously interior meo waiting to be transferentially revived again. In this regard, and this 
conclusion is as necessary as it is unsettling, the radical receptivity of the nursing infant 
and the trauma victim are rooted in the exact same human capacity. The vital difference 
is what they are thereby being radically and unconsciously defined by: the expected and 
humane pleasures of the breast versus the unexpected and inhumane pain of total viola-
tion. 
 One last observation is in order before closing this subsection. If there is any con-
structively redemptive point to be taken from viewing the tragic example of trauma from 
within our framework of identification it might be the following. Bearing witness to the 
                                                
50 E.g. Yochai Ataria, “Trauma from an Enactive Perspective: The Collapse of the Knowing-How 
Structure,” Adaptive Behavior 23, no. 3 (2015): 143-54. 
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horrors of trauma, not to mention walking with and building up its victims, stands as a 
simultaneous reminder of something that is nearly imperceptible from “within” the egoic 
act itself because it is, by definition, concomitantly elicited by it for as long as it contin-
ues to be in act: the identificatory pleasure of being an embodied, self-conscious subject. 
By drawing attention to the conditions of its “absence,” we likewise gain a stronger ap-
preciation for the presence of this fragile pleasure through which, as we can now turn to 
consider, all the higher pleasures of the intellect and the will become vertically available 
to us as well.  
c. The Egoic Act, the Reflection Theory, and the Vertical Operations of Intelligence 
As we have noted time and again, the crux of the reflection theory as described by Dieter 
Henrich’s reading of the genealogy from Kant to Schleiermacher is a circularity that rein-
serts the egoic, self-conscious subject back into what was supposed to be an explanation 
of its origins. It does so by problematically assuming two things: (1) that an individual 
always already possesses an awareness of the subject-object distinction and (2) that 
somehow the intelligently reflecting subject can “find” qua object that which is necessari-
ly a precondition qua subject—i.e. a self-conscious “me”—in the act of reflection itself. 
As recalled at the outset of this chapter, in the Introduction I added to Henrich’s diagnosis 
of these two problematic assumptions by observing that the overall lack of conceptual 
clarity that plagues the genealogy from Kant to Schleiermacher is rooted in a poverty of 
metaphysical resources to distinguish precisely between different types of human capaci-
ties (e.g. sense-perception, intelligent knowledge, desire), the varieties inten-
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sive/extroverted unity, and the “infinite” drive of the self and its teleological relation to 
objects qua objects.  
 What can be seen in the light of the entire Aristotelian/Thomist framework that 
we have developed and expanded by way of Freud is that the attraction of the reflection 
theory turns on a enduring confusion between two different types of intensive unity that 
are vertically related to one another: (1) an act of identification with one’s sensing body 
that unconsciously produces a collated, pre-reflective whole out of the myriad of our sen-
sitive processes and (2) the derivative act of intelligent reflection that produces self-
knowledge. 
  Without question, Hölderlin and Novalis came the closest to describing the ori-
gins of this confusion when they critiqued Fichte’s attempt to ground self-consciousness 
in a primal unity of “the subjective and the objective”51 that thereby can affirmed as an 
exceptional form of “immediate self-knowledge.”52 By countering that intelligent 
knowledge must always be based on some kind of “separation” in something primally 
whole—which is then “reunited” in such knowledge—Hölderlin and Novalis rightly saw 
that intelligence, including its mode of operation in self-reflection, must be dependent 
somehow on conditions that precede and thereby elude the subject/object distinction in-
trinsic to intelligent operations. What their philosophical milieu could not furnish for 
them, however, is a way to think through that riddles of “separation,” “self-unity,” self-
consciousness, intelligence, and, we can add back in a this point, “infinite” desire in a 
                                                
51 Fichte, “Versuch einer neuen Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre,” I:526-527. 
52 Again, this is Henrich’s summarizing phrase for this element in Fichte’s theory of self-consciousness. Cf. 
Henrich, “Fichtes ursprüngliche Einsicht,” 212-213 (“Fichte’s Original Insight,” 36-37). 
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manner that allows these phenomena to be vertically related to one another such that a 
lower-level phenomenon can furnish essential aspects of the conditions required for a 
higher-level process without thereby being reduced in principle to the preceding process.  
 The closest that Hölderlin and Novalis came to formulating something like verti-
cality can be glimpsed in their contention that the simple unity of “absolute being” is not 
the same kind of unity as the intellectual union of subject and object. To recall Hölder-
lin’s expressive formulation: “die Identität nicht = dem absoluten Sein.”53 Despite the 
acuity of the critique of Fichte embedded in this formulation, what remains unclear in 
Hölderlin and Novalis is whether these two types of unity can be positively related in any 
manner other than the aesthetic route that they both propose as the most promising. 
 When this riddle is cast into our modified Aristotelian/Thomist framework that 
we have developed, however, what becomes promisingly clear is that the onto-
developmental process that Hölderlin and Novalis were trying to describe is actually 
comprised of four vertically-related types of intensive unities: the three culled from Au-
gustine/Aquinas (primal/epistemic/teleological), plus the addition of the egoic act. I will 
state these in sequence and then elaborate on how they are vertically related to one anoth-
er. The most basic and “primal” kind of intensive unity is that which comes closest to 
what Hölderlin and Novalis called “absolute being:” the soul as the primal cause of every 
individual’s existence. The second type of intensive unity is furnished by the identificato-
ry/egoic act that condenses around the sensing body and terminally yields a pre-
reflectively whole “me” finitely differentiated from the remaining flux of the sensible 
                                                
53 Hölderlin, “Urteil und Sein,” IV:227. 
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“that.” On the basis of both of these intensive unities as necessary preambles to its own 
acts, the intellectual powers then forge the last two types of intensive unity in and through 
the reflections of self-knowledge and the vertical alignment of the appetites.   
 As to how each of these unities are vertically related to one another, we have dis-
cussed the overall dependence of all human powers upon the soul as its singular principle 
at great length. From this unitary principle, an individual receives not only the definitions 
for all of its natural powers, but also its existence as a living, individual being. The soul’s 
actualization of existence is the ultimate vertical preamble (apart from the Creator’s act 
itself, of which it is a causal medium). As to how the egoic act furnishes a necessary ver-
tical preamble to the higher operations of the intelligent layer of the soul, including the 
intellect’s capacity for self-reflection, there are two loci of its act that seem most im-
portant in this regard. 
 First, by converting the various sensitive elements that make up our “feeling” of 
our bodies’ enfleshed topography into the wholeness characteristic of self-consciousness, 
the egoic act thereby furnishes the will with the integrated, finite self that it was naturally 
created to direct, control, and lead to its holistic teleological perfection. Or, as Blanke and 
Metzinger write very similarly, the advent of self-consciousness furnishes “an integrated 
functional state, which for the first time makes the body available for attention and global 
control.”54 Notably, this integrated availability is exactly what collapses under the sev-
erest forms of trauma: one literally cannot move because the will’s identificatory basis 
has been disrupted, assaulted, and violated.  
                                                
54 Blanke and Metzinger, “Full-body Illusions and Minimal Phenomenal Selfhood,” 8. 
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 Secondly, by pre-reflectively circumscribing the bounds of that which is radically 
received as “myself,” the egoic act ipso facto “opens up” the sensitively-received “space” 
required for intelligent operations. Here we are close to specifying the exact origin be-
tween the egoic act and something we have been aiming at for awhile now: the origins of 
the subject/object distinction. In this regard, however, it is crucial to remember that the 
identifying faculty does not thereby positively define any sensations irrelevant to the 
identificatory form of the sensing body as anything at all—”nothing more can be said” 
about them from within the metaphysical province of identification. For as long as these 
sensations remain in a certain range of intensity—e.g. outside of the intensity that elicits 
the disruptive effects of traumatic identification—then they are simply adiaphora, akin to 
the background noise that proves to be irrelevant to a nursing infant or the egoic act’s sat-
isfied ideality as it has condensed in/around the associated topography of one’s body.  
 To the will, however, this adiophoric realm of the ipso facto “not me” immediate-
ly opens up as the realm into which the highest level of desire—the desire to know—
expands and is naturally directed: if that “that” is not me, then what is it? Lonergan was 
fond of remarking that children never need to be taught to ask the questions, “what is 
that?” and “why is that?”55 That is, to be sure, true enough as far is it goes as any parent 
can gladly (or exasperatingly!) confirm. Nonetheless, and somewhat ironically for the 
theologian who thematized the notion of vertical finality implicitly in Aquinas and Aris-
totle, to simply assert this fact obscures the intense drama, the nature of which testifies to 
its ongoing vertical fragility, that all humans endure as infants in order to finally have 
                                                
55 Cf. Lonergan, The Triune God: Systematics, 12:599, 647. 
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their highest level of desire unleashed. Once unleashed, however, the will moves the in-
tellect in its search for truth. As we suggested in Chapter 2, the first grasp of truth’s uni-
versality that the young intellect undoubtedly hits upon is that which yields the most gen-
eral of all temporal inner words that we later signify by the external words “thing” or 
“object, viz. “a unity, identity, [a] whole in data.”56 In this regard, one of the greatest con-
firmations of Augustine’s seminal notion of a prelinguistic inner word of understand-
ing—a “word of no language”57—is that infants show every indication of grasping that 
something is an object in itself far before they can ever utter any signifying word for it. 
Through this most archaic insight, each of us proceeds in “desir[ing] to know what re-
mains”58 precisely because “the thing is the basic synthetic construct of scientific thought 
and development.”59 
 If the egoic act thereby is a necessary precondition for the unleashing of the will’s 
desire to know and the intellect’s corresponding mode of apprehending the intelligibility 
of objects qua objects, what then can we say about the intellect’s capacity for self-
reflection? What we can first say is that the intellect is obviously fully capable of reflect-
ing on any piece of sensitive (i.e. phantasmastic) data, including the individual’s own 
sensitive apprehensive and appetitive acts, in order to understanding their intrinsic intelli-
gibility. As I referenced above, the multiplicity intrinsic to the sensitive acts remain as 
they are and must be affirmed as “accessible,” to cite another effect of self-consciousness 
referenced in the Introduction, to the derivative analysis and use of the intelligent powers.  
                                                
56 Lonergan, Insight, 3:271. 
57 Augustine, trin. XV.22. 
58 Ibid., X.2. 
59 Lonergan, Insight, 3:273. 
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Furthermore, based upon its initial judgment of other objects as things, it likely will not 
take long for it to come to the insight that “my” body is a “thing” generically like those 
other things as well. Likewise, the intellect can pivot on its own acts of understanding 
and judgment, through the process we outlined in Chapter 3, in order to grasp their intrin-
sic intelligibility as well.   
 However, when it comes to any attempt to reflect directly upon—to objectify—the 
egoic act itself, the intellect inevitably founders. It cannot separate itself from the very 
circumscribed, self-differentiated wholeness, manifested in the given, integrated unity of 
one’s “own” phenomenal consciousness, that is one of its necessary vertical precondi-
tions. Expressed differently, and as Henrich’s critique of the reflection theory presuppos-
es, there is simply no intelligent act that does not always already presuppose the egoic, 
embodied self. To be sure, and as I have painstakingly tried to establish, the condensive 
wholeness of the egoic act is not always already in act; but, if the intelligent operations of 
the soul are in fact in act, then they in themselves have always already presupposed the 
egoic act of identification. At this point one of the central aspects of the metaphysical 
framework of verticality that we have developed makes one of its most decisive contribu-
tions: because identification and intelligence have a vertical relation to one another, the 
circular loop that plagues the reflection theory is cut short. That which we come to know 
as “our” intelligence is in fact itself dependent on two intensive unities from whence its 
capacity for bridging the subject/object divide through intelligible unities is always al-
ready absolutely dependent: the formal unity of the soul and the identificatory unity of 
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the egoic act.60 Without the actualization of either, the higher unities of intelligence and 
intelligent self-knowledge are, quite simply, impossible to achieve. 
 There are, however, two important contributions that can be attributed to the intel-
lect that should be mentioned at the juncture. First, its seems clear that through the semi-
nal understanding of other objects qua objects that the intellect is able not only to under-
stand the body as an integrated sensible and sensing object per se, but to ultimately signi-
fy that understanding with an actually verbally uttered, “me” or “I.” To be sure, this act 
of understanding and signification would not at all be possible without the preceding 
condensation of the identificatory, pre-reflective “‘me.’” Accordingly, they must be 
strictly distinguished metaphysically even as we insist on their close vertical relation and, 
of course, their rather exact, albeit ongoingly elastic in terms of identification, contermi-
nance from an ontological perspective (viz. centered in/around this actual body). Second, 
despite our insistence that we cannot objectify our own egoic act per se, this does not of 
course mean that the intellect cannot grasp the intelligibility of the egoic act—and the 
identificatory layer of the soul as a whole—based upon other data and inquiring about the 
necessary causes for such data. This, of course, has been a necessary presupposition of 
our entire project. The most important data that we have analyzed have been the disrup-
tions enumerated by psychological pathologies, the “feeling” (Gefühl) of our own finite 
                                                
60 One of the tragic confirmations of this vertical dependence is that if the egoic act is disrupted—e.g. in 
severe trauma, schizophrenia, or psychosis—the characteristic “self-absence” of these states is defined by a 
collapse of the subject/object divide that is necessary for the proper operations of the intellect and the will. 
In fact, to take the example of trauma again, one of the possible definitions that has been offered for trauma 
is an enforced state in which the conditions for intelligent knowledge collapses altogether. E.g. Dori Laub, 
“A Record That Has Yet to Be Made: An Interview with Dori Laub,” in Listening to Trauma: 
Conversations with Leaders in the Theory and Treatment of Catastrophic Experience, ed. Cathy Caruth 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014), 47-80 and Ataria, “Trauma from an Enactive 
Perspective: The Collapse of the Knowing-How Structure,” 143-54. 
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bounds that we have associated with the identificatory form of self-consciousness, and 
the conditions necessary for explaining how the subject/object distinctions grounds, but is 
not caused by, the operations of intelligence and reflection. 
 Finally, one last remark is in order before turning to addressing the open riddle of 
secondary (i.e. post-egoic) identification. If we take a moment to look back over the con-
tours of our proposal regarding the origin of self-consciousness and its operative relation 
to intelligence, it is hard not feel as if it represents a certain, if unexpected, vindication 
and confluence of different aspects of Aquinas’s and Augustine’s most basic anthropo-
logical convictions. The nature of these aspects naturally foreshadow a loop that we will 
complete in the third and final section below when we comment upon their relation to 
grasping the theological significance of self-consciousness. Vis-à-vis Aquinas, what we 
see is a final triumph of his axiomatic affirmation that the human soul actuates a mode of 
existence marked by a native extroversion that slowly migrated inward. In his own an-
thropology, of course, he argued for this native extroversion over against Augustine’s al-
ways already epistemically unified self in order to affirm—via Aristotle—that intelligent 
self-knowledge is always strictly derivative from our understanding of external intelligi-
bles upon which we can then pivot “inward” to understand ourselves. What we find 
above is that a directly analogous natural extroversion occurs in our most archaic identi-
ficatory acts when our first identificatory loves/pleasures are always in reality “external” 
to us, most notably in/around the maternal body. However, the crisis of pain/ambivalence 
slowly moves us “inward” toward an identification with our own sensing body, the occur-
  
  399 
rence of which immediately launches us back outward via the desire to know in the ex-
troversion that was most obvious and interesting to Aquinas (and Aristotle). 
  Even so, by insisting that the desire to know is necessarily preceded by a variety 
of intensive unity through which we, in a way, perceive and love “ourselves” as our (em-
bodied and conscious) “selves,” Augustine’s rhetoric regarding a primal unity in De Trin-
itate receives a bit of new life as well. His mistake, like Fichte’s, was to suppose that that 
intensive unity was itself always already intelligent. Nonetheless, this suggestive connec-
tion should not come as a complete surprise: it seems that the Thomist framework has an 
intrinsic tendency—wider in fact than Aquinas ever even intended, but nonetheless in 
line with his obvious intentions—to vindicate many of the Bishop’s insights precisely by 
transposing them into terms commensurate with its own metaphysical presuppositions.   
II. Secondary Identification and the Vertical Overflow of Intelligence 
 
In turning back to secondary, post-egoic identification, we are setting out again to rein-
corporate several of Freud’s insights regarding identification in general that we originally 
had to set aside last chapter following our initial exposition of the relevant portions of his 
metapsychology. We set it aside in order to resolve his vacillation between a pre-
objectal/pre-egoic (i.e. primary) identification and a post-objectal/post-egoic (i.e. second-
ary) identification via our rehabilitated and translated account of identification. Now that 
we have completed that translated account and demonstrated its pertinence to the riddle 
of egoic self-consciousness, the task before us here is to show how we can successfully 
integrate the post-egoic and objectal phenomena associated with secondary identifica-
tion—most notably transference and the ego-ideal—into our proposed framework cen-
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tered on the vertical relation between the egoic act and the higher operations of intelli-
gence.  
 According to our analysis last chapter, the crux of the incommensurability in 
Freud’s attempt to relate these two types of identification (primary and secondary) could 
be seen in their opposite ways of rendering the subject/object distinction. Primary identi-
fication, as we have repeatedly emphasized, presupposes a pre-reflective fusion between 
the identifying faculty and its corresponding apprehensive form—or, in Freud’s termi-
nology, primary identification takes “place earlier than any object-cathexis.”61 Secondary 
identification, on the other hand, presupposes both the subject’s awareness of its finite 
bounds and, we can now say, the vertical, intelligent insight of an object qua object. On 
the basis of this presupposed self-differentiated space, Freud theorizes secondary identifi-
cation in terms of specific kinds of desire. For example, his two most common examples 
of such identificatory desire are those structured as a having (i.e. I am not that/I do not 
have that/I want to have that) or a being-like (i.e. I am not that/I want to be like that), the 
latter of which Freud equates with the rise and function of the ego-ideal. 
 Notwithstanding the unresolved lacuna that the juxtaposition of these two types of 
identification represents in his metapsychology, there still remained a thread of crucial 
insight embedded in a specific way that Freud attempted to connect them that we have 
highlighted at several points and now bring to the forefront of our discussion. This insight 
holds that the archaic bonds of primary identification form a mnemic/habitual foundation 
that is later manifested in their transferential reawakening in a post-egoic setting as desir-
                                                
61 Freud, The Ego and the Id, SA 3:299/SE 19:31. 
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ous impulses whose formal content is unconsciously archaic in origin and thus regres-
sively repetitive in its influence. Last chapter we witnessed and bookmarked this insight 
in several places in Freud’s writings. For example, in The Ego and the Id, he suggests 
that our earliest erotic “object-choices […] relating to the father and mother” find their 
habitual “starting-point” in pre-objectal identification and thus end up “reinforc[ing] the 
primary identification.”62 Similarly, in “Findings, Ideas, Problems” he makes the illumi-
nating comment that we elaborated upon via Kristeva’s notion of abjection in which he 
theorizes that the desire “to have” is developmentally derivative from a prior state of 
identificatory fusion with that which is now desired qua object, e.g. “‘The breast is part 
of me, I am the breast. Only later: ‘I have it,’ that is, ‘I am not it.”63 In other words, the 
post-egoic desire to have the breast, whether experienced as a child or as an adult, is for-
mally and developmentally linked to the primary identification in which “I” and “the 
breast” were pre-reflectively one. In giving rise to such a desire to have that with which 
“I” once “was,” so Freud theorizes, the archaic ideality of primary identification is un-
consciously reactualized in a post-egoic setting in the form of trying to regressively 
reestablish the active stasis of fusion, and the intensive wholeness that it entailed, that “I” 
once enjoyed pre-egoically. Despite the unquestionable brilliance of this insight, which in 
many ways represents a psychoanalytic version of both Plato’s anamnesis and Augus-
tine’s “primordial memory,”64 what Freud lacked within his own intellectual framework 
was any ability to capitalize upon this insight coherently, i.e. without circularly reinstat-
                                                
62 Ibid. Cf. n. 99 on p. 297 above regarding my translation of this passage.  
63 Freud, “Findings, Ideas, Problems,” GW 17:151/SE 23:299. 
64 Augustine, trin. XV.41. 
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ing egoic self-differentiation as something that always already existed in order to make 
sense of the desires characteristic of secondary identification.  
 Based upon our translation of primary identification into an Aristoteli-
an/Thomistic framework, what resources might be available to us in order to more effec-
tively integrate this insight into our proposed account of the egoic act and the subsequent 
vertical operations of intelligence? In my judgment, the key to answering this question 
within the metaphysical framework we have developed for identification is to explain the 
phenomena associated with secondary identification by drawing an extended analogy be-
tween intelligence’s vertical relationship to sensitivity and its parallel relation to identifi-
cation. In particular, what I propose is that the secondary phenomenon of transference 
and the ego-ideal can be explained by expanding upon Aquinas’s notion of how intelli-
gence can vertically “overflow” to other parts of the soul that can thereby become “ra-
tional by participation.”  
To recall our discussion in Chapter 3, Aquinas employs the notion of the intellec-
tual powers’ vertical “overflow” (refluentia) into the sensitive layer of the soul in order to 
explain at least four facets of sensitivity’s operation(s) in the human soul: (1) the cogita-
tive power (or particular reason) discursively comparing individual intentions from 
memory in order to evaluate a sensible object’s relative suitability to a creature’s well-
being (i.e. whether it is good or evil), (2) the sensitive appetite’s usual—apart from ex-
ceptional situations—inability to directly move the locomotive powers to act without the 
will’s consent; (3) the sensitive appetite’s attraction to non-natural objects derivative 
from intelligent acts of human artifice, e.g. wealth, entertainment, wine; and (4) the sensi-
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tive appetite’s capacity for being moved by the “overflow” of particularly strong affec-
tions vertically emanating from the will.   
 Why turn to the concept of intelligent “overflow” in order to explain secondary 
identification? The thematic overlap occurs in that Aquinas leans on the notion of over-
flow in order to explain acts that come from the sensitive layer of the soul, but which 
seem to presuppose—on a lower level—the acts of intelligence. My argument is that 
something directly analogous occurs in secondary identification, i.e. the operations of in-
telligence open up possible acts in the identifying layer of the soul that are not possible, 
strictly speaking, apart from the concomitant vertical acts of intelligence. We can express 
the key component of this overflow in the form of a thesis that we can elaborate upon in 
the following discussions: once established, and for as long as it endures, the combined 
vertical relation between the egoic act, the will’s desire to know, and the intellect’s cor-
responding acts of insight serves to open up the familiar self-differentiated “space” quin-
tessentially characteristic of the vast majority of our lives. On the level of rational desire, 
this self-differentiated space underlies our capacity, as we have expressed it at various 
critical junctures in this study, to understand, desire, love, and choose objects precisely as 
the objects that the intellect apprehends. This includes, as will expand upon next section, 
our ability to understand ourselves in acts of self-knowledge, to share that self-knowledge 
through self-expression and narration, and to love, understand, and enjoy other people 
precisely as individuals with their own intimate intelligibility that we can thereby share in 
(and love) as well. Might it be possible, however, that the ongoing effects of this intelli-
gently self-differentiated space overflows in such a way that a lower level reflection of 
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this perfection—a la the cogitative power and the sensitive desire for products of intelli-
gent artifice—can derivatively be found in acts within the identificatory layer of the soul? 
 This is exactly what I take to occur in the phenomenon of secondary identifica-
tion. By this I mean, to hearken all the way back to our initial engagement with Freud’s 
earliest theories, that the forms mnemically retained in one’s identificatory memory can 
be actualized under the self-differentiated space presupposed by the ongoing egoic act 
and the vertically derivative acts of the intellect and the will. In this sense, acts of sec-
ondary identification, whether they are derivative of infantile or post-traumatic forms, 
really are “reminiscences,” as Breuer and Freud wrote in Studies on Hysteria. The dou-
bled effect of this simultaneity could be compared to suddenly remembering seeing 
something while continuing to see something else. In secondary identification, however, 
this doubled effect manifests itself in that the egoic act of identification with the presently 
sensing body continues unabated—unless of course the reawakening is strong enough to 
disrupt the egoic act and thus produces the kind of “absences” of the ego that Freud and 
Breuer associated with schizophrenia and post-traumatic reawakenings. Up until that 
point of disruption, however, the ongoing identificatory presence of the sensing body is 
enough to defensively “protect” the identifying faculty from reaching this breaking point 
that causes the egoic act, the vertical operations of the intellect and the will, and the de-
rivative self-differentiated “space” that they structure all to collapse into a pre-reflective 
fusion with another identificatory form. Or, to borrow a superb articulation from Kriste-
va, up until that point of the self’s collapse, the egoic act functions as a “screen” (un 
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écran)65 for the radical receptive vacancy—the “emptiness” (vide) as she calls it—implied 
by the identifying faculty being left wide open. Secondary, transferential identification 
occurs as the mnemic reawakening of an identificatory form under the operative condi-
tions caused by the egoic act and the vertical overflow of intelligence: the immediacy of 
pre-reflective fusion as dispersed by the egoic screen and the intellect’s spatial and nomi-
nal differentiation between, for instance, you and me.  
 Postulating this type of coexistence of the self-differentiated space vertically fur-
nished by the egoic act and intelligence immediately illuminates several intriguing ex-
planatory directions vis-à-vis secondary, transferential identification. Most obviously, it 
would seem to open up a promising avenue for explaining how the ideality of the original 
fusions of primary identification, in which there is only the appetitive alternation between 
affections of inclination and rest, can be reawakened in a context in which they could be 
affirmed as that which Freud associates with secondary identification: the archaic mne-
mic ground for the type of affection that seeks to bridge (or increase) self-differentiated 
space, viz. desire (or aversion, or even, in vertical dependence upon the judgment of par-
ticular reason, the affections that Aquinas groups together under the irascible passions).   
By setting forth this theorization, we should be clear on what we are proposing. Claiming 
that identificatory affections of movement are indeed naturally possible, and in fact do 
occur, does not change the preceding claim that in the pre-reflective fusions of identifica-
tion (i.e. that which is “seen” now) there is only the rapid alternation between love/have 
and pleasure/pain. Instead, the claim is that they are only possible from “within” an oper-
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ative and experiential context structured by the self-differentiated stability assumed by 
the vertical relation of the egoic act, the concomitant appetitive love/pleasure of one’s 
sensing body, and the derivatively possible overflow of intelligence. If that fragile opera-
tive context collapses, then the identifying layer of the soul reverts back to the undiffer-
entiated space characteristic of infancy and the binary alternations between love/hate and 
pleasure/pain. 
 If we are to fully elaborate this claim that secondary identification occurs as a 
mnemic reactualization of another identificatory form under the vertical conditions of the 
egoic act and intelligence, the next step is to recall the important ways that we initially 
differentiated identificatory memory from sensitive memory near the end of Chapter 4. 
On the most basic level of distinction, we noted that remembering sensations themselves 
would not be the same as “remembering” the act of identification itself through which 
those sensations were condensed and converted into the pre-reflective fusion characteris-
tic of identification. This insistence, as we noted in that context as well, sets our account 
apart from Freud and Breuer’s constant search to somehow recall the “repressed” mnemic 
material “in the unconscious” directly and/or literally.  
By establishing this trajectory, we also made the initial point that forms retained 
in identificatory memory always remain, like the original act of primary identification 
itself, unconscious both in their mnemic storage and derivative recollection. By remain-
ing unconscious in its mnemic storage, identificatory forms—unlike sensitive memory—
never become open to reason’s “syllogistic” search through its “store house” of retained 
forms. Instead, its mode of recollection always remains limited to the type of “sudden 
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recollections” and synecdochical associations that we correlated, via Aquinas, with a 
memorative power devoid of reason’s intentionality. Similarly, by remaining unconscious 
in its derivative recollection, identificatory forms that are involuntarily reactualized under 
the vertical conditions furnished by the egoic act and intelligence do not produce any 
conscious effect in themselves. Instead, they are primarily decipherable, and only on the 
basis of rational analysis, on the basis of two derivative effects that can and often do oc-
cur simultaneously with the egoic act: (1) the identificatory appetitive movements that 
they produce, which often cyclically converge with and amplify sensitive appetitive 
movements and (2) any phantasms (e.g. fantasies, hallucinatory, and/or traumatic flash-
backs) that it vertically causes in the sensitive imagination.  
The resulting experience aligns exactly with what Freud describes as the time-
lessness of the unconscious and the regressive repetitions of transference. When the req-
uisite sensations unconsciously reawaken the ideality of an identificatory form from the 
past, the resulting appetitive and/or phantasmatic responses appear on the surface to only 
have their corresponding referents with objects/circumstances/people/passions that are 
“contemporaneous and real,”66 i.e. timeless in the Freudian sense. This is despite the fact 
that they have their unconscious roots in one’s “own personal prehistory.”67 Those con-
temporary sensations, and the transferential objects and circumstances to which they cor-
respond, are simply the present context in which we are appetitively prompted to project 
a “reprint” or “new edition” of that prehistory in the here and now. Hence the resulting 
transferential desire that seeks to close the experienced distance with its corresponding 
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object(s) and thus (re)create the fantasized, but nonetheless deeply regressive, ideality: I 
want (to be) the breast (again). This same repetition can be imagined vis-à-vis either a 
masochistic/melancholic identificatory form—e.g. I want the pain of that object’s ab-
sence (again)—or a derivative aversion/hatred of an object/circumstance for always fail-
ing to live up to the desired ideality intrinsic even to secondary identification. The latter 
circumstance thus unconsciously reproduces the infantile experience of ambivalence, 
which ironically led to the formation of the egoic act in the first place, within the post-
egoic structuring of self-differentiated space.  
One of the necessary questions that arises at this juncture has to do with how to 
account for the contingent variations that occur in the circumstances that make up each 
occurrence of transference. If you will recall, Freud distinguished between what he saw 
as unchanged transferential “reprints” of an infantile imago and genuinely “revised edi-
tions” of that imago. He used the latter category to classify instances in which transferen-
tial attraction (or aversion/hostility) in the psychoanalytical clinical setting seemed to in-
corporate “some real peculiarity in the physician’s person or circumstances.”68 From 
within our modified account of transference, such a distinction would seem to be super-
fluous. Each transferential reawakening naturally has some level of detailed variation 
simply because contingent circumstances are always diverse in this way; it is only neces-
sary to affirm that some element(s) present is each circumstance is synecdochically remi-
niscent enough to the condensed elements of the identificatory form to trigger its reawak-
ening.  
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Nonetheless, Freud’s highlighting of such contingent variations still leads us to 
two analogous affirmations within our own framework. First, it seems necessary to affirm 
that it is possible for the contingent circumstances of each transferential reawakening to 
be incorporated and/or condensed in a new mnemic trace (i.e. a bond) that itself can be 
subsequently reawakened in another transferential recollection. Put differently, the inter-
related structure between identificatory memory and secondary transference echoes one 
of Augustine’s seminal articulations in De Trinitate: each subsequent reawakening is 
“off-printed” from the original mnemic copy, which is thereby “left alone,” and thus has 
an ontologically distinct and malleable character to itself: a “new edition.” As was the 
case with pre-egoic identificatory bonds, the derivative influence of newly minted trans-
ferential bonds has some direct relation to how long and in what way the transferential 
reawakening is kept “open,” and what sensitive and volitional habits are developed in 
reference to the desire (or aversion) that it produces in an individual. The more an ideal-
ized transferential fantasy is pursued, stoked, and associated with pleasures imagined, 
secured, and/or lost (again), the more “general and lasting” its derivative mnemic trace 
will be. The result of this mnemic structure, in a point we will return to in our closing 
section, is that our infantile imagos end up derivatively causing a constantly ramifying set 
of transferential experiences and associations in post-egoic life. Or, to borrow another 
phrase from Kristeva, the identificatory space of desire opened up by the egoic act and 
intelligence is characterized by a dynamic of “infinite transference”69 that simultaneously 
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propels an individual forward in desire even while constantly perpetuating an uncon-
scious undertow of regression.  
Second, having affirmed this constant transferential ramification intrinsic to sec-
ondary identification, it would also seem that the nature of our most archaic identificatory 
forms and the deep rhythms of our lives make it altogether likely that we will experience 
transferential reawakening most readily within and derivative of our most intimate and 
long-term interpersonal relationships. Part of this is, of course, a matter of frequency: the 
more time we spend with someone, the more likely transference and/or cyclical clusters 
of transferences will occur and be perpetuated. In addition, however, if we look back to 
Freud’s initial theorization of transference based upon his clinical experiences, what 
seems reasonable is that it is also within these relationships that we are most likely to find 
ourselves (or put ourselves) in relational contexts most reminiscent of our infantile ori-
gins in terms of dependent vulnerability and the prevalence of intense physical pleasures. 
Most obviously this occurs in the many years following the solidifying of the egoic act 
when we find ourselves (usually) in dependent relation to those with the most numerous 
and direct sensitive associations with our archaic identificatory bonds: our parents. The 
result of this intense relational upbringing is a whole series of complex and continuously 
ramified secondary bonds that predispose us, as Freud documented well, to parentally-
based transferences for the entirety of our life.  
Almost certainly the next most frequent cluster of transferential relations occurs 
in romantic and/or sexual relationships wherein, as we discussed last chapter, the reawak-
ened ideality of identification so often converges with the sexual appetite. This conver-
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gence results in the cyclically recurring chimerical fantasy of “falling in love” that inevi-
tably—like the ideality of all archaic bonds apart from the one that condenses in/around 
the body—fragments (again) into identificatory ambivalence in the face of the reality and 
complexity of another person (thus pointing, as we will turn to soon, to the vertical finali-
ty of rational love and its capacity to know and love a person as they really are). Similar 
clusters of transferences can easily found in interpersonal relationships involving authori-
ty and dependent vulnerability such as those with caregivers, counselors, (psy-
cho)therapists, doctors, pastors, and teachers.  
Finally, if we are right that the effects of the vertical operations of intelligence 
end up overflowing into the identifying layer of the soul, then it might be reasonable to 
expect that we will encounter variations in the desires elicited by secondary identification 
that—a la our sensitive desire for human artifice—presuppose the terminal effects of in-
telligent acts. To be sure, the most common and obvious configuration of identificatory 
desire is that with which we have largely been working so far—i.e. that which Freud 
specifies as a desire for having that which we unconsciously take as something we used 
to be. As Freud was fond of pointing out in his own way (rightly, in my judgment), one 
of the surest signs of the pre-egoic roots of this desire is how often our post-egoic pursuit 
of its transferentially proposed pleasures leads us toward acts in which the vertically-
enabled space between “us” is bridged and/or obliterated. One might opt for “bridged” 
when describing consensual erotic and/or sexual acts in which the physical copula (of 
many varieties) inevitably functions as a transferential “object” of pre-egoic pleasures 
and fusions. However, “obliterated” is the right word for the many instances in which 
  
  412 
identificatory ambivalence ends up fueling violence whereby the hard reality of another’s 
space is violated to the point that we forcibly claim it/them under the quintessential indi-
cia of identification: “mine.” In both cases, however, the basic shape of identificatory de-
sire and its climax of pleasurable union is formally the same: by assimilating “that” to 
“me” I regressively reestablish the ideality of identificatory fusion in a post-egoic setting. 
Even in these most basal manifestations of identificatory desire, however, the very space 
that grounds its derivative affections testifies to the preceding vertical effects of intelli-
gence’s specification of the desiderative “that” (i.e. the not-I) as that which populates the 
“space” outside of the pre-reflective “me.”  
Still, there do seem to be at least two other configurations of identificatory desire 
that presuppose the terminal effects of intelligent acts in a different, we might even say 
higher, way. First, there seems to be a predictable cluster of transferential variations 
whereby the most archaic structure of having/being/consuming can be “revised” via both 
the non-consuming elements in our archaic identificatory form (i.e. touching, skin-to-skin 
contact, and olfactory or auditory sensations) and the “real peculiarities” of contingent 
transferential events in order to highlight the pleasures of being-with instead of a being 
that must absolutely obliterate interpersonal space by consuming “them.” The toddler 
who calls out for “mommy” or “daddy” in a moment of solitary freight and is then com-
forted through their physical presence/touch/warmth/voice almost certainly simultaneous-
ly forms a transferential memory based upon a whole series of pre-egoic and/or prior 
post-egoic identificatory loves/hates/pains/pleasures associated with his/her parents. 
Through this amplification of transference, there results a pleasure actualized through the 
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mere presence of the one for whom the desire seeks in that moment. Moreover, that 
pleasure often (and again) evokes with it a post-egoic version of a familiar pre-egoic 
pleasure: “I’m ok, I’m ok, I’m ok.” 
Second, and here we hearken back to affirm in our own way another of Freud’s 
most striking insights, the configuration of identificatory desire that presupposes the 
highest degree of intelligent activity is indeed that which lies behind the Freudian ego-
ideal. At the center of this type of identificatory desire lies an image (or series of images) 
of oneself in the sensitive imagination that bears the characteristics of a transferentially 
desired object/person/group either directly (through physical mimicry) or indirectly as 
translated through the imperatival ideals—be like this—as received implicitly or explicit-
ly through spoken or written words. The latter source of imaginary material requires the 
most obvious contributions of intelligence: grasping imperatives and vertically translating 
their meaning into a constructive form commensurate for the sensitive imagination. These 
images thereby become the sensitive triggers for reawakening our transferential desires 
for the object/person/group from whom they were originally derived. The result is the 
familiar triangular variation of identificatory desire the Freud so effectively described in 
The Ego and the Id under the banner of the ego-ideal: we desire to be like that which we 
desire and thereby close the self-differentiated space between “them” and “us” in and 
through the idealized and sensitively encoded version of “me.” Or, in its ambivalently 
negated form characteristic of adolescence: we desire to not conform to the ideals of our 
authority figures precisely in order to increase that space of self-differentiation—”I just 
want to be ‘me.’” Even in such aversion, however, the very passion with which we push 
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back against such ideals reveals the degree to which we are already contingently and 
transferentially defined by them.   
Despite their accidental differences, the formal line of similarity that ties together 
having, being-with, and being-like as all commonly rooted in the identifying faculty is 
that they all bear the unmistakable trace of identification’s receptivity to being contin-
gently defined as an individual that begins in our pre-egoic fusions, solidifies in the egoic 
act, and transferentially multiplies in the space opened up for secondary identification by 
the egoic act and the higher operations of intelligence. As Freud seminally discovered in 
his own way, this commonality is most transparently revealed in the frequency with 
which the pain of our transferential desires involuntarily oscillate between registering in 
reference to the recipients of our transferential projections (i.e. the pain of not being able 
to have/be with/like them) and registering in reference to our (absent) selves in the maso-
chistic forms of melancholia and the self-revilings of the ego-ideal. Typically, the depri-
vations of not having and not being-with are more likely to solidify into the habitual cycle 
of melancholia whereby we love and take pleasure in the painful absence of someone 
who, in one respect we really did know to be other than us, but who in another respect 
became transferentially bound up with the identificatory forms that contingently became 
interior meo. Similarly, when there is a dissonance between ourselves and the idealized 
image of our transferential desires it often elicits in us an identificatory appetitive re-
sponse that our intelligence sometimes actually helps us signify and verbalize (immanent-
ly or audibly): “I hate myself.” The fact that such self-reviling utterances are so often 
spoken in the first-person—instead of in the voice of those from whom they were trans-
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ferentially derived—is one of the strongest indications that such utterances are the result 
of a secondary identificatory conversion whereby a sensitive “that” is unconsciously and 
transferentially converted into something that thereby defines “me.” This highlights the 
point to which we now turn: only in the vertical perfections of intelligence do we finally 
achieve the ability to truly know and love people (and objects) on the basis of that which 
really, i.e. intelligibly, defines them apart from our transferential projections onto them. 
And, to hearken back to Aquinas’s chief correction of Augustine: it is only through those 
acts in which we come to know that which is outside of ourselves that we are then deriva-
tively capable of truly knowing ourselves through contingent acts of self-reflection.   
III. The Vertical Perfections of Intelligence: Desire’s Unifying Ascent and the Imago Dei 
 
By positioning this last section in the manner that we have foregrounded, we are in a 
sense combining the three main open-ended thematic threads that remain for us to ad-
dress: (1) the various ways, in addition to its apprehension of objects qua objects, that 
intelligence vertically influences the identifying layer of the soul in a manner analogous 
to its political and therapeutic dominion over the sensitive layer of the soul; (2) the creat-
ed role that identification plays in our multilayered unifying ascent of desire through four 
different types of intensive unity as teleologically ordered toward the source of our ulti-
mate perfection and happiness: beatific union with the triune God “face to face;” and (3) 
the question as to what degree any aspect of identification might be eminently affirmed in 
God’s eternal simplicity and thus be incorporated into our understanding of the imago 
Dei. From a theological (i.e. Augustinian/Thomist) perspective, of course, there is a natu-
ral interconnection between these themes because they name conjoined links in our redi-
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tus back to God that are inversely reflective of creation’s causal exitus from that same 
God as the eminent principle of all things. To enumerate, as we have done in many ways 
in this study and in our reading of Augustine and Aquinas, the vertical perfections of hu-
man intelligence is to set out toward God’s eternal—and, via revelationis, triune—
simplicity on the well-trodden analogical roads of eminence, negation, and causality. 
 In offering this concluding account of intelligence’s vertical relation to identifica-
tion, we will draw extensively upon both the Augustinian structure of desire’s ascent 
back to God introduced in Chapter 1 and the combined account of the soul, the intellect, 
and the will that we detailed in Chapters 2 and 3 in conversation with Aquinas without 
recapitulating their interrelation in advance. Instead, our task here is simply to integrate 
our metaphysical account of identification into the overarching philosophical and theo-
logical framework built upon those conceptual cornerstones that we have continued to 
consider axiomatic throughout our extensive excursion into the realm of desire(s) tradi-
tionally governed by psychoanalysis. Having made these initial remarks, the rhetorical 
path ahead of us will progress sequentially through two sub-sections below. The first will 
consider the intellectual powers’ political and therapeutic dominion over identification, 
while the second will turn to the role of self-consciousness as a fourth type of intensive 
unity—in addition to the soul, self-knowledge, and the teleological alignment of desire, 
that serves a discernible purpose in the providential ordering of a deficiently (but genu-
inely) good creation within which intelligent creatures can ascend back into union with 
their Creator (i.e. their highest good and perfection). 
  
  417 
a. Intelligence and its Political and Therapeutic Dominion over Identification 
As we discussed in Chapter 3, at the heart of how Aquinas understands the intellectual 
powers’ vertical dominion over sensitivity is an analogy that he draws from Aristotle’s 
Politics regarding two types of governance that are both present in a creature. The is one 
type of governance one that is despotic (and therefore absolute) and one that is political 
(and therefore admits of an autonomy characteristic of free subjects). For instance, as we 
have noted before, the soul’s command over the body’s limbs is despotic and cannot be 
resisted. However, the intellectual powers’ governance of, for instance, the sensitive ap-
petite is much more political in the sense that the created, natural principles of the lower 
appetite give it a “horizontal” spontaneity that cannot simply be commanded away by 
reason or the will unilaterally. Instead, the political influence of reason and the will can 
vertically influence the sensitive appetite through measures such as the will’s power of 
consent, universal reason’s therapeutic use of particular reason, and the overflow of vir-
tuous acts into the passions. The long-term telos of this political negotiation aims at grad-
ually aligning the sensitive passions to the virtuous ordering of reason and the higher 
goods/pleasures apprehended by the intellect and intensely loved by the will. Or, as 
Aquinas puts it: for the sensitive appetite to become “rational by participation.”70   
 When we turn to applying this notion of political rule to the vertical relation be-
tween intelligence and the identifying powers’ natural principles, we find a number of 
intriguing overlaps by way of analogy. First and foremost, Aquinas attributes the highest 
degree of horizontal autonomy to the sensitive apprehensive powers, especially the exter-
                                                
70 Aquinas, ST I-II.56.4.ad1. 
  
  418 
nal senses. Because the external senses are moved to their respective acts solely by exter-
nal sensible forms, the intellectual powers can only vertically influence these acts through 
indirect means such as moving the body away from certain sensible stimuli or physically 
inhibiting their reception (e.g. closing eyelids or plugging one’s ears). Similarly, given 
the principles that govern identification, not to mention its quality as unconscious, we 
have to deny that the will can ever directly control identification or its memorative power 
evident in transference. This chimes with our preceding discussion of the egoic act’s ne-
cessity for the intellectual powers’ vertical operations in the first place; the will cannot 
directly cause that which is its own preceding necessity any more than the human intel-
lect can cause the phantasms that are its vertical prerequisite. Likewise, as we have dis-
cussed as well, neither the will or reason can directly incite (or prevent) an act of trans-
ference from identification’s memorative power or any of the immediately derivative ap-
petitive responses from an act of transference.  
 Nonetheless, as one might expect given the analogy with sensitivity, the intellec-
tual powers do have a number of indirect avenues through which to politically negotiate 
with the identifying powers. Before enumerating these avenues of influence, however, we 
should first note that all of them obviously presuppose the active stasis characteristic of 
the self-differentiated space made possible by the egoic act and the vertically derivative 
acts of intelligence. Just like a particularly intense passion can overwhelm an individual 
to the point that they no longer “have use of [their] reason,”71 so too can the disruption of 
the egoic act or a particularly strong transferential reminiscence (e.g. a post-traumatic 
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flashback) involuntarily immobilize a person such that they are, to cite Aquinas once 
again, “totally absorbed” 72 either by another identificatory form entirely or the appetitive 
effects of a certain act of transference. Apart from these extraordinary circumstances, 
however, the intellectual powers can influence the identificatory powers in a negotiation 
similarly oriented toward the long-range (i.e. eschatological) vertical alignment of identi-
fication with the order of reason and, ultimately, the beatific pleasure of union with God.  
 The most conspicuous mechanism of this influence again falls in line with the in-
tellectual powers’ dominion over sensitivity: the will has a power of consent over any 
proposed locomotive or intelligent actions that could be carried out in reference to appeti-
tive responses that an act of transference elicits. For example, one of the most common 
transferential affections is anger, i.e. the actions or relational characteristics of a contem-
poraneous person/circumstance can easily reawaken a past memory in the present regard-
ing some prior situation in which an individual had been separated from a “good” that 
itself had been idealized through transference. The result would be an experience of anger 
toward the contemporaneous person/circumstance that has been unconsciously amplified 
because it includes the influence of our “past” anger as timelessly projected into the pre-
sent. As is the case with sensitive appetitive responses on their own, the spontaneous elic-
iting of transferential affections is, strictly speaking, involuntary because it is grounded in 
identification’s horizontal autonomy. However, in the experience of such anger, the will 
still has the capacity to consent to any number of volitional responses to that anger.  
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To begin making a distinction that we will elaborate upon as we transition to con-
sider the therapeutic effects of the intellectual powers, the possible volitional responses to 
this type of transferential appetitive movements fall into two main categories. First, there 
are those volitional responses that consent to actions that express/carry out the appetitive 
promptings in a largely unencumbered and unrestrained manner. To stay with the exam-
ple of anger, such actions might include yelling, physical hostility, imaginatively perpet-
uating that anger by seething internally, or passive aggressively seeking revenge. All of 
these volitional actions, when grounded in a transferentially amplified state of appetitive 
affairs, inevitably serve to perpetuate and habitually deepen the transferential reawaken-
ing and underlying desire for an idealized “good.” We can find clarifying terminology in 
both Freud and Aquinas for what happens when the will consents to these type of actions. 
For Freud, what we find here is a mere repetition in a post-egoic setting of the underlying 
identificatory ideality/fantasy that has been reawakened in transference. For Aquinas, we 
have a classic instance of the Augustinian inversion of powers whereby the higher pow-
ers of intelligence simply become the accessories for carrying out the unfettered impulses 
furnished by lower powers. Analogous repetitions and inversions can be found, for in-
stance, in transferences that condense in/around harmful relational patterns, melancholic 
withdrawal, masochistic self-harm (e.g. physical self-harm and/or the mental self-
revilings of the ego-ideal), and addictive pleasures (e.g. alcohol, drugs, power, entertain-
ment, sex). The more such transferential reawakenings are cyclically stoked and the more 
volitional/sensitive habits are forged in relation to the them, the more difficult it becomes 
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to restore the will’s freedom in relation to the regressively idealistic mnemic traces and 
resulting appetitive responses at the heart of these phenomena.    
The second set of volitional responses, however, are all grouped together because 
they share a common denominator in that they involve the will declining to simply en-
dorse the experienced appetitive responses and instead choosing to direct reason (and, by 
extension, the intellect) to examine the relevant immanent and external data in accord-
ance with this question: “Why am I feeling this way?” In drawing attention to this ele-
ment of the intellectual powers’ dominion over identification, we have to immediately 
distinguish between two different, though sometimes overlapping, trajectories toward 
which this intervention of the will and reason can be oriented. The more superficial tra-
jectory aims at circumstantial clarity. For example, when faced with anger a person 
can—before authorizing any immediate responses reflective of unrestrained anger—
intelligently survey the circumstances that have causally contributed to the emergence of 
anger. Such a surveyal might inquire into the relational dynamics at play, past experienc-
es of anger, how to best prevent the situation from escalating, and what response(s) are 
appropriate/proportional given the perceived slight at hand.  
Even though some of the side-effects of this intelligent inquiry might end up mod-
ifying the immanent experience of anger, and even developing the habits and virtues nec-
essary for more in depth inquiry into its causes, for the most part the scope of this type of 
rational investigation and volitional intervention is oriented toward negotiating the con-
temporary situation wisely and well. In contrast, the other trajectory aims more specifi-
cally at therapeutic analysis that finally brings us back in the ambit of psychoanalysis, 
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hypnosis, the Freudian talking-cure, and—we hasten to add—the enhanced therapeutic 
role of particular self-knowledge that we bookmarked at the end of Chapter 3. Whereas 
the search for circumstantial clarity might ipso facto end up bracketing the amplifying 
effects of an act of transference, the trajectory of therapeutic analysis seeks to isolate and 
explain as far as is possible the cyclical patterns of transference that can be rationally dis-
cerned in and through the appetitive and circumstantial rhythms of our lives: e.g. what 
circumstances seem to predictably provoke this anger in me? Through this type of reflec-
tion, our intellectual powers can enable each of us, to recall several of Freud’s phrases 
that we cited last chapter, to try to “fit these emotional impulses [that arise from transfer-
ences] into the nexus [..] of [our] life history, to submit them to intellectual consideration 
and understand them in the light of their psychical value.”73 Thus, even though such ap-
petitive movements are still experienced and elicited, the interrelated acts of volitional 
intervention and reflection function as a refusal to simply repeat the timeless ideality 
prompted by transference. Instead they jointly open a vertical avenue through which in-
dividuals can “become acquainted” with a pattern of transference and thereby engage in 
the immanent “struggle” to “work through it, to overcoming it, by continuing, in defiance 
of it, the analytical work” that can gradually therapeutically diminish its influence in 
one’s life.  
But, given all the different ways that we have translated and altered Freud’s gen-
eral accounts of identification and transference, how now shall we describe and explain 
these therapeutic effects made possible by the intellectual powers? For reasons that mir-
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ror in some ways Freud’s own rejection of the therapeutic framework that he first devel-
oped with Breuer, we cannot embrace any overly ambitious therapy that seeks to reduce 
all transferences to an archetypal “foreign body”74 that can simply be dissected, verbally 
named, and thereby neatly abjected after the fact. The inevitable process of transferential 
multiplication and contingent habituation that is unique to each individual is simply too 
complex for the powers of human reason to grasp in such a literalistic fashion. To set out 
on such a search is to opt for, as Kristeva calls it, an “impossible quest for [an] absolute 
origin.”75 In addition, transferential memories/acts, like the infantile acts of identification 
from which they were derived, always remain unconscious in themselves: they are never 
open to direct objectal investigation, but can only be indirectly affirmed on the basis of 
examining the appetitive and circumstantial data at hand. Similarly, given our metaphysi-
cal separation of identification from sexual desire, we also have to deny Freud’s thera-
peutic replacement centered on isolating the ur-repression of sexual desire (e.g. whether 
grounded in Oedipal desire or its phallic sublimation) and its resulting neurotic effects.  
Instead of either of these routes, our description of the intellectual powers’ thera-
peutic dominion over the identifying powers begins with accenting again the will’s ca-
pacity for choosing to put an individual into circumstances in which instances of transfer-
ence will more than likely occur to one degree or another. Usually these circumstances 
are characterized by either interpersonal relations of dependent vulnerability or a preva-
lence of intense physical pleasures (or both). Sometimes the will does so merely as an 
extension of a whole of host habits that have been built up around an oft-repeated trans-
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ferential cycle, such as those cited above in which the will becomes a subservient acces-
sory to the impulsive repetitions of transference. At other times, though, the will seems to 
be capable of positioning the individual vis-à-vis another person (or group or circum-
stance) in a receptive, vulnerable posture that almost inevitably “opens up” that individu-
al to the emergence of a transferential act. For instance, this would seem to be the kind of 
willed vulnerability characteristic of the relation between the hypnotist and the hypno-
tized with the result consisting in a regressive reappearance of child-like obedience.   
Obviously, as we discussed at length last chapter, Freud similarly thinks of the re-
lation between (psycho)therapist and client (or analysand) as a controlled space in which 
transference can “assert [and display] itself in a definite field”76 open to the intelligent 
examination of both members involved in that intentionally arranged therapeutic site. To 
this extent, we are in agreement with Freud. One of the essential routes for vertical nego-
tiation that the will possesses vis-à-vis the identifying powers is to intentionally arrange 
circumstances in which transferences can “show themselves,” not in order to merely re-
peat their idealistic fantasies and projections, but in order to subject them to rational 
analysis. Sometimes this occurs in formal therapy sessions, but something similar can 
occur in any rational reflection upon oneself—or, for instance, in a conversation with a 
friend or, to include the theological dimension, with God—in which one is trying to sepa-
rate out the ideality of one’s transferences from the immediate circumstances of one’s 
embodied present.  
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Where our explanation—based upon the framework of verticality that we have 
developed via Aquinas—goes far beyond what Freud could accomplish on his own, how-
ever, arrives in the fact that we can name the appetitive overflow of intelligent insight as 
the decisive metaphysical mechanism through which the intellectual powers can most 
effectively therapeutically (re)negotiate the identifying powers’ transferential tendencies. 
Even more that: we can also point to this mechanism as the pivot that explains that which 
Freud describes as sublimation, i.e. the redirection of lower-level impulses to higher-level 
ends. In order to detail what I mean by this overall claim, we must be careful to delineate 
in what way the intellectual powers’ relation to identification is vertically analogous to its 
relation to sensitivity and in what ways it is not. As we discussed in Chapter 3, sensitive 
passions can be therapeutically influenced by the intellectual powers in two ways: (1) 
through universal reason guiding particular reason according to some universal proposi-
tion (e.g. the divine law’s prohibition against adultery) in a such a way as to alter particu-
lar reason’s judgment and thus the corresponding sensitive passion(s) as well; and (2) 
through the intense affections of the intellective appetite (i.e. the will) overflowing into 
the sensitive appetite in a manner that can gradually enable the habitual constitution of its 
passions to move more easily in accordance with the will’s rational ordering (i.e. virtue 
“produces ordinate passions”).77    
When ported into the question of the intellectual powers’ relation to identification, 
it becomes quickly clear that the first therapeutic path is simply not available to reason 
because there is no intrinsically rational power of judgment in the identifying apprehen-
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sive powers. Instead, there is only the unconscious, radical receptivity typical of pre-
egoic identification, the egoic act, and post-egoic transference. However, the second path 
suggests a promising set of connections vis-à-vis the therapeutic effects that Freud asso-
ciates with the interrelated practices of intelligently analyzing transferential impulses and 
engaging in the type of self-narration characteristic of the talking-cure. The trick to capi-
talizing upon this promise is to specify exactly what kind of insight most directly leads to 
therapeutic effects. The temptation in Freudian discourse, a temptation that began with 
the Breuer/Freud collaboration and continues in various forms to this day,78 is to attribute 
a pathogenic literality—e.g. a “foreign body,” an indwelling “spirit,” or even a specifical-
ly repressed “memory”—to what we have called the unconsciousness of identificatory 
and transferential forms/bonds. The telltale sign of giving into this temptation is that the 
therapeutic window opened up by transference always takes on a correspondingly literal-
ized process of “removal” through the passing of this pathogen into consciousness under 
the “reawakening” conditions furnished by transference. If only the originating events 
could be “remembered” accurately enough or “relived” intensely enough to “release” the 
repressed emotions,79 then, it is supposed, the “foreign body” could be expelled,80 the in-
dwelling spirit could be “destroyed,”81 and/or the memory could finally be “remembered” 
in its fullness.82  
There are a number of problems that always arise when someone gives into this 
temptation. For example, on what basis can we assume a clear distinction between the 
                                                
78 See n. 179 on p. 342 above for examples of this type of pathogenic literality.  
79 Cf. Breuer and Freud, Studies on Hysteria, GW 1:85/SE 2:6. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Cf. Freud, “The Dynamics of Transference,” SA 11:168/SE 12:108. 
82 Cf. Freud, “Remembering, Repeating, and Working-Through,” SA 11:214/SE 12:155. 
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pathogenic material and the person who it has infected/haunted?83 Or, vis-à-vis Freud’s 
later reliance on the difference between “repeating” and “remembering,” what exactly is 
it about “remembering” that renders a therapeutic effect? As we saw last chapter, his at-
tempts to answer this question only yielded an unexpected return to the possible power of 
hypnotic suggestion and inchoate references to the power of intellectual consideration. In 
contrast to such literality, we have clarified the conceptual confusions that perpetuate this 
temptation by insisting that identification and transference always remain unconscious 
and involuntary.  
Instead, my proposal is that the most decisive therapeutic avenue that the intellec-
tual powers have on this front can be explained as the gradual effect of an overflow of 
rational affections to the identifying appetite that are elicited, in the midst of a transferen-
tial act, by intelligent insights that have as their “generic object,” so to speak, the impos-
sible and fantastical ideality intrinsic to transferential affections (e.g. loves, hates, desires, 
aversions, anger, pains, and/or pleasures). To be sure, these insights might specifically 
become associated with various, and perhaps altogether plausible, explanations for trans-
ferential cycles as discernible from the pattern of one’s own “life history” as sensitively 
recalled from memory: e.g. one is still mourning the loss of one’s father, or one has inter-
nalized ideals received from your mother, or one is still traumatically haunted by an event 
of violence and the involuntary “self-definition” that was thereby tragically implanted. 
Nonetheless, the generic form of all such insights hangs, not on the “impossible quest for 
an absolute origin of one’s transferential loves,” but rather in jointly grasping the patterns 
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of transferential ideality that repeat themselves in the appetitive rhythms of our lives and 
their regressive dissonance with finite reality as we can now intelligently understand it: 
e.g. no parental embrace is interminable, those internalized maternal ideals are impossible 
to perfectly achieve and (in addition) are open to critical examination, and the violently 
traumatic “self-definition” received at the hands of another is always the result of the 
perpetrator’s own idealized grasp at power/dominion. In other words, these intelligent 
insights enable us to do as adults that which we could not do as infants: to grasp and ac-
cept the finitude of a reality that will not yield to the ideality of our identificatory desire 
or, as Kristeva puts, to “dedramatize [the] death”84 of our fantasies when they fail to ap-
pear (again). To gradually intelligently grasp that limit of reality is to slowly become in-
telligible to ourselves as subject of desire(s) within a world of temporal and transitory 
goods (including ourselves).  
However, as Kristeva is found of pointing out, to acknowledge this finitude in the 
“detached” abstraction of a general rational affirmation simply will not yield any thera-
peutic effect. 85 Rationality, by its very vertical and defensive position vis-à-vis the identi-
fying powers, can just as easily function as a thick “mask”86 that prevents an individual 
from “opening themselves up” to the transferential vulnerability necessary for intelli-
gence to truly operate as a sublimatory balm. To enter into such vulnerability is necessary 
because, and here we are at the crux of our proposal, it is necessary to forge a ramified 
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transferential bond that incorporates the overflow of rational affections that are elicited 
by truly grasping ourselves as contingently-formed subjects of transferential desire. The 
nature of these affections usually take on a two-fold ordering according to different as-
pects of therapeutic insights. In one aspect, to grasp the pattern of one’s transferential de-
sire is to apprehend an intelligible truth about oneself that rightly elicits pain and sadness 
in the will: for the ongoing deprivation of these desires is rightly understood as a present 
evil to be grieved, a facet of an individual that hinders her from realizing the fullness of 
the pleasurable perfection for which she was created. The rational pain/sadness that en-
sues from this apprehension that then intensely overflows to the appetites below corre-
sponds exactly with what psychoanalysis classically associates with catharsis: the “re-
lease” of a sadness/pain that cannot be apprehended (or named, spoken, or aesthetically 
signified) via the identifying powers’ own natural capacities. In another crucial respect, 
however, this type of particular self-knowledge is a profound good in itself. Put different-
ly, that which is known in this type of insight is a metaphysical evil, but the act of know-
ing it, and the intelligible intensive unity between knower and known that it thereby actu-
alizes, is a good whose immanent presence often elicits pleasure and joy that similarly 
redounds to the lower appetites.  
It is this redounding of an intelligible pleasure/joy in the midst of a transferential 
act that opens up the road of sublimation whereby the verticality of an intelligible good 
can therapeutically alter the trajectory of transference’s habitual cycles and repetitions. It 
can do so because the ramified character of transferential bonds can gradually incorporate 
the pleasure/joy that redounded to it via the intellectual powers’ such that, over time, that 
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which is more likely, habitually speaking, to be transferentially reawakened in the present 
will bear the appetitive imprint of a metaphysically higher good. Intelligence cannot un-
der any circumstances “remove” the unmodified ideality of our most archaic and/or trans-
ferentially reinforced identificatory forms embedded in the unconscious depths of our 
souls. However, the intellectual powers can, via the therapeutic window opened by trans-
ference and the higher goods that the intellect can apprehend, slowly cultivate appetitive 
habits in the sensitive and identifying layers of the soul that increasingly exhibit, in 
Aquinas’s slightly laconic phrasing, “a certain habitual conformity of these powers to 
reason.87 Even if the phrasing is laconic, the reality to which it bears witness is anything 
but trivial. This is because this phenomenon successfully incorporates the identifying 
powers into the overarching teleological trajectory that we have adopted as axiomatic 
from Aquinas (and Aristotle): that the vertical perfection of a creature is intensively actu-
alized, penultimately this side of God, when all the powers of the soul move in alignment 
with the genuine truth(s) apprehended by the intellect and delighted in by the will as that 
which fulfills the creature’s own goodness. 
Before turning to explicitly address the continuity of this teleological trajectory 
when the identifying powers are placed within the ascent of desire and the exitus-reditus 
theological framework for creation so central to both Augustine and Aquinas, one final 
avenue of observation vis-à-vis psychoanalysis is in order. Within psychoanalysis itself 
(and a whole host of other parallel professional therapeutic contexts), the therapeutic ef-
fects that we have described here vis-à-vis the intellectual powers are usually limited to 
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insights that explicitly have the individual as the chief locus of therapeutic understanding, 
i.e. self-knowledge is the intelligible good that therapy is structured to furnish. Indeed, 
the entire structure of engaging in an intentional setting in which transference is elicited 
in such a way that the therapist will likely become caught up in the patient’s transferential 
desire depends upon breaking off the therapeutic relationship at some point: this transfer-
ential relation must also “die” because the goal is self-understanding through analysis, 
not the establishment of a long-term relationship in which the therapist becomes person-
ally implicated in as well. Put differently: formal therapy is designed such that the thera-
pist is neither available for transferential having, nor is the goodness of their intimate in-
telligibility—embedded in the recesses of their own self-knowledge and strictly distin-
guishable from any didactic data that they impart to the patient—intended to be available 
as a means for therapeutic sublimation.  
But surely this is not the case for all human relationships. For instance, one can 
easily imagine many different instances of human friendship in which acts of transference 
are not only elicited by the dependent vulnerability experienced in friendship, but also 
thereby make possible therapeutic effects that can be caused by the redounding of ration-
al affections to the lower appetites based upon coming to know and love the intimate in-
telligibility of another person through the mutual practices of self-narration, listening, and 
the interpersonal bond between knower and known that thereby arises. For in and through 
this type of vulnerable sharing each friend, as Aristotle writes, “shows [herself] to each as 
loveable and is [then] trusted.”88 Here we have a kind of “therapy” that depends not on 
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apprehending knowledge of oneself, but rather in knowing and loving the intelligible 
goodness of another.  
Even though this intersection between transference and the therapeutic effect of 
an intelligible good can definitely occur in any form of friendship, it is likely to be espe-
cially prominent—both promisingly and perilously—in the context of romantic/erotic 
relationships in which the prevalence of intense physical pleasures are added into a con-
text already defined by dependent vulnerability. The result is the constitution of a type of 
relationship, as Freud so brilliantly observed, that is particularly ripe for transference (e.g. 
the quixotic fantasy of “falling in love”) and its quickly ramifying and ambivalent trans-
ferential affections (e.g. I love/hate/desire/am pained by you). Even though we do not 
have the space to expand on the insight at the moment, there is a deep theology of mar-
riage to be developed right at this juncture. For in and through the long-term “space” of 
marriage the beauty of a genuinely common work, a gemeinsamer Arbeit to reappropriate 
Freud’s apt description,89 can gradually be nurtured in which each partner has the oppor-
tunity to therapeutically clear away the fantastical mists emanating from their own inevi-
table transferential projections in the process of coming to know and love the real intelli-
gible goodness of this particular person, in all their complexity and “intimate harmony,”90 
over the course of a lifetime together. 
Lastly, raising the possibility of an external good having sublimatory effects upon 
an individual connects up with a question that an astute reader might inquire about at this 
juncture: does the intellectual powers’ therapeutic dominion over the identifying layer of 
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the soul have any relevance to the egoic act itself and the sensing body with which we 
thereby identify as “ourselves”? Our answer to this question might run like this: if one of 
the decisive therapeutic routes that intelligence can forge vis-à-vis our identificato-
ry/transferential bonds occurs in isolating the intrinsic ideality involved in our transferen-
tial desire and the painful “death” that each of them suffers given the conditions of reali-
ty, then the climax of this line of inquiry will come in grappling with the inevitable death 
of one’s own sensing body and therefore our egoic self-consciousness as well. In this 
sense, the vertical dynamic between intelligence and identification ends up raising one of 
the questions at the heart of Christian theology, the themes of which to which now turn: 
is there a higher good, something even more “general and lasting,” to hope for if our bod-
ies, and the active ideality of our egoic identification with them, will inescapably perish 
as well?  
b. Intensive Unities, the Imago Dei and Desire’s Unifying Ascent Back to God 
For some readers it may seem odd after such a deep exegetical and constructive dive into 
Freud’s metapsychology that we should conclude here with an explicit return to a set of 
theological themes that we first encountered in Schleiermacher’s approach to self-
consciousness in the Introduction and then expounded upon at length in our chapter-
length readings of Augustine (Chapter 1) and Aquinas (Chapters 2 and 3) in order to in-
tegrate our account of identification, self-consciousness, and transference with that over-
arching theological framework. After all, for Freud himself the question of God seems to 
have an obvious regressive and fantastical relation to the kind of infantile dramas the de-
cisive importance of which we have endorsed in our own way as well. As Freud famously 
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declared in Civilization and Its Discontents (1929/30) regarding the supposed infantile 
origins of the belief in a providentially good God: 
The common man cannot imagine this Providence otherwise than in the figure of 
an enormously exalted father. Only such a being can understand the needs of the 
children of men and be softened by their prayers and placated by the signs of their 
remorse. The whole thing is so patently infantile, so foreign to reality, that to any-
one with a friendly attitude to humanity it is painful to think that the great majori-
ty of mortals will never be able to rise above this view of life.91 
 
Given our explicit purposes for taking up and appropriating Freud, we simply do not have 
the space to trace in detail the logical fallacies that drive Freud (and many after him, in-
cluding Kristeva) to consider this argument to be so self-evident in its persuasiveness. 
Moreover the topic has been taken up by others ably and often.92 For our part, as we turn 
our attention fully to our framing theological sources one last time, what we can simply 
note here is that there is a strong inverted overlap between how Freud and, for instance, 
Augustine/Aquinas view the “God”-world relation that is of some import for how we 
have chosen to resource both intellectual traditions in a single constructive project. For 
Freud, any phylogenetic link between our infantile desires and our desire for God neces-
sarily indicates that the latter is “foreign to reality.” For Augustine and Aquinas, on the 
other hand, the same observation would simply signal another unsurprising sign that the 
very ordering of reality as it truly is, even down to the intimate ordering of each individ-
ual’s unconscious “prehistory,” deficiently reflects the eternal nature of its Creator. 
Whereas Freudians consider this proposed link between our temporal loves and the eter-
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nity of divine love to be deeply suspicious, Augustinians and Thomists would find it 
equally suspicious—perhaps even despairingly so—if reality was not vertically ordered 
as a sequence of loves that have a discernible (i.e. intelligible) relation to one another. For 
my part, I simply find the cumulative explanatory evidence, much of which we enumer-
ated in the first three chapters, too strong not to cast our intellectual lot, holistically con-
sidered to include the gracious apprehensions of faith, in with Augustine and Aquinas 
and, as a result, to continue to allow their theological framework to fruitfully guide our 
reading, translation, and appropriation of Freud’s anthropological insights accordingly.  
 When we turn back to this overarching theological framework for rendering the 
God-world relation in the wake of our constructive accounts of identification, self-
consciousness, and transference, the immediate question that arises is a familiar one for 
an Augustinian or a Thomist: is there anything in God’s triune and eternal simplicity that 
could be considered as an eminent perfection of the identifying powers? Given identifica-
tion’s place in the soul “beneath” the intelligent powers, the most promising explanatory 
route for answering this question is reminiscent of how Aquinas denies (relatively obvi-
ously) that there is anything literally akin to sensitive powers in God, even while affirm-
ing that creation’s sensible forms are eminently grounded in God’s essence. Thus, in cre-
ation there is a division between universal intelligible forms and their contingent actual-
ization in enmattered (i.e. sensible) particulars that parallels the nature of human intelli-
gence that illuminates the intelligible species in and through sensitively received phan-
tasms, whereas in God there is only the supreme unity of the divine essence that is the 
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eminent formal cause and “active principle”93 of all created things. Hence there is no 
“need” for senses in God for God always already knows all things—“not only in the uni-
versal, but also in the singular”94—by simply knowing God’s own essence. 
 When placed within this explanatory context, what immediately becomes clear is 
that identification has a vertically analogous position to sensitivity vis-à-vis the exitus-
reditus structure of creation and its correspondingly metaphysically deficient similitude 
to its Creator. If sensitivity furnishes the non-intelligent basis for knowing external things 
intelligently, then the egoic act of identification furnishes the other required non-
intelligent relata, the pre-reflective wholeness of self-consciousness as a fourth type of 
intensive unity, that opens up the “space” that intelligence then vertically bridges in the 
higher union between knower and known. In this regard, the identifying powers are an-
other layer (literally) of God’s providential ordering of creation into a metaphysically de-
ficient realm governed by that which is foreign to God, strictly speaking, but nonetheless 
is eminently present in the purus actus of the divine essence, i.e. potencies and the con-
tingent actualization of those created potencies via the mediation of forms.  
 More specifically, as several aspects of this chapter have already suggested, iden-
tification and identificatory forms stand between sensitive and intelligible forms as the 
linchpin that in the egoic act launches an individual into the highest level of desire’s uni-
fying ascent back to God in a manner that deficiently incorporates the metaphysi-
cal/divine superiority of self-knowledge into that ascent and yet reinforces humanity’s 
native extroversion such that the vertical telos of desire is found, not in any act of self-
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reflection, but only in an extroverted union with God “face-to-face.” In other words, the 
pre-reflective egoic act stands in as a created similitude of God’s eternal reflective self-
unity as the intensive wholeness necessary to get human intelligence “off the ground,” so 
to speak, and into the extroverted, self-differentiated space required for its own deficient 
acts of understanding. Such a division between an initial pre-reflective, but nonetheless 
still self-differentiated, wholeness is unnecessary—to return again to Aquinas’s hierarchy 
of intelligent life enumerated in Chapter 2—for either God or angelic beings because all 
of their intelligent knowledge really does come from the reflective “within:” God’s 
through the divine essence and angels’ through the intelligible species natively “im-
pressed”95 upon their minds by the Creator. In human intelligence, however, as Aquinas 
(via Aristotle) rightly insists pace Augustine (and, as we have extended the point vis-à-
vis modern figures such as Kant and Fichte), there is no primal intelligent knowledge at 
all (of self, world, or God) always already immanent within a human individual. Instead, 
this lowest form of intelligence “take[s] the first beginning of its knowledge from without 
[ab extrinseco]”96 as the active intellect “throws light”97 on sensitive phantasms, moves 
the passive intellect to its acts of understanding/judgment, and thereby provides the basis 
on which the intellect can then pivot “inward” in reflection for the first time. As I have 
argued repeatedly, without identification’s egoic act, and the pre-reflective self-
consciousness that is its term, none of this would be possible; “we” would only be undif-
ferentiated fluxes of phenomenal consciousness.  
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 A very similar point regarding the role of identification in creation can be articu-
lated in something of an Augustinian/Thomist homage to some of Schleiermacher’s sem-
inal theological insights. The heights of a human existence in which self-consciousness 
and intelligence are simultaneously active are strictly and “absolutely dependent” upon 
two acts—coincident with the first two types of intensive unity—that we so often take for 
granted “later on,” but in relation to which every self-conscious and intelligent “I” is 
purely receptive. The first, the actuality of the soul in an enmattered body “which has life 
potentially,” 98 accounts for our existence as a living being simpliciter. The second, the 
egoic act with which we pre-reflectively identify with that enmattered body as “me,” ac-
counts for our existence as a self-differentiated living being that has its intellectual pow-
ers unleashed vis-à-vis “everything else.” Together these two acts constitute the provi-
dentially ordered instrumental causes, the divine interior intimo meo, of our open-ended 
self-conscious and intelligence existence, the contingent “whence of our receptive and 
active existence”99 that propels us toward the divinely eternal whence (exitus) and whither 
(reditus) of all of creation’s derivative causality. These two acts are related to one another 
in the created order as forging two lower-level intensive unities within an individual (viz. 
Schleiermacher’s “abiding-in-self”), the first (i.e. the soul) constitutive of an individual’s 
ontological unity and the second (i.e. the egoic act) as a self-conscious subject. Together 
these lower-level intensive unities furnish the necessary conditions for intelligently 
knowing and loving external things, reflecting upon ourselves and thus forging self-
knowledge, and—finally—the highest level of intensive unity possible for a human be-
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ing: that which will teleologically redound to every layer of the soul in an intelligent un-
ion with God “face-to-face.” For in that most ecstatic epistemic “passing-beyond-self” a 
perfectly vertically aligned “abiding-in-self” will finally be actualized—i.e. made “re-
al”—in us as the eschatological fulfillment of the imago Dei: “[W]e shall be like him be-
cause we shall see him as he is.”100 
   But, we might finally reasonably ask, what about transference? When evaluated 
from within the principled ordering of creation, what is “good” about the mnemic struc-
ture of transference? Why might God create a world in which the ideality and derivative 
ambivalence of our infantile loves/pleasures/hates/pains are unconsciously repeated and 
multiplied in our post-egoic lives? Moreover, what are we to make of the infantile depri-
vations at the heart of these primal identificatory bonds and their seeming dissonance 
with the intrinsic fluctuations of created reality as we continue to encounter it? To ask 
questions like these is inevitably to find ourselves in the knotty context of theological 
themes such as evil, sin, and grace that we have, as I signaled at the outset in the Intro-
duction, for the most part bracketed in the course of our study, not for any reason of 
nervous avoidance or trepidation, but only for the sake of brevity and analytical clarity 
given the wide-range of problems already involved in tackling the anthropological riddles 
that we have investigated. 
Nonetheless, even amidst all the times in which either our infantile deprivations 
are exacerbated by parental sinfulness or we sinfully consent to actions that are grounded 
in appetitive impulses elicited by our unconscious transferences, I still do not think that 
                                                
100 1 Jn. 3.2 and Augustine, trin. XII.22, XIV.25, and XV.21. 
  
  440 
we are completely at a loss for deciphering a dint of the Creator’s intended goodness in 
including the identifying powers in the human soul. According to Aquinas, there are two 
types of evils evident in creation: natural and moral. Both evils find their basic definition 
in the “absence of the good, which is natural and due to a thing.”101 Their difference, 
however, is significant for understanding the experience of different types of evil in a 
world made by and resembling an all-good and all-powerful God. Moral evil, which is 
exclusive to creatures with a will, entails that a human being who volitionally chooses an 
act ordered to a last end other than God thereby “becomes evil”102 herself inasmuch as she 
thereby habitually separates herself from her own highest good, the (divine) good itself. 
These instances of evil are not, strictly speaking, caused directly by God.103 Rather, they 
are efficiently caused by the free-will of the agent, which is itself a good not an evil, cre-
ated by God.104 Natural evils, on the other hand, result from either the failure of a being’s 
natural powers (e.g. blindness) or the inevitable contingent conflicts between the relative 
goodness of living beings, inanimate things, and/or other natural phenomena. God is the 
cause of this evil, but only in the sense that the participated goodness of creation is such 
that, unlike God, finitely good things with a secondary causality of their own can, and in 
fact sometimes do, fail in their divinely intended goodness105 and, unlike in the eternal 
simplicity of the divine essence, different finite goods can, and in fact do, come into con-
flict with one another. In this type of evil, neither the victim of failure, nor the parties of a 
conflict between genuine goods, are necessarily “evil” per se or thereby made evil. How-
                                                
101 Aquinas, ST I.49.1. 
102 Ibid., I.48.6. 
103 Ibid., I.49.2. 
104 Ibid., I.49.1. 
105 Cf. Ibid., I.48.2. 
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ever, they may, and often in fact do, experience the pain (poena) of being deprived (mo-
mentarily or permanently) of a good that is natural to them. Some of Aquinas’s stock ex-
amples of natural evils include: the accidental or congenital corruption of a natural power 
(e.g. blindness), the corruption of air (or wood) by fire, and/or the lion’s killing of an ass.   
For our purposes here, one of the most salient aspects of Aquinas’s notion of nat-
ural evils, especially those that arise from a conflict between the relevant goods of differ-
ing beings, is that he insists that it is possible, even necessary, to vindicate the genuine 
goodness of the created order in the face of these evils on the basis of a metaphysical 
concept has proven to be pivotal throughout the length of our study: vertical finality. 
Thus, to take one of the examples cited above, the lion’s killing of the ass, while obvious-
ly an evil for the ass, nonetheless serves the higher good of the lion’s health. Even though 
Aquinas most often applies this vertical finality of natural evils to visible, external con-
flicts between different natural beings or phenomena, there is a strong sense in which 
something very similar can found in the tensions that necessarily occur between the dif-
ferent natural principles of operation found in each layer of the soul and a creature’s de-
rivative intentional states of pain (dolor) and/or sorrow (tristia). Accordingly, there is a 
natural tension between, on the one hand, the respective, horizontal, political autonomy 
of these powers vis-à-vis one another and, on the other hand, their collective vertical fi-
nality in relation to intelligence. Thus, for instance, something can be a natural good for 
the sensitive appetite (e.g. food, drink, sex)—and produce contingent, “horizontal” affec-
tions of love/desire—and yet from the vertical perspective of the will’s natural principles 
pertaining to the last end be judged in a particular instance to be an evil. Despite their ul-
  
  442 
timate vertical telos of alignment with one another, under the conditions of a creation le-
gitimately populated by finite goods that will rightly appeal to the sensitive appetite the 
absence of that sensitive good will register in the interim as the painful absence of a de-
sired good. Nonetheless, that natural evil ultimately serves the higher good(s) desired by 
intelligence. 
My argument for the created place of the identifying powers’ intrinsic ideality is 
that their providential goodness can be found in that they seem to be necessary for devel-
opmentally structuring an intelligent form of life with a stable, but non-intelligent, inten-
sive wholeness (i.e. self-consciousness) borne from apprehensive powers that nonetheless 
have a natural extroverted quality to them that mimics that of the external senses (on a 
lower level) and of the intellect (on a higher level). Could God have created a world in 
which human beings identified with the finite bounds of their bodies—and thus were 
genuinely primally egoic—from birth onward? It seems likely, at least from a theoretical 
standpoint.  
The question, however, is what higher good might have been sacrificed in a theo-
retical creation such as that one. Given the entire explanatory framework developed 
above, the most obvious experience that would be absent from our lives under these theo-
retical conditions for creation would be the profoundly moving sense in which our later, 
post-egoic loves/pleasures are somehow enhanced, especially when moderated and di-
rected intelligently, by the archaic traces of our infantile loves/pleasures as reawakened 
and multiplied under the conditions of transference. If Freud is right on this particular 
matter, and I think he is, without the developmental gap between the maternal body and 
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the solidifying of the egoic act, it would be hard to imagine either the human phenome-
non of “falling in love,” along with all of its cultural, aesthetic, philosophical, and theo-
logical domains of meaning, or the vertical capacity for intelligible goods to sublimatori-
ly incorporate and heal past bonds into a future trajectory defined by the higher pleas-
ures/joys furnished by the intellect. Both of these significant realms of human experience 
and appetitive complexity/intensity depend on a natural developmental pattern through 
which the native extroversion of our identifying faculty, especially when combined with 
the lasting influence of the maternal, choric space with which we all first identified, as-
sumes a primal habituation of bonds whose ideality are associated with beings who are—
ontologically speaking—outside of what we later come to identify with and (even later) 
know as “ourselves.”  
Perhaps we could even express this in another, more theological, way. The higher 
good that is produced in the developmental interlude between identifying with the mater-
nal body and identifying with our own sensing bodies can be named as a kind of inverse 
participationism that accrues to our lives because of it. If creation itself is structured as a 
realm whose deficient goods derivatively participate in God’s goodness and the intelli-
gent creatures in that realm are on an assent of desire “back” to this Creator, then what 
we find in the realm of transferential desire is a kind of inverted echo of that overarching 
intelligent ascent. In this contingently formed drama of transferential desire, our emer-
gence out of the maternal body gives birth to an open-ended ramification of that singular 
pleasure such that our present and future loves can formally participate through transfer-
ence in our past, and even most archaic, loves. There is an undeniable goodness in that 
  
  444 
inverted participationism that gives a special dignity to the maternal body, and in addition 
to the vocations of all parental figures, as bearing a unique similitude to the Creator’s re-
lation to creation: from this whence we all came to be before we even knew ourselves as 
ourselves.  
In this regard, the ultimate dignity of the maternal body is found in that this con-
tingent exitus—and the numerous desires and pleasures that flow from it—finds its true 
reditus, its most intense transferential amplification and sublimatory convergence, in the 
vertically eminent good of the Creator from whom its dignity is given and to whom it 
bears witness. For the creation of a power in the soul whose natural principles exude an 
ideality for a wholeness that is “always there” stands in its own way as a lower-level ver-
sion of the intellectual powers’ natural straining towards an intelligible good that cannot 
be “found here” in creation per se, but can be foretasted in its penultimate truths, espe-
cially those graciously given in the inward apprehensions of faith. In other words, the de-
velopmental gap between the maternal body and the dawn of the egoic act will necessari-
ly issue forth in painful cries indicative of the horizontal absence of a good for which 
they were naturally created and in relation to which the finite goodness of every parental 
figure will inevitably fall short. In the short-term, that cry will be satisfied in the intensive 
wholeness of the sensing body in an act that founds the self-conscious subject. Nonethe-
less, that developmental gap simultaneously furnishes a cry for something extrovertedly 
whole that cannot be satisfied merely horizontally by the egoic self and the fragile, per-
ishable body upon which it is founded. For in these cries, there is articulated a deficient 
longing for a divine eternity—for something that is “always there”—the effects of which 
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have always been interiores intimis nobis and that genuinely lies ahead as our highest 
good and joy: in the intensive, sublimated perfection that redounds to a resurrected body 
extrovertedly united to God for all of eternity. For in relation to this eternal God we are 
all absolutely dependently vulnerable and from this same Creator the gift of every good 
pleasure flows, the greatest of which is the divine essence itself.   
IV. Conclusion 
 
In this chapter I have drawn together the three constructive threads that remained. Most 
centrally, I have set forth a proposal regarding the origins of self-consciousness in an 
egoic act of identification that slowly condenses around “our” sensing bodies following 
the post-partum disruption of our archaic identification with the maternal body. In setting 
out this proposal, I also demonstrated how this theorization successfully eludes the circu-
lar pitfalls of the reflection theory, even as it accounts many of the experiential phenome-
na regarding the synthetic structuration of self-consciousness as seminally described by 
the observations of modern figures such as Kant, Fichte, Hölderlin/Novalis, and Schlei-
ermacher, by insisting that intelligent reflection is only possible on the basis of the pre-
ceding, pre-reflective wholeness furnished by the egoic act. I then extended this proposal, 
secondly, in order to explain the post-egoic, post-objectal phenomena of transference and 
the ego-ideal as acts of the identifying faculty’s memorative power within the self-
differentiated “space” opened up by the ongoing vertical relation between the egoic act 
and the higher operations of intelligence such as the will’s desire to know and the intel-
lect’s apprehension of objects qua objects.  
  
  446 
Lastly, I turned to integrate this proposed link between identification and the ego-
ic act with the overarching metaphysical and theological conviction regarding the vertical 
finality of intelligence as that through which all the other powers of the soul can be di-
rected to their perfection. This perfection, so I have argued, is penultimately found in the 
alignment of the soul’s powers with reason’s political and therapeutic dominion. Ulti-
mately, however, this perfection can only be found in union with God as the climax of a 
drama of desire enacted through the various movements of desire/appetite that irrigate 
our lives with loves, desires, and pleasures (and all of their hated and painful absences 
and opposites). Within the penultimate course of that drama of desire, I finally situated 
egoic self-consciousness as a fourth type of intensive unity that, together with the primal 
unity of existence furnished by our soul, vertically grounds the higher intensive unities of 
self-knowledge and the teleological alignment of our appetites. On this basis, I also con-
cluded that in the ultimate scope of our ascent of desire “back” to the Creator, the combi-
nation of identification’s natural ideality and the habitual ramifications of our archaic fu-
sion with the maternal body serves to propel us vertically toward our final union with a 
God in whom there is, quite literally, infinitely more to know and love than we could ever 
find by merely reflecting upon ourselves. 
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Conclusion 
The Theological Frontiers of Identification 
The aim of this dissertation has been to offer a reframed, non-reflective account of egoic 
self-consciousness—its origin, theological significance, and relation to fundamental hu-
man capacities such as desire and knowledge—by synthesizing the combined anthropo-
logical insights of Augustine, Aquinas, and Freud. I have just concluded by constructive-
ly arguing that self-consciousness gradually arises as we progress from identifying with 
our infantile bonds (e.g. the maternal body and parental imagos) to identifying with our 
sensing bodies as that which we later intelligently signify as “me.” Furthermore, I also 
situated the resulting pre-reflective wholeness within a theologically-informed typology 
of four different intensive unities that tie together human existence and deficiently re-
semble the eminence of God’s simplicity in different ways: (1) the primal unity of the 
soul, (2) the egoic unity of self-consciousness, (3) the epistemic unity of reflective self-
knowledge, and (4) the teleological unity of vertically aligned appetites. 
 Given the long road we have traveled, how shall I conclude? There are a number 
of options that present themselves. For instance, I could offer one last summary of the 
overarching argument stretching from the Kant/Schleiermacher genealogy, to Augustine, 
to Aquinas, and then to Freud. However, that would seem slightly redundant because the 
summative structure of Chapter 5 already necessitated repeating all the major rhetorical 
moves that established its foundation. Another option might be to haphazardly try to tie 
up some of the open-ended questions regarding identification that I bracketed above (e.g. 
its relationship to non-rational animals or its metaphysical relationship to materiality) for 
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the sake of setting out its prima facie explanatory relevance vis-à-vis a number of phe-
nomena that have rarely been integrated into a single theological anthropology (e.g. self-
consciousness, the unconsciousness of infantile/regressive desire, and the therapeutic ef-
fects of intelligence). Still, any attempt at even a suggestive return to these questions 
would likely fail to do justice to their complexity and the detail that they require in order 
to address them adequately. 
 Instead, what I would like to do here is to note very briefly three specifically theo-
logical fronts on which I think the concept of identification and its corresponding forms 
of desire are positioned to make constructive contributions. As I referenced in the Intro-
duction, one of the motivating impulses behind this project was an increasing frustration I 
experienced in witnessing the conceptual incoherence that so often arises in contempo-
rary theological conversations when we try to make constructive theological, pastoral, 
and moral judgments without possessing a maximally coherent theological anthropology 
on which to base such reasoning and reflection. The preceding proposal has attempted to 
make progress in terms of the basic task of establishing such a fundamental anthropologi-
cal framework. Accordingly, by outlining these three theological fronts I am looping back 
in order to state where I think the most clarifying derivative reasoning and judgment 
might take place in the future. Concisely stated, these three theological fronts are: (1) 
modernity’s “infinite” pursuit of knowledge and its relation to the individual; (2) sexual 
desire’s theological relationship to other goods; and (3) feminist concerns regarding how 
creation, salvation and gendered God-talk are analogically related.  
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I. Modernity’s “Infinite” Pursuit of Knowledge and Its Relation to the Individual 
 
According to a number of convincing accounts, one of the quintessential marks of mo-
dernity’s emergence was what has been called the “infinitization of the medieval cos-
mos.”1 Whereas the medieval cosmos was defined by a theologically-influenced and hier-
archically-ordered epistemology/ontology that supposedly pinpointed the finite bounda-
ries of knowledge, in the modern world following the Copernican revolution there oc-
curred a shift toward affirming what Elizabeth Brient has superbly called the “extensive” 
and “intensive” infinity of human knowledge. Extensively, people rapidly began to con-
sider the advancement of human knowledge as directly analogous to the newly reoriented 
(i.e. non-geocentric) universe: infinitely expanding in scope. Intensively, each individual 
quickly began to be considered as infinitely rich in themselves and thus irreducible to the 
universalizing assumptions of any metaphysical hierarchy (e.g. the exitus-reditus scheme) 
that affirms the epistemological primacy of all beings as originally, ontologically, and 
teleologically analogous to one another.  
 As a matter of genealogical interest, this two-fold observation goes a long way to 
explain Western culture’s strange authoritarian mix of endless scientific/technological 
progress as our defining corporate narrative (i.e. extensive infinity) and the ideals of self-
expression and atomistic freedom as that which guards the sacred status of each individu-
al’s uniqueness (i.e. intensive infinity). Theologically, however, there are of course good 
reasons to wonder about the long-term effects of this particular ideological conjunction. 
Most pivotally, both emphases seem to intrinsically and systematically exclude God—
                                                
1 Brient, The Immanence of the Infinite, 145. Cf. Brient’s collected sources, especially her dependence upon 
Hans Blumenberg.  
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and even talk about God—as the one in whom the corporate pursuit of knowledge and 
the intensive richness of each individual converge into a common telos and measure. The 
pursuit of knowledge is not endless, even though it is—in a different sense—infinite; it 
ends in the infinity of God. Nor is every individual endlessly unique; lest we aid and abet 
a debilitating loneliness in isolation from one another and the God who has always al-
ready known and loved us. Furthermore, this concern is far from simply a matter for in-
tellectual debate. For if Augustine and Aquinas are right that all of our natural desires 
flourish when they are aimed at God as their last end, then we will have every reason to 
suspect that the impressive frenzy that results from these deeply modern cultural impulses 
will also end up leaving real people plagued by an “uncanny sense of homelessness and 
orientationlessness in the newly infinitized universe.”2 
 In the midst of lodging such a critique, however, identification opens up a promis-
ing space in which to meaningfully retrieve modernity’s concern for the individual’s in-
tensive richness. It does so by naming a God-created capacity that accounts for how the 
most decisive contingent events/relationships/tragedies/pleasures from our lives really do 
end up defining us in irreducibly unique ways. Nonetheless, identification is able to inte-
grate this concern within a theological anthropology—not to mention hopefully real 
communities committed to its therapeutic embodiment—that insists that such contingent 
richness will eventually lose its luster the more that individuals’ self-expressive mono-
logues are allowed to fragment because of their alienation from the unifying effects of a 
truth that is larger than themselves. Instead, identification serves to affirm the constitutive 
                                                
2 Ibid., 250.  
  
  451 
dignity of each person’s story, in all of its mixed up anguish and joy, even while stead-
fastly maintaining that the deepest truth of all of our stories is found on a road in which 
the extensiveness of the universe and intensiveness of each life intersect in the eternal 
singularity of God.  
II. Sexual Desire’s Theological Relationship to Other Goods 
 
Sex is, of course, a much vexed theme in Christian theology. This is true both throughout 
its history and now in many different fronts of contemporary debate. One of the main 
sources of vexation stems from a deep inclination in Christian theology—which can cer-
tainly be traced to Augustine’s outsized influence, but also goes all the way back to 
Scripture—to suspect that there is something about sexual desire that particularly predis-
poses its impulses to carrying us away from seeking God as our highest good. In its worst 
variations, this inclination has resulted in the degradation of sexual desire in general, the 
suspicion that it has no goodness outside of simply being “controlled,” and the marginali-
zation of countless people who dared to question the condemnation that silenced sexual 
impulses into the isolated shadows of shame. In its best variations, however, this inclina-
tion has structurally cultivated two questions vis-à-vis anyone trying to formulate a con-
structive theology of sexual desire: (1) is there something about sexual impulses that 
makes them “more than” simply a seemingly straightforward matter of attraction that 
could help explain any extra influence that sexual desire has upon the overall course of 
our ascent of desire? and (2) how can we formulate the created goodness of sexual desire 
in terms of its holistic relation to other goods and ends with which it seems to have at 
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least some horizontal and vertical connection (e.g. marriage, children, the desire to know, 
the desire for God)? 
 Theologically speaking, the decisive contribution that identification makes is that 
it allows us to revisit the first question armed with Freud’s insights regarding the uncon-
scious origins of many sexual impulses in a manner that nonetheless still allows us to 
successfully answer the second question productively.3 If it is the case that many, if not 
all, sexual impulses are regressively and unconsciously amplified by repetitions of identi-
fication’s past ideality, then there arises a rather urgent theological/pastoral/ecclesial con-
cern to formulate accounts of sexual desire that do not depend on the assumption that the 
created goods of sexual acts can easily be made transparent by any of us on the illusory 
basis of self-analysis and self-dominion alone. At least on this need to place a question 
mark over the cause of any contemporaneous sexual impulse, Freud and Augustine agree. 
Where our Augustinian/Thomist account of identification differs from Freud, however, is 
in its capacity to resituate this complexity of sexual desire in relation to higher goods—
especially, as I have suggested above, Christian marriage understood as a kind of embod-
ied therapy—in which the unconscious amplifications of identification find vertical ends 
beyond their own horizontal tendency to merely repeat themselves over and over again.   
III. Feminist Concerns Regarding Creation, Salvation and Gendered God-Talk  
 
Over the last thirty years, feminist theologians have prompted deep reflection regarding 
how Christian theology has perpetuated systemic misogyny by excluding any maternal 
metaphors in the mainlines of its gendered God-talk. In addition to drawing attention to 
                                                
3 This is, of course, in contrast to Freud, who would consider the second question of no value because all of 
these other “goods” are ultimately and absolutely reducible to sexual desire’s fantasies. 
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the Scriptural and historical prominence of naming God as “Father” and referring to 
“him” exclusively through the employment of masculine pronouns, these criticisms have 
also clustered around the tendency for the intellectualist analogy of God as a divine 
“mind” to reinforce a masculinist mind/body dualism that denigrates bodies in general 
and the maternal body in particular. For example, this tendency has manifested itself in 
doctrinal accounts of creation that have suppressed maternal analogies for creation’s em-
anation from God in favor of masculinist portrayals of creation as technological produc-
tion4 and descriptions of salvation that juxtapose mind/body by stressing the need to 
simply “control” the body’s desires.5  
 In relation to this overall problem, the centrality that our account of identification 
accords to the maternal body—and the derivative/ramified desires that flow from our ar-
chaic identification with it—opens up two routes for constructive engagement that are 
especially promising. First, our positioning of identification in a vertical relation to both 
sensitivity and intelligence raises the pivotal question as to whether many of the above 
criticisms too quickly bypass “traditional” resources for affirming a much more positive 
account of the mind/body relation than has often been presented by many feminist critics. 
                                                
4 E.g., Sallie McFague, The Body of God: An Ecological Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), 
151-59. 
5 Two of the more pointed theological versions of this feminist critique of “masculinist” reason can be 
found in the voices of Rosemary Radford Reuther and Catherine Keller: Rosemary Radford Ruether, 
Sexism and God-talk: Toward a Feminist Theology (Boston: Beacon Press, 1983); Catherine Keller, From 
a Broken Web: Separation, Sexism, and Self (Boston: Beacon Press, 1986) and Face of the Deep: A 
Theology of Becoming (New York: Routledge, 2003). More recently, Wendy Farley, Eugene Rogers, and 
Sarah Coakley have furnished theologies of desire and the gendered body that, in my judgment, move in a 
more balanced and nuanced direction: Eugene F. Rogers, Sexuality and the Christian Body: Their Way into 
the Triune God, Challenges in Contemporary Theology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999); Sarah Coakley, God, 
Sexuality, and the Self: An Essay ‘On the Trinity’ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); and 
Wendy Farley, The Wounding and Healing of Desire: Weaving Heaven and Earth (Louisville: Westminster 
John Knox Press, 2005).  
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Furthermore, there are good—even deeply pastoral—reasons to reposition the vertical 
preeminence of the intellect and the will as truth-apprehending and self-ordering powers 
that, when rightly understood, are intrinsically necessary for many of the liberative ends 
so central to many feminist theologies. For it is impossible to either speak truth to miso-
gynistic violence or apply healing balm to the wounded bodies/desires of its victims 
without the illuminating light of the intellect and the therapeutic effects of the will.  
 Second, the central positioning that identification accords the maternal body as a 
similitude to God’s own relation to creation suggests the outline of a way to reconstrue 
the analogical connection between gendered God-talk and the nature of creation and sal-
vation.6 To be sure, such a reconstrual begins with the rather obvious analogical affini-
ty—that we affirmed in several ways in Chapter 5—between creation’s exitus from God 
and the contingent birth of each one us from our mothers. For in both cases, each of these 
births simultaneously give rise to desires that have their origins in an impulse to return to 
the absolute whence of our lives. Even more intriguingly, however, the vertical and ther-
apeutic role of intelligence in sublimatorily providing a vertical “way out” of identifica-
tion’s horizontal repetitions is, and this point is virtually undeniable, almost classically 
“paternal” from a psychoanalytic perspective. For the psychoanalytic paternal-function 
always serves to call us “out of” the maternal/familial fusions of infancy and into the 
“higher/wider” realms of culture, language, and “the law.” Such a potential rapproche-
ment might no doubt seem counter-productive and/or anxiety-producing to many feminist 
theologians. Nonetheless, it certainly seems worth inquiring: what if this paternal “calling 
                                                
6 I owe the crystallization of this insight to a conversation with Jared Bangs.  
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out” ultimately points us toward a reditus with a divine maternality from whom we origi-
nally made our exitus and in whom the paternal/maternal-functions find their analogical 
eminence? For in the unity of this divine activity, creation and salvation are tied together 
into a single and teleologically-ordered whole. 
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